PAN-AMERICANISM 


ROLAND-  G- USHER 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  Of  CALIFORNIA 
RIVERSIDE 


PAN-AMERICANISM 


\0lt\7- 

PAN-AMERICANISM 

A  FORECAST  OF  THE  INEVITABLE  CLASH 

BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES 

AND  EUROPE'S  VICTOR 

BY 
ROLAND  CRUSHER,  PH.D. 

PROFESSOR    OF   HISTORY,    WASHINGTON    UNIVERSITY,    ST.    LOUIS 
AUTHOR  OF  "  PAN-GERMANISM,"  "  THE  RISE  OF  THE  AMERICAN  PEOPLE,"  ETC. 


NEW  YORK 
THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1915 


3X1416 
U7 


COPYRIGHT,  1915,  BY 
THE    CENTURY   CO. 


Published,  March,  1915 


Co 

THE   MEMORY   OF 

MY  GRANDFATHER 

WHOSE   NAME   I   BEAR 

Co 
THE  LITTLE  SON 

WHO   BEARS   MINE 

FROM  THE  LIVING   TO  THE   DEAD 
FROM  THE   PRESENT  TO  THE   FUTURE 


PREFACE 

I  HAVE  sought  to  make  as  clear  as  possible 
within  the  confines  of  a  brief  volume  the 
relation  of  the  United  States  to  the  present 
European  situation  and  to  the  probable  or  possible 
crisis  which  the  end  of  the  war  may  precipitate. 
With  past  history  and  diplomacy,  with  strategy 
and  geography,  I  have  dealt  where  it  seemed  to 
me  essential  to  view  present  factors  in  their  historic 
relationships;  but  the  major  part  of  the  volume 
has  been  devoted  to  the  present  condition  of  the 
United  States  and  of  Latin  America,  with  especial 
attention  to  Pan-Americanism  as  a  possible  solu- 
tion of  American  problems.  I  have  not  scrupled 
to  examine  hypotheses  about  the  future,  to  com- 
pare the  probable  results  of  policies,  and  discuss 
remote  possibilities  of  war  and  conquest.  The 
formulation  of  a  national  decision  in  regard  to  the 
interests  to  be  furthered  and  the  policies  best 
adapted  to  that  end  can  result  only  from  an  active 
interchange  of  opinions  between  the  different 
sections  and  interests  in  the  nation  and  fairly 

vii 


PREFACE 

demands  argument  about  past  history  and  present 
factors. 

To  analyze,  to  discuss,  and  to  examine  has 
therefore  been  my  province  and  I  have  left  ad- 
vocacy and  proselytizing  for  those  who  will  draw 
conclusions  from  the  body  of  ascertained  facts  I 
have  done  my  best  to  gather.  I  hold  no  brief 
myself  for  armament  or  disarmament,  for  England, 
Germany,  or  Latin  America,  for  expansion  or 
imperialism.  To  treat  so  vital  and  controversial 
a  subject  objectively  and  with  detachment;  to 
give  the  reader  perspective  as  well  as  information, 
a  brief  statement  of  jarring  opinions  and  suggested 
solutions;  this  has  been  my  object.  Naturally, 
many  of  these  views  set  off  against  each  other  are 
contradictory  and  I  beg  my  readers  not  to  tax  me 
with  inconsistency  until  they  are  sure  that  the 
statements  they  are  comparing  are  intended  to 
represent  my  own  ideas.  I  have  ventured  to 
suggest  in  Book  IV  a  reading  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  which  seems  to  me  to  harmonize  its 
apparent  inconsistencies  and  (what  is  of  more 
consequence)  permits  us  to  act  to-day  in  accord- 
ance with  the  dictates  of  present  expediency  with- 
out doing  violence  to  the  true  precedent  of  the 
past. 

To  quote  evidence  and  cite  authorities  was  not 
viii 


PREFACE 

possible  in  a  brief  book  dealing  with  most  of  the 
past  and  present  controversies  of  American  de- 
velopment and  not  a  few  of  Europe  and  Asia. 
Those  who  will  challenge  the  accuracy  of  my  state- 
ments will  ask  more  proof  than  a  few  corroborative 
quotations  can  afford.  For  them  I  have  added  a 
short  critical  bibliography  and  a  few  remarks 
upon  the  difference  in  the  character  of  evidence 
in  contemporary  history  from  that  in  past  cen- 
turies and  its  inevitable  effect  upon  the  nature 
of  our  conclusions. 

Though  not  without  definite  conclusions  about 
many  factors  of  the  situation,  I  am  conscious  of 
no  partizanship  or  interest  beyond  that  of  the 
scholar  and  observer  in  search  of  truth.  Yet  I  am 
aware  that,  where  notions  of  impartiality,  of 
patriotism,  and  of  disinterestedness  are  as  various 
as  they  are  to-day,  my  own  interpretation  of  these 
qualities  may  not  be  acceptable  to  all  my  readers. 
I  can  only  ask  that  presumption  of  honesty  and 
patriotism  which  each  American  has  a  right  to 
expect  from  another. 

WASHINGTON  UNIVERSITY,  ST.  Louis. 
January,  1915. 


IX 


CONTENTS 
FOREWORD 

PAGES 

AMERICAN  PROBLEMS  AND  THE  WAR          .         3-18 

Seriousness  of  the  present  crisis;  clash  with  Europe's  victor 
inevitable;  South  America  will  entice  him  to  Western  Hemisphere; 
the  hour  for  decision  here;  we  must  act  now;  splendid  role  of  the 
United  States  in  history;  people  anxious  to  play  a  noble  part  in 
present  crisis;  knowledge  the  prerequisite;  task  of  reaching  de- 
cision made  difficult  by  newness  of  issue,  by  varieties  of  partizan- 
ship;  we  must  know — (a)  whether  armament  has  been  essential 
factor  of  defense  in  past,  (6)  the  probable  victor  and  his  motives, 
(c)  whether  we  are  morally  bound  to  defend  South  America. 

BOOK  I 
THE  UNITED  STA  TES 

I 
FOUNDATIONS  OF  AMERICAN  INDEPENDENCE        21-38 

Strategic  position  of  United  States  the  foundation  of  American 
independence;  first  element:  the  Atlantic  Ocean  caused  isolation 
in  time  and  space,  made  European  interference  in  administration 
impossible,  made  independence  of  England  a  fact;  second  eleme.it: 
balance  of  power  in  Europe,  and  our  lack  of  geographical  relation 
to  Europe  important  in  European  quarrels;  third  element:  strate- 
gical geography  of  United  States  which  makes  enormous  army 
necessary  for  invasion  or  conquest;  fourth  element:  European 
situation  made  it  impossible  for  European  nations  to  spare  such 
a  force:  fifth  element:  lack  of  adequate  motive  for  such  exertion; 
— interaction  and  interplay  of  these  forces  during  Colonial 
period  and  revolution;  resultant  non-military  character  of  our 
institutions. 

xi 


CONTENTS 
II 

PAGES 

THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  SEA   .         .         .      39-58 

The  control  of  the  sea  by  England  fundamental  fact  in  our  his- 
tory; to  it  we  owe  predominantly  English  character  of  American 
civilization;  England's  sea-power  primarily  domestic  necessity; 
other  uses  seen  aftei  control  secured;  reason  for  aggressive  attitude 
toward  other  navies;  limitations  of  the  sea-power;  their  fortunate 
effect  on  America:  result  on  the  American  Revolution;  Revolution 
cost  us  all  privileges  on  the  sea;  quarrel  with  England  over  rights 
of  neutrals;  probable  plans  for  extorting  recognition  of  rights  in 
1812;  result  and  policy  of  cordial  relations  with  the  sea-power; 
England's  moderation  in  use  of  sea-power:  to  this  we  owe  our  lack 
of  a  meichant  maiine;  and  the  size  and  character  of  our  navy. 

Ill 

SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES    .      59-79 

Colonial  period  dominated  by  existence  of  West  Indies;  our 
dependence  upon  them  for  medium  of  European  exchange;  our 
determination  to  have  freedom  of  trade  with  them :  objection  to  it 
in  England  leads  to  Revolution:  Revolution  costs  us  all  privileges 
in  West  Indies;  necessity  of  cordial  relations  with  sea-power  first 
seen;  difficulty  of  securing  favorable  terms;  factors  behind  the 
Monroe  Doctrine — (a)  our  paramount  interest  in  West  India 
trade;  (6)  necessity  to  challenge  England's  control  of  it;  character 
of  English  relations  with  Latin  America;  independence  of  republics 
gives  England  Spain's  control  also;  challenged  by  Holy  Alliance; 
(c)  tradition  of  our  cordial  relations  with  sea-power;  (d)  tradition 
of  protection  of  our  independence  by  keeping  European  powers 
out  of  Americas; — why  Canning's  offer  of  cooperation  was  de- 
clined; complex  of  ideas  in  Monroe  Doctrine  of  1823. 

IV 

THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  WESTERN  HEMI- 
SPHERE     ......       80-97 

England  retains  supremacy  of  Western  Hemisphere  in  1823; 
her  relations  to  new  Latin-American  republics;  our  interest  in 
West  Indies  disappeared  with  downfall  of  prosperity  in  sugar 
islands;  cotton  changes  whole  situation  by  making  territorial 
expansion  our  immediate  interest;  resulted  in  new  phase  of  Mon- 
roe Doctrine:  England's  opposition  led  to  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty; 
English  moderation  in  use  of  their  supremacy;  revolution  of  situ- 
ation by  rise  of  German  navy;  England  passed  supremacy  to 
United  States;  results  of  our  attainment  of  supremacy;  nature  of 
our  supremacy. 

xii 


CONTENTS 
V 

PAGES 

OUR  PRESENT  STRATEGIC  POSITION   .         .    98-108 

Developments  of  nineteenth  century  rob  us  of  invulnerability; 
America  no  longer  isolated  from  Europe;  feasibility  of  adminis- 
trative or  military  interference  from  Europe;  United  States  also 
able  to  take  offensive;  change  in  character  of  warfare  alters  pre- 
requisites of  defense;  military  factors  no  longer  permissive;  end  of 
war  will  probably  destroy  our  remaining  defenses. 

BOOK  II 
THE  VICTOR 


EUROPEAN  POLICIES  AND  MOTIVES    .         .  111-123 

The  war  will  not  decide  economic  problems  of  future;  but  will 
place  solution  in  the  victor's  hands;  rapidity  of  recent  economic 
development  and  its  benefits;  determination  to  provide  for  its  con- 
tinuance; doctrine  of  defense  for  the  future  and  of  business  at  a 
continued  profit;  need  for  expanding  markets;  all  European  na- 
tions affected  by  crisis;  feasibility  of  projecting  part  of  some  Euro- 
pean nation  across  the  Atlantic;  economic  situation  provides  the 
victor  with  a  motive  for  interference  in  Western  Hemisphere. 


II 

THE  REDISCOVERY  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA    .     124-134 

South  America  fitted  to  solve  the  victor's  problems;  reasons 
why  it  has  played  so  little  part  in  history — (a)  character  of  early 
colonization;  (6)  existence  of  North  America; — its  rediscovery 
mainly  due  to  modern  science,  and  to  modern  medicine;  also  to 
decline  in  rate  of  profit  obtainable  elsewhere. 

Ill 

PROBABILITIES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION      .   135-150 

Character  of  a  German  victory;  Pan-Germanism  will  send 
victorious  Germany  to  Latin  America  not  to  United  States;  suit- 
ability of  Latin  America  for  German  needs;  size  of  the  market; 

xiii 


CONTENTS 


PAGES 

extent  of  resources  for  development;  opportunity  for  emigration; 
importance  of  high  development  of  certain  areas;  South  America 
most  feasible  solution  for  Germany;  the  easiest  for  the  Allies  to 
concede;  the  only  one  Germany  can  afford  to  accept;  economic 
and  military  advantages. 


IV 
POSSIBILITIES  OF  ENGLISH  AGGRESSION     .   151-165 

England  the  probable  victor;  victory  will  restore  her  suprem- 
acy in  Western  Hemisphere;  desirable  for  her  to  extend  her 
authority  in  Latin  America;  she  will  probably  put  an  end  to  our 
supremacy;  Alaska  can  easily  be  seized;  quarrel  over  relations  of 
United  States  and  Canada  imminent;  victory  will  lead  to  an  at- 
tempt to  limit  our  trade  with  Latin  America;  fundamental  do- 
mestic economic  needs  will  make  extension  of  English  trade  with 
Latin  America  essential;  desire  to  accelerate  pace  of  England's 
development  probable;  and  will  require  increased  trade  with 
Latin  America. 


RIGHTS  OF  NEUTRALS       ....  166-183 

United  States  already  at  odds  with  England;  English  attitude 
toward  neutral  trade;  character  of  claims  advanced  by  neutral 
nations;  reasons  for  English  refusal  to  accept  them  as  valid;  spe- 
cific objections  of  the  United  States;  why  England  will  accord 
these  serious  attention;  reasons  urging  the  United  States  to 
press  the  demands;  probable  results  of  so  doing:  ruin  of  American 
trade. 


VI 

JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND  THE  PACIFIC     .  184-200 

Japan's  opportunity;  character  of  Japanese  civilization;  strate- 
gic position  of  Japan;  building  of  fleet  changes  strategic  situation 
in  Pacific;  obiect  of  Japanese  ambition;  growth  of  German  navy 
robs  England  of  supremacy  in  the  Pacific;  she  hands  it  to  Japan 
with  conditions;  importance  of  the  Philippines  to  Japan;  our 
opposition  to  Japanese  colonization  in  Western  Hemisphere  a 
source  of  discord;  the  European  war  gives  Japan  an  opportunity 
to  further  her  ambitions. 

xiv 


CONTENTS 

BOOK  III 

PA  N-A  M ERIC  A  NISM 


PAGES 

PREREQUISITES  OF  PAN- AMERICANISM         .  203-217 

Meaning  of  the  term;  its  possible  significance  in  the  future; 
piemises  of  an  administrative  union  or  Confederation;  prere- 
quisites of  such  a  Confederation — (a)  federal  executive  and  legis- 
latute;  (6)  tegular  intercourse  between  the  republics;  (c)  legal 
and  social  equality  of  citizens; — probable  results  of  such  a  Con- 
federation; past  history  of  Pan-Americanism;  character  of  past 
association;  Pan-Americanism  not  now  a  reality. 

II 

FALLACIES  OF  PAN- AMERICANISM       .         .  218-231 

Assumptions  underlying  Pan-Americanism;  fallacy  of  a  closer 
geographical  relationship  of  North  and  South  America  to  each 
other  than  to  Europe;  the  fallacy  of  isolation  from  Europe;  the 
fallacy  of  mutual  interests  between  the  American  republics;  his- 
torical explanation  of  these  fallacies;  common  dependence  of  both 
Americas  upon  Europe;  sensitivity  of  Latin  Americans;  the  lack 
of  acquaintanceship  between  the  continents;  the  United  States 
sundered  from  Latin  America  by  barriers  of  race,  language,  and 
religion. 

Ill 

LACK  OF  ECONOMIC  MUTUALITY        .         .  232-249 

Latin  Americans  claim  that  economic  benefits  of  Pan-American- 
ism all  favor  the  United  States;  inability  of  United  States  to  take 
the  place  of  Europe — (a)  no  adequate  merchant  marine;  (i)  no 
exchange  facilities  for  direct  business;  (c)  no  adequate  supply  of 
commodities  to  fill  their  demand;  (d)  inability  to  utilize  the  bulk 
of  their  exports;  (<)  American  supply  of  capital  inadequate; 
— difficulty  of  supplanting  the  European  nations  in  the  trade  of 
Latin  America. 

IV 
THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  PAST       .         .         .  250-266 

Lack  of  mutual  trust  and  confidence  between  the  United 
States  and  Latin  America;  greatest  obstacle  lies  in  the  history  of 

XV 


CONTENTS 

PAGES 

the  past;  Latin  Americans  interpret  our  utterances  by  our  actions; 
past  aggression  of  the  United  States;  treatment  of  Indians  and 
negroes  in  the  United  States;  modern  Latin  Americans,  con- 
scious of  their  mixed  parentage,  fear  the  whites;  general  policy 
of  the  white  man  to  make  others  like  him;  Latin  Americans  do 
not  wish  to  be  modeled  on  United  States. 


ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL  PROBLEMS     .  267-288 

Necessity  of  common  administration  and  courts  to  make  Pan- 
Americanism  real;  premises  of  such  a  Confederation  are  lacking; 
difference  in  size  between  the  United  States  and  Latin  America 
formidable  difficulty;  same  dispaiity  between  Latin-American 
republics;  administrative  difficulties  of  dealing  with  so  large  a 
territory ;  methods  of  appointing  officials ;  obstacles  in  way  of  mak- 
ing uniform  code  of  law;  in  way  of  enforcing  it  in  the  courts;  prob- 
lem of  pioviding  a  sanction  for  commands  of  the  Confederation; 
strength  of  the  democratic  movement  in  Latin  America  for  state 
sovereignty. 

VI 
SOCIAL  OBSTACLES   .....  289-303 

Social  equality  absolute  prerequisite;  mixed  racial  character  of 
Latin  Americans;  individual  attainments;  obstacles  in  way  of 
recognition  of  social  equality  in  United  States;  continued  inde- 
pendence of  Latin  America  depends  upon  ability  of  the  people; 
unwillingness  of  Americans  to  grant  social  equality  read  as  inten- 
tion to  interfere  with  attempt  of  Latin  Americans  to  solve  their 
own  problems;  equality  for  Latin  Americans  in  United  States 
would  mean  social  equality  for  all  Indians  and  negroes. 


VII 
DEFENSIVE  WEAKNESS      ....  304-316 

Can  Pan- Americanism  defend  the  Western  Hemisphere  against 
Europe's  victor?  Latin  America  not  threatened  by  Europe  with 
political  conquest;  cooperation  of  Latin  America  with  United 
States  against  Europe's  victor  impossible  because  Latin  Ameri- 
cans fear  United  States  and  not  Europe;  exclusion  of  Europeans 
from  Western  Hemisphere  not  to  interests  of  Latin  Americans;  is 
defense  possible  from  military  point  of  view? 

xvi 


CONTENTS 
VIII 

PAGES 

THE  FUTURE  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM  .         .  317-323 

Pan- Americanism  has  no  future;  prerequisites  are  non-existent; 
Latin  America  about  to  challenge  assumption  by  United  States 
of  supremacy ;  alliances  of  Latin  America  likely  to  be  with  Latin 
states  of  Europe. 

BOOK  IV 
THE  FUTURE 


CONCRETE  ISSUES     .....  327-332 

Independence  of  the  sea-power;  the  supremacy  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere;  expansion  in  the  Western  Hemisphere;  imperialism 
in  the  Far  East;  all  these  spell  armament. 

II 

THE  PREREQUISITES  OF  INDEPENDENCE      .  333-350 

Its  ethics;  economic  desirability;  independence  a  prerequisite  of 
aggressive  policy  in  foreign  affairs ;  prerequisites  of  independence — 
(a)  an  adequate  merchant  marine;  (6)  American  foreign  banking 
and  exchange  system ;  (c)  an  adequate  fleet;  (d)  an  adequate  army 
for  defense; — adequacy  to  be  determined  by  the  price  set  by  the 
victor  upon  our  independence;  difference  between  independence 
and  security;  we  can  afford  the  expense  of  such  armament. 

Ill 

THE  ECONOMICS  OF  EXPANSION         .         .  351-366 

Does  the  economics  of  European  expansion  apply  to  the 
United  States?  Causes  of  rapid  growth  of  United  States;  causes 
of  its  recent  retardation;  meaning  of  economic  interdependence; 
tendency  of  rate  of  progress  in  all  nations  to  diminish;  the  de- 
velopment of  the  United  States  solved  the  economic  problems  of 
Europe  in  the  past;  future  economic  problem  of  United  States; 
from  this  will  come  a  demand  for  help  from  political  agencies; 
identity  of  American  and  European  interests;  extent  of  present 
interests  of  United  States. 

xvii 


CONTENTS 
IV 

PAGES 

THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION       .         .         .  367-389 

Definition  of  word,  ethics;  pacifist  and  individualist  ethics  as 
applied  to  expansion;  non-ethical  character  of  economic  forces; 
premise  of  expansion  the  desirability  of  gain;  pacifist  and  individ- 
ualist ethics  never  used  in  past  by  nations;  international  ethics 
based  on — (a)  notion  of  self-defense;  (6)  the  ethics  of  business; 
subtlety  of  notion  of  self-defense  to-day;  (c)  the  ethics  of  the 
Crusader  and  explorer; — can  justify  expansion  by  the  past 
conduct  which  nations  have  agreed  was  justifiable. 


THE  EXPEDIENCY  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  390-406 

Right  of  United  States  to  political  and  economic  independence 
real  meaning  of  Monroe  Doctrine;  expedients  for  advancing  these 
ends  usually  stated  instead  of  the  principle  itself;  true  principle 
too  fundamental  to  abandon;  previous  expedients  we  are  not 
bound  to  maintain;  all  past  expedients  now  obsolete;  we  are 
not  obligated  to  defend  Latin  America;  if  Monroe  Doctrine 
means  Pan-Americanism,  Latin  Americans  will  oppose  it;  if  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  means  expansion  or  imperialism,  to  realize  it  spells 
aggression;  and  is  to  be  sustained  only  by  extensive  armament. 

VI 
THE  ARGUMENT  FOR  DISARMAMENT  .         .  407-421 

Duty  of  the  United  States  to  set  Europe  an  example;  humani- 
tarian motives;  will  not  involve  danger  to  our  integrity;  will  not 
sacrifice  access  to  foreign  markets;  idle  to  attempt  independence 
of  European  powers  on  the  sea;  aggression  unnecessary  for  the 
United  States;  war  is  incapable  of  creating  economic  benefits; 
intensive  development  of  the  United  States  more  profitable  than 
aggression;  expense  of  armament  is  economic  waste;  alliance  with 
the  sea-power  will  assure  the  United  States  all  legitimate  advan- 
tages. 

VII 
THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT  .         .         .  422-442 

Armament  and  disarmament  both  relative;  the  United  States 
already  disarmed  in  all  but  name;  real  issue  a  continuance  of  pres- 
ent policy  or  to  develop  adequate  armament;  price  of  disarma- 

xviii 


CONTENTS 

PAGES 

ment  the  impossibility  of  reversing  the  decision  when  the  crisis 
appears;  disarmament  may  cost  us  our  security;  it  will  probably 
not  cost  us  our  access  to  world  market;  it  will  cost  us  all  our  na- 
tional ambitions,  present  and  future;  Latin  America  will  become 
foreign  territory;  our  extra-continental  possessions  will  be  sacri- 
ficed; disarmament  will  retard  our  economic  development;  it  will 
compel  us  to  develop  our  own  resources  at  a  constantly  diminish- 
ing rate  of  profit;  it  will  compel  us  to  trust  our  privileges  to  the 
good  will  of  the  other  nations  of  the  world ;  will  this  sacrifice  really 
benefit  the  cause  of  universal  peace?  Are  the  moral  and  ethical 
qualities  of  the  present  nations  such  that  we  can  safely  trust  our 
national  future  to  their  interests  and  mercy? 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 443 

INDEX 461 


xix 


PAN-AMERICANISM 


PAN-AMERICANISM 


FOREWORD 
AMERICAN  PROBLEMS  AND  THE  WAR 

THE  United  States  is  facinga  crisis  without  par- 
allel in  its  history  since  the  signature  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence.  As  a  nation, 
we  are  less  concerned  with  the  European  war  itself, 
its  causes,  its  course,  than  with  its  ending.  What- 
ever the  result  of  this  war  may  be,  whoever  wins  it, 
whenever  it  ends,  the  victor  will  be  able  to  threaten 
the  United  States,  and,  if  he  chooses,  to  challenge 
our  supremacy  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The 
motive  for  challenging  it  is  already  in  existence;  the 
power  with  which  to  do  so  effectively  will  beyond 
doubt  be  in  the  victor's  hands.  We  have  reached, 
in  fact,  a  time  in  our  national  history  when  a 
momentous  decision  is  to  be  made ;  one  now  attain- 
able by  careful  thought  and  conscious  deliberation, 
advisedly,  wisely ;  one  that  is  sure  to  be  made  later 

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PAN-AMERICANISM 

in  the  face  of  the  crisis  itself,  hastily,  hysterically, 
and  regrettably. 

Because  the  state  of  war  in  Europe  itself  pro- 
tects us  at  present  from  military  and  naval  aggres- 
sion, it  is  unwise  to  infer  that  it  will  always  do  so; 
for  the  war  will  probably  destroy  that  close  balance 
of  power  in  Europe  upon  which  our  past  immunity 
from  European  interference  has  in  large  measure 
rested.  Because  we  have  given  no  just  cause  for 
aggression,  let  us  not  assume  that  we  may  not  be 
assailed ;  the  example  of  Belgium  should  suffice  all 
nations  for  at  least  a  century.  Because  the  belliger- 
ent nations  to-day  avow  no  intention  to  make 
war  on  us  and  no  schemes  involving  us,  we  are  not 
necessarily  safe ;  we  have  only  to  remember  that  all 
of  them  regard  the  present  war  as  a  war  of  self- 
defense  on  their  own  part  and  of  unprovoked 
aggression  upon  that  of  their  enemy.  Whenever 
the  end  of  the  war  comes,  whatever  the  result,  it 
will  undoubtedly  affect  our  political,  military,  and 
naval  position  in  ways  which  will  scarcely  be 
matters  of  indifference  to  us.  Exactly  what  the 
effect  will  be  only  the  circumstances  of  the  victory 
itself  can  show. 

The  lure  which  will  in  all  probability  entice  the 
victor  to  the  Western  Hemisphere  will  be  South 
America.  So  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned, 

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AMERICAN  PROBLEMS  AND  THE  WAR 

there  can  be  only  two  victors  in  this  war.  With 
France,  Russia,  Austria,  and  the  lesser  nations,  the 
United  States  will  hardly  be  concerned.  Only 
England  and  Germany  are  in  a  position  to  com- 
pete for  the  supremacy  of  the  sea  and  for  the  con- 
trol of  the  approaches  to  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  commonly  understood  to 
mean  that  the  United  States  obligates  itself  to  pre- 
serve intact  the  Western  Hemisphere  from  Euro- 
pean aggression.  With  it  the  victor  will  inevitably 
clash. 

Although  we  need  not  doubt  that  the  victor  will 
come  and  that  he  will  be  powerful  enough  to  in- 
jure us,  we  need  not  conclude  of  necessity  that  we 
are  in  real  danger,  or  that  armament  is  our  true 
recourse.  Elaborate  armament,  undertaken  solely 
to  know  that  no  one  could  hope  to  attack  us  with 
success,  would  be  foolish;  but  it  does  not  in  the 
least  follow  that  we  are  in  danger  because  we  are 
not  ready  to  fight.  On  the  other  hand,  disarma- 
ment proceeding  from  sentimental  pleas  about  the 
horrors  of  war  would  be  unwise.  There  are  con- 
ceivably real  dangers  with  which  we  can  easily 
cope,  the  preparation  for  which  it  would  be  criminal 
to  neglect.  Indeed,  before  we  arm  or  conclude  not 
to  arm,  let  us  count  as  nearly  as  we  may  the  cost 
and  view  the  probable  consequences  of  one  or  the 

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PAN-AMERICANISM 

other.  Whatever  we  do  let  us  undertake  it  only 
after  very  general  agreement  as  to  its  probabilities. 
If  we  maintain  the  Monroe  Doctrine  or  espouse 
Pan-Americanism,  begin  building  a  merchant  ma- 
rine or  strengthening  the  fleet  and  the  army,  let 
us  establish  beforehand  exactly  what  ends  we  pur- 
pose to  subserve  by  such  means.  If  we  decide  on 
the  other  hand  that  extensive  armament  is  in- 
expedient, we  must  visualize  with  exceeding  clear- 
ness before  we  come  to  our  final  conclusion  what 
the  exact  consequences  will  be,  and  what  policies, 
ambitions,  or  interests  the  decision  will  compel  us 
to  sacrifice.  Obviously,  to  enounce  certain  policies 
and  to  neglect  adequate  armament  to  maintain 
them  can  lead  to  but  one  result — national 
humiliation  at  the  victor's  hands. 

The  hour  for  decision  therefore  has  struck.  We 
must. know  in  the  near  future  what  our  attitude  is 
to  be  toward  the  European  situation  to  be  created 
by  the  ending  of  this  war,  as  well  as  toward  those 
probable  developments  of  the  war  in  the  immediate 
future  which  may  affect  this  country.  To  fail  to 
reach  a  decision  at  this  time  will  be  to  compel  our- 
selves to  renounce  all  the  interests,  policies,  and 
ambitions  which  any  degree  of  adequate  prepara- 
tion would  make  it  imperative  to  maintain  or  se- 
cure. Not  to  decide  is  to  reach  a  negative  decision 

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AMERICAN  PROBLEMS  AND  THE  WAR 

as  effectively  as  if  it  had  been  reached  by  delibera- 
tion. If  we  fail  to  grasp  the  requirements  of  our 
present  or  future  position  or  to  comprehend  the 
probable  current  of  international  affairs,  we  shall 
simply  throw  away  all  opportunity  of  furthering 
or  protecting  the  interests  of  the  United  States. 
We  shall  do  so  blindly,  ignorant  of  what  our  true 
interests  are. 

The  United  States  has  played  an  important  and 
unique  part  in  the  history  of  nations.  Dominion  is 
ours,  wealth  almost  beyond  estimation,  prosperity, 
cultivation,  liberty,  and  for  these  inestimable  boons 
we  have  paid  no  price  in  blood  or  in  women's  tears. 
The  foundation  of  our  wealth  and  greatness  lies 
in  no  sense  in  aggression,  conquest,  or  spoliation. 
We  owe  all  to  the  development  of  great  natural 
resources  by  the  honest  labor  of  sturdy  men  and 
women.  Strong  differences  of  opinion  about 
national  policy  and  the  great  moral  issue  of  slavery 
compelled  our  fathers  to  fight  a  long  civil  war; 
more  than  once  we  have  been  involved  in  foreign 
wars,  while  once  or  twice  we  have  been  hurried  by 
unfortunate  counsel  into  aggression.  Such  actions 
have  been  contrary  to  popular  judgment,  and 
have  fortunately  contributed  little  to  our  national 
position.  We  stand  therefore  in  the  congress  of 
nations  in  an  almost  unique  position  as  the  only 

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PAN-AMERICANISM 

great  nation  which  does  not  in  large  measure  owe 
its  present  territory  and  international  prominence 
to  a  series  of  aggressive  conquests  against  its 
neighbors  or  inferiors. 

The  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United  States 
are  resolved  to  play  a  dignified  and  disinterested 
part  in  this  world  war,  to  act  if  possible  in  accord- 
ance with  the  highest  ethical  motives  upon  which 
national  actions  can  be  based.  While  they  are  not 
disposed  to  sacrifice  essentials  if  once  it  is  shown 
that  they  are  truly  essentials  of  the  national  wel- 
fare or  of  the  national  safety,  they  clearly  deny 
that  the  ordinary  premises  of  European  political  ac- 
tion have  any  prima  facie  value  for  us.  The  people 
undoubtedly  feel  that  we  have  to-day  a  unique 
opportunity  to  place  in  abeyance  our  own  tem- 
poral and  temporary  interests  in  favor  of  disin- 
terested action  in  furtherance  of  the  highest  ideals 
of  the  race.  They  would  engrave  our  national 
name  among  those  most  splendid  on  history's 
roll. 

If  they  are  insistent  that  the  opportunity  should 
not  be  thrown  away,  they  are  anxious  not  to  be 
misled  as  to  its  true  character.  Even  the  least 
intelligent  seem  to  apprehend  instinctively  that 
nobility  of  action  is  indissolubly  united  to  wisdom 
and  discretion,  and  that  to  be  sublime  an  action 

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AMERICAN  PROBLEMS  AND  THE  WAR 

must  be  the  result  of  a  conscious  choice  between 
alternatives,  and  not  merely  the  outcome  of  a  head- 
long impetuosity  which  by  good  fortune  stumbled 
across  the  truth.  The  American  people  prefer  a 
generous  part  devoid  of  gain  and  even  entailing 
loss  to  one  which  they  know  beforehand  spells 
selfish  aggression  or  selfish  conservation.  What  is 
now  needed  is  not  action,  but  that  knowledge  which 
must  form  the  basis  of  intelligent  action.  Yet  as  a 
nation  our  past  indifference  to  foreign  relations 
and  international  complications  has  been  almost  as 
marked  as  our  disinterestedness  and  impartiality; 
the  one  no  doubt  has  lent  strength  to  the  others. 
To-day  these  traits  make  possible  a  temperance  in 
action  and  a  discretion  in  judgment  not  possible  in 
most  European  countries  where  primary  interests 
and  antipathies  appear  in  the  populace  in  the  guise 
of  passion  and  prejudice.  There  has  never  been  a 
time  when  knowledge  was  more  imperative ;  there 
has  never  been  a  time  when  the  people  at  large 
were  more  determined  to  acquire  it.  A  great 
variety  of  policies  are  being  waved  insistently 
before  their  eyes,  and  immediate  action  demanded 
by  vehement  advocates.  Rightly,  the  people  have 
denied  action  and  have  sought  adequate  informa- 
tion. They  will  not  be  frightened  into  armament 
by  alarmists,  nor  yet  committed  to  non-resistance 

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PAN-AMERICANISM 

without  due  consideration,  despite  the  importunity 
and  zeal  of  idealists  and  pacifists. 

How  is  it  possible  to  adopt  a  liberal  and  unselfish 
policy  without  endangering  the  national  safety  or 
risking  more  of  its  material  well-being  than  the 
frailty  of  the  majority  will  endure?  The  task  of 
reaching  a  decision  upon  the  present  interests  of 
the  United  States  and  upon  the  policy  best  adapted 
to  advance  them  is  made  difficult  by  the  newness  of 
the  issue  itself,  for  in  reality  we  are  facing  a  prob- 
lem which  has  never  before  appeared  in  our  history, 
to  which  the  policies  and  precedents  of  the  past  do 
not  explicitly  apply,  and  to  which  it  may  not  be 
possible  to  adapt  them  successfully.  We  have  had 
no  primary  interest  in  crystallizing  our  foreign 
policies  around  some  great  national  necessity, 
comparable  to  the  European  need  for  the  defense 
of  the  national  independence.  In  the  past  our 
interests  have  been  secondary  in  importance,  per- 
missive rather  than  essential,  issues  whose  desira- 
bility or  inexpediency  were  by  no  means  clear. 
Nor  have  these  varied  interests  always  been  con- 
sistent with  one  another,  or  complementary.  No 
event  has  ever  focused  all  of  them  at  once  before 
the  nation  and  revealed  their  lack  of  coherence 
and  essential  relationship.  Sometimes  we  have 
furthered  one,  sometimes  another;  again  a  third 

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AMERICAN  PROBLEMS  AND  THE  WAR 

has  received  our  attention.  The  present  situation, 
therefore,  which  does  focus  at  once  all  our  interests, 
has  produced  a  new  problem  which  compels  us  to 
comprehend  our  lack  of  a  primary  interest,  and,  in 
the  European  sense,  to  grasp  the  diversity  of  our 
secondary  interests,  and,  emphasize  the  import- 
ance of  deciding  between  them.  They  cannot  all 
be  subserved  at  the  same  time,  any  more  than  we 
can  vote  for  disarmament  and  in  the  same  breath 
reaffirm  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

To  establish  clearly  the  fundamental  facts  of 
the  historic  past  where  our  interests  had  origin  is 
imperative,  if  we  care  to  see  in  perspective  present 
interests  and  possible  policies.  Otherwise  we  shall 
never  separate  the  good  from  the  bad,  the  cogent 
from  the  unimportant.  Daily  we  see  excellent 
causes  vitiated  by  bad  logic  and  ignorance  of  his- 
tory ;  we  see  praiseworthy  motives  marred  by  excess 
of  zeal;  unimpeachable  premises  followed  by  lame 
conclusions;  specious  conclusions  which  appear 
convincing  until  their  obvious  premises  are  easily 
demolished;  arguments  which  would  be  cogent 
were  not  the  conclusion  itself  assumed  as  a  premise. 
Indeed,  it  is  not  about  the  conclusions  and  policies 
which  we  shall  quarrel,  but  about  the  premises. 
What  we  need  to  establish  at  present  is  the  fun- 
damental factors  and  postulates  from  which  any 

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PAN-AMERICANISM 

conclusion  must  proceed,  and  which  must  be  duly 
weighed  and  considered  before  any  wise  conclusion 
can  be  reached. 

We  shall  soon  have  as  many  varieties  of  patriots 
as  there  are  shades  of  opinion,  and  much  ill-feeling 
and  heartburning  over  their  different  policies.  If 
only  each  could  remember  to  ascribe  to  others 
the  same  honesty  of  intention  by  which  he  feels 
himself  strongly  moved!  Unfortunately,  the  most 
ardent  and  eager  friends  are  not  always  the 
wisest  counselors;  nor  has  a  passionate  affection 
for  one's  country  and  readiness  for  its  service  been 
invariably  coupled  with  accurate  information  and 
great  discretion.  We  shall  need  a  wise  constraint 
more  often  than  zeal  and  adequate  information 
more  often  than  enthusiasm. 

One  of  the  most  peculiar  and  in  some  respects 
one  of  the  most  annoying  aspects  of  great  crises  is 
the  insistence  by  most  of  the  adherents  of  irrecon- 
cilable opinions  that  they  alone  are  the  true 
patriots  who  have  their  country's  welfare  at  heart. 
There  is  a  cheap  jingoism  always  waving  the 
"bloody  shirt"  and  shouting  for  war  and  arma- 
ment without  in  the  least  comprehending  what  the 
demand  involves.  There  is,  if  anything,  a  more 
dangerous  enemy  of  calm  and  discreet  action  in 
the  variety  of  jingo  who  has  robbed  the  name  of 

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AMERICAN  PROBLEMS  AND  THE  WAR 

patriot  of  all  its  finer  and  loftier  connotations. 
He  spurns  as  an  imputation  upon  the  honor  of  his 
ancestors  the  questioning  of  his  country's  pre- 
paredness; he  thrusts  scornfully  from  him  as  un- 
necessary any  impartial  inquiry  into  its  history  to 
discover  whether  or  not  the  facts  correspond  with 
his  suppositions.  His  bluster  masks  a  very  real  ig- 
norance and  an  actual  intellectual  cowardice ;  for 
he  is  afraid  his  assumptions  might  not  stand  the 
test  of  examination  and  he  fears  to  surrender  them 
because  he  is  not  capable  of  imagining  anything  to 
substitute  for  them.  Such  "patriots"  are  not 
satisfied  that  our  history  should  be  glorious;  they 
insist  that  it  should  be  glorious  according  to  certain 
preconceived  notions  about  glory.  The  search  for 
actual  knowledge,  the  endeavor  to  reach  a  clear 
and  wise  decision  after  thoughtful  consideration, 
should  be  recognized  as  the  duty  of  patriotism,  for 
by  it  alone  can  the  true  welfare  of  the  country  be 
advanced. 

When  we  stand  as  a  nation  face  to  face  with  a 
crisis  of  undoubted  gravity  which  may  imperil  in 
the  near  future  the  national  safety  and  which 
certainly  will  leave  deep  traces  upon  the  national 
structure,  we  have  a  right  to  ask  ourselves  in  all 
seriousness  and  with  all  reverence  what  have  been 
the  props  beneath  our  independence,  the  founda- 

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PAN-AMERICANISM 

tion  of  our  immunity  from  European  aggression 
during  the  last  century ;  the  basis  of  the  respect  in 
which  we  are  clearly  held  by  all  the  great  nations 
of  Europe.  We  are  making  no  sentimental  inquiry ; 
we  are  abroad  upon  no  indifferent  quest.  We  need 
to  know  and  have  a  right  to  know  how  far  our 
history  is  the  work  of  military  and  naval  prowess 
and  how  far  our  independence  and  our  proud  posi- 
tion in  the  family  of  nations  are  due  to  factors  less 
evanescent  and  perishable  than  the  genius  of 
generals  and  the  valor  of  armies.  It  may  be  vital 
for  us  to  know  the  truth.  If  our  nation  has  been 
built  by  the  fruits  of  war,  there  will  be  at  least  a 
presumption  raised  that  we  shall  need  to  defend  in 
arms  what  our  ancestors  have  built  by  arms.  If 
we  find  that  our  independence  and  security  rest,  in 
part  at  least,  on  other  than  military  factors,  if  we 
can  show  that  the  aggression  of  Europe  has  been 
checked  in  the  past  by  stronger  and  less  personal 
forces  than  armies  and  fleets,  we  shall  raise  a  very 
strong  presumption  that  extensive  armament  will 
not  be  indispensable  to  insure  the  safety  of  a  rich 
and  powerful  nation,  intrenched  by  Nature  in  a 
continent,  and  her  loins  girt  on  each  side  by  a 
thousand  miles  of  ocean. 

The  cheap  enthusiasm  of  the  so-called  "Fourth- 
of-July  patriot"  eagerly  assumes  that   military 


AMERICAN  PROBLEMS  AND  THE  WAR ; 

prowess  must  be  the  basis  of  national  glory,  be- 
cause it  is  easily  understood  and  furnishes  the  sort 
of  explanation  for  independence  which  the  blood- 
soaked  history  of  Europe  has  taught  him  to  expect. 
The  United  States  has  the  unique  distinction 
among  nations  of  owing  its  independence  and  its 
safety  to  its  geographical  situation,  and  to  the  arts 
of  peace.  To  fail  to  grasp  this  fact  and  all  it  implies 
is  to  veil  the  reality  of  our  ancestors'  achievement, 
and  to  gloss  over  its  real  difficulties  and  vital  sig- 
nificance. To  win  revolutions  and  protect  nations 
with  conquering  armies  and  victorious  fleets  is 
simple  and  comparatively  inglorious ;  rascals  have 
been  good  generals ;  much  stupidity  and  blundering 
have  had  to  be  retrieved  by  the  use  of  violence, 
while  much  iniquity  has  been  exalted  by  victory. 
Intelligence,  organization,  a  careful  study  of  the 
realities  of  life  are  indispensable  for  the  achieve- 
ment of  great  results  without  armies.  They  are  a 
thousandfold  nobler  and  their  victories  a  thousand- 
fold more  permanent  than  those  attained  to  the 
sound  of  cannons  and  to  the  shrieks  of  the  dying. 
No  true  patriot  would  insist  in  the  face  of  the 
horrors  of  this  present  war  upon  believing  that  the 
independence  of  his  country  had  necessarily  been 
won,  and  necessarily  must  be  preserved,  by  military 
and  naval  prowess.  The  true  patriot  will  rather 

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PAN-AMERICANISM 

rejoice  if  he  can  convince  himself  that  no  such 
heavy  price  was  paid  to  redeem  his  liberty  or  to 
insure  his  comfortable  fireside,  and  he  will  look 
into  the  future  with  real  confidence  and  a  clear 
conscience,  calm  in  his  belief  that  we  are  not 
necessarily  in  danger  of  conquest  because  un- 
prepared. To  the  consideration  of  the  past  and 
present  position  and  interests  of  the  United  States 
the  first  part  of  this  volume  will  be  devoted. 

The  situation  in  Europe,  the  probable  victor  and 
his  interests  and  ambitions,  will  also  be  of  such 
consequence  in  reaching  a  final  conclusion  that  the 
second  book  will  be  given  over  to  their  elucidation. 
We  must  know  who  is  likely  to  appear,  what 
circumstances  will  make  possible,  probable,  or 
profitable  his  appearance. 

The  belief  is  common  in  the  United  States  that 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  protected  South  America 
from  European  aggression  since  1823.  If  this  be 
true,  we  have  a  strong  moral  obligation  to  maintain 
that  doctrine  in  the  interests  of  the  weaker  Ameri- 
can republics,  should  they  be  actually  threatened 
by  Europe's  victor;  nor  will  the  United  States 
shirk  or  abandon  this  moral  obligation  because  it 
may  involve  expenditure  and  require  armament. 
If  such  a  moral  obligation  does  exist,  if  the  South- 
ern Continent  is  actually  and  literally  dependent 

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AMERICAN  PROBLEMS  AND  THE  WAR 

upon  our  protection,  those  facts  will  be  extremely 
cogent.  If  they  shall  not  prove  to  be  true  on  in- 
vestigation, equally  material  premises  will  have 
been  established. 

The  issue  is  indeed  perplexing  and  immediate. 
Perhaps  the  most  vital  fact  in  American  history  is 
the  non-military  character  of  the  American  people, 
their  disinclination  to  arm  except  for  the  gravest 
reason,  their  entire  lack  of  present  interest  in  con- 
quest. In  obvious  conflict  with  these  national 
characteristics  is  the  assertion  of  our  paramount 
interest  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  of  our 
right  to  exclude  European  nations  from  it ;  for  if 
our  traditions  argue  against  the  use  of  force,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  assumes  our  willingness  to  exert 
it  if  need  should  arise.  The  two  are  irreconcilable, 
and  the  day  has  now  come  when  the  test  is  about 
to  be  made  to  discover  which  of  the  two  is  the 
stronger  current  of  our  national  life. 

In  reaching  some  wise  conclusion,  we  shall  be 
much  assisted  by  knowing  whether  the  United 
States  and  South  America  are  vitally  related  to  one 
another,  whether  they  possess  mutual  interests  and 
sympathies,  and  really  desire  to  act  in  concert  for 
the  exclusion  of  European  nations  from  this  hemi- 
sphere. The  variety  of  notions  called  Pan-Ameri- 
canism will  require  close  investigation,  for  upon  the 

17 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

result  of  that  inquiry  will  depend  in  large  measure 
the  expediency  of  maintaining  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. If  our  interests  and  those  of  South  America 
are  mutual  and  strong,  and  are  based  upon  fun- 
damental principles  of  political  and  economic 
association,  the  maintenance  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, even  under  arms,  may  conceivably  be  ex- 
pedient. But  if  our  interests  are  not  of  that 
nature,  it  will  obviously  be  unwise  for  us  to  base 
our  foreign  policy  with  Europe  and  South  America 
upon  facts  which  are  not  existent. 

We  shall  then  be  in  possession  of  sufficient  in- 
formation about  fundamental  forces,  factors,  and 
policies  to  discuss  in  some  detail  the  pros  and  cons 
of  armament  and  disarmament  and  to  envisage 
clearly  the  probable  consequences  of  the  adoption 
or  abandonment  of  policies.  The  alternatives 
should  then  be  clear;  the  decision  between  them  is 
for  the  American  people. 


18 


BOOK  I 
THE  UNITED  STATES 


The  United  States 


CHAPTER  I 

FOUNDATIONS    OF    AMERICAN    INDE- 
PENDENCE 

THE  strategic  position  of  the  United  States  is 
peculiar  and  unique,  created  by  the  inter- 
play between  our  geographical  location  and 
great  natural  forces,  economic  factors,  and  condi- 
tions in  Europe.     It  has  been   throughout  our 
history  the  foundation  of  American T  independence. 
The  first  and  most  important  element  in  it  is  the 

'The  Latin  Americans  protest  against  the  use  of  the  word 
"  America  "  to  denote  the  United  States  of  America  and  of  "  Ameri- 
can" to  denote  its  citizens  as  contrary  to  the  geographical  facts. 
While  an  accurate  terminology  is  desirable,  the  purpose  of  lan- 
guage is  to  convey  ideas  and  not  to  create  distinctions,  and  popular 
usage  in  the  United  States  as  well  as  the  State  Department  has  so 
definitely  established  such  a  meaning  that  it  has  seemed  pedantic 
to  object  to  it.  "Central  America"  and  "South  America"  are 
used  to  denote  those  geographical  districts,  while  "Latin 
America"  and  "Latin  Americans"  denote  the  twenty  republics 
south  of  the  Rio  Grande  and  their  peoples. 

21 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Atlantic  Ocean,  a  barrier  between  us  and  Europe 
three  thousand  miles  broad,  the  existence  of  which 
meant  for  us,  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries,  practical  isolation  in  space  and  time. 
Men  forget  with  readiness  the  commonest  facts 
about  life  in  the  past  when  only  sailing-ships  were 
available,  and  when,  too,  the  ships  were  small. 
Then  the  voyage  across  the  Atlantic  was  no  mere 
pleasure  trip,  but  an  adventure  fraught  with  some 
peril  and  accompanied  by  a  great  deal  of  hardship. 
Storms  were  not  less  frequent  than  they  are  now ; 
food  was  bad  at  the  best;  scurvy  was  prevalent; 
while  the  sea  and  wind  effectively  prevented  any- 
thing like  promptness  or  regularity  of  arrival. 
Swift  vessels  under  good  conditions  made  the  voy- 
age in  a  month.  Six  weeks  was  considered  a  fast 
trip,  and  two  months  was  very  common.  Under 
such  conditions  the  Atlantic  was  in  point  of  time 
wider  than  it  now  is  long.  The  regular  mail 
steamers  plying  between  England  and  Australia 
travel  a  distance  approaching  one  half  of  the  cir- 
cumference of  the  globe  in  about  the  same  time 
that  a  fast  ship  under  favorable  conditions  needed 
in  the  eighteenth  century  to  go  from  London  to 
New  York. 

This  general  slowness  of  communication  made 
literally    impossible    any    active    interference    in 

22 


AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE 

America  by  European  nations.  About  three 
months  was  necessary  under  the  best  conditions 
to  get  an  answer  or  to  learn  of  some  crisis  and  to 
send  directions  as  to  what  should  be  done  about  it. 
A  defeat  in  America  was  therefore  not  really 
known  in  England,  France,  or  Spain  until  the  vic- 
tor had  had  ample  time  to  make  the  best  use  of 
its  results.  Before  an  army  could  be  actually 
gotten  together,  embarked,  and  landed,  news  of 
its  preparation  would  have  preceded  it  by  a 
sufficient  number  of  weeks  to  have  permitted 
preparations  for  defense  by  no  means  as  inade- 
quate as  the  disparity  in  potential  strength  be- 
tween the  various  settlements  in  America  and  the 
European  nations  would  seem  to  indicate.  Mili- 
tary interference  in  America  was  made  extremely 
difficult  by  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  which  until  about 
1840  placed  us  as  far  from  Europe  in  point  of  time 
and  space  as  Australia  is  to-day  from  New  York 
or  London.  This  is  the  fundamental  fact  of  our 
location,  this,  the  fundamental  barrier  upon  which 
our  independence  rests.  Other  factors,  potent  in- 
deed, have  greatly  assisted  at  one  time  and  another 
this  primary  geographical  position,  but  it  was  un- 
questionably for  two  centuries  and  a  half  the  great 
formative  fact  in  American  history. 

It  created  a  separation  in  point  of  time  between 
23 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

us  and  England  which  made  anything  approach- 
ing the  government  of  the  colonies  from  England  a 
literal  impossibility.  Actual  directions  could  not  be 
received  from  England  soon  or  constantly  enough 
to  be  of  the  slightest  avail,  even  if  the  colonists 
had  been  anxious  to  obtain  them;  while  to  have 
waited  for  actual  assistance  or  even  for  advice 
would  at  many  crises  have  invited  destruction. 
Nor  could  the  English  find  out  what  was  happen- 
ing in  America  with  either  promptitude  or  regu- 
larity. American  democracy  grew  up  in  the 
wilderness,  to  furnish  the  government  and  direction 
which  the  mother  country,  for  geographical  reasons, 
was  incapable  of  affording.  We  never  were  depend- 
ent upon  England  or  any  other  European  coun- 
try. The  Atlantic  Ocean  made  us  independent 
from  the  first. 

Independence  was  necessarily  an  accomplished  fact 
that  no  fiat  could  create,  and  which  was  in  1776  a 
condition  resulting  from  the  operation  of  forces  in  the 
decades  just  passed.  The  Revolution  by  no  means 
created  the  thirteen  States.  It  declared  the  already 
accomplished  fact  that  those  thirteen  States  were  in- 
dependent entities  distinct  from  England  in  ideals  and 
interests,  strong  enough  to  maintain  themselves 
against  the  rest  of  the  world,  experienced  in  self- 
government,  and  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  liberty. 1 

1  Usher,  Rise  of  the  American  People,  31. 
24 


AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  did  not  fight  for  independ- 
ence; it  was  thrust  upon  us.  We  were  separated 
from  the  very  first  so  far  in  point  of  time  from 
Europe  that  all  their  armies  and  all  their  fleets 
were  incapable  of  robbing  us  of  administrative 
independence.  Conceivably,  they  might  have  set 
up  a  government  in  America  by  force,  but  in  no 
possible  way  could  they  have  governed  us  from 
Europe. 

The  Declaration  of  Independence  was  a  statement 
of  the  evident  fact  that  the  American  Colonies  were  in 
reality,  and  long  had  been,  independent  of  England; 
that  they  had  governed  themselves  in  the  past  without 
assistance,  and  could  do  so  in  the  future;  that  their 
interests  were  too  different  from  those  of  the  mother 
country  for  them  to  accept  her  decisions  in  regard  to 
policy.1 

The  second  factor  in  our  strategic  position  one 
might  almost  call  a  corollary  of  our  location  be- 
yond the  Atlantic.  For  some  centuries  at  least 
the  really  vital  fact  in  European  politics  has  been 
the  formation  of  a  series  of  alliances  among  the 
stronger  countries  for  the  preservation  of  what  has 
been  called  the  balance  of  power.  The  geographical 
structure  of  Europe  is  peculiar,  and  has  juxta- 
posited  a  number  of  strong  countries  in  a  relatively 

1  Ibid.,  118-119. 

25 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

small  space  without  erecting  between  them  effec- 
tive barriers,  although  leaving  at  the  same  time  a 
sufficient  geographical  hindrance  to  their  complete 
union.  They  are  separated  without  being  isolated. 
With  no  love  for  one  another,  they  are  not  able  to 
free  themselves  entirely  from  one  another's  pres- 
ence. All  the  nations  in  Europe,  therefore,  are 
potential  allies  of  one  another  and  potential  ene- 
mies. Very  few  of  them  could  regard  as  incredi- 
ble war  with  any  other  nation  on  the  continent; 
their  independence,  therefore,  and  their  economic 
strength  and  development,  are  of  significance 
to  all  other  possible  enemies  and  allies.  The 
control  of  territory  obtained  by  political  domina- 
tion resulting  from  military  conquest  would  put 
several  nations  in  a  far  more  advantageous 
position  and  enable  them  to  further  their  own 
ambitions  and  antipathies.  For  instance,  the 
possession  of  Belgium  has  been  at  times  of  great 
military  advantage  to  both  France  and  Germany, 
and  has  enabled  either  to  attack  the  other  much 
more  effectively.  The  possession  of  Denmark 
or  Sweden  would  be  of  vast  consequence  to 
Russia,  and  would  enable  her  to  threaten  Ger- 
many's naval  position  and  perhaps  insure  her 
the  control  of  the  Baltic.  Every  nation  affected 
by  the  strengthening  of  France,  Germany,  or 

26 


AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE 

Russia  would  be  vitally  interested  in  either  of 
these  happenings. 

The  United  States  lacks  a  geographical  relation 
to  Europe  of  importance  in  European  quarrels. 
No  nation  or  group  of  nations  could  find  its  in- 
dependence or  integrity  threatened  by  our  ex- 
istence. Our  economic  development,  therefore, 
produced  in  Europe  no  alarms,  while  the  economic 
development  of  Germany  produced  many.  As  we 
threaten  nobody,  the  control  of  our  territory  would 
be  of  no  advantage  to  any  European  nation  for 
defense  or  for  aggression;  indeed,  from  a  military 
point  of  view  our  political  independence  or  depend- 
ence is  almost  a  matter  of  indifference  to  Europe. 
To  overestimate  the  importance  of  this  lack  of 
relation  to  the  European  situation  is  impossible. 
The  primary  motive  for  conquest  as  it  appears  in 
Europe  is  lacking;  the  primary  purpose  of  an 
assault  upon  our  political  independence  is  absent. 
Legions  numerous  enough  to  shake  the  land  with 
their  tread,  navies  great  enough  to  burden  the  sea 
with  their  weight,  have  not  erected  in  the  way  of 
the  aggressor  in  Europe  barriers  one  half  as  for- 
midable. Our  political  independence  is  as  secure 
from  Germany  or  Russia  as  it  is  from  England  or 
France.  The  sea  is  absolutely  impartial.  We  are 
not  a  part  of  Europe.  We  never  can  be  a  part  of 

27 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Europe.  We  are  independent  and  free  by  the 
accident  of  geography,  a  fact  which  armies  and 
navies  are  powerless  to  change  and  scarcely  able 
to  strengthen. 

The  third  factor  in  our  strategic  position  is  the 
strategical  geography  of  the  United  States  itself. 
Continental  United  States1  is  divided  into  three 
districts,  the  Atlantic  coast,  the  Mississippi  valley, 
and  the  Pacific  coast.  From  a  military  point  of 
view  the  three  are  unrelated,  for,  while  there  are 
certain  roads  between  them,  certain  strategic 
points  controlling  the  communications  between 
them  along  these  roads,  the  enemy  might  control 
one  of  the  three  without  in  any  way  insuring  his 
military  possession  of  the  others.  The  country  is 
so  vast,  the  area  necessarily  covered  by  operations 
would  be  so  stupendous,  that  its  military  control 
in  the  European  fashion  by  the  capture  of  two  or 
three  points  is  out  of  the  question.  The  Civil  War 
demonstrated  the  impossibility  of  expecting  the 
conquest  of  the  Mississippi  valley  to  insure  the 
control  of  the  Atlantic  slope;  the  Revolution 
showed  the  complete  fallacy  of  supposing  that  any 
part  of  the  Atlantic  slope  insured  its  possessor 

x  Throughout  this  book,  in  geographical  statements  or  compari- 
sons, "the  United  States,"  or  "America,"  mean  continental 
United  States,  excluding  Alaska  and  our  island  possessions. 

28 


AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE 

military  control  of  any  sort  over  other  parts  of  it. 
If  the  campaign  were  being  conducted  by  two  or 
three  millions  of  men,  the  very  magnitude  of  the 
operations  might  conceivably  develop  something 
resembling  strategic  relationship  between  various 
parts  of  the  country,  but  nothing  short  of  the 
simultaneous  invasion  of  the  Atlantic  coast  at  a 
variety  of  points  could  possibly  give  the  aggressor 
control  or  allow  him  even  to  knock  at  the  gateways 
leading  into  the  interior. 

Fortunately, 'too,  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  coast 
districts  are  both  comparatively  narrow  and 
are  separated  from  the  great  bulk  of  the  continent 
by  high  mountain  chains  which  can  be  easily 
passed  by  an  army  only  at  the  extremities. 
Through  New  York  and  through  Georgia  are 
broad  roads  leading  into  the  Mississippi  valley. 
If  the  invader  chose  one  and  neglected  the  other, 
the  United  States  army  could  successfully  cut  his 
communications  with  his  fleet  and  leave  him  at  our 
mercy  somewhere  in  the  interior.  He  would  be 
compelled  to  operate  in  force  through  both,  and  to 
guard  in  addition  approaches  like  the  Cumber- 
land Gap,  in  order  to  protect  his  rear.  In  fact, 
the  Mississippi  valley  is  a  great  natural  fortress, 
separated  from  the  sea  on  both  sides  by  mountains 
whose  passes  are  neither  numerous  nor  difficult  of 

29 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

defense.  In  this  vast  territory  live  the  major- 
ity of  the  American  people  and  in  it  are  all  the 
essentials  for  equipping  an  army  and  for  its  in- 
definite maintenance.  The  loss  of  New  York  as 
a  seaport  and  commercial  center  could  be  easily 
remedied  by  using  some  other  excellent  harbor. 
Effectively  to  blockade  the  United  States  would 
be  a  colossal  task  for  the  English  fleet;  to  take 
military  possession  and  hold  it  would  be  a  colossal 
task  for  the  German  army.  The  strategic  charac- 
ter of  the  Atlantic  coast  and  of  the  Mississippi 
valley  is  such  as  to  require  the  full  strength  of  any 
European  power  for  conquest  and  perhaps  even 
for  invasion. 

This  makes  truly  significant  the  delicate  balance 
of  the  European  situation.  Any  nation  sending 
enough  ships  and  men  to  insure  success  in  opera- 
tions against  the  United  States  would  so  weaken 
its  forces  in  Europe  as  to  invite  annihilation  at  the 
hands  of  its  potential  enemies  who  have  been 
waiting  for  centuries  for  it  to  commit  some  such 
capital  blunder.  There  are  several  armies  in 
Europe  and  three  fleets  which  could  undertake 
hostile  operations  against  the  United  States  with 
definite  prospects  of  success.  There  is  no  doubt 
about  it:  the  United  States  can  be  invaded,  it 
might  even  be  conquered ;  but  success  would  not 

30 


AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE 

be  of  the  slightest  conceivable  importance  to  any 
European  state,  and  would  involve  operations  of 
such  magnitude  that  the  aggressor  would  risk  his 
national  independence  in  Europe.  The  delicate 
balance  between  the  various  European  nations, 
their  rivalries  and  hatreds,  their  determination  to 
prevent  any  one  state  from  becoming  too  strong^ 
have  been  therefore  a  cardinal  factor  in  our  stra- 
tegic position.  So  long  as  this  balance  endures,  it 
will  so  aid  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  the  strategic 
character  of  the  United  States  itself  as  to  make 
us  virtually  invulnerable. 

Assuming,  however,  that  no  European  nation 
had  anything  to  gain  by  the  political  control  of  the 
United  States  or  by  its  military  conquest,  were 
there  not  economic  reasons  rendering  such  opera- 
tions desirable?  That  there  have  never  been  such 
economic  motives  in  the  past  has  also  been  an  im- 
portant factor  in  our  strategic  position.  For  up- 
wards of  two  centuries  the  Western  Hemisphere 
was  easy  prey  for  several  of  the  European  nations, 
and  had  there  been  a  strong  economic  motive 
counseling  possession,  the  present  territory  of  the 
United  States  might  well  have  been  the  scene  of  a 
battle  royal  or  have  experienced  at  least  the  vicis- 
situdes of  Central  America  and  the  West  Indies. 
But  while  the  United  States  has  had  the  greatest 

31 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

attraction  for  individuals,  it  has  never  furnished 
nations  with  an  adequate  incentive  for  political 
conquest.  Here  men  and  women  have  sought 
homes  on  a  fertile  soil,  blest  by  climate  and  nature, 
but  where  the  products  which  interested  European 
nations  were  lacking.  The  Spaniard  conquered 
Mexico  and  Peru  for  their  gold  and  silver;  the 
English  fought  and  bled  to  monopolize  the  impor- 
tation of  negroes  to  the  West  Indies  and  to  Central 
America;  kings  and  princes  risked  the  investment 
of  money  in  the  Hudson  Bay  Company  for  the 
exploitation  of  the  fur  trade  in  northern  Canada; 
and  such  was  the  value  of  the  sugar  trade  of  the 
West  Indies  in  the  eighteenth  century  that  Euro- 
pean nations  fairly  jostled  against  one  another  in 
their  haste  to  acquire  islands.  But  tobacco,  cod- 
fish, grain,  lumber,  lacked  speculative  attraction. 
Indeed,  we  had  nothing  which  the  Europeans 
would  accept  after  importunity,  and  were  obliged 
to  sell  our  own  produce  in  the  West  India  Islands, 
the  Azores,  or  Africa,  where  products  could  be  had 
which  possessed  exchange  value  in  Europe.  Clearly 
continental  America  possessed  nothing  which  any 
European  nation  thought  a  fair  reward  for  the 
expense  and  difficulty  of  conquest.  The  English 
never  had  to  fight  to  retain  possession  of  their 
continental  colonies;  the  French  and  Indian  wars 

32 


AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE 

were  nothing  more  than  raids.  The  real  object  of 
the  Seven  Years'  War  was  the  conquest  of  the 
French  colonies.  In  fact,  the  English  themselves 
did  not  regard  their  continental  colonies  as  of  any 
particular  consequence  until  1763,  for  the  attention 
of  the  Government  and  of  individuals  was  riveted 
upon  the  West  India  Islands.  Thus,  during  the 
decades  when  the  continental  colonies  were  in  the 
making,  the  economic  interests  of  Europe  lay  else- 
where, and  the  general  routes  of  trade  left  them 
to  one  side.  They  occupied,  indeed,  as  far  as 
Europe  was  concerned,  for  many,  many  decades 
the  invulnerable,  though  undesirable  position  of 
the  poor  man  who  has  nothing  which  the  thieves 
value,  and  who  therefore  goes  his  way  in  peace. 

Our  strategic  position  is  really  the  result  of  the 
interaction  and  interdependence  of  these  factors. 
None  of  them  alone  would  be  quite  so  potent. 
When  the  width  of  the  Atlantic  and  the  distance 
in  space  and  time  from  Europe  add  themselves  to 
the  fact  that  our  location  has  no  strategic  relation- 
ship, advantageous  or  disadvantageous,  for  warring 
European  powers,  and  then  join  to  themselves  the 
large  force  needed  to  undertake  operations  against 
the  United  States  plus  the  extreme  danger  to 
which  the  despatch  of  such  a  force  from  Europe 
would  expose  the  aggressor,  a  position  somewhat 
3  33 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

approaching  invulnerability  is  the  result.  When 
in  addition  we  literally  possess  nothing  here  which 
would  warrant  any  European  nation  in  conquering 
us,  we  may  breathe  with  considerable  freedom  and 
calmly  regard  statements  that  we  are  in  imme- 
diate danger.  As  long  as  these  strategic  factors 
exist,  continental  United  States  will  never  be  in 
danger  of  European  invasion  or  conquest.  The 
question  whether  they  are  about  to  change  must 
be  reserved  for  another  chapter. 

How  admirably  these  forces  have  protected  us 
in  the  past  centuries  appears  in  our  history.  In  the 
early  sixteenth  century  the  Spanish  explored  the 
United  States  with  some  pertinacity  and  saw  no- 
thing that  they  cared  for.  The  victory  of  the  Eng- 
lish fleet  over  the  Spanish  Armada  in  1588  and  the 
revolt  of  the  Dutch  effectually  occupied  the  efforts 
of  Spain's  greatest  ruler.  Then  during  the  long 
years  when  the  weak  and  struggling  English 
colonies  might  have  been  wiped  out  by  assault,  the 
English  fleet  protected  us  from  other  nations.  The 
Atlantic  Ocean  and  the  separation  in  distance  and 
time  saved  us  from  English  administrative  inter- 
ference and  enabled  us  to  develop  an  indigenous, 
democratic,  independent  administration.  During 
the  seventeenth  century  English  kings  and  minis- 
ters were  much  preoccupied  with  the  Civil  War, 

34 


AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE 

the  Restoration,  and  the  Revolution  of  1689. 
Scarcely  had  these  been  settled  when  a  series  of 
European  wars  consumed  most  of  the  money  and 
much  of  the  energy  of  the  mother  country.  Then 
there  were  the  West  India  Islands,  from  which 
came  a  great  income. 

In  the  time  of  George  III,  the  mother  country 
first  realized  the  strength  and  importance  of  the 
colonies  which  had  grown  up  on  the  mainland,  and 
the  attempt  of  ministers  to  erect  an  efficient  ad- 
ministration of  officials  resident  in  America  opened 
the  eyes  of  the  colonists  to  the  reality  of  their 
political  and  administrative  independence  of  the 
English  Government,  and  proved  to  them  the  very 
simple  thesis  that,  if  they  had  wrought  so  well  in 
the  past  unaided,  they  were  abundantly  able  to 
govern  themselves  in  the  future  without  assistance. 
The  Atlantic  Ocean  was  the  true  basis  of  this 
independence,  and  the  English  army  and  the 
English  fleet  could  not  in  any  conceivable  manner 
remove  it.  There  was  in  reality  nothing  to  defend. 
We  must  eventually  have  won  the  Revolution,  even 
if  we  lost  every  battle.  In  fact,  Washington  soon 
saw  that  he  had  merely  to  fight  a  defensive  war  and 
wear  out  the  English;  that  the  one  thing  he  had  to 
fear  was  a  serious  defeat  in  the  open  field,  an 
eventuality  easily  evaded  by  not  accepting  battle 

35 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

unless  the  conditions  were  unusually  favorable  or 
the  political  situation  made  some  sort  of  a  stand 
advisable. 

The  English,  too,  soon  learned  the  truth.  They 
found  that  there  were  no  strategic  points  on  the 
Atlantic  Coast.  They  tried  Boston,  New  York, 
Philadelphia,  and  learned,  to  their  great  disgust, 
that  marching  and  countermarching  had  been  of 
no  avail;  when  in  force  they  had  marched  pretty 
much  where  they  wished,  but  were  no  better  off 
than  if  they  had  stayed  where  they  were  in  the 
first  place.  Conquest  would  require  a  very  large 
army,  would  compel  them  to  hold  a  great  variety 
of  widely  severed  districts,  and  would  make  essen- 
tial subsequently  the  garrisoning  of  the  country  by 
an  army  almost  as  large  as  the  one  needed  to  con- 
quer it  in  order  to  keep  it  in  subjection.  The 
Americans  had  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  they 
could  resist  any  effort  the  English  could  bring  to 
bear  and  could  continue  the  war  indefinitely.  The 
English  were  no  less  confident  that  they  possessed 
enough  force  to  win  the  war,  but  they  had  no  doubt 
whatever  that  conquest  involved  an  operation  of 
greater  magnitude  than  was  worth  while.  They 
weakened  their  position  in  Europe  more  than  was 
safe,  and  gained  nothing  commensurate  from  a 
military  and  naval  point  of  view.  The  continental 

36 


AMERICAN   INDEPENDENCE 

colonies  were  worthless  possessions  upon  which  to 
expend  effort  and  resources  when  the  same  amount 
of  exertion  could  be  directed  easily  enough  toward 
possessions  in  the  Mediterranean  and  India  of  in- 
dubitable value.  The  Revolutionary  army  was 
not  actually  called  upon  to  expel  the  British;  the 
strategic  factors  were  too  powerful  to  require  more 
than  assistance.  The  army,  in  fact,  merely  has- 
tened a  result  which  time  alone  and  passive  re- 
sistance could  not  have  failed  in  the  end  to  secure. 

The  formative  effect  of  our  strategic  position 
upon  our  policy  has  been  deep  and  fundamental. 
So  well  was  the  operation  of  these  factors  under- 
stood by  the  Revolutionary  leaders  that  they 
firmly  impressed  upon  the  country  the  obvious 
conclusion  that  our  political  independence  would 
not  require  elaborate  military  dispositions  to  main- 
tain. For  us  wars  would  be  abnormal  and  in  vio- 
lation of  the  true  interests  of  the  aggressor,  since 
no  European  power  would  possess  a  motive  for 
assailing  us  or  for  challenging  our  independence. 

It  should  be  laid  down,  therefore,  as  a  funda- 
mental tenet  of  American  policy  that  we  need  not 
anticipate  war  or  prepare  for  it  as  a  probable  con- 
tingency. Our  organization  should  be  fundamen- 
tally non-military.  What  had  not  needed  armies  to 
create  could  not  normally  require  armies  to  main- 

37 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

tain.  If  wars  did  come,  if  they  were,  so  to  speak, 
thrust  upon  us,  we  should  meet  them  as  best  we 
could,  and  depend  upon  the  peculiar  structure  of 
our  country  to  delay  the  invader's  progress  while 
we  were  making  adequate  preparations.  Civil 
war,  if  such  an  unfortunate  eventuality  should 
arise,  would  find  both  parties  equally  unprepared 
and  therefore  equally  matched;  but  civil  war  was 
almost  entirely  abnormal,  unexpected,  accidental, 
and  obviously  not  a  thing  to  be  prepared  for  in  a 
healthy  political  community.  The  necessity,  there- 
fore, of  the  defense  of  the  country  by  a  large  army 
was  not  regarded  as  likely  by  the  men  who  won 
our  independence,  and  to  whom  indeed  we  owe 
the  fundamentally  non-military  character  of  our 
organization  and  the  established  conviction  that 
for  the  United  States  armies  are  abnormal. 
Whether  or  not  the  time  has  come  to  reconsider 
this  decision  will  appear  in  its  proper  place  for 
discussion. 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  SEA 

THE  undisputed  supremacy  of  the  continent  of 
North  America  in  our  own  hands,  the  un- 
disputed control  of  the  seas  by  England — 
these  two  have  been  fundamental  formative  in- 
fluences in  the  development  of  the  United  States, 
and  have  left  deep  marks  upon  its  foreign  policy. 
Even  before  the  germs  of  English  colonies  existed 
in  the  present  United  States,  this  sea-power  was 
a  reality,  and  to-day  it  still  endures.  We  have 
adjusted  ourselves  to  this  fact  during  the  long  cen- 
turies of  growth,  and  have  so  accustomed  ourselves 
to  it  that  we  regard  it  almost  as  one  of  the  world's 
axioms,  to  be  accepted  accordingly.  Yet  we  can- 
not omit  from  consideration  the  sea-power  in 
England's  hands  and  explain  or  understand  the 
history  of  the  United  States. 

To  it  we  owe  the  predominantly  English  char- 
acter of  American  civilization.    Many  races  arriv- 

39 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

ing  here  at  different  epochs  have  somehow  or 
other  become  fused  and  amalgamated  into  a  differ- 
ent nation  from  any  of  them,  a  nation  perhaps  of 
mixed  blood,  but  whose  characteristics  are  pre- 
dominantly English.  The  English  language  has 
conquered  all  other  tongues,  as  English  literature 
for  the  vast  majority  has  conquered  all  other 
literary  traditions.  Few  other  races  preserve  either 
their  identity  or  their  language  into  the  third  gen- 
eration, and  in  most  it  disappears  in  the  second 
generation.  Our  laws,  courts,  and  institutions 
are  as  clearly  descendants  of  the  English  institu- 
tions of  the  seventeenth  century  as  are  the  present 
practices  in  England.  While  tolerant  of  all  reli- 
gions, the  United  States  is  reckoned  a  Protestant 
nation,  drawing  its  religious  inspiration  in  the 
main  from  characteristic  forms  of  English  Protes- 
tantism. So  much  was  assured  on  that  summer 
day  when  the  English  fleet  wrested  the  supremacy 
of  the  sea  from  the  Spanish  Armada  in  the  English 
Channel ;  the  part  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  not 
already  occupied  by  the  Spanish  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  nation  whose  fleet  controlled  its  approaches ; 
for  better  or  for  worse  that  nation  was  to  play  the 
leading  part  in  colonizing  and  developing  the 
Northern  Continent.  The  supremacy  of  the  sea 
made  this  inevitable.  For  this  same  reason  the 

40 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  SEA 

English  nation  is  the  only  nation  which  has  played 
a  part  as  a  nation  in  the  upbuilding  of  the  United 
States.  From  other  nations  have  come  persons  of 
ability,  sincerity,  and  intelligence,  whose  coopera- 
tion has  been  vital  to  the  result;  but  the  only 
European  nation  to  play  a  part  in  shaping  the 
United  States  is  England.  This  is  a  legacy  of  the 
supremacy  of  the  sea  to  the  United  States,  and 
there  is  in  our  history  hardly  another  fact  to  be 
compared  with  it  in  significance. 

The  exact  nature  of  England's  supremacy  of  the 
sea  is  extremely  subtle  and  complex,  and  from  an 
international  point  of  view  is  composed  as  much 
of  the  things  which  the  English  refrain  from  doing 
as  of  those  which  they  do;  indeed,  so  far  as  the 
United  States  is  concerned,  what  the  English  fleet 
could  do  if  it  chose  has  scarcely  entered  into  the 
problem.  The  English  supremacy  of  the  sea  funda- 
mentally was  and  is  a  domestic  necessity  main- 
tained rather  as  a  part  of  England's  defensive 
position  on  the  channel  than  for  the  purpose  of 
exerting  influence  in  different  parts  of  the  world. 
It  is  this  fact  which  we  must  firmly  grasp  if  we  are 
to  understand  the  relation  of  the  English  sea- 
power  to-day  to  international  alliances  in  general 
and  to  the  United  States  in  particular. 

Many  centuries  ago  the  English  saw  that  the 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

control  by  a  fleet  of  the  waters  surrounding  their 
island  would  make  it  invulnerable.  Armies  had 
to  be  conveyed  across  the  channel  by  fleets,  and 
could  be  more  easily  defeated  before  they  started 
than  after  they  arrived.  From  the  first  they 
developed  their  fleet,  became  in  time  a  nation  of 
sailors,  and  developed  a  new  type  of  ship  and  a 
variety  of  naval  strategy  and  tactics  which  in 
1588  vanquished  by  their  own  inherent  excellence 
the  former  possessor  of  the  supremacy  of  the  sea. 

Originally  intended  for  defense  against  invasion, 
the  fleet  was  promptly  seen  to  be  an  instrument 
capable  of  a  variety  of  uses.  When  England 
realized  decades  later  that  she  could  no  longer 
maintain  her  population  from  produce  raised  in 
the  British  Isles,  she  began  to  import  the  necessary 
food,  and  soon  the  raw  materials  required  to  keep 
her  factories  at  work,  secure  in  the  conviction 
that  the  fleet  would  keep  open  the  highways  over 
which  her  own  merchant  marine  brought  her  these 
necessities  of  life  from  distant  lands.  To-day  the 
industrial  fabric  of  England  is  built  upon  the  sea- 
power.  The  very  food  and  clothes  of  her  swelling 
millions  depend  upon  it.  It  is  still  the  premise  of 
continued  existence,  the  essential  prerequisite  of 
prosperity.  Yet  although  to-day  more  than  ever 
the  prime  factor  in  England's  policy,  it  is  still  not 

42 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  SEA 

an  international,  but  primarily  a  domestic,  factor. 
It  was  not  created  to  threaten  or  rule  other  nations, 
and  exerts  an  influence  in  international  affairs 
only  as  a  result  of  its  necessary  existence  for  the 
maintenance  of  domestic  peace  and  prosperity. 
It  is  to-day  so  vital  for  defense  that  it  could  not 
possibly  be  used  for  aggression  alone ;  to  risk  in  an 
offensive  war,  undertaken  purely  for  aggression, 
the  very  bulwark  of  the  national  existence  would 
be  folly  of  the  worst  description,  a  fact  of  the 
utmost  consequence  in  the  study  of  international 
affairs. 

As  soon  as  the  English  discovered  how  indis- 
pensable the  fleet  was  to  their  own  welfare,  they 
viewed  in  a  different  light  the  existence  of  other 
navies.  The  latter  were  by  no  means  rivals  of  an 
English  fleet  engaged  in  aggressive  attempts  to 
broaden  the  English  domain  and  thus  to  extend 
her  authority  and  power;  they  were  possible 
assailants  of  England,  possible  protectors  of  an 
invading  army,  and  were,  first  and  foremost, 
capable  of  taking  the  bread  from  the  mouths  of 
Englishmen  and  of  stripping  their  clothes  from 
their  backs.  Such  a  possibility  could  not  be  coolly 
contemplated.  The  very  life  of  England  depended 
upon  the  control  of  the  sea,  not  merely  upon  the 
prevention  of  armed  invasion.  She  did  not  there- 

43 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

fore  believe  it  expedient  to  countenance  rival 
navies  or  rival  merchant  fleets,  for  in  the  days 
of  wooden  sailing-ships  a  large  merchant  marine 
could  be  readily  transformed  into  a  navy  quite 
capable  of  fighting  with  deadly  effect.  To  her 
hostility  of  navies  and  merchant  marines  she 
joined  a  disinclination  to  leave  the  strategic  points 
controlling  the  ocean  roads  in  the  hands  of  other 
nations.  They  were  in  fact  of  no  great  importance 
for  the  defense  of  England  from  invasion  and  of  no 
vital  assistance  in  aggression  against  other  nations; 
they  did  insure  England's  firm  control  of  the  ocean 
highways  along  which  came  her  food  supplies. 

Until  1776  the  American  colonies  were  a  part  of 
the  British  Empire,  and  were  protected  from  the 
aggression  of  other  nations  by  the  English  fleet. 
Our  colonial  trade  and  shipping  were  fostered  by 
the  Navigation  Acts,  and  were  together  the  basis 
of  the  wealth  which  made  the  colonies  strong 
enough  in  1776  to  claim  and  to  make  good  their 
independence.  If  our  independence  is  primarily 
due  to  our  own  strategic  position,  it  is  almost  as 
fundamentally  the  work  of  the  supremacy  of  the 
sea.  • 

The  English  have  understood  the  limitations  of 
the  fleet  as  well  as  they  have  its  uses.  It  could 
control  the  approaches  to  various  countries;  it 

44 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  SEA 

could  insure  access  to  English  ships  and  restrict 
the  access  of  other  nations;  it  could  always  secure 
for  the  English  commercial  privileges.  In  this 
sense  it  could  control  the  land,  but  never  could  it 
insure  or  even  make  possible  political  domination. 
With  the  cooperation  of  an  army  transported  and 
maintained  by  the  fleet,  conquest  was  possible; 
without  it,  impossible.  While  the  fleet  controlled 
the  sea,  England  at  home  was  invulnerable,  an 
army  was  unnecessary,  and  the  English  grew  to 
look  upon  the  creation  of  an  army  as  an  extraor- 
dinary measure  of  so  unusual  and  indeed  of  so 
unessential  a  nature  as  to  require  the  most  ex- 
traordinary justification.  To  send  an  army  away 
from  England  could  be  expedient  in  few  cir- 
cumstances. Were  there  any  benefits  likely  to 
accrue  to  England  from  conquest  and  political 
domination  which  the  fleet  could  not  secure  un- 
aided by  the  simple  fact  of  its  ability  to  close  the 
seas?  The  tradition  grew  firm  that  any  object 
which  could  not  be  attained  by  the  fleet  with  the 
aid  of  a  relatively  small  army  was  prima  facie 
something  certain  to  cost  for  its  achievement  out 
of  all  proportion  to  its  value.  England's  island 
position,  the  defensive  character  of  her  sea-power, 
made  her  a  non-military  nation  whose  fundamen- 
tal position  made  essential  an  offensive  policy  on 

45 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  sea  only  when  her  control  was  threatened, 
and  made  inexpedient  attempts  at  the  political 
domination  of  distant  countries  the  moment  large 
military  forces  became  necessary  to  establish  or 
maintain  it. 

For  the  United  States  there  could  scarcely  have 
been  a  decision  of  greater  importance.  The  su- 
premacy of  the  sea  has  been  for  three  centuries, 
throughout  the  whole  of  our  history,  in  the  hands 
of  a  nation  whose  own  position  made  inexpedient 
an  attempt  to  expand  its  political  authority  out- 
side its  own  borders.  The  question  of  force, 
naturally,  was  not  raised  until  the  American 
Revolution.  We  were  until  then  willing  subjects 
of  England,  valuing  the  connection  and  admiring 
the  mother  country.  With  the  issue  over  which 
the  war  broke  out  we  are  not  here  concerned.  A 
dispute  did  arise;  subjects  of  England  declined 
flatly  to  obey  administrative  orders  and  statutes 
passed  by  the  mother  country;  they  declared  in 
words  and  made  good  in  arms  their  determination 
to  resist.  They  created  promptly  a  situation  to 
which  this  fundamental  English  policy  applied. 
Was  the  political  domination  in  the  colonies  worth 
maintaining  by  an  army? 

The  nature  of  the  trouble  was  the  all-important 
factor  to  establish.  The  English  learned  from  all 

46 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  SEA 

their  officers  and  officials  as  well  as  from  many 
Americans  that  there  was  no  revolution,  but  sim- 
ply an  armed  outbreak  led  by  a  few  gentlemen  of 
excellent  character,  but  misguided  notions,  whose 
following  consisted  of  men  without  property  and 
aiming  at  their  own  personal  aggrandizement  and 
without  sympathy  with  the  lofty  ideals  held  by  the 
leaders.  The  movement  possessed,  so  the  English 
were  told,  neither  strength,  coherence,  nor  support. 
A  little  show  of  force ,— and  it  would  be  quite  essen- 
tial to  show  it  and  not  to  exert  it, — a  little  pressure 
on  exactly  the  right  persons,  the  hanging  of  a  few 
and  the  exiling  of  a  few  more,  and  the  whole  would 
be  over.  Some  years  were  needed  to  convince 
George  III  and  his  advisers  that  their  informants 
in  America  had  been  badly  mistaken  as  to  the 
size  and  character  of  the  movement.  Force  had 
been  shown,  and  had  not  terrified  the  "rebels"  in 
the  least;  several  attempts  to  apply  it  had  been 
met  with  a  firmness  which  proved  that  the  new 
movement  was  by  no  means  the  work  of  a  low- 
spirited  rabble;  the  character  of  the  men  who  had 
come  forward  all  over  the  country  to  lend  it  coun- 
tenance and  support  demonstrated  beyond  doubt 
that  the  wealth  and  intelligence  of  the  country  had 
by  no  means  rallied  unanimously  in  support  of 
English  authority. 

47 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

The  moment  the  truth  became  clear  in  London 
the  whole  situation  took  on  a  vitally  different 
aspect.  There  had  been  little  hesitation  about 
dealing  promptly  with  disorderly  conduct  in  the 
colonies.  There  was  much  hesitation  about  under- 
taking the  conquest  of  thirteen  colonies  which  be- 
lieved themselves  independent  and  whose  willing 
and  efficient  cooperation  in  the  future  was  a  matter 
of  grave  doubt.  That  they  could  subdue  the 
colonies  they  were  quite  sure,  but  they  were  not 
by  any  means  sure  it  was  worth  doing.  That  it 
could  not  be  done  by  the  English  forces  then  in 
America  five  years  of  campaigning  had  abundantly 
demonstrated.  Many  thousands  of  men,  and 
elaborate  equipment  would  be  needed  to  conquer 
the  colonies  in  the  first  place,  and  the  English 
generals  who  had  seen  service  in  America  insisted 
that  it  would  afterward  be  necessary,  in  order  to 
maintain  English  authority,  to  garrison  the  coun- 
try with  almost  as  large  an  army  as  was  needed  to 
conquer  it.  Was  there  anything  to  gain  from  the 
conquest  of  the  Americans  which  the  fleet  and  the 
supremacy  of  the  sea  did  not  absolutely  insure 
England?  The  game  was  not  worth  while.  The 
support  of  armies  at  a  distance  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  political  domination  was  contrary  to 
England's  best  interests. 

48 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  SEA 

Adam  Smith  had  pointed  out  before  the  Revolu- 
tion that  American  trade  did  not  flow  to  England 
because  of  the  political  connection,  but  for  eco- 
nomic reasons,  and  some  dim  appreciation  of  this 
fact  had  dawned  upon  English  statesmen  by  1783. 
They  saw  clearly  that  our  trade  was  the  only  thing 
really  valuable  for  England,  and  that  no  other 
nation  could  get  it  without  England's  permission ; 
and  they  believed  that  we  would  trade  with  Eng- 
land rather  than  not  trade  at  all.  Let  us  not 
say  that  we  owe  our  independence  to  England's 
forbearance  or  to  her  decision  that  conquest  was  in- 
expedient. We  owe  our  independence  to  the  Atlan- 
tic Ocean  and  to  our  strategic  position,  which  must 
in  the  long  run  have  given  us  the  victory,  even  if 
we  assume  so  incredible  a  notion  as  the  entire 
worthlessness  of  the  Revolutionary  army.  But 
the  English  decision  undoubtedly  gave  us  our  in- 
dependence at  a  much  lower  cost  than  we  should 
otherwise  have  had  to  pay  for  it,  and  established 
forever  in  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  the 
principle  that  political  domination  of  the  United 
States  was  from  an  English  point  of  view  entirely 
inexpedient.  Ever  since  1783  this  has  been  a 
cornerstone  of  English  foreign  policy. 

There  could  scarcely  be  a  more  important  factor 
in  the  history  of  the  United  States  than  the  control 
4  49 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

of  the  sea  and,  therefore,  of  all  the  approaches  to 
this  country  by  a  power  whose  own  interests  led 
her  to  prevent  other  nations'  access  with  hostile 
intent,  and  whose  interests  also  led  her  to  consider 
inexpedient  the  use  of  her  power  for  conquest  or 
political  domination. 

The  true  nature  of  the  sea-power  and  of  its 
benefits  to  us  were  appreciated  by  a  few  of  the 
leaders  in  America,  but  by  none  of  the  rank  and 
file.  The  Revolution  cost  us  all  our  privileges  on 
the  sea  and  in  British  possessions  and  resulted  in  a 
commercial  crisis  of  the  first  magnitude.  For  the 
first  time  we  were  in  opposition  to  the  sea-power, 
and  the  cause  of  our  difficulties  was  less  clear  than 
the  practical  effects  upon  shipping  and  trade.  The 
feeling  in  America  was  in  the  main  one  of  acute 
indignation  that  the  tyrant's  hand  should  still  be 
able  to  interfere  with  our  destinies.  In  general,  the 
people  were  hostile  to  England  as  the  oppressor 
from  whom  we  had  just  been  freed,  and  extremely 
friendly  to  France,  whose  assistance  had  materially 
hastened  the  end  of  the  war.  There  was  on  the 
whole  a  disposition  to  defy  England  and  bid  her 
do  her  worst.  We  therefore  proceeded  to  quarrel 
with  the  sea-power  about  things  in  general  and 
presently  about  things  more  specific. 

The  outbreak  of  the  French  Revolution  led  to  the 
50 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  SEA 

creation  of  a  demand  in  Europe  for  the  food  staples 
which  the  colonies  raised  in  large  quantities,  but 
the  bulk  of  which  had  hitherto  made  the  freights 
too  costly  to  permit  export  to  the  Continent  or  to 
England.  With  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  prices 
soared  to  a  height  which  made  exportation  from 
America  not  only  possible,  but  highly  profitable. 
A  brisk  trade  sprang  up,  the  bulk  of  which  tended 
to  drift  to  France,  where  the  need  was  greatest  and 
the  prices  highest,  and  to  a  people,  moreover,  for 
whom  most  Americans  had  the  liveliest  admiration 
and  whom  they  were  glad  to  supply  with  the 
materials  needed  to  fight  our  own  old  enemy. 
Friction  with  England  was  inevitable.  We  were 
breaking  the  English  statutes;  we  were  creating  a 
merchant  marine;  we  were  supplying  England's 
enemy;  English  deserters  were  obtaining  protec- 
tion in  our  merchant  fleet  and  even  in  our  navy,  so 
they  claimed ;  we  were  carrying  contraband  of  war 
in  vessels  built  in  America,  but  manned  by  cos- 
mopolitan crews.  In  short,  we  were  doing  all  the 
things  which  the  English  had  deemed  from  the 
earliest  times  peculiarly  inimical  to  their  suprem- 
acy of  the  sea  in  its  defensive  aspect,  and  they 
therefore  enforced  strictly  their  rules  regarding 
the  right  of  search,  the  seizure  of  English  deserters 
upon  American  vessels,  and  the  confiscation  of 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

contraband  in  American  ships.  We  protested  in 
vain.  We  also  fought  in  vain.  We  could  not  hope 
by  direct  attack  to  damage  the  victor  of  Trafalgar, 
the  possessor  of  the  greatest  fleet  known  to  history. 
Our  strategic  position,  defensively  invulnerable, 
was  without  offensive  strength  against  a  European 
power. 

The  statesmen  who  began  the  War  of  1812  do 
not  seem  to  have  expected  to  extort  anything 
from  England  by  aggression.  They  thought  indeed 
that  our  privateers  and  frigates  might  prey  upon 
her  commerce  and  do  enough  damage  to  make  it 
worth  her  while  to  concede  us  something;  but 
they  knew  that  our  ships  were  swift  rather  than 
large,  our  sailors  gallant  rather  than  numerous,  and 
that  pitched  battles  with  English  fleets  were  out 
of  the  question.  With  the  destruction  of  mer- 
chantmen and  the  capture  or  destruction  now  and 
then  of  some  frigate  or  sloop  of  war,  they  were  well 
satisfied.  The  real  pawn  in  the  game  upon  which 
they  counted  was  Canada.  There  was  little  doubt 
in  Washington  that  it  could  be  easily  conquered, 
and  less  doubt  that  it  would  give  us  a  decidedly 
valuable  possession  to  offer  the  English  in  exchange 
for  commercial  rights  of  various  sorts.  They 
thought  they  could  buy  with  it  what  they  could 
not  take.  As  for  Canada,  they  knew  the  Cana- 

52 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  SEA 

dians  to  be  fewer  in  number  than  the  Americans, 
and  probably  no  better  prepared  for  war.  Troops 
from  England  would,  at  any  rate,  not  appear  in 
considerable  numbers  while  the  crisis  abroad  was 
so  serious.  This  would  enable  them,  they  believed, 
to  conquer  Canada  in  the  first  place,  and,  once 
in  our  hands,  the  same  forces  which  had  pre- 
vented England  from  conquering  America  in  the 
Revolution  would  effectively  stand  in  the  way  of 
reconquering  Canada  without  paying  an  enor- 
mously heavier  price  than  the  commercial  con- 
cessions the  United  States  demanded.  The  en- 
deavor failed,  however,  and  proved  the  complete 
futility  of  attempting  to  challenge  the  English 
supremacy  on  the  sea  with  obviously  inadequate 
resources.  It  proved  also  our  inability  to  extort 
terms  from  England  by  other  methods. 

The  end  of  the  War  of  1812  brought  once  more 
into  prominence  the  policy  earlier  espoused  by 
the  more  moderate  leaders,  Washington,  Madison, 
Hamilton,  Jay,  as  soon  as  the  Revolution  had 
made  clear  the  importance  of  the  British  sea-power. 
The  United  States,  they  had  maintained,  must 
have  cordial  relations  and,  if  possible,  an  alliance 
with  the  power  controlling  the  sea.  That  England 
had  been  the  mother  country  from  whom  we  had 
just  won  our  independence  was  regrettable,  but  it 

53 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

must  not  stand  in  the  way  of  our  interest  in  foster- 
ing cordial  relations  with  the  power  controlling  all 
the  approaches  to  our  country  and  all  our  inter- 
course and  foreign  trade.  Access  to  the  West 
Indies  and  to  Europe  we  must  have;  only  with 
England's  consent  and  on  England's  terms  could 
we  have  it;  we  must  therefore  get  such  terms  as 
we  could,  and  hope  in  time  for  better.  The  Anti- 
Federalists  had  always  considered  hostility  toward 
England  as  the  late  mother  country  more  import- 
ant than  our  commercial  association  with  England 
as  the  sea-power.  That  the  two  were  irreconcilable 
they  declined  to  admit  till  after  the  War  of  1812. 
There  was  then  something  approaching  an  agree- 
ment that  our  own  interests  required  us  to  ally 
with  the  supremacy  of  the  sea,  and  to  make  that 
alliance  a  fundamental  factor  of  our  foreign  policy 
to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  interests,  antipathies, 
or  friendships.  *  Since  then  such  has  in  fact  been 
our  policy,  although  it  has  rarely  been  openly 
avowed  and  has  often  been  threatened  with  rup- 
ture by  the  rise  of  other  interests  upon  which  we 
clashed  with  England. 

1  "Great  Britain  is  the  nation  which  can  do  us  the  most  harm 
of  any  one  or  all  on  earth;  and  with  her  on  our  side  we  need  not  fear 
the  whole  world.  With  her  then  we  should  most  sedulously 
cherish  a  cordial  friendship." — Jefferson  to  Monroe,  Oct.  24, 1823. 
Writings  of  Monroe,  Hamilton's  ed.,  vi.,  391. 

54 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  SEA 

England  on  her  part  has  seen  the  wisdom  of 
using  her  sea-power  with  moderation,  and  of  per- 
forming with  scrupulous  exactitude  the  various 
duties  it  imposed  upon  her  in  the  interest  of  other 
nations.  So  long  as  she  insisted  that  her  defense 
and  the  protection  of  the  imports  of  food  and  raw 
materials  made  it  necessary  for  her  to  hold  the 
absolute,  unquestioned  supremacy  on  the  sea,  so 
long  she  must  pay  due  heed  to  the  necessities  of 
the  nations  dependent  upon  her  for  their  com- 
munication with  one  another.  To  hamper  their 
freedom  of  trade,  to  charge  extortionate  rates 
because  of  her  monopoly,  to  fail  to  provide  enough 
ships,  would  infallibly  lead  to  discontent,  to  the 
creation  of  powerful  merchant  marines  by  various 
nations  to  render  the  service  which  the  supremacy 
of  the  sea  imposed  upon  her.  An  excellent  mer- 
chant marine,  affording  other  nations  dependent 
upon  her  prompt,  adequate,  reasonable  service, 
with  low  freight  rates,  low  insurance,  and  broker- 
age, has  been  and  still  is  essential  to  the  continu- 
ance of  her  authority.  She  must  freely  and  without 
compulsion  do  for  them  what  they  would  otherwise 
have  to  do  for  themselves,  and  be  satisfied  with 
the  normal  profits  which  their  own  merchants 
might  have  expected  to  pay  to  a  merchant  marine 
of  their  own.  So  much  was  obvious. 

55 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Never  to  abuse  her  power  was  equally  important. 
It  should  never  be  stained  by  aggression,  and  the 
line  between  defense  and  aggression  must  be 
strictly  drawn  and  never  exceeded.  At  any  time  a 
general  alliance  of  the  maritime  nations  against 
her  might  shake  or  even  destroy  the  supremacy 
which  her  own  domestic  needs  made  more  essential 
to  her  than  to  other  nations.  As  long  as  she 
recognized  and  willingly  furthered  the  just  and 
legitimate  interests  of  other  nations  on  the  sea, 
so  long  would  they  in  all  probability  recognize  her 
own  paramount  interest  in  holding  its  supremacy. 
Forbearance,  tact,  wisdom,  generosity  even,  in 
her  relations  with  other  countries,  would  be  as 
vital  as  the  strength  of  the  fleet  itself  in  the  main- 
tenance of  her  supremacy.  She  must  prove  that 
her  sea-power  was  primarily  defensive  by  refrain- 
ing from  using  it  for  purposes  of  aggression.  What 
was  necessary  to  her  must  never  become  intoler- 
able to  others.  In  reality  the  moderation  and 
wisdom  with  which  England  has  used  her  authority 
is  more  responsible  than  the  strength  of  her  fleets 
for  the  length  of  time  that  she  has  been  supreme, 
and  for  the  relatively  few  times  in  the  past  when 
her  control  has  been  really  threatened  or  indeed 
advisedly  questioned. 

To  the  English  control  of  the  sea,  to  their  policy 
56 


THE  SUPREMACY  OF  THE  SEA 

of  regarding  it  primarily  as  defensive,  to  the 
moderation  and  fairness  which  they  have  dis- 
played in  their  use  of  it,  we  owe  our  lack  of  a  strong 
merchant  marine  intended  for  international  oceanic 
trade  and  the  postulates  upon  which  our  navy  has 
been  built.  Our  contact  with  the  rest  of  the  world 
has  been  in  English  hands,  and  it  is  really  as- 
tonishing that  we  have  found  so  few  grounds  for 
serious  complaint  in  the  past.  Since  the  War  of 
1812  harmonious  relations  have  been  the  rule  with 
England ;  the  mutual  interests  of  both  in  reaching 
agreement  and  in  hearty  cooperation  have  been 
recognized,  and  such  a  cordial  understanding  with 
England  is  one  of  the  few  settled  facts  in  American 
diplomacy.  To  this  sea-power  and  all  that  goes 
with  it  our  whole  economic  fabric  has  been  ad- 
justed. Upon  it  nearly  everything  depends.  We 
have  never  known  any  other  condition,  and  have 
had  no  serious  reasons  since  1815  to  desire  to 
change  it. 

Our  army  is  based  upon  our  strategic  position 
and  the  improbability  of  the  need  of  military 
strength  for  the  maintenance  of  our  political  in- 
dependence. It  has  been  a  police  force  rather 
than  a  military  organization  in  the  European  sense. 
It  is  highly  important  at  this  time  to  realize  that 
our  navy  has  never  been  based  at  any  time  upon 

57 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  assumption  of  challenging  England's  suprem- 
acy of  the  sea.  That  has  become  almost  an 
axiom  of  our  policy.  We  have  attempted  rather 
to  build  a  supplementary  force,  sufficient  to  police 
our  own  waters  and  to  deal  adequately  with  the 
minor  European  navies  which  might  conceivably 
attempt  an  assault  upon  us  at  a  time  when  the 
situation  in  Europe  might  make  the  English 
hesitate  to  send  a  fleet  to  American  waters  on 
their  own  account.  The  recent  growth  of  foreign 
navies  has  caused  a  concentration  of  English 
ships  in  European  waters,  and  has  made  us  feel 
it  desirable  to  strengthen  our  navy  so  as  to  be 
able  to  protect  ourselves  against  any  other  power 
than  England.  There  could  scarcely  be  a  more 
striking  testimonial  to  our  confidence  in  the  fair- 
ness of  England,  of  our  belief  in  the  strength  of  her 
friendship  for  us,  and  in  the  firmness  with  which 
she  means  to  maintain  her  policy  of  defense. 


CHAPTER  III 
SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES 

SCARCELY  less  fundamental  in  its  formative 
influence  upon  our  history  than  our  stra- 
tegic position  and  the  control  of  the  seas 
by  England  has  been  the  existence  of  the  West 
Indies  and  of  South  America.  If  the  first  period 
of  our  history,  a  period  of  growth,  was  dominated 
by  the  Atlantic,  the  second,  a  period  of  commercial 
expansion,  was  dominated  by  the  West  Indian 
trade.  From  its  vital  importance  to  our  well-being 
sprang  that  fundamental  concept  of  American 
policy  that  the  economic  interests  of  the  United 
States  in  the  West  Indies  and  South  America  are 
necessarily  paramount  to  those  of  any  European 
nation,  and  are  so  essential  to  our  welfare  and  to 
the  welfare  of  those  countries  that  we  should  do 
great  violence  to  the  interests  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  if  we  should  allow  any  nation  to 
interfere  with  our  freedom  of  trade.  As  against 

59 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

European  nations,  we  must  be  supreme  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  for  the  mutual  interests  of 
the  United  States  and  Latin  America  demand  it. 
We  must  not  forget  to-day  how  far  back  in  the 
past  this  tradition  has  its  roots,  nor  fail  to  under- 
stand that  it  represents  conditions  which  were  at 
one  time  significant  for  the  national  welfare. 

Throughout  the  first  two  centuries  of  our  exist- 
ence the  trade  of  the  continent  was  entirely  de- 
pendent upon  the  existence  of  the  West  Indian 
islands.  In  those  times  there  were  few  or  no 
manufactures  in  America,  and  American  merchants 
imported  from  England  nearly  every  conceivable 
commodity  from  pins  and  hats  to  laces  and  broad- 
cloths. For  these  we  had  little  to  exchange  which 
the  Europeans  valued:  of  tobacco,  Virginia  and 
Maryland  produced  sufficient  for  their  own  needs 
of  exchange,  but  unquestionably  not  enough  for 
the  needs  of  the  colonies  as  a  whole;  the  staples 
of  New  England,  fish  and  lumber,  the  staples  of 
the  middle  colonies,  wheat,  corn,  and  live  stock, 
were  too  bulky  to  send  to  England,  and  commanded 
too  small  prices  in  a  market  already  overstocked 
with  such  produce  to  make  their  export  profitable. 
The  colonies  needed  a  market  in  which  the  pro- 
duce they  did  raise  could  be  sold  at  profit  and 
in  which  they  could  purchase  something  for 

60 


SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES 

which  Europeans  would  exchange  manufactured 
goods. 

Such  a  market  existed  in  the  West  Indian  islands, 
where  the  sugar  colonies  of  the  various  European 
nations  had  grown  to  considerable  size  by  the 
middle  of  the  seventeenth  century.  They  found 
it  too  expensive  to  produce  food  when  land  and 
labor  brought  in  much  greater  returns  if  devoted 
to  cane,  and  they  therefore  raised  few  of  the  neces- 
sities of  life.  To  bring  from  Europe  adequate 
supplies  of  such  bulky  produce  was  more  expen- 
sive, even  had  not  the  length  of  the  voyage  to 
Europe  and  the  uncertainty  of  arrival  made  sup- 
plies from  such  a  source  precarious.  The  food 
products  of  the  Atlantic  coast  were  as  absolutely 
essential  to  the  West  India  colonists  as  the  market 
was  to  the  continental  colonists.  The  round  of 
colonial  trade  thus  assured  the  needed  exchange. 
The  New  England  merchants  carried  to  Africa  a 
cargo  of  rum,  which  was  exchanged  for  slaves, 
who  were  carried  in  turn  to  the  West  Indian  islands 
for  molasses  or  sugar,  which,  when  taken  back 
to  New  England,  was  converted  into  more  rum 
with  which  to  continue  the  process.  The  food 
products  of  the  coast,  salt  fish  and  the  various 
grains,  lumber  in  all  its  forms,  were  also  exported 
to  the  West  Indies,  where  they  found  ready  sale 

61 


PAN-AMERICANISM  • 

in  exchange  for  sugar  or  molasses,  products  which 
commanded  a  great  market  in  England  and  the 
Continent,  and  which  were  easily  turned  into  manu- 
factured goods,  to  be  brought  back  to  America 
and  sold  by  the  merchants  for  more  of  the 
food  products  with  which  to  continue  the  trade. 
We  furnished  the  West  Indies  with  a  merchant 
marine;  they  furnished  us  with  a  market;  they 
bought  from  us  their  food ;  they  sold  us  the  where- 
withal to  buy  manufactured  goods  in  Europe. 
The  relationship  was  mutual  in  the  best  and 
strictest  sense,  for  it  was  absolutely  essential  to 
the  continued  economic  prosperity  of  both.  From 
it  the  colonists  drew  the  conclusion  that  the  inter- 
ests of  the  Atlantic  Coast  in  the  West  Indies  were 
paramount  to  any  interest  which  any  European 
country  could  have,  and  that  freedom  of  access 
to  the  West  Indies  lay  at  the  root  of  our  prosperity 
as  well  as  of  theirs.  It  was  at  this  time  completely 
true.  From  that  trade  we  obtained  the  wealth 
which  made  us  strong  enough  to  stand  alone,  and 
with  it  we  paid  the  price  of  independence. 

The  result  of  this  situation  and  of  the  conclu- 
sions which  the  colonists  drew  from  it  was  a 
complete  and  frank  disregard  of  European  claims 
and  regulations  intended  to  fetter  or  limit  in  any 
way  this  intercourse.  With  equal  nonchalance 

62 


SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES 

they  violated  the  British  Navigation  Acts,  the 
French  Regulations,  and  the  Spanish  Rules.  As 
all  the  sugar  colonies  of  whatever  nationality 
needed  American  products  and  were  ready  to 
pay  for  them,  the  colonists  sold  to  all  without 
regard  to  nationality.  To  this  they  were  urged 
by  the  rapid  growth  of  the  coast  colonies  during 
the  eighteenth  century,  a  growth  stupendous  in 
percentage  of  population  and  in  the  increase  of 
the  volume  of  produce,  and  which  made  markets 
more  essential  than  ever.  If  the  producers  at 
home  were  to  continue  to  sell  at  profit,  expanding 
markets  were  essential  to  ward  off  the  com- 
mercial ruin  which  a  glut  of  produce  in  home 
markets  would  inevitably  cause.  Soon  the  English 
colonies  on  the  continent  outgrew  the  market  fur- 
nished them  by  the  English  sugar  colonies,  pro- 
duced more  than  the  latter  could  possibly  use,  and 
required  more  goods  for  European  exchange  than 
the  latter  produced.  They  therefore  extended 
the  smuggling  trade  with  the  foreign  possessions 
in  the  West  Indies,  and  drew  into  their  own  hands 
something  approaching  a  monopoly  of  the  West 
Indian  trade,  with  such  results  that  the  year  1764 
showed  them  with  perfect  clearness  that  nothing 
less  than  a  monopoly  of  the  whole  West  Indian 
market  would  suffice  to  absorb  the  volume  of 

63 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

commodities  annually  produced  by  the  thirteen 
colonies.  Unless  they  could  sell  to  this  expand- 
ing market,  production  at  home  must  be  retarded, 
and  the  economic  progress  of  America  proceed  at 
a  less  rapid  pace. 

This  monopoly  of  the  West  Indian  trade  was 
not  received  in  England  with  favor.  So  long 
as  the  English  islands  had  been  fully  supplied 
from  the  continent  they  had  maintained  a  certain 
natural  advantage  over  the  foreign  sugar  colonies, 
whose  supplies  perforce  had  to  be  raised  on  the 
island  or  brought  from  a  great  distance.  When 
the  coast  colonies  sold  produce  to  all,  the  English 
colonies  lost  their  important  advantage,  and  their 
degree  of  profit  was  in  consequence  seriously 
reduced.  The  agreements  entered  into  between 
England  and  France  as  to  privileges  and  restric- 
tions in  the  cod  fisheries  off  Newfoundland  the 
colonists  declined  to  obey.  Salt  fish  was  the  great 
staple  food  for  the  slaves  in  the  West  Indies; 
absolute  freedom  of  access  to  the  supply  of  fish 
was  as  necessary  to  them  as  access  to  the  market 
in  which  to  sell  it;  they  demanded  both,  and  both 
with  very  little  ceremony  they  meant  to  take, 
regulations  or  no  regulations.  To  compel  them  to 
obey  these  regulations  and  the  Navigation  Acts 
was  the  intention  of  much  of  the  English  legisla- 

64 


SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES 

tion  which  led  to  the  American  Revolution.  We 
were  no  longer  to  trade  with  the  foreign  sugar 
colonies.  That  much  was  clear  in  London.  The 
moment  it  became  clear  in  America  the  merchants 
saw  it  would  ruin  the  prosperity  of  the  colonies, 
since  there  was  no  other  market  in  which  the 
surplus  products  could  be  sold. 

They  diagnosed  the  difficulty  as  the  political 
bond  which  bound  the  colonies  to  England  and 
made  them  liable  to  administrative  regulations 
made  in  English  interests  rather  than  in  their  own. 
To  admit  now  that  this  political  bond  also  com- 
pelled them  to  contribute  taxes  for  the  creation  and 
maintenance  of  a  resident  administration  strong 
enough  to  compel  the  observance  of  those  noxious 
regulations  was  to  concede  the  right  of  the  mother 
country  to  ruin  the  colonies.  If  the  political 
bond  was  the  difficulty,  political  freedom  was  the 
cure.  Once  obtained,  it  would  insure  a  freedom 
of  trade  with  the  West  Indies  and  consequently  a 
monopoly  of  the  West  Indian  trade,  for  the  natives 
would  be  forced  to  trade  with  the  coast  colonies 
as  long  as  the  latter  alone  produced  the  desired 
supplies.  Interference  by  European  nations 
could  result  only  in  stopping  the  stream  of  sup- 
lies  which  their  own  colonists  demanded,  and  in 
checking  our  production  of  the  commodities  which 
s  65 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

they  could  obtain  only  from  us.  The  connection 
between  the  colonies  and  the  West  Indian  islands 
was  natural  and  normal,  with  which  interference 
was  artificial,  unnatural,  oppressive,  and  tyranni- 
cal. It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  freemen 
would  endure  such  conditions  or  recognize  a 
political  bond  which  imposed  them. 

To  secure  freedom  of  access  to  the  West  Indian 
and  South  American  trade  we  fought  the  Revolu- 
tion. Administrative  independence  it  was  scarcely 
necessary  to  struggle  for;  our  strategic  position 
had  already  taken  it  from  England's  hands  and 
fairly  thrust  it  into  our  own;  it  was  a  privilege 
they  could  not  hope  to  retain,  a  burden  of  which 
we  could  not  rid  ourselves.  Our  economic  posi- 
tion was  not  thus  assured,  and  a  struggle  was 
thought  well  worth  while  to  remove  a  captious 
and  arbitrary  interference  based  upon  whims  and 
ignorance,  and  contrary  to  all  normal  rights  and 
interests  of  both  the  principal  parties. 

But  the  results  of  the  Revolution  were  hardly 
those  expected.  Hitherto  the  English  fleet  had 
protected  the  colonists,  assured  them  access  to  the 
West  Indies,  and  looked  on  more  or  less  indiffer- 
ently while  they  broke  the  regulations  of  other 
countries.  Under  no  circumstances  were  the 
English  accustomed  to  allow  foreign  ships  to 

66 


SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES 

capture  or  interfere  with  their  own.  The  import- 
ance of  this  protection  was  not  realized  in  America, 
because  the  aid  of  the  English  war-ships  was  rarely 
needed,  and  their  presence  not  invariably  known. 
As  soon  as  the  Revolution  was  over  and  the  poli- 
tical bond  broken,  the  English  fleet  was  promptly 
put  into  action  against  the  American  vessels,  and 
the  new  republic  found  that  operations  which  had 
been  wholly  feasible  with  the  connivance  of  the 
British  navy  were  entirely  impossible  when  that 
navy  was  arrayed  against  it.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  Revolution  robbed  us  of  the  rights  we  had  had 
in  all  the  West  Indian  colonies,  because  the  Ameri- 
can navy  was  not  strong  enough  to  maintain  the 
smuggling  trade  in  the  face  of  the  united  opposi- 
tion of  all  the  European  owners.  We  had  no 
rights  at  all  and  were  not  strong  enough  to  defy 
even  the  weakest  powers  in  the  West  Indies,  while 
the  British  colonies  were  wholly  closed  against  us. 
It  was  a  terrible  blow.  The  leaders  saw  for  the 
first  time  the  importance  of  the  supremacy  of  the 
sea :  all  our  approaches  were  in  England's  hands, 
all  our  intercourse  with  the  outside  world  at  her 
mercy.  The  dilemma  was  extraordinary.  Having 
defied  England  as  the  mother  country,  roused 
feeling  against  her  as  a  tyrant,  and  won  our  inde- 
pendence with  the  aid  of  her  worst  enemy,  the 

67 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

leaders  now  found  that  harmonious  relations  had 
to  be  established  with  this  same  country  because 
intercourse  with  the  outside  world  was  absolutely 
essential  for  us  and  was  to  be  had  only  on  her 
terms.  Her  double  r61e  had  not  been  entirely 
appreciated  before  the  Revolution,  and,  in  the  face 
of  the  popular  hostility  to  England  after  the 
war,  it  was  a  difficult  fact  to  make  clear  to  the 
people.  The  majority  found  it  hard  to  understand 
the  necessity  of  any  relations  with  England.  Had 
not  the  war  been  fought  for  the  purpose  of  sever- 
ing relations?  Had  we  not  fought  to  obtain 
an  extension  of  privileges,  and  should  we  now 
humiliate  ourselves  by  begging  England  to  grant  us 
as  favors  those  same  rights  which  we  had  just 
thrust  from  us  with  contumely  and  scorn?  Nor 
were  the  English  inclined  to  forget  the  Revolu- 
tion and  restore  to  us,  now  that  we  were  independ- 
ent, what  we  had  so  vehemently  insisted  was 
entirely  insufficient  while  we  had  been  parts  of 
the  British  Empire.  However,  there  was  nothing 
for  it,  so  the  majority  of  the  leaders  thought,  but 
to  make  the  best  terms  we  could.  Throughout 
the  critical  period  and  the  three  Federalist  ad- 
ministrations negotiations  were  prosecuted  with 
vigor,  but  without  success.  One  treaty  was 
agreed  upon  which  granted  some  of  our  requests, 

68 


SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES 

but  which  the  Senate  refused  to  approve  because 
it  did  not  grant  them  all. 

By  1800  the  scene  had  shifted  in  Europe.  The 
French  Revolution  and  general  European  war 
had  created  a  market  on  the  Continent  for  Amer- 
ican provisions  and  furnished  us  for  the  time 
being  with  a  direct  medium  of  exchange.  This 
relief  from  the  intensity  of  the  distress  felt  at  the 
close  of  the  Revolution  caused  a  distinct  drawing 
away  from  England,  lent  support  to  the  natural 
antipathy  that  Jefferson  and  the  Anti-Federalists 
had  always  cherished,  and  brought  negotiations  to 
an  end.  Above  all,  it  seemed  to  justify  the  claim 
that  amicable  relations  with  England  were  less 
essential  to  our  prosperity  than  the  Federalists 
had  believed.  From  the  growth  of  an  American 
merchant  marine  and  a  trade  with  the  Conti- 
nent which  broke  many  of  the  English  war  regu- 
lations came  disputes;  from  the  bickering  came 
disagreements,  and  out  of  the  quarrels  grew  in 
time  the  War  of  1812.  If  the  war  stopped  all 
trade  with  Europe  and  rendered  the  whole  situa- 
tion worse  than  it  had  been  before,  its  ending 
brought  little  relief,  because  the  European  markets 
were  now  irrevocably  lost  with  the  beginning 
anew  of  production  in  Europe.  Moreover,  Eng- 
land still  stood  in  the  way,  and  prevented 

69 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

our  getting  across  the  Atlantic   except   on   her 
terms. 

The  situation  after  the  War  of  1812,  out  of 
which  grew  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  reveals  a  com- 
plex tangle  of  interests  in  which  the  past  and 
future  jostled  each  other  in  the  minds  of  American 
statesmen.  The  first  and  most  fundamental 
interest  which  they  seem  to  have  had  in  mind 
was  the  tradition  of  our  necessary  connection  with 
the  West  Indian  trade  and  the  consequent  belief 
that  as  our  interests  in  it  were  paramount  to 
those  which  any  European  nation  could  have,  so 
the  interests  of  the  colonists  in  the  West  Indies 
and  in  South  America  were  identical  with  ours, 
and  were  consequently  contrary  to  those  of  Euro- 
pean nations.  To  establish  such  a  fact  the  Revo- 
lution had  been  fought,  and  American  statesmen 
were  by  no  means  minded  to  yield  the  point  in 
1823,  even  had  they  believed  it  within  their  power 
to  renounce  so  fundamental  a  principle  of  our 
polity.  It  was  our  primary  interest,  to  be  sub- 
served at  all  costs.  The  next  great  outstanding 
fact  was  that  borne  in  upon  us  by  the  War  of 
1812 — the  supremacy  of  England  on  the  sea  and 
the  impossibility  of  its  dispute  by  the  United 
States.  Its  corollary  was,  they  realized  with 
considerable  anxiety,  the  supremacy  of  England 

70 


SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES 

in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  since  the  absence  of 
adequate  communication  overland  between  the 
various  countries  and  colonies  made  intercourse 
inevitably  by  water,  and  accordingly  placed  its 
control  in  England's  hands.  Such  a  supremacy 
was,  however,  a  physical  fact  which  American 
statesmen,  with  the  War  of  1812  fresh  in  mind, 
were  not  inclined  to  dispute,  though  by  no  means 
one  they  stood  ready  to  countenance. 

Beside  these  two  facts  stood  the  control  by 
England  of  the  trade  with  South  America  and  the 
West  Indies.  For  long  years  England  had  been 
interested  in  South  American  trade,  and  even  in 
the  seventeenth  century  had  begun  to  draw  a 
considerable  portion  of  it  into  her  hands.  She 
had  taken  pains  to  secure  a  certain  technical 
sanction  for  it  in  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  at  the 
beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  and  under 
this  aegis  the  trade  had  grown  in  importance. 
When  English  merchants  were  compelled  during 
the  Napoleonic  wars  to  look  for  a  market  in  which 
to  dispose  of  the  produce  they  could  no  longer  sell 
to  Europe  because  of  Napoleon's  Continental 
System,  they  turned  to  the  West  Indies  and  South 
America.  There  a  certain  artificial  and  technical 
obstacle — Spanish  ownership — stood  in  the  way  of 
their  monopolizing  the  trade  in  the  guise  of  regula- 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

tions  which  denied  them  freedom  of  intercourse. 
Firm  in  their  traditional  policy  of  not  acquiring 
political  domination  of  distant  countries  which 
force  might  be  needed  to  maintain,  England  seems 
to  have  suggested  to  the  South  Americans — or  at 
any  rate  to  have  encouraged  an  idea  of  their  own- 
independence.  This  would  remove  all  obstacles, 
and  the  English  control  of  the  sea  would  enable 
them  to  regulate  conditions  under  which  other  na- 
tions should  share  the  trade,  for  an  exclusive  mo- 
nopoly does  not  seem  to  have  been  contemplated 
or  deemed  advisable.  Independence,  it  was  seen, 
would  be  easy  to  win.  The  resident  governments 
were  weak  and  incompetent,  and  the  necessary 
munitions  of  war  the  English  stood  ready  to 
furnish,  and  would  not  be  inclined  to  insist  upon 
payment,  although  the  transaction  would  out- 
wardly be  commercial.  The  operation  was  per- 
fectly safe,  because  the  English  fleet  would  hold 
Spain  and  the  rest  of  Europe  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Atlantic,  and  not  permit  interference.  Whether 
or  not  these  suppositions  are  true,  the  fact  remains 
that  the  Spanish  American  colonies  did  revolt 
and  did  claim  their  independence  at  various 
times  after  1810;  by  1823  the  process  was  com- 
plete. 

To   the   European   nations   it   was   peculiarly 
72 


SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES 

evident  that  England  was  about  to  succeed  in 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  in  South  America  to  the 
position  which  Spain  had  previously  held,  and  it 
seemed  inadvisable  to  allow  her  to  make  so  con- 
siderable an  acquisition  of  territory  under  cover 
of  the  thin  fiction  of  political  independence  for 
the  natives.  That  it  meant  unusual  commercial 
privileges  for  England  no  one  doubted.  For 
some  years  the  European  powers  were  too  busy 
arranging  the  domestic  affairs  of  Europe  to  be 
able  to  turn  their  attention  to  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, but  in  due  course  of  time  the  Holy  Alliance 
of  France,  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria,  moved 
ostensibly  by  the  request  of  Spain,  issued  a  protest 
against  the  loss  of  the  Spanish  colonies  and  in- 
timated the  desirability  of  their  restoration  to 
Spain.  The  blow  was  of  course  aimed  at  England 
who  held  the  actual  control,  so  far  as  the  outside 
world  was  concerned,  but  the  fiction  of  political 
independence  made  it  necessary  to  protest  techni- 
cally against  the  independence  of  the  republics 
and  to  direct  any  coercion  against  them  and  not 
against  England.  This  would  give  England  the 
alternative  of  avowing  her  control  and  of  defend- 
ing it  or  of  declining  battle  and  so  sacrificing  her 
new  allies  and  her  new  dominion.  France  and 
Russia  indeed  were  moved  by  no  strong  desire  to 

73 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

hand  the  colonies  back  to  Spain,  but  by  a  great 
desire  to  keep  them  out  of  England's  hands. 

The  issue  was  thoroughly  well  understood  in 
England.  Her  power  on  the  sea  was  believed  to 
be  the  decisive  factor,  and  an  assault  upon  South 
America  was  not  feared ;  but  she  was  by  no  means 
sure  the  Holy  Alliance  would  not  force  the  issue. 
Though  not  doubting  eventual  success,  Eng- 
land dreaded  war,  for  she  wished  to  control  the 
Western  Hemisphere  without  fighting  for  it.  In 
any  case  she  was  anxious  to  prevent  the  United 
States  from  joining  her  enemies,  because  in  the 
event  of  a  war  the  location  of  the  United  States 
would  be  important,  and  its  strength  would  compel 
England  to  increase  the  force  despatched.  Can- 
ning, the  Foreign  Minister,  made  therefore  to  the 
United  States  an  offer  of  the  utmost  subtlety. 
He  suggested  a  joint  protest  of  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain,  directed  to  the  Holy  Alliance, 
against  the  reconquest  in  favor  of  Spain  of  hef 
late  colonies,  and  also  suggested  that  the  note 
should  recognize  the  equality  of  interests  which 
England  and  the  United  States  possessed  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  Its  purpose  was  apparently 
to  secure  from  the  United  States  an  official  recog- 
nition of  England's  new  dominion  in  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  and  South  America. 

74 


SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES 

If  the  situation  was  thoroughly  well  understood 
in  England  and  on  the  Continent,  it  was  none  the 
less  well  understood  in  the  United  States.  There 
were  two  traditions  which  influenced  American 
statesmen.  The  first  was  that  of  the  necessity  of 
cordial  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
the  power  controlling  the  sea,  which  had  been 
enunciated  so  often  as  to  be  commonplace.  Negoti- 
ations however  had  failed  so  often  as  to  be  disap- 
pointing in  the  extreme,  and  made  so  fair  an  offer 
as  this  recognition  of  equality  of  interests  promis- 
ing and  important.  Monroe,  the  President,  and 
several  important  public  men  were  in  favor  of  the 
acceptance  of  the  offer  upon  these  grounds. 

There  was,  however,  a  second  precedent  of  no 
less  consequence  and  antiquity.  It  had  early 
been  seen  that  our  strategic  situation  made  us 
clearly  independent  of  European  powers  acting 
from  Europe,  and  that  neither  invasion  nor  aggres- 
sion was  to  be  feared  from  that  source.  Our  real 
danger  would  arise  from  European  powers  located 
in  America.  The  existence  of  the  French  colonies 
since  the  earliest  times,  the  difficulties  of  the  French 
and  Indian  Wars,  the  fear  common  during  the 
Revolution  that  the  English  meant  to  build  up 
in  the  Mississippi  valley  a  great  state  which  would 
in  time  absorb  the  coast  states,  had  demonstrated 

75 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

our  danger  from  resident  European  colonies  and 
shown  that  European  nations  were  anxious  to 
establish  dominion  in  North  America.  While 
the  cession  of  the  district  between  the  Alleghenies 
and  the  Mississippi  to  the  United  States  by  the 
Peace  of  1783  ended  the  danger  for  the  time,  it 
appeared  again  with  greater  insistence  in  the  fear 
of  the  erection  by  France  or  England  of  a  state 
to  the  west  of  the  Mississippi.  This  was  ended 
by  the  purchase  of  Louisiana,  but  the  location  of 
the  threatened  European  aggression  was  merely 
shifted,  first  to  Florida,  then  successively  to  the 
West  Indies,  Texas,  Mexico,  and  Central  America. 
Any  of  them  obviously  could  have  been  used  as  a 
basis  for  a  great  European  state  whose  existence 
in  such  a  locality  might  very  well  throw  the  United 
States  upon  the  defensive  and  impose  a  more 
serious  burden  upon  the  young  and  struggling 
community  than  it  was  capable  of  bearing.  De- 
claration after  declaration  had  been  made  with 
additional  earnestness  and  upon  public  and  in- 
creasingly solemn  occasions  that  we  could  not  see 
such  an  establishment  of  European  authority  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere  without  grave  anxiety 
and  fear  for  our  independence. 

To  this  tradition  Adams,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
and  those  who  thought  with  him,  appealed.     If 

76 


SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES 

England's  offer  was  likely  to  further  our  tra- 
ditional policy  of  cordial  relations  with  the  sea- 
power  and  seemed  about  to  confer  upon  us  some 
of  the  commercial  privileges  in  the  West  Indies 
we  had  long  sought,  was  it  not  also  diametrically 
contrary  to  our  policy  of  defense?  England  was 
suddenly  offering  the  United  States  valuable 
privileges  which  she  had  long  denied  us  and  was 
asking  in  return  apparently  no  concessions.  To 
Adams  this  proved  that  she  was  subserving  some 
interests  of  her  own,  obtaining  from  us  something 
which  she  valued,  and  it  was  his  duty  to  find  out 
what  that  was.  Surely  it  was  not  our  assistance 
in  the  protection  of  the  South  American  republics, 
for  if  the  English  fleet  could  not  save  them,  we  had 
not  enough  strength  to  add  to  turn  the  tide.  Nor 
did  our  moral  assistance  seem  to  him  sufficiently 
regarded  in  Europe  to  have  influenced  Canning. 
The  truth  was,  he  pointed  out,  the  protection  of 
the  new  republics  by  the  English  sea-power  meant 
simply  their  transfer  from  Spain  to  England,  and 
before  Monroe's  message  was  read,  Adams's  pre- 
science was  demonstrated  correct  by  an  agree- 
ment between  France  and  England  to  prevent 
the  re-conquest  of  the  republics.  This  settled 
the  question  of  their  independence  and  it  really 
made  the  joint  protest  of  the  United  States 

77 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

and  England  virtually  worthless.    The  deed  was 
done. 

In  the  suggestion  that  the  United  States  and 
England  jointly  declare  their  mutual  interests  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere,  Adams  saw  the  conces- 
sion that  was  desired,  and  that  it  was  a  concession 
which  we  ought  never  to  make.  It  was  contrary, 
in  the  first  place,  to  the  known  facts;  our  natural 
and  normal  interest  in  the  West  Indian  trade  was 
greater  than  that  of  England  could  be,  and  in  all 
probability  our  interest  in  the  South  American 
trade  was  of  much  the  same  significance.  For 
those  people,  the  ability  to  secure  food-stuffs  was 
more  important  than  the  purchase  of  European 
manufactured  goods.  The  interests  of  the  United 
States  were  paramount  to  those  of  England,  and 
the  proposed  English  relationship  intended  to 
erect  an  artificial  barrier  in  the  way  of  a  trade 
indispensable  to  the  welfare  of  the  United  States, 
of  the  West  Indies,  and  of  South  America.  It  was 
also  vitally  contrary  to  our  first  principle  of  de- 
fense not  to  recognize  the  erection  of  a  strong 
European  state  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  If 
any  white  nation  were  to  control  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico  and  Central  America,  the  United  States 
should;  our  expansion  might  become  essential, 
and  we  ought  never  to  recognize  any  other  prin- 

78 


SOUTH  AMERICA  AND  THE  WEST  INDIES 

ciple  than  that  of  our  supremacy  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  If  for  the  time  the  sea-power  held 
us  helpless,  the  situation  might  change,  and  mean- 
time we  should  make  our  protest  against  this  new 
English  dominion.  Such  arguments  were  cogent, 
and  eventually  carried  the  day.  As  enunciated 
in  Monroe's  famous  message,  they  were  interpreted 
both  in  America  and  in  Europe  to  denote  a  de- 
fiance of  England  and  an  intention  at  some  future 
time  to  contest  her  supremacy  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  In  reality,  the  complexity  of  ideas 
was  much  greater.  The  doctrine  comprised  our 
paramount  interests  in  the  West  Indies  and  South 
America  as  against  England  or  all  Europe;  the 
statement  that  we  should  consider  the  erection  of 
a  strong  European  state  in  the  gulf  or  in  Central 
America  as  an  aggressive  act  primarily  aimed  at 
the  independence  of  the  United  States;  an  asser- 
tion that  such  a  connection  between  Latin  America 
and  Europe  was  abnormal  and  artificial  and  con- 
trary to  the  true  interests  of  the  Americas;  and, 
lastly,  a  declaration  of  our  rightful  supremacy  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere  as  against  England  or 
any  other  European  power. 


79 


CHAPTER  IV 

THE   SUPREMACY   OF   THE   WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE 

THE  supremacy  of  the  Western  Hemisphere 
remained  in  England's  hands  because  of 
her  continued  possession  of  the  supremacy 
of  the  sea.  It  was  a  physical  fact,  a  result  of 
physical  conditions,  not  in  the  least  to  be  shaken 
by  diplomatic  or  military  achievements;  the 
intercourse  between  the  various  parts  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere  was  unavoidably  by  water, 
and  the  water  routes  were  too  incontestably  in 
England's  hands.  The  real  issue  before  the 
American  statesmen,  as  Adams  had  shown,  was 
not  the  denial  of  the  existence  of  such  established 
facts,  but  the  policy  of  formally  recognizing  them 
or  of  admitting  their  justice  or  consonance  with 
the  interests  of  the  United  States.  The  doctrine 
of  Monroe's  message  declared  that  the  United 
States  recognized  no  paramountcy  and  accepted 
no  supremacy  vested  in  a  European  power,  and 

80 


SUPREMACY  OF  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

the  formal  publicity  given  the  statement,  to 
Canning's  thinking,  attested  an  American  deter- 
mination to  contest  the  facts  at  the  earliest 
opportunity. 

The  South  Americans,  though  torn  at  first  by 
apprehensions,  soon  accepted  the  situation.  Brit- 
ish statesmen  were  at  some  pains  to  prove  to  them 
that  they  owed  their  independence  to  the  protec- 
tion afforded  by  the  British  fleet, — a  protection 
which  the  United  States  could  not  furnish, — that 
England  possessed  liberal  supplies  of  capital 
which  she  would  gladly  furnish  them,  while  the 
United  States  was  not  able  to  finance  its  own 
development  and  was  seeking  large  amounts  of 
capital.  Manufactured  goods  the  English  also 
had,  which  the  United  States  did  not  produce  in 
sufficient  quantities  for  her  own  consumption  and 
which  she  was  obviously  not  able  to  supply  for 
South  American  needs.  South  America's  crude 
products  could  be  utilized  by  the  varied  industrial 
demands  of  England's  economic  fabric,  but  did 
not  find  and  would  not  for  many  years  find  in 
the  United  States  anything  like  an  adequate 
market.  The  fullness  of  the  English  hands,  the 
entire  adequacy  of  the  English  offer  to  South 
America,  their  statesmen  were  at  some  pains  to 
make  clear.  The  diplomatic  representations  of 
6  81 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  United  States  at  the  Pan- American  Congress 
of  1826,  while  received  with  courtesy,  were  with- 
out avail.  The  physical  facts  were  against  us.  We 
could  not  buy  what  they  had  to  sell;  we  could 
not  sell  them  what  they  wished  to  buy;  we  did 
not  control  the  approaches  to  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere or  the  trade  routes  in  American  waters. 
Why  should  they  doubt? 

In  addition  the  English  were  ready  to  recognize 
and  maintain  the  political  independence  of  the 
new  republics  in  exchange  for  a  tacit  recognition 
of  the  English  control  of  the  South  American 
trade.  The  English  supremacy  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  was  therefore  exceedingly  subtle 
and  peculiar:  no  display  of  force  was  made  or 
contemplated;  no  challenge  on  the  sea  was  ex- 
pected; conquest  on  land  was  undesirable;  the 
only  sanction  was  to  be  the  potential  power  of 
the  British  fleet.  The  South  American  republics 
were  technically  sovereign  and  ostensibly  were 
to  be  themselves  supreme.  The  English  control 
was  almost  in  the  nature  of  a  reserved  right  to 
interfere,  with  the  distinct  understanding  that 
the  interference  should  in  no  case  touch  political 
or  domestic  affairs.  An  open  recognition  of  the 
English  supremacy  on  the  sea  was  expected  in 
the  acceptance  of  English  regulations  and  restric- 

82 


SUPREMACY  OF  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

tions  upon  trade  and  in  the  passage  of  local  regu- 
lations to  facilitate  intercourse  with  England. 
No  militating  regulations  against  England  were 
to  be  tolerated.  These  notions  the  United  States 
would  not  accept;  the  old  quarrels  over  rights  in 
the  West  Indies  were  transferred  to  South  America, 
and  were  aggravated  by  the  attempts  of  Congress 
to  impose  identical  restrictions  upon  English 
trade  with  the  United  States.  Still,  on  the  whole, 
the  English  supremacy  of  the  Western  Hemisphere 
was  sensed  rather  than  seen,  and  was  subtly  con- 
cealed in  the  guise  of  the  supremacy  of  the  sea. 

This  diplomatic  tensity,  like  that  which  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  with  its  defiance  of  England, 
had  threatened,  was  relieved  by  the  operation 
of  forces  which  Canning  could  not  have  set  in 
motion,  nor  Monroe  have  opposed.  The  pros- 
perity of  the  sugar  islands  disappeared.  It  had 
been  partly  damaged  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
Revolution  by  the  interference  with  the  full  stream 
of  supplies  which  had  hitherto  poured  in  from  the 
continental  colonies,  and  it  was  further  injured 
by  the  falling  off  of  the  demand  for  sugar  upon  the 
outbreak  of  the  Napoleonic  wars;  but  the  final 
blow  was  struck  in  1833  by  the  abolition  of  slavery 
in  the  English  West  Indian  islands.  The  most 
valuable  of  the  foreign  islands  had  meanwhile 

83 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

passed  into  English  hands,  and  the  ruin  which  fell 
upon  the  trade  embraced  nearly  all  the  prominent 
centers  of  production.  Thus  disappeared  an 
extensive  market  for  American  products  in  the 
West  Indies,  and  our  loss  of  rights  in  it  became  no 
longer  of  consequence.  With  it  went  our  para- 
mount interest  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  and 
our  really  vital  interest  in  opposing  the  English 
supremacy  on  the  sea.  Nor  was  South  America 
able  to  take  the  place  of  the  West  India  groups. 
We  had  little  to  sell  which  they  were  willing  to 
buy,  because  they  themselves  produced  food-stuffs 
and  lumber  and  were  not  engaged  in  growing 
staples  like  sugar  and  tobacco  by  gangs  of  slaves 
who  had  to  be  maintained  from  imports ;  nor  could 
they  supply  us  what  we  needed,  an  exchange 
medium  adequate  for  our  own  purchases  of  manu- 
factured goods  in  Europe.  There  was  no  longer 
a  mutual  economic  interest  between  the  Americas 
to  be  protected  by  diplomacy. 

An  indigenous  product,  cotton,  had  appeared  in 
America  for  which  so  great  a  demand  developed 
in  Europe  that  it  kept  pace  with  an  almost  in- 
credible annual  increase  in  production,  and  began 
to  rouse  lively  expectations  that  the  eagerly 
sought  medium  of  direct  exchange  had  at  last 
been  found.  It  would  give  us,  too,  a  commodity 

84 


SUPREMACY  OF  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

for  our  European  trade  of  which  the  sea-power 
could  not  rob  us  and  the  export  of  which 
England  would  normally  facilitate,  because  she 
herself  demanded  the  new  staple.  American 
statesmen  even  began  to  dream  of  obtaining  from 
her  favorable  commercial  terms  in  exchange  for 
omnipotent  cotton.  The  potency  of  cotton  was 
proportionate  to  the  size  of  the  crop,  and  the  de- 
velopment of  the  industry  was  a  prerequisite  of  its 
adequacy  as  a  medium  of  exchange  or  as  a  bribe  for 
other  concessions.  Immediately  great  stress  was 
laid  upon  increasing  the  rate  of  its  development: 
we  must  obtain  as  soon  as  possible  an  amount  for 
export  equivalent  in  value  to  the  sum  total  of 
American  imports  of  manufactured  goods.  For 
such  development  land  was  needed  in  large  amounts 
and  of  peculiar  quality.  The  largest  crops  of 
the  best  cotton  could  be  grown  at  that  time  only 
upon  the  virgin  soil  of  the  river  bottoms,  and  even 
this  Land  afforded  the  maximum  profit  only  when 
cultivated  by  the  gangs  of  slaves,  the  number  of 
which  reduced  the  expense  of  oversight  and  ad- 
ministration to  a  minimum.  Such  a  degree  of 
return  depended  as  well  upon  the  frequent  change 
of  the  scene  of  labor,  for  the  cotton  crop  soon 
materially  decreased  in  size  on  soil  lately  virgin. 
The  amount  of  virgin  soil  in  the  river  bottoms 

85 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

was  limited  by  nature,  but  the  amount  of  the  po- 
tential supply  available  in  continental  United 
States  was  smaller.  In  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and 
Central  America,  however,  was  a  vast  area  the 
soil  and  climate  of  which  were  favorable  for  cotton 
culture  and  seemed  a  legitimate  field  for  its 
expansion. 

New  land  in  large  amounts  was  vehemently 
demanded  and  promptly  obtained.  The  expul- 
sion of  the  Creeks  and  Cherokees  from  the  Gulf 
States  opened  large  tracts  to  settlement  and 
exploitation ;  large  numbers  of  Americans  migrated 
with  their  slaves  into  Texas,  a  province  at  that 
time  of  the  Mexican  Republic.  The  insatiable 
demand  led  eventually  to  the  annexation  of  Texas, 
to  the  Mexican  War  and  the  annexation  of  the 
whole  western  quarter  of  the  present  United 
States,  and  to  the  aggressive  assertion  of  our  need 
for  Cuba,  the  coast  provinces  of  Mexico,  and  a 
great  many  other  districts  on  the  gulf.  Northern 
statesmen  charged  the  Southerners  with  a  plan 
for  the  establishment  of  a  huge  slave  empire, 
embracing  all  the  land  bordering  on  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico  and  all  the  islands. 

In  justification  of  this  aggression,  certain  phases 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  cited.  The  exten- 
sion of  American  authority  as  a  defensive  measure 

86 


SUPREMACY  OF  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

was  ardently  advocated  by  those  who  claimed  that 
England  purposed  to  annex  Texas  or  Mexico  or 
Cuba  and  begin  there  the  erection  of  a  state  to 
contest  our  position  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
Plausibly  this  compelled  us  to  act  in  self-defense 
and  forestall  so  dangerous  a  neighbor  by  assuming 
control  ourselves.  From  it  came  also  plausible 
claims  to  interfere  in  the  domestic  concerns  as  well 
as  the  foreign  relations  of  the  minor  countries  to 
assure  ourselves  that  no  foreign  influence  was 
creeping  in  or  being  afforded  adequate  excuse  for 
aggression.  Nor  was  precedent  lacking  for  such 
territorial  expansion;  its  inevitability  had  been 
predicted  by  a  long  line  of  men  eminent  in  Amer- 
ican annals,  and  its  importance  to  our  welfare 
had  been  a  frequent  subject  of  oratory  both  in 
Congress  and  in  the  country  at  large. 

To  these  actual  territorial  gains  and  to  this 
presumptive  desire  for  actual  possession  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  England  raised  objections.  The 
intercourse  between  the  various  parts  of  this  new 
empire  would  necessarily  depend  upon  the  sea, 
which  was  controlled  by  England,  and  she  ob- 
jected to  an  assumption  of  sovereignty  which 
ignored  the  fact  of  her  supremacy  and,  in  parti- 
cular, to  the  schemes  for  the  extension  of  our  influ- 
ence to  the  exclusion  of  her  own.  So  insistent 

87 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

were  these  representations  that  eventually  the 
United  States  accepted  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty.  The  fundamental  principle  of  the  docu- 
ment seems  to  have  been  that  of  cooperation 
between  England  and  the  United  States  in  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  which  had  been  previously  sug- 
gested by  Canning  and  rejected  by  Adams  and 
Monroe.  Each  recognized  the  other's  active 
interests  in  the  gulf,  agreed  not  to  acquire  special 
interests  to  the  other's  detriment  or  without  the 
other's  consent,  and  explicitly  bound  itself  not 
to  build  a  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
or  at  any  other  place  without  the  other's  express 
consent.  The  treaty  was  extremely  unpopular 
in  America  and  was  assailed  as  the  abrogation 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  an  admission  that 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  were  no  longer 
paramount  in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Neither 
the  treaty  nor  the  principle  upon  which  it  was 
based  met  with  entire  approval  from  subsequent 
administrations,  which  again  and  again  declared 
it  without  relation  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Thus 
matters  stood  at  the  close  of  the  century. 

Meanwhile  the  English  continued  to  retain  the 
supremacy  of  the  Western  Hemisphere,  though 
they  rarely  chose  to  assert  it  and  never  demanded 
its  formal  recognition  by  European  nations  or 

88 


SUPREMACY  OF  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

by  the  United  States.  A  genuine  liberality  and 
tolerance,  as  well  as  a  sense  of  expediency,  marked 
their  use  of  it.  The  economic  growth  of  various 
nations  during  the  nineteenth  century  had  natu- 
rally led  to  development  of  their  trade  with  South 
America ;  but  England  viewed  it  with  little  appre- 
hension, for  she  realized  that  she  could  not  pos- 
sibly buy  the  whole  of  South  America's  raw 
products,  because  she  could  not  use  them  herself, 
and  that  her  own  interests  were  furthered  more 
by  the  development  of  South  America  by  other 
nations  than  by  an  attempt  to  monopolize  such 
trade  as  already  existed.  The  actual  volume  of 
English  trade  and  the  actual  English  profits 
would  be  larger  by  sharing  with  other  nations  an 
increased  and  developed  trade  than  by  monopoliz- 
ing a  trade  which  the  circumstances  of  the  mono- 
poly would  limit  and  stunt,  even  were  it  not 
contrary  to  English  policy  to  interfere  with  freedom 
of  trade  in  the  markets  of  the  world.  She  must 
always  refrain  from  raising  issues  which  might  lead 
to  the  questioning  of  her  sea-power  and  hence  to  an 
assault  upon  her  means  of  defending  herself.  Far 
from  involving  a  loss  of  her  supremacy  or  its  renun- 
ciation, this  policy  demanded  merely  a  wise  employ- 
ment of  it,  a  recognition  of  its  economic  and  naval 
limits  and  of  the  essential  rights  of  other  nations. 

89 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

The  rise  of  Pan-Germanism,  the  creation  of  the 
German  fleet,  the  nature  of  Germany's  objection 
to  England's  position  on  the  sea,  promptly  altered 
the  actual  facts  of  England's  supremacy.  The 
Germans  challenged  the  rightf  ulness  of  the  control 
of  the  sea  by  any  nation,  for  it  placed  in  its  hands 
a  potential  power  more  detrimental  to  the  inter- 
ests of  all  others  than  any  one  nation  should  hold. 
That  the  foreign  trade  and  intercourse  of  any 
nation  should  depend  upon  the  good-will,  for- 
bearance, or  domestic  interests  of  another  was 
intolerable.  Nothing  short  of  complete  independ- 
ence could  be  recognized.  Past  liberality,  present 
generosity,  and  assurances  for  the  future  were  no 
guaranty  of  an  apparent  freedom  which  ill  con- 
cealed a  very  real  inferiority.  Could  not  the 
English  close  all  the  avenues  of  approach  to 
Europe,  stop  German  trade  with  the  rest  of  the 
world,  and  hamper  the  German  development  on 
which  her  safety  depended?  The  English  argu- 
ment that  the  control  of  the  seas  was  an  absolutely 
essential  defensive  measure  for  the  protection  of 
England's  imports  of  food  and  raw  materials 
they  did  not  find  convincing.  Should  they  admit 
that  the  continued  prosperity  of  England  was  a 
burden  which  they  were  under  obligation  to  further 
or  recognize?  Why  should  they  permit  England's 

90 


SUPREMACY  OF  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

defensive  needs  to  become  paramount  to  their 
own? 

The  building  of  the  German  fleet  gradually 
compelled  England  to  concentrate  her  own  ships 
in  the  channel  and  in  the  North  Sea,  and  thus 
robbed  her  of  her  physical  control  of  the  waters 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  In  reality,  so 
long  as  she  owned  the  greatest  fleet  in  the  world 
and  so  long  as  it  remained  unbeaten,  her  control 
would  potentially  exist  and  be  implicit  in  the 
situation.  The  actual  facts,  however,  were  other- 
wise. The  moment  she  no  longer  patrolled  Amer- 
ican waters  in  sufficient  force  to  compel  obedience 
to  her  regulations,  her  supremacy  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  became  a  myth,  dissipated  by  the 
growth  of  the  German  fleet.  As  long  as  the 
existence  of  the  German  fleet  compelled  the  reten- 
tion of  English  ships  in  European  waters  and 
therefore  prevented  her  despatch  to  American 
waters  of  sufficient  naval  strength  to  maintain 
her  old  supremacy,  the  actual  control  of  American 
waters  had  passed  from  England's  hands,  and 
would  remain  a  potentiality  rather  than  a  fact 
until  the  German  fleet  had  been  defeated. 

All  this  the  English  thoroughly  understood, 
and  they  were  at  some  pains  to  explain  it  to  the 
United  States  in  an  attempt  to  make  certain 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

arrangements  to  insure  the  exclusion  of  Germany 
from  the  Western  Hemisphere  in  any  eventuality. 
If  the  supremacy  of  the  seas  passed  from  English 
hands  and  the  British  Empire  fell,  neither  should 
strengthen  Germany.  England  was  not  minded 
to  contest  the  supremacy  of  all  the  oceans,  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  of  the  Mediterranean,  of 
Egypt  and  India  at  the  same  time,  nor  to  hand 
over  to  her  own  conqueror,  if  disaster  should  be 
her  lot,  the  plenitude  of  her  own  authority.  The 
empire  should  be  broken  up,  the  supremacy  of 
the  seas  divided,  before  Germany  should  fall  heir 
to  either.  But  both  would  fall  into  the  hands  of 
her  successor  in  the  control  of  European  waters, 
if  they  were  not  previously  placed  in  the  hands 
of  resident  powers  capable  of  defending  them  and 
whose  normal  interests  would  urge  their  preserva- 
tion. The  constant  reaffirmation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  and  its  interpretation  in  the  United 
States  as  fairly  obliging  us  to  exclude  European 
interests  from  the  Western  Hemisphere,  gave 
reasons  for  hope  that  the  United  States  would  not 
supinely  surrender  to  a  victorious  Germany  what 
the  English  conceived  to  be  our  national  ambition. 
They  therefore  proposed  to  hand  over  to  the 
United  States  the  actual  control  of  American 
waters  and,  in  particular,  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 

92 


SUPREMACY  OF  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

before  the  European  situation  should  compel  them 
to  renounce  their  supremacy  forever.  In  the  cir- 
cumstances they  were  willing  to  cede  it  outright, 
to  make  the  United  States  supreme,  in  exchange 
for  an  understanding  as  to  the  ways  in  which  the 
United  States  should  use  its  control  of  American 
waters  and  for  an  amicable  arrangement  which 
would  probably  lead  to  close  economic  relations 
with  the  United  States  that  the  English  saw 
would  be  essential  to  them  upon  the  outbreak  of 
a  general  European  war.  The  closing  of  the  Black 
Sea  and  the  Baltic  would  promptly  deprive  the 
English  of  important  sources  of  food  supplies 
and  would  necessitate  access  to  adequate  supplies 
elsewhere.  The  United  States  alone  possessed 
them.  Manufactured  goods  of  all  sorts  would  be 
highly  important  for  England  and  her  ally,  France ; 
certain  types  of  munitions  of  war  could  not  be 
produced  by  the  existing  English  and  French 
factories  in  sufficient  quantities ;  the  United  States 
was  the  only  manufacturing  power  with  a  suffi- 
ciently large  and  varied  economic  fabric  to  enable 
her  to  meet  promptly  and  adequately  such  de- 
mands. Further,  a  market  for  English  goods 
during  the  war  would  be  essential,  for,  while  the 
rate  of  production  would  naturally  be  reduced, 
the  output  would  still  be  more  considerable  in  all 

93 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

probability  than  could  be  marketed  unless  the 
English  should  be  ready  to  sell  to  the  United 
States  the  amount  of  manufactured  goods  which 
the  latter  had  previously  bought  from  Germany  and 
Austria.  The  employment  of  the  English  mer- 
chant marine  would  be  advisable,  if  not  essential; 
it  would  find  in  its  trade  with  the  United  States 
a  sufficient  occupation  during  hostilities  to  ward 
off  actual  distress.  Indeed,  the  economic  struc- 
ture of  the  United  States,  they  saw,  was  comple- 
mentary to  that  of  England.  If  the  United 
States  could  build  a  canal  at  Panama,  it  could  also 
create  a  great  ocean  highway  to  the  far  East  and 
to  the  English  colonies  in  the  southern  Pacific, 
which  might  be  of  supreme  importance  in  case 
Pan-Germanism  was  able  to  close  the  Mediter- 
ranean. If  in  addition  the  United  States  navy 
could  protect  the  canal  and  American  waters  from 
fleets  other  than  England's,  and  be  able  in  case 
of  need  to  patrol  effectively  the  commercial  high- 
ways across  the  Atlantic,  it  could  afford  England 
very  substantial  aid  in  time  of  war  and  further 
the  mutual  economic  interests  of  both  countries. 

The  economic  development  of  the  nineteenth 
century  had  changed  the  relations  of  the  United 
States  with  South  America;  a  close  connection 
between  them  had  become  possible,  if  indeed  a 

94 


SUPREMACY  OF  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

certain  mutuality  of  economic  interest  did  not 
already  exist.  Varied  industries  now  provided 
an  enormous  bulk  of  manufactured  goods  for 
export;  the  new  agriculture  furnished  vast  sup- 
plies of  food-stuffs  which  the  railroads  and  steam- 
ships were  now  able  to  transport  cheaply  to  the 
European  market;  modern  science  had  made 
available  for  export  nearly  everything  the  country 
produced ;  nor  was  the  country  any  longer  depend- 
ent upon  a  single  staple  as  a  medium  of  exchange. 
Changes  both  in  Europe  and  in  America  of  an 
unquestionably  fundamental  nature  had  revolu- 
tionized the  whole  situation,  while  the  propor- 
tionately great  development  of  the  United  States 
had  freed  us  from  our  dependence  upon  Europe. 
We  were  now  able  to  supply  the  South  Americans 
with  manufactured  goods;  we  were  able  also  to 
use  in  our  own  manufactures  the  staple  products 
of  South  America ;  capital  for  investment  was  now 
plentiful  in  the  United  States.  The  close  com- 
mercial bond  which  had  been  impossible  because 
of  our  economic  deficiencies  found  in  its  way 
only  the  English  control  of  the  sea,  for  the  simul- 
taneous development  of  South  America  had  made 
those  republics  able  to  trade  with  the  United 
States. 

Such  reasoning  was  cogent,  the  offer  was  allur- 
95 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

ing,  and  was  accepted  by  the  United  States.  The 
results  are  familiar  enough,  but  none  the  less  strik- 
ing and  significant.  The  United  States  now  con- 
trols the  Gulf  of  Mexico  in  actual  fact,  owns  land 
at  Panama  on  each  side  of  the  canal,  and  exercises 
a  protectorate  over  the  more  important  islands, 
Cuba,  San  Domingo,  and  Porto  Rico;  American 
capital  has  poured  into  Central  America  and, 
assisted  in  one  way  or  another  by  diplomatic 
agencies,  has  left  the  smaller  states  at  present  little 
more  than  the  shadow  of  political  independence 
and  the  control  of  local  government  subject  to 
suggestion  and  dictation  from  Washington.  In 
Mexico,  American  interests  are  predominant,  but 
still  insistent  upon  a  diplomatic  and  political 
support  which  they  have  not  as  yet  received.  In 
the  Pacific,  the  United  States  possesses  Hawaii, 
the  Philippines,  and  various  smaller  islands, 
thus  effectively  controlling  the  commercial  high- 
way across  that  great  ocean  and  holding  a  strong 
strategic  position  in  Chinese  waters.  The  Philip- 
pines control  on  one  side  the  approach  to  China 
from  Europe  and  India  which  Hong-Kong  and 
Shanghai,  in  England's  possession,  hold  on  the 
other.  Strong  representations  have  been  made 
by  the  United  States  Government  to  the  European 
nations  with  regard  to  our  equality  of  opportunity 

96 


SUPREMACY  OF  WESTERN  HEMISPHERE 

in  the  trade  of  the  far  East,  and  the  policy  known 
as  the  "Open  Door"  is  more  or  less  closely  related 
to  these  developments. 

So  far  as  the  Western  Hemisphere  is  concerned, 
the  supremacy  of  the  United  States  is  physically 
and  morally  so  great  that  it  is  not  likely  to  be  dis- 
puted, even  though  she  should  be  in  no  better 
position  than  at  present  to  make  it  good  in  arms. 
As  against  Europe,  she  is  also  now  supreme.  The 
only  fleets  at  all  able  to  dispute  our  position  are 
definitely  located  in  Europe  until  the  issue  of  the 
war  is  settled  clearly  one  way  or  the  other.  The 
English  and  German  fleets  are  in  the  North  Sea 
and  the  English  Channel,  the  French  fleet  is  in 
the  Mediterranean,  and  the  three  can  desert  their 
posts  only  at  the  cost  of  handing  over  to  the  others 
all  that  they  hold  dear.  While  they  certainly 
will  not  interfere  with  the  United  States  on  any 
such  terms  as  these,  it  is  well  to  remember  that 
the  situation  in  Europe  rather  than  our  own  geo- 
graphical location  or  our  own  naval  strength  makes 
us  supreme  to-day  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
Our  control  as  against  American  powers,  our  tenure 
as  against  European  powers,  are  conditional  upon 
the  continuance  of  something  approaching  a 
naval  balance  of  power  in  European  waters,  upon 
a  fact  which  is  not  within  our  own  control. 

97 


CHAPTER  V 
OUR    PRESENT    STRATEGIC    POSITION 

THE  vital  developments  of  the  nineteenth 
century  in  science  and  in  industry  have 
already  robbed  our  strategic  position  of  a 
part  of  its  former  invulnerability,  while  the  Euro- 
pean war  threatens  seriously  to  alter  the  more 
important  of  its  other  features,  and  to  make  an 
army  no  longer  a  secondary  or  subsidiary  element 
in  our  national  defense.  Our  strategic  position 
has  been  based,  as  already  indicated,  upon  the 
existence  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  our  separation 
from  Europe  in  time  and  space,  robbing  us  of  a 
position  influential  in  military  and  naval  issues 
in  Europe,  and  giving  the  rival  powers  of  Europe 
little  or  no  reason  to  regard  our  conquest  as  desir- 
able. In  addition,  the  strategic  character  of  the 
country,  which  requires  the  continuous  use  of  an 
enormous  army  to  make  conquest  practicable  or 
invasion  easy,  has  been  of  vital  importance  to  us 
throughout  our  history,  because  there  has  not  yet 

98 


OUR  PRESENT  STRATEGIC  POSITION 

been  a  time  when  one  of  the  great  nations  of 
Europe  has  felt  itself  able  to  spare  so  consider- 
able a  force  from  its  own  domains  in  Europe. 
Economic  interests  to  attract  a  conqueror  here, 
we  have  had  none.  In  the  action  and  interaction 
of  these  peculiar  factors,  both  positive  and  nega- 
tive, has  lain  our  practical  invulnerability  for  more 
than  two  centuries. 

The  invention  of  the  locomotive,  the  steamboat, 
the  telegraph  has  entirely  changed  the  character 
of  the  first  and  most  important  of  our  strategic 
defenses,  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  Indeed,  it  would 
be  most  extraordinary  if  these  changes  in  com- 
munication and  transportation  had  not  left  an 
enduring  mark  upon  our  position,  for  they  have 
revolutionized  conditions  as  old  as  the  history  of 
man  and  have  affected  greater  changes  in  inter- 
course than  all  man's  progress  since  the  days  of  the 
Pharaohs.  Time  and  space  have  been  annihilated 
to  a  degree  almost  incredible.  The  land  jour- 
ney even  to  Philadelphia  was  during  the  Revolu- 
tion an  undertaking,  almost  an  adventure,  and 
the  arrival  of  the  traveler  could  not  be  predicted 
with  any  certainty.  America  is  now  no  farther 
from  London  than  Newport  was  from  New  York 
by  sea  in  the  days  of  George  Washington,  while 
John  Adams  traveled  to  New  York  overland  to 

99 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

be  inaugurated  as  Vice-President  of  the  United 
States  in  1789  in  more  time  than  it  takes  to- 
day to  go  from  Boston  to  San  Francisco  or,  in- 
deed, from  Boston  to  Paris.  In  fact,  not  only 
is  communication  more  regular  and  consider- 
ably more  a  matter  of  course  between  Europe  and 
America  to-day  than  contact  was  between  the 
colonies  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  but  incom- 
parably more  people  in  the  United  States  have 
traveled  widely  in  Europe  to-day  than  had  visited 
in  the  old  times  a  point  one  hundred  miles  from 
home.  The  annihilation  of  time,  so  far  as  inter- 
course is  concerned,  is  even  more  complete.  The 
telegraph  and  the  wireless  place  us  in  instantaneous 
connection  with  all  parts  of  the  world  and  give 
us  every  morning  the  world's  happenings,  to  be 
skimmed  through  while  we  take  our  coffee. 

The  result  upon  international  politics  has  been 
extraordinary.  The  separation  in  time  and  space 
to  which  our  independence  was  primarily  due  has 
disappeared  forever.  It  would  now  be  possible 
for  a  European  nation  to  govern  the  United  States 
successfully  even  though  severed  by  the  Atlantic. 
England  governs  India  to-day  far  easier  and  better 
than  she  was  able  to  govern  the  continental 
colonies  in  the  eighteenth  century;  for,  where  her 
administration  of  the  colonies  was  too  slow,  too 

IOO 


OUR  PRESENT  STRATEGIC  POSITION 

halting  and  inefficient  to  be  of  real  consequence, 
her  administration  in  India  is  prompt,  efficient, 
and  stable.  From  this  inability  of  European 
nations  to  govern  distant  lands  came  much  of 
their  disinclination  for  distant  political  conquests. 
We  are  not  now  protected  from  conquest  by  any 
such  factor. 

The  military  situation  has  been  even  more 
strikingly  revolutionized.  The  present  war  is 
being  fought  in  Europe  by  forces  of  men  who  have 
come  together  from  the  four  comers  of  the  earth. 
Contingents  from  Canada,  India,  and  Australia 
have  been  established  and  maintained  in  the 
English  ranks  in  France  with  a  readiness  and  an 
ease  which  would  have  been  impossible  half  a 
century  ago.  In  the  trenches  these  men  are 
eating  food  grown  in  Dakota  and  in  Texas,  wrap- 
ping themselves  in  blankets  woven  from  Austra- 
lian wool  by  American  factories;  American  mules, 
driven  by  Hindus,  are  drawing  English  cannon 
into  action,  while  the  Frenchmen  who  fight  beside 
them  are  clad  in  American  clothes  and  wear 
American  shoes.  Indeed,  the  French  and  English 
officials  regard  as  perfectly  feasible  the  supplying 
and  provisioning  of  their  armies  from  the  United 
States,  and  philanthropists  have  undertaken  to 
supply  the  entire  Belgian  nation  with  American 

101 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

food  and  clothes.  We  shall  be  blind  to  the  most 
obvious  of  facts  if  we  fail  to  see  that  a  European 
army  can  be  maintained  in  the  United  States  as 
easily  as  the  present  European  armies  can  be 
maintained  from  the  United  States.  If  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  men  can  be  fed  at  that  distance 
in  Europe,  it  is  at  least  conceivable  that  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  men  could  be  supplied  in  the 
United  States  from  European  sources.  Invasion 
of  the  United  States  is  no  longer  forbidden  by  the 
practical  difficulty  of  maintaining  at  such  a  dis- 
tance a  force  sufficiently  large  to  make  an  invasion 
decisive. 

On  the  other  hand,  for  the  first  time  in  its 
history  the  United  States  possesses  offensive 
strength,  the  present  to  us  of  the  nineteenth 
century.  We  might  now  send  a  large  and  efficient 
army  to  Europe,  which  might  quite  conceivably 
play  a  very  important  part  in  the  actual  operations 
in  the  field.  True,  our  lack  of  strategic  relation 
to  the  European  terrain  persists;  the  American 
army  in  America  is  as  powerless  as  before  to  influ- 
ence the  European  situation :  but  it  is  now  so  easy 
to  move  the  American  army  and  locate  it  in 
the  precise  strategic  spot  most  advantageous  that 
our  offensive  strength  to-day  is  distinctly  to  be 
reckoned  with.  If  our  present  army  is  not  large 

1 02 


OUR  PRESENT  STRATEGIC  POSITION 

enough  to  arouse  apprehension  in  Europe,  our 
potential  strength  is  enormous,  because  the  num- 
ber of  men  and  the  natural  resources  on  which  we 
have  to  draw  are  greater  than  those  of  any  Euro- 
pean nation  except  Russia,  and  in  point  of  avail- 
ability are  beyond  all  doubt  vaster  than  those 
of  Russia.  Indeed,  our  economic  strength  now 
makes  us  of  interest  to  European  nations  and  a 
potential  ally. 

These  developments  that  have  so  much  af- 
fected our  position  have  worked  great  changes 
also  in  the  character  of  warfare.  The  premise  of 
unpreparedness  which  has  been  the  tradition  in 
America  assumes  of  course  that  the  obstacles 
strewn  by  nature  in  the  invader's  way  will  be 
sufficient  to  delay  his  progress  until  we  can  com- 
plete preparations  for  a  reasonably  adequate 
defense.  In  the  days  of  the  Revolution  the 
conditions  of  warfare  made  the  preparation  of 
defense  at  the  last  moment  eminently  feasible. 
Nearly  every  man  in  the  community  had  a  gun 
and  knew  how  to  use  it,  and  an  army  was  assem- 
bled by  bringing  together  various  men  with  guns, 
all  of  whom  brought  their  own  provisions  and 
supplied  their  own  clothes.  They  were  all  trained 
in  methods  of  Indian  warfare,  which  happened 
to  be  vastly  efficient  against  the  trained  troops 

103 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

brought  from  England,  because  the  nature  of  the 
ground  in  America  was  so  different  from  that  on 
which  their  manoeuvers  originated  as  almost  to 
erase  the  difference  in  efficiency  between  the 
trained  and  the  untrained.  In  such  circum- 
stances, aided  by  the  difficulty  of  supplying  an 
army  because  of  the  slowness  of  transportation, 
we  easily  fought  a  defensive  war  and  won  it  with- 
out having  been  in  the  least  prepared  at  the  time 
the  war  began  to  cope  with  trained  troops.  We 
have  not  since  that  time  had  to  face  the  question 
of  invasion. 

Recent  developments  in  warfare  have  vitally 
changed  the  arrangements  necessary  for  adequate 
defense.  The  modern  invader  arrives  equipped 
with  a  variety  of  devices  of  vast  potency,  which 
are  to  be  successfully  resisted  only  by  devices 
of  equal  potency.  The  backbone  of  the  modern 
army  has  proved  to  be  the  artillery,  because 
again  and  again  the  infantry  has  proved  available 
only  after  this  artillery  has  cleared  the  way.  To 
create  such  weapons  months  are  needed;  to  teach 
a  gun  crew  how  to  use  one  effectively  takes  longer 
than  it  does  to  make  the  gun ;  such  cannon  fire  in  a 
few  days  an  amount  of  ammunition  which  as  many 
months  may  be  needed  to  manufacture.  The 
supply  of  such  materials  required  to  begin  a  war 

104 


OUR  PRESENT  STRATEGIC  POSITION 

is  vast,  the  number  of  men  who  ought  to  stand 
ready  trained  to  step  into  the  shoes  of  those  who 
fall  in  the  first  engagement  must  be  a  good  deal 
larger  than  the  uninitiated  are  inclined  to  imagine. 
To  produce  the  supply  of  ammunition  continu- 
ously needed  requires  a  plant  of  enormous  size, 
equipped  with  highly  intricate  machinery  which 
can  be  operated  with  success  only  by  men  who 
have  had  long  experience  in  times  of  peace.  It 
will  be  obvious  to  the  most  ignorant  that  effective 
preparation  for  modern  warfare  requires  foresight 
and  precludes  entirely  the  extemporization  of  an 
adequate  defense  after  the  arrival  of  the  invader 
has  been  signaled. 

We  have  dealt  here  with  only  the  elements,  the 
tools  which  the  soldiers  are  to  use,  and  they  alone 
require  many  months  for  preparation;  but  the 
modern  army  is  really  composed  of  men  whose 
training  requires  years  before  they  attain  a  degree 
of  efficiency  in  manceuvering  and  in  rapid  action 
sufficient  to  resist  successfully  a  determined  assault 
by  a  trained  army.  To-day  the  men  cooperating 
in  an  attack  ordinarily  do  not  see  one  another  or 
the  enemy,  nor  do  they  know  his  whereabouts 
or  their  friends'  location.  Directions  come  to 
them  over  a  wire,  information  vital  to  their  safety, 
and  the  orders  upon  whose  prompt  obedience 

105 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

their  lives  and  the  very  existence  of  the  army  as 
a  whole  may  depend.  Under  such  conditions,  a 
high  degree  of  administrative  efficiency  and  of 
intelligent  cooperation  is  the  prerequisite  of  the 
continued  existence  of  the  army  and  demands  a 
sort  of  training  for  which  ordinary  life  provides 
no  counterpart  or  substitute.  An  efficient  modern 
army  can  be  trained  only  by  actual  service  in  per- 
forming the  work  of  defense;  to  send  even  a  large 
number  of  untrained  men  against  modern  artil- 
lery in  the  hands  of  a  single  army  corps  is  asking 
them  to  commit  suicide.  If  preparation  is  post- 
poned until  the  invader  appears,  defeat  and  con- 
quest will  be  inevitable. 

And  the  developments  of  the  nineteenth  century 
have  thrown  down  our  defensive  barriers.  Modern 
inventions  in  transportation  and  communication, 
the  new  science  of  warfare  based  upon  them,  have 
definitely  and  unquestionably  rendered  us  vul- 
nerable from  a  military  point  of  view.  Nor  is 
this  all.  The  war  may  alter  those  factors  of  our 
defensive  position  which  are  still  intact.  Nothing 
has  yet  happened  to  invest  us  with  a  strategic 
position  of  itself  important  for  a  decision  of  the 
issue  in  Europe;  nothing  has  yet  changed  our  own 
strategical  geography,  which  makes  success  depend 
upon  the  magnitude  of  the  operations  undertaken ; 

106 


OUR  PRESENT  STRATEGIC  POSITION 

nothing  has  yet  made  it  possible  for  the  European 
nations  to  spare  so  large  a  number  of  men  from 
the  armies  in  Europe.  Yet  we  ought  not  to  forget 
that  these  factors  of  our  strategic  position  are 
those  over  which  we  do  not  exercise  control,  and 
that  we  are  in  reality  defended  to-day  by  the 
complicated  and  delicate  balance  of  the  European 
situation.  Until  that  is  radically  changed,  until 
one  side  or  the  other  can  spare  from  Europe  a 
sufficiently  large  army  to  occupy  the  United  States 
without  imperiling  its  own  safety  at  home,  until 
the  power  possessed  of  the  physical  strength  and 
the  opportunity  to  use  it  shall  find  an  adequate 
motive  to  cross  the  Atlantic,  we  shall  still  be 
entirely  safe.  We  need  no  defense  against  an 
invasion  which  cannot  start. 

But  we  can  hardly  claim  that  we  are  without 
interest  as  to  the  outcome  of  the  war  in  Europe,  for 
it  may  destroy  these  remaining  features  of  our 
defensive  position.  Our  lack  of  any  location 
which  necessarily  influences  the  present  tangle  of 
interests  in  Europe  is  of  consequence  merely  so 
long  as  the  tangle  of  interests  persists.  The  un- 
willingness of  European  nations  to  despatch  an 
army  to  the  Western  Hemisphere  sufficient  in 
size  to  endanger  us  again  assumes  that  the  battle 
in  Europe  is  either  not  joined  or  not  decided.  The 

107 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

decision  of  the  issue  in  the  field  in  favor  of  either 
coalition  may  finally  destroy  the  delicate  balance 
of  power  in  which  lay  our  security  and  provide 
the  victor  with  an  adequate  force  and  an  adequate 
motive  for  aggression .  Victory  will  not  necessarily 
provide  him  with  either,  but  may  provide  him 
with  both.  To-day  we  are  safe;  to-morrow  we 
may  be  defenseless,  except  for  human  agencies. 


108 


BOOK  II 
THE   VICTOR 


109 


The  Victor 


CHAPTER  I 
EUROPEAN    POLICIES    AND    MOTIVES 

OUT  of  past  economic  and  political  problems 
has  grown  the  present  war,  fought  because 
honest  and  sincere  men  of  great  intelli- 
gence and  of  humane  desires  saw  no  other  chance 
of  escaping  from  the  dread  alternatives  which 
hedged  them  in.  The  war  will  not  decide  these 
problems, — economic,  political,  and  moral  issues 
are  never  decided  by  fighting, — dispel  the  difficul- 
ties out  of  which  they  grew,  or  remove  the  specters 
of  economic  distress  which  hover  in  the  back- 
ground. Victory  will  merely  insure  the  victors 
an  opportunity  to  struggle  with  the  very  problems 
out  of  which  the  war  itself  proceeded,  with  only 
one  change,  the  elimination  of  the  vanquished. 
For  the  right  to  undertake  that  settlement,  to 
dictate  its  terms  in  their  own  favor,  to  impress 

in 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

upon  the  future  their  own  stamp,  are  they  fighting, 
and  we  need  not  expect  that  a  situation  sufficiently 
tangled  to  necessitate  war  for  its  solution,  import- 
ant enough  to  all  the  nations  in  Europe  to  make 
them  conclude  that  this  great  war  was  inevita- 
ble, and  look  forward  to  a  victory  in  it  as  a  solu- 
tion of  their  national  problems  for  at  least  half  a 
century,  will  not  furnish  the  victor  with  a  grim 
determination  to  override  any  further  obstacles 
which  may  stand  in  the  way  of  the  solution 
deemed  most  desirable  for  his  national  future. 
The  victor's  interference  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, far  from  proceeding  from  the  whims  of 
kings  or  emperors,  or  from  the  evanescent  policies 
of  a  militaristic  state,  will  rest  upon  causes  as 
deep  and  as  far-reaching  as  history,  as  complex  as 
modern  life  in  its  varied  phases,  as  certain  to 
continue  in  one  aspect  or  another  as  the  world 
is  to  turn  on  its  axis. 

Behind  the  present  situation  in  Europe  stands 
the  economic  progress  of  the  last  half -century, — a 
progress  rapid  beyond  all  previous  precedent, 
beneficial  in  its  results  upon  nations  and  individu- 
als beyond  the  dreams  of  idealists,  marking  a 
more  decisive  stride  in  the  economic  advancement 
of  the  race  than  all  the  centuries  since  man  began 
to  write  the  record  of  his  deeds.  For  the  first 

112 


EUROPEAN  POLICIES  AND  MOTIVES 

time  in  the  history  of  the  race  the  specter  of 
famine  and  nakedness  has  been  entirely  exor- 
cised ;  there  is  no  longer  a  doubt  that  there  will  be 
enough  to  eat  and  to  wear.  How  stupendous 
this  achievement  is  we  scarcely  appreciate.  It 
has  made  commonplace  luxuries  for  which  kings 
once  sighed  in  vain,  and  has  conferred  upon  the 
individual  an  amount  of  leisure  and  an  amount  of 
freedom  from  drudgery  unknown  since  the  first 
Pharaoh  began  the  irrigation  of  Egypt.  With 
material  progress  has  come  an  astonishing  intel- 
lectual advance  and  the  birth  of  a  new  corporate 
soul,  of  a  new  nation,  of  a  new  individual,  who 
sees  with  ecstasy  the  entrancing  vision  of  a  great 
people,  imbued  with  a  spirit  of  self-sacrifice,  co- 
operating in  the  attempt  to  advance  by  conscious 
effort  the  temporal  and  spiritual  growth  of  the 
future  nation.  In  comparison,  the  progress  of 
the  past  seems  scarcely  worth  while;  the  progress 
of  the  present  barely  sufficient;  its  continuance 
so  necessary,  and  its  acceleration  so  obviously 
desirable  as  to  be  beyond  question  for  sane  and 
reasoning  men.  So  keen  is  the  realization  of  the 
benefits  of  this  economic  growth,  so  clear  the  vision 
of  the  possibilities  if  it  can  be  accelerated,  that 
the  great  nations  can  scarcely  conceive  of  a  sacri- 
fice too  great  for  the  attainment  of  such  an  object. 

8  113 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

For  the  first  time  great  communities  are  willing 
to  sacrifice  the  present  to  the  future;  for  the  first 
time  the  patriotism  of  the  present  generation  is 
unselfish  enough  to  include  the  generations  yet 
to  be  born.  We  shall  ill  understand  the  tenden- 
cies of  our  own  time  if  we  fail  to  appreciate  the 
nobility  of  this  idealism,  the  splendor  of  its  aim, 
the  marvel  of  its  sacrifice,  the  fineness  of  the 
national  spirit  which  is  moved  by  it,  and  the 
strength  of  its  determination  to  achieve. 

The  increase  of  material  comforts  enormously 
stimulated  the  growth  of  population,  a  phenom- 
enon which  men  now  realize  brought  in  its  train 
difficulties  and  perplexities  of  a  nature  previously 
unobserved.  It  is  the  determination  to  insure 
to  the  individuals  of  this  greater  community  all 
the  new  economic  benefits,  to  increase  their  well- 
being  to  a  point  scarcely  dreamed  of  a  century  ago, 
and  to  render  certain  the  possession  of  at  least 
this  degree  of  comfort  by  the  expanding  millions 
about  to  be  born,  which  creates  the  newest,  but 
most  characteristic,  feature  of  the  present  situation. 
With  so  much  dependent  upon  the  acceleration 
of  the  rate  of  economic  progress,  the  possibility 
that  it  is  more  likely  to  diminish  than  to  increase 
is  deemed  alarming.  The  astonishing  pace  at 
which  industry  and  agriculture  have  marched  has 

114 


EUROPEAN  POLICIES  AND  MOTIVES 

been  the  product  of  factors  not  likely  to  be  re- 
placed in  the  future  by  others  of  equal  potency. 
The  great  inventions  of  the  nineteenth  century — 
the  steam  engine,  the  railroad,  the  steamship, 
the  telegraph,  machinery  of  a  thousand  varieties — 
have  worked  marvels  which  can  scarcely  be  re- 
peated, and  which  have  already  exhausted  the  first 
great  impulse.  They  were  applied  in  most  in- 
stances to  natural  resources  almost  virgin;  the 
railroad  and  the  steamship  opened  to  settlement 
and  cultivation  vast  areas  of  soil  untrodden  by  the 
white  man's  foot.  The  new  machinery  uncovered 
and  utilized  new  deposits  of  coal,  copper,  silver, 
and  iron  of  unexampled  richness.  The  last  two 
generations,  however,  have  stripped  the  earth 
bare  of  these  first  resources,  have  wasted  and  de- 
spoiled with  little  thought  for  the  future.  The 
first  readjustment  of  industry  to  machinery  is 
nearly,  if  not  quite,  complete,  the  frontier  gone, 
unoccupied  lands  in  the  temperate  zone  uncom- 
mon, and  the  profit  from  agriculture  and  industry 
is  decreasing  while  population  is  increasing. 

Most  European  statesmen  cannot  predicate 
the  continuance  of  this  abnormal  rate  of  progress 
while  the  business  of  the  community  and  of  the 
state  is  conducted  in  the  old  haphazard  and  ineffi- 
cient manner,  and  they  see  a  solution  in  the  con- 

"5 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

scious  utilization  of  these  great  forces  and  factors 
by  a  community  willing  and  able  to  cooperate  as 
a  nation  in  the  promotion  of  the  corporate  welfare. 
The  individual  must  find  the  mean  between  his 
interests  and  those  of  the  greater  aggregate,  the 
majority  of  whose  citizens  have  yet  to  be  born; 
the  present  must  not  despoil  the  future,  or  forget 
that  it  must  sacrifice  a  little  that  the  future  may 
reap  much.  The  situation  has  given  birth  to  a 
doctrine,  which  may  be  termed  the  defense  for  the 
future,  predicating  policies  the  results  of  which 
will  require  half  a  century  for  achievement,  and  a 
second  doctrine,  which  may  be  dubbed  the  neces- 
sity of  business  at  a  continued  profit.  Each  year 
hundreds  of  thousands  of  men  are  added  to  the 
nation's  workers  by  the  arrival  of  a  new  generation 
of  laborers  numerically  stronger  by  hundreds  of 
thousands  than  the  generation  which  ceases  work. 
For  them  new  work  must  be  found,  or  the  workers 
already  employed  will  be  compelled  to  share  with 
them.  To  share  means  less  wages,  less  work,  less 
comforts,  the  sting  of  privation,  and  soon  discon- 
tent and  emigration  to  some  country  promising 
more  comforts.  To  keep  the  normal  increase  of 
the  population  at  home  means  that  the  trade  of  the 
nation  and  its  industry  must  develop  at  a  con- 
tinued profit;  the  new  hands  must  have  work  at 

116 


EUROPEAN  POLICIES  AND  MOTIVES 

a  profit  that  the  old  hands  may  also  continue  to 
work  at  a  profit,  for  unless  both  work  at  a  profit, 
the  wolf  will  soon  appear  at  the  door. 

On  the  other  hand,  no  European  nation  can 
view  with  equanimity  the  emigration  of  its  citizens 
as  long  as  the  strategic  and  military  situation 
compels  it  to  defend  itself  against  neighboring 
countries  which  cherish  antipathies  and  rivalries 
reaching  back  through  a  mist  of  traditions  into 
the  dim  past.  The  country  which  loses  by  emi- 
gration loses  military  strength,  and  if  emigration 
is  the  result  of  economic  conditions,  it  will  con- 
tinue to  lose  military  strength,  and  to  that  extent 
fall  into  the  power  of  neighboring  nations  whose 
population  is  able  to  stay  at  home.  In  time  this 
disparity  in  size  will  make  aggression  and  conquest 
the  preliminaries  of  national  humiliation  and 
absorption.  Behind  military  issues  and  political 
or  diplomatic  policies  stands  the  economic  problem. 

With  the  growth  of  population,  the  boundaries 
of  European  states  and  their  natural  resources 
have  not  kept  pace;  there  is  less  territory  per 
capita  in  Europe  to-day  than  there  was  half  a 
century  ago.  If  the  population  continues  to 
grow  at  the  present  rate,  there  will  be  vastly  less 
half  a  century  hence.  The  natural  resources  of 
every  country  are  less  than  they  were  in  actual- 

117 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

ity,  and  will  be  proportionately  and  actually  less 
adequate  each  succeeding  decade.  Yet  every 
decade  will  provide  more  hands  to  be  employed 
at  a  profit  that  every  decade  will  be  less  possible 
of  attainment  by  the  utilization  of  the  nation's 
own  natural  resources.  There  are  few  statesmen  in 
Europe  who  really  believe  that  the  rate  of  growth 
of  the  last  half -century  can  be  continued  at  all 
unless  the  nation  can  secure  outside  markets 
capable  of  absorbing  annually  by  reason  of  their 
own  internal  development  the  additional  produce 
turned  out  by  the  new  workers  in  Europe. 

Every  nation  knows  that  the  volume  of  its 
trade  with  its  rivals  is  greater  than  with  its  de- 
pendencies, and  greater  than  it  is  likely  to  be  in 
such  markets  as  the  less  developed  continents  can 
afford.  Not  the  volume  of  trade,  but  the  degree 
to  which  it  can  be  developed,  is  of  consequence. 
England  will  sell  Germany  more  goods,  but  she 
will  buy  more  in  about  the  same  proportion,  the 
normal  increase  in  England  being  offset  by  the 
normal  increase  in  Germany,  in  France,  and  in 
the  United  States.  The  normal,  natural  develop- 
ment of  all  communities  in  Europe  should  be,  and 
is,  reciprocal,  and  might  indeed  solve  the  difficulty 
were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  only  England  and 
France  are  satisfied  to  continue  at  the  present  rate 

118 


EUROPEAN  POLICIES  AND  MOTIVES 

of  development.  The  other  nations  regard  them- 
selves as  already  behind  in  an  economic  race 
where  the  loss  of  place  will  spell  in  time  national 
extinction.  To  them  the  status  quo  is  very  un- 
satisfactory, and  a  normal  growth  (in  the  sense  of 
a  growth  proportionate  to  the  development  of 
their  rivals)  they  regard  as  objectionable  and 
detrimental  to  the  national  interests.  An  ab- 
normal growth,  disproportionate  compared  with 
the  development  of  other  nations,  that  will  con- 
tinue until  their  economic  equality  with  other 
nations  now  more  favorably  situated  is  an  actual- 
ity, is  precisely  what  they  deem  most  essential. 
From  such  premises  there  is  no  escape.  Foreign 
markets,  expanding  markets,  are  necessary  for 
the  defense  of  the  future,  and  the  greater  good  to 
the  greater  number  yet  to  be  born  justifies  a  war 
of  apparent  aggression  to  insure  their  welfare. 

All  European  nations  feel  distinctly  the  pressure 
for  outside  markets,  though  in  different  states  the 
problem  presents  itself  in  different  guises.  Ger- 
many, Austria-Hungary,  and  Italy  feel  that  the 
danger  of  aggression  from  their  neighbors  makes 
it  essential  for  them  to  prevent  emigration  in 
order  to  maintain  an  annual  increase  of  their 
national  strength  proportionate  to  the  growth  of 
their  enemies.  While  Russia  is  growing  rapidly, 

119 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

emigration  involves  peril  for  Germany  and  Austria ; 
while  Austria  is  adding  hundreds  of  thousands 
annually,  Italy  must  increase  her  strength  at  all 
costs.  The  three  nations  are  so  hemmed  in  by 
other  states  that  the  acquisition  of  additional 
territory  is  impossible,  even  if  the  smaller  states 
around  them  were  not  experiencing  the  same  diffi- 
culty of  a  rapid  growth  of  population  in  a  limited 
area  the  natural  resources  of  which  cannot  be 
increased.  Russia,  an  undeveloped  country,  and 
therefore  anxious  to  grow  at  an  abnormal  rate, 
finds  the  problem  less  acute  because  of  its  vast 
area  and  the  existence  of  Siberia.  In  France  the 
difficulty  is  least  because  the  population  has  for 
years  been  nearly  stationary. 

Great  Britain  long  ago  experienced  the  difficulty, 
but  for  decades  was  able  to  view  with  equanimity 
the  steady  stream  of  emigrants  to  Australia,  to 
Canada,  and  to  the  United  States,  because  she  felt 
confident  that  her  island  position  and  the  strength 
of  her  fleet  made  an  army  less  necessary  and  the 
retention  of  the  population  at  home  undesirable. 
From  the  savings  of  the  past  came  furthermore 
an  income  sufficient  to  support  many  thousands 
of  her  people  at  home;  from  her  vast  merchant 
marine,  her  banking  business,  and  her  general 
services  to  the  world  as  broker,  banker,  carrier, 

120 


EUROPEAN  POLICIES  AND  MOTIVES 

insurer,  she  drew  the  maintenance  of  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  hands;  in  her  dependencies  other 
thousands  found  occupation  and  a  comfortable 
livelihood.  All  these  factors,  with  the  steadily 
increasing  output  of  manufactured  goods,  have 
kept  England  and  the  English  prosperous  and 
contented.  But  they  realize  that  their  prosperity 
rests  upon  their  access  to  non-European  countries, 
and  that  this  access  depends  upon  their  fleet.  The 
difference  between  the  attitude  of  England  and 
France  and  that  of  Germany  and  Austria  lies  not 
in  a  fundamental  difference  in  the  national  prob- 
lem, but  to  the  fact  that  their  location  and  their 
military  and  naval  prowess  enabled  them  to  secure 
the  non-European  markets  that  have  thus  far 
solved  the  difficulty.  Naturally,  they  are  loath 
to  part  with  their  advantage.  The  other  Euro- 
pean nations  are  grimly  determined  somehow  to 
solve  the  same  problem,  and  are  willing  to  contest 
with  force  of  arms  freedom  of  access  to  the  markets 
of  the  world. 

Entirely  within  the  bounds  of  possibility  is  an 
attempt  to  project  across  the  Atlantic  into  the 
Western  Hemisphere  the  surplus  population  inex- 
pedient for  the  mother  country  to  retain  and  its 
establishment  in  a  favorable  location  where  it 
could  develop  without  losing  its  identity  as  an 

121 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

integral  part  of  the  nation.  Modern  transporta- 
tion and  communication  have  made  possible  a 
degree  of  cooperation  between  distant  groups 
which  might  literally  erase  even  as  great  a  differ- 
ence in  space  as  the  Atlantic  between  the  two 
parts  of  the  same  nation,  and  render  possible  a 
real  acquaintanceship,  a  real  sympathy  in  ideals, 
an  essential  identity  of  speech,  administration, 
and  methods.  Such  a  state  can  certainly  be 
founded,  and  the  question  of  geographical  con- 
tinuity will  be  relatively  unimportant  if  these 
other  essentials  of  nationality  exist.  England  has 
literally  and  successfully  projected  herself  into 
Canada.  The  Germans  have  long  talked  of 
Das  Deutschtum  in  Ausland  as  a  reality,  as  an 
integral  part  of  the  German  nation,  and  there  is 
reason  to  believe  that  the  migration  of  large 
numbers  of  Germans  to  Cuba  and  South  America 
would  result  in  a  situation  similar  to  that  of  Canada 
and  Great  Britain.  This  literal  possibility  of 
successfully  projecting  European  nations  across 
three  thousand  miles  of  water  is  a  significant 
consideration  for  us  who  live  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere. 

The  present  situation  is  only  a  phase  of  an 
economic  problem  which  is  permanent,  and  which 
will  probably  influence  European  policies  more 

122 


EUROPEAN  POLICIES  AND  MOTIVES 

powerfully  decade  by  decade  than  it  does  now. 
We  need  not  doubt  the  existence  of  a  motive 
which  may  lead  the  victor  of  this  present  war  to 
invade  the  Western  Hemisphere.  It  may  be  that 
the  only  entirely  feasible  solution  of  his  economic 
problems  will  be  found  there.  We  must  now  see 
to  what  extent  the  Western  Hemisphere  is  fitted 
to  assist  him. 


123 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  REDISCOVERY  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 

THERE  is  no  historical  fact  more  trite  than  the 
discovery  of  South  America  by  Christopher 
Columbus,  and  none  better  attested  than  its 
barrenness  of  wide  results  for  nearly  four  centuries. 
Although  the  first  continental  land  seen  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  its  real  features  and  possi- 
bilities remained  unrealized  until  discovered  by 
our  own  generation,  by  whom  knowledge  about  it 
was  first  effectively  disseminated.  This  remark- 
able fact  has  been  thrown  into  strong  relief  by 
the  outbreak  of  the  European  war,  for  it  is  in  the 
undeveloped  condition  of  South  America,  in  its 
marvelous  adaptability  for  European  needs,  that 
the  victor  will  find  the  motive  needed  to  lure  him 
to  the  Western  Hemisphere.  The  reasons  for  this 
neglect  of  South  America  during  many  centuries 
are  striking;  the  reasons  for  its  rediscovery  by 
Europe  and  by  the  United  States  are  significant; 
a  comprehension  of  both  is  essential  to  a  grasp  of 

124 


THE  REDISCOVERY  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 

the  potentialities  and  probabilities  rendering  a 
clash  between  Europe  and  the  Western  Hemisphere 
imminent. 

In  the  early  sixteenth  century  the  New  World 
seemed  entirely  to  correspond  to  the  expectations 
of  Europeans.  True,  many  had  suffered  dis- 
appointment; the  new  land  was  not  the  fabled 
territory  of  the  Great  Khan  nor  yet  the  location  of 
Quivira  and  the  Seven  Cities  of  Cibola:  but  the 
precious  metals  and  jewels  were  found  in  Mexico 
and  Peru,  and  by  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth 
century  the  results  of  conquest  loomed  stupendous, 
rendering  Spain  apparently  the  wealthiest  of  Euro- 
pean nations.  Then  all  vanished;  the  interest  in 
South  America  of  the  world  in  general  waned,  and 
men  began  to  forget.  We  have  not  far  to  seek  for 
the  reasons.  The  precious  metals  and  jewels  were 
derived  from  surface  mines,  which  yielded  steadily 
diminishing  returns  to  the  feeble  efforts  of  the 
conqueror,  for  the  crude  methods  of  mining  then 
understood  made  it  possible  to  utilize  little  beyond 
the  surface  deposits  of  comparatively  free  metal. 
As  always,  the  question  of  labor  was  the  most 
difficult  to  solve.  The  Peruvians  and  Aztecs 
faded  away  in  the  mines  and  fields,  and  the  other 
Indian  stocks  proved  scarcely  better  workers. 
By  the  third  quarter  of  the  sixteenth  century  a 

125 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

brisk  trade  in  negro  slaves  brought  from  Africa 
had  sprung  up,  and  attempts  to  develop  South 
and  Central  America  were  largely  abandoned  in 
favor  of  the  production  in  the  West  India  Islands 
of  the  great  staple  crops,  sugar  and  tobacco,  for 
which  a  great  demand  was  appearing  in  Europe. 
The  interest  of  Europe  in  Central  and  South 
America  was  slight  in  the  seventeenth  and  eigh- 
teenth centuries  compared  with  its  vital  interest 
in  the  West  Indies,  North  America,  and  the  East 
Indies. 

We  shall  probably  not  be  far  wrong  if  we  as- 
cribe much  of  this  indifference  to  the  marshy  or 
moist  character  of  the  coast  regions,  strewn  with 
swamps,  morasses,  and  rivers,  abounding  in  in- 
sects and  malaria,  with  a  soil  not  often  dry  enough 
to  make  the  labor  of  clearing  it  worth  while.  Such 
a  district  was  not  suited  for  the  homes  of  white 
men  in  a  new  world,  and  conquered  even  stern 
Huguenots,  men  and  women  of  desirable  stock, 
whose  ability  and  determination  failed  to  found 
successful  colonies.  The  few  Spanish  settlements 
languished,  agriculture  dwindled,  and  finally  there 
were  left  in  a  semi-somnolent  state  only  trading 
posts  and  factories  which  communicated  with  the 
interior  by  water  and  furnished  a  basis  for  barter 
with  the  natives.  Around  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 

126 


THE  REDISCOVERY  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 

always  clustered  a  few  communities  dependent 
upon  the  trade  with  Peru  and  the  western  coast. 
The  whole  district  was  ill-fitted  to  produce  the 
commodities  then  in  demand  in  Europe,  and  there 
were  few  or  no  products  except  dye-woods  in 
which  Europeans  were  much  interested  or  in  the 
development  of  which  they  saw  possible  profit. 

In  fact,  the  existence  of  North  America,  its 
superior  adaptability  for  the  home-maker,  the  vast 
extent  of  its  fertile  lands,  stood  in  the  way  of  the 
utilization  of  South  America  by  Europeans  until 
the  nineteenth  century.  Much  more  accessible  and 
much  more  understandable,  admirably  adapted 
for  the  production  of  what  the  European  of  that 
day  deemed  the  necessities  of  life,  colonists  of 
all  nations  sought  the  United  States  in  prefer- 
ence to  lands  farther  south.  For  capitalists  and 
merchants  the  profits  of  trade  with  North  America 
and  with  the  West  Indies  were  so  great  that  the 
probabilities  of  profit  in  the  development  of  a  less 
accessible  country  were  not  alluring.  Indeed, 
something  like  the  complete  settlement  of  the 
United  States,  something  like  an  approximate 
utilization  of  the  resources  of  North  America, 
was  necessary  to  render  South  America  an 
attractive  field  for  enterprise  or  settlement. 

The  achievements  of  modern  science  and  modern 
127 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

industry,  however,  are  mainly  responsible  for  its 
rediscovery.  They  have  made  South  America 
valuable,  desirable  to  Europeans  as  never  before. 
The  continent  itself  was  inaccessible  and  was 
virtually  isolated  from  Europe  by  time  and  space 
in  the  days  of  sailing-ships.  This,  however,  was 
less  important  than  the  inaccessibility  of  the  really 
desirable  districts  in  the  interior  for  the  residence 
of  white  men  and  for  commercial  exploitation. 
While  nearly  two  thirds  of  the  continent  is  in  the 
tropics,  the  prevalence  of  mountains  and  high 
plateaus  in  its  center  provides  over  the  bulk  of  its 
area  conditions  by  no  means  tropical,  so  that  much 
of  Peru  and  Ecuador  and  the  whole  of  Bolivia 
are  to  all  intents  and  purposes  in  the  temperate 
zone  and  adapted  by  soil  and  climate  for  the  resi- 
dence of  Europeans  or  Americans.  Railroads  to 
carry  bulky  products  to  the  seaboard,  steamships 
and  cheap  ocean  freights  were  the  prerequisites  of 
the  development  of  the  interior  of  South  America. 
The  problem  of  transportation  solved  by  the  nine- 
teenth century  opened  the  whole  area  to  settlement 
and  enterprise.  It  is  now  merely  a  question  of  time 
when  the  whole  will  be  utilized. 

Another  difficulty,  insuperable  until  the  nine- 
teenth century,  lay  in  the  inability  of  European 
peoples  to  utilize  most  of  its  abounding  natural 

128 


THE  REDISCOVERY  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 

products.  It  was  not  merely  a  question  of  profit 
or  of  transportation;  the  thing  itself  had  as  little 
conceivable  utility  when  landed  in  Europe  as 
the  famous  pocket-handerchiefs  intended  for  the 
savages  in  Africa.  Like  rubber,  the  market  of 
which  is  a  matter  of  decades  and  depends  upon  the 
great  development  of  the  automobile  and  the  ex- 
tended use  of  electricity  for  a  great  variety  of 
purposes,  a  whole  class  of  commodities  have  been 
found  indispensable  to  diversified  industry  which 
were  hitherto  useless.  Another  class  the  value  of 
which  was  already  known  could  not  have  been 
reached  without  modern  machinery.  South  Amer- 
ica abounds  in  minerals,  the  majority  of  which  were 
non-existent  for  the  Spaniards,  partly  because  it 
was  not  profitable  to  extract  the  ore  unless  in  large 
quantities  and  relatively  free,  and  partly  because 
the  valuable  metals  in  low-grade  ores  could  not 
be  separated  at  all  from  the  foreign  substances  by 
the  crude  methods  then  employed.  Modern  drills 
and  dynamite,  the  steam  engine,  the  new  crushers, 
have  been  needed  to  give  us  access  to  the  mines  of 
the  Andes.  In  the  forests  are  quantities  of  hard- 
wood suitable  for  furniture  of  the  finest  grades,  but 
too  hard  to  be  dealt  with  profitably  by  hand  and 
too  heavy  and  bulky  to  be  successfully  transported 
without  the  railroad. 

9  129 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Not  less  important  has  been  the  growth  of  the 
industrial  community  in  Europe  and  in  the  United 
States,  the  extension  of  its  desires,  the  multiplica- 
tion of  its  wants.  As  the  division  of  labor  became 
more  successful,  as  thousands  of  hands  were  freed 
from  the  labor  of  producing  the  necessities  of  life 
and  turned  to  the  task  of  producing  luxuries,  a 
thousand  new  economic  wants  clamored  for  satis- 
faction for  the  effectuation  of  which  the  community 
was  ready  to  pay.  Nothing  short  of  this  rapid  ex- 
pansion of  the  economic  fabric  in  Europe  and  the 
United  States,  this  multiplication  of  luxuries  and 
new  wants,  the  vital  change  in  the  standard  of 
well-being  which  made  the  luxuries  of  the  early 
nineteenth  century  the  necessities  of  the  twentieth, 
could  have  provided  an  adequate  market  for  the 
South  American  produce.  Laborers  now  expect  to 
enjoy  food  and  clothes  superior  to  those  eaten  and 
worn  by  royalty  not  so  long  ago,  and  in  this 
extension  of  the  former  luxuries  of  thousands  to 
the  millions  lay  the  market  for  South  American 
produce.  The  demand  must  precede  the  supply, 
and  all  the  facilities  of  transportation  were  un- 
availing until  the  demand  came  into  existence. 

Access  to  the  coast  region  has  always  been  easy ; 
residence  beyond  brief  periods  has  been  usually 
impossible  for  white  men  in  great  districts,  while 

130 


THE  REDISCOVERY  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 

settlements  of  white  men  in  districts  otherwise 
commercially  admirable  has  been  out  of  the  ques- 
tion. For  years  this  barrier  of  fever-ridden  land 
stood  between  the  settler  and  the  fertile  fields 
and  inexhaustible  resources  of  the  interior  of  the 
northern  half  of  South  America.  Yet  before  the  in- 
terior could  be  developed  on  a  great  scale  the 
coast  had  to  be  rendered  habitable  for  white  men, 
because  contact  with  the  interior  must  take  place 
from  the  coast.  We  must  give  due  weight  to  the 
epoch-making  achievements  of  modern  science, 
which  has  already  worsted  malaria  and  yellow 
fever,  the  two  dread  scourges  which  closed  the 
coast  regions  of  much  of  South  America  to  the 
whites  for  many  generations.  It  is  now  merely 
a  question  of  time  when  the  whole  will  be  con- 
quered by  modern  sanitation  and  modern  medicine. 
The  rediscovery  of  South  America  has  been,  and 
is  still,  a  commercial  proposition,  and  not  alone  a 
matter  of  profit,  but  of  comparative  profit,  for  no 
merchant  normally  does  business  at  a  loss,  and  no 
investor  who  believes  himself  entirely  sane  would 
dream  of  putting  money  into  one  enterprise  so 
long  as  a  more  desirable  enterprise  was  available. 
On  the  whole,  the  rate  of  profit  in  the  development 
of  a  country  where  crude  products  must  be  pro- 
duced in  large  quantities  and  transported  great 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

distances  will  be  comparatively  small  in  proportion 
to  the  physical  bulk  of  the  commodity  dealt  in. 
The  profit  on  a  pound  of  sugar,  a  square  foot  of 
timber,  a  pig  of  iron,  or  an  ingot  of  silver  is  not 
usually  high  in  percentage,  and  to  make  the  trans- 
action as  a  whole  really  lucrative,  the  merchant 
must  extend  his  operations  in  many  directions  and 
produce  on  a  large  scale  in  order  that  his  profit 
may  be  certain  even  if  relatively  small  on  each 
transaction.  While  rubber  companies  and  mining 
investors  have  at  times  obtained  annual  profits  of 
fifty  or  a  hundred  per  cent.,  and  in  some  cases  even 
larger  percentages,  such  is  not  the  normal  profit 
in  South  American  trade.  Before  the  investor  and 
the  merchant  would  be  drawn  thither,  it  was 
necessary  that  the  rate  of  profit  in  ordinary  trans- 
actions in  other  countries  should  fall  to  a  percent- 
age somewhat  below  that  which  can  be  regularly 
obtained  in  the  production  of  bulky  agricultural 
staples  and  natural  products.  With  the  profits 
made  in  the  past  in  exploiting  the  United  States 
and  the  West  Indies,  South  America  could  scarcely 
compete,  for  when  opportunities  for  merchant, 
investor,  or  laborer  were  so  great  and  so  near  at 
hand,  distant  projects  were  not  alluring.  Colonial 
merchants  who  did  not  realize  at  least  one  hundred 
per  cent,  on  the  year's  business  thought  themselves 

132 


THE  REDISCOVERY  OF  SOUTH  AMERICA 

defrauded.  One  Baltimore  shipowner  who  lived 
about  the  time  of  the  American  Revolution  pur- 
chased a  cargo  of  salt  in  Bermuda  with  tobacco, 
carried  it  into  Baltimore,  and  cleared  a  profit  of 
eight  hundred  per  cent.  The  cotton  industry  in 
the  South  before  the  war,  like  the  cultivation  of 
virgin  soil  in  the  Mississippi  valley,  produced 
enormous  profits. 

Indeed,  it  might  almost  be  claimed  that  until 
very  recently  Europe  and  the  United  States  have 
regarded  South  America  and  Central  America  not 
as  fields  for  investment  and  development,  but  for 
exploitation  and  speculation.  The  attitude  of  the 
outside  world  has  changed.  Instead  of  robbing  its 
inhabitants,  despoiling  the  land,  and  leaving  it  to 
its  fate,  they  are  now  anxious  to  develop  in  that 
continent  strong,  self-reliant,  capable  communities 
which  will  develop  their  own  resources  and  with 
whom  ordinary  business  can  be  transacted  from 
which  the  usual  rate  of  profit  will  be  expected 
and  deemed  satisfactory.  The  increase  of  popula- 
tion in  Europe  and  the  United  States,  the  greater 
keenness  of  competition,  the  introduction  of 
machinery,  the  improvements  of  transportation, 
have  increased  the  volume  of  business  and  have 
decreased  its  rate  of  profit  on  individual  transac- 
tions to  a  point  which  makes  opportunities  for 

133 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  development  of  the  Southern  Continent  seem 
attractive. 

The  economic  independence  of  South  America 
is  at  hand;  the  days  of  its  slavery  and  degradation 
are  already  past;  its  rediscovery  portends  the 
realization  of  the  important  part  it  can  and  ought 
to  play  in  the  interdependent,  international  econo- 
mic fabric.  The  end  of  the  European  war  is  more 
than  likely  to  render  this  fact  appallingly  clear  to 
the  victor. 


134 


CHAPTER  III 

PROBABILITIES  OF  GERMAN 
AGGRESSION 

THE  circumstances  in  which  Germany  emerges 
from  the  present  war  as  victor  will  be 
more  significant  for  the  United  States  than 
the  fact  of  victory.  Should  Germany  conclu- 
sively defeat  the  Allies  on  land  and  sea,  she 
would  in  all  probability  carry  out  the  Pan-Ger- 
manic schemes  for  the  absorption  of  Africa  and 
India,  and  would  find  in  the  development  of  an 
administration  and  in  the  solution  of  colonial 
problems  abundant  occupation  for  some  years  for 
such  endeavor  as  she  could  spare  from  the  re- 
arrangement of  Europe  and  the  reorganization  of 
Germany  and  Austria.  While  such  a  sweeping 
victory  would  by  no  means  prevent  her  from  ex- 
tending her  aegis  over  the  Western  Hemisphere,  it 
would  render  an  attempt  to  do  so  improbable.  A 
victory  by  Germany  and  Austria  on  land  and  an 
English  victory  on  the  sea  will  also  send  the 

135 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

German  armies  to  India  and  the  far  East,  and 
with  that  eventuality  the  United  States  will  not 
be  concerned.  A  naval  victory  over  England  and 
either  a  stalemate  on  land  or  a  victory  without  the 
annihilation  of  the  French  and  Russian  armies; 
a  qualified  victory  on  land  and  sea  by  Germany 
and  Austria  not  sufficient  to  humble  or  crush  their 
enemies,  but  enough  to  compel  the  latter  to  con- 
clude a  peace  on  terms  favorable  to  Germany — 
these  are  the  eventualities  which  the  United  States 
ought  to  view  with  apprehension.  And  precisely 
these  circumstances  the  military  and  naval  prob- 
abilities indicate.  The  English  fleet  seems  likely 
to  retain  control  of  the  sea  despite  diminishing 
numbers  and  occasional  defeats,  and  if  Germany 
and  Austria  win  at  all  on  land,  it  will  probably  be 
a  victory  which  will  fall  far  short  of  the  annihila- 
tion of  the  allied  armies.  This  will  be  the  very 
situation  which  the  United  States  has  most  to  fear. 
In  no  event  is  a  German  army  likely  to  set  foot 
upon  the  soil  of  North  America  to  attack  the 
United  States,  Canada,  or  Mexico.  Though  we 
are  told  of  German  plans  for  the  invasion  of  the 
United  States,  no  doubt  the  War  Department  at 
Berlin  could  display  in  its  archives  an  elaborate 
scheme  for  the  invasion  of  every  country  on  the 
globe,  and  we  shall  do  well  not  to  deceive  ourselves 

136 


PROBABILITIES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

into  a  belief  that  the  attempt  to  educate  the  gen- 
eral staff  in  various  European  countries  portends  an 
invasion  of  the  United  States.  Any  notion  that 
Germany  would  even  dream  of  conquering  America 
is  based  upon  a  fundamentally  incorrect  concep- 
tion of  Pan-Germanism. 

Economic  problems,  though  not  more  funda- 
mental than  in  other  European  countries,  are  more 
pressing  in  Germany,  where  the  benefits  of  the 
economic  development  of  the  last  decades  have 
been  proportionately  greater  than  elsewhere,  and 
where  the  fear  that  they  may  not  be  durable  is 
based  upon  a  vivid  memory  of  conditions  when 
Germany  was  less  prosperous.  Many  people  now 
alive  in  Germany  have  experienced  comparative 
penury  and  real  prosperity  within  the  span  of 
their  own  lives,  and  look  upon  a  possible  diminu- 
tion of  the  rate  of  economic  progress  with  some- 
thing more  than  a  speculative  eye.  Markets,  for 
the  swelling  volume  of  German  manufactured 
goods  greater  each  year  by  the  amount  produced 
by  the  new  generation  of  efficient  hands,  Germany 
is  seeking;  markets  in  which  she  may  continue  to 
sell  at  a  profit  indefinitely,  and  so  ward  off  that 
readjustment  of  German  industry  which  must 
involve  considerable,  even  though  temporary, 
suffering  to  many  of  her  people  and  probably  invite 

137 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

emigration.  Rightly  or  wrongly,  she  does  not  feel 
that  the  European  countries,  the  United  States, 
and  Canada,  will  offer  her  such  a  market.  South 
America  and  Central  America  are  apparently  ideal 
for  her  purpose,  and  she  needs  merely  to  remove 
from  her  path  two  technical  and  artificial  obstacles, 
the  English  fleet  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  With 
the  one  she  is  at  present  attempting  to  deal ;  to  the 
other  she  may  in  due  time  direct  her  attention. 

Americans  who  study  an  atlas  but  seldom,  and 
who  see  their  own  country  and  Europe  depicted 
on  large  scale  maps,  so  that  Russia,  Massachusetts, 
and  Belgium  each  occupy  a  full  page,  and  then 
chance  in  turning  the  leaves  to  stumble  across  a 
map  of  Latin  America  also  occupying  a  page,  have 
not  the  slightest  realization  of  its  immense  size. 
Its  area  approximates  nine  million  square  miles, 
about  three  times  greater  than  the  United  States, 
and  it  contains  one  state  which  alone  is  as  large 
as  the  United  States.  Approximately  seventy- 
five  millions  of  people  inhabit  the  twenty  republics 
stretching  between  the  Rio  Grande  and  Cape  Horn, 
but,  though  they  are  collectively  numerous,  it  is 
vital  to  remember,  when  we  are  speaking  of  the 
adaptability  of  various  parts  of  the  world  for 
Germany's  purposes,  that  only  three  fourths  as 
many  people  as  there  are  in  the  United  States 

138 


PROBABILITIES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

are  scattered  over  an  area  three  times  as  great. 
Probably  no  country  so  well  fitted  for  develop- 
ment by  Europeans  is  unappropriated  by  them. 

The  natural  resources  of  the  country  are  vast 
almost  beyond  relief.  The  land  itself  is  excessively 
fertile,  and  the  conditions  in  various  parts  of  the 
country  permit  the  profitable  cultivation  of  all 
tropical  staples  and  of  most  products  of  the  tem- 
perate zone,  for  somewhere  the  right  conditions  of 
soil,  climate,  and  rainfall  will  be  found  in  conjunc- 
tion. Its  forests  produce  such  commercial  staples 
as  rubber,  dye-woods,  and  hard-woods  for  cabinet 
making;  its  mountains  contain  minerals  in  pro- 
fusion— the  precious  metals,  quantities  of  iron, 
lead,  and  tin,  besides  many  minerals  of  which 
relatively  small  quantities  are  available  in  Europe 
and  many  of  which  the  supply  in  Europe  proper 
is  steadily  diminishing.  As  a  field  for  enterprise, 
South  America  is  unsurpassed  in  the  world  and 
without  a  peer. 

Its  resources  have  been  scarcely  uncovered,  and 
the  ground  has  barely  been  scratched.  While  in 
southern  Brazil  and  in  the  northern  Argentine  Re- 
public are  highly  developed  areas,  much  of  the  coast 
is  entirely  undeveloped,  and  the  greater  part  of 
the  interior  is  almost  virgin  because  it  has  not  yet 
been  reached  by  modern  transportation.  There  are 

139 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

thousands  of  miles  of  railroads  in  South  and  Cen- 
tral America,  but  the  area  to  be  covered  is  three 
times  as  great  as  that  of  the  United  States,  the 
number  of  people  to  be  reached  is  nearly  seventy- 
five  millions,  and  the  mileage  necessary  to  meet 
their  needs  is  enormous.  Yet  upon  adequate  rail- 
road facilities  depends  the  profitable  development 
of  the  interior  and  the  coast,  for  when  the  rail- 
roads are  in  operation,  the  rapidity  with  which  the 
country  can  grow  will  depend  solely  upon  the 
amount  of  capital  which  can  be  drawn  thither. 
That  degree  of  rapid  development  which  the  Ger- 
mans believe  essential  for  their  new  market  is 
entirely  feasible  in  South  and  Central  America. 

As  a  field  for  emigration,  South  America  is  un- 
surpassed by  any  similar  area  outside  of  Europe 
and  North  America  which  is  not  already  crowded 
to  bursting  with  population.  Vast  areas  await 
settlement — vast  areas  with  a  temperate  climate, 
fertile  soil,  abundant  mineral  resources,  every- 
thing necessary  for  the  comfort  of  a  European 
population. 

The  South  Americans  are  naturally  zealous  to 
win  favorable  opinions  about  their  country  from 
foreigners, — quite  as  anxious  as  the  inhabitants  of 
Chicago,  London,  and  Berlin, — and  they  resent 
with  perfect  justice  the  representation  of  South 

140 


PROBABILITIES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

America  as  an  uninhabited  country.  In  all  fair- 
ness we  should  emphasize  the  existence  of  broad 
bands  of  highly  developed  territory  where  condi- 
tions are  essentially  the  same  as  in  Europe  and  in 
the  United  States.  If  some  towns  and  districts 
are  unprepossessing,  there  are  tank-towns  and 
mining  cities  in  the  United  States  of  America 
consisting  of  a  few  saloons  and  one-story  shacks, 
and  the  domestic  architecture  in  the  Middle  West 
and  even  in  well-known  Eastern  States  has  not  yet 
attracted  the  commendation  of  artists.  Candor 
will  extort  from  Americans  who  see  nothing  but 
the  pictures  the  admission  that  Rio  Janeiro  and 
Buenos  Aires  surpass  from  an  architectural  point 
of  view  the  great  majority  of  American  cities,  and 
contain  certain  districts,  finer  than  anything  in 
America,  which  compare  favorably  with  the  show 
places  of  Europe.  Travelers  insist  that  the  reality 
far  surpasses  the  pictures,  and  that  the  hotels  and 
accommodations  in  the  larger  cities  are  luxurious 
to  a  degree  unknown  in  a  good  many  parts  of  the 
United  States.  At  the  same  time  that  we  insist 
upon  these  facts,  we  must  also  stress  the  existence 
of  vast  areas  as  yet  undeveloped,  where  the  popu- 
lation is  ignorant  and  crude  when  it  is  not  literally 
savage.  The  most  vital  fact  to  keep  in  mind  about 
Latin  America  as  a  whole  is  the  juxtaposition  of  the 

141 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

developed  and  the   undeveloped,  of  civilization 
and  barbarism.    Both  exist  in  Latin  America. 

Were  it  not  true  that  millions  of  these  people  are 
highly  civilized  and  accustomed  to  satisfying  a 
very  great  variety  of  economic  wants  by  the  im- 
portation of  European  manufactured  goods,  Latin 
America  would  offer  a  conspicuously  less  favorable 
opportunity  to  German  trade;  for  the  German 
problem  is  in  reality  a  future  problem — to  expand 
her  trade  as  fast  as  her  population  can  possibly 
grow,  to  increase  her  exports  in  proportion  to  the 
increase  of  industrial  efficiency  in  production,  and 
to  sell  all  at  a  profit.  Not  much  consideration  is 
needed  to  show  us  that  South  America  is  naturally 
better  fitted  than  most  European  dependencies  to 
afford  an  expanding  market.  The  population  in 
Morocco  and  Egypt,  like  the  population  in  India, 
has  not  been  accustomed  to  a  high  degree  of  com- 
fort, judged  by  European  standards,  and  is  not 
easily  and  rapidly  educated  in  varieties  of  new 
wants  that  European  endeavor  and  capital  are 
essential  to  satisfy.  The  pace  at  which  such 
markets  can  be  developed  is  difficult  to  accelerate, 
and  the  more  expensive  and  complicated  manu- 
factured products  are  less  easily  sold  there.  A 
market  for  pianos  is  more  difficult  to  develop  in 
India  than  in  South  America,  where  European 

142 


PROBABILITIES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

music  is  a  passion  with  a  large  part  of  the  native 
population,  where  there  are  opera-houses  the 
architecture  of  which  puts  to  blush  our  structures 
for  similar  purposes,  and  performances  are  usu- 
ally comparable  with  our  own.  The  markets  for 
European  goods  in  South  America  are  already 
developed;  the  volume  of  trade  is  already  enor- 
mous; it  has  grown  in  the  last  few  decades  with 
leaps  and  bounds,  affording  proof  of  the  pace  at 
which  it  will  continue  to  grow  under  favorable 
conditions. 

The  inability  of  Germany  to  wait  until  the  day 
when  her  navy  can  beat  the  English  fleet  in  open 
battle  has  compelled  her  to  seek  markets  outside 
Europe  which  can  be  reached  by  land  and  the 
trade  of  which  cannot  be  controlled  by  sea-power, 
and  has  aimed  Pan-Germanism  at  Egypt  and 
India,  at  the  fertile  valleys  of  the  Tigris  and  Eu- 
phrates. But  inasmuch  as  this  assault  upon  Africa 
and  Asia  involves  highly  unpleasant  consequences 
for  other  nations,  Germany's  success  may  conceiv- 
ably raise  almost  as  many  problems  as  it  will 
settle.  While  she  has  already  achieved  powerful 
allies,  and  in  the  event  of  victory  may  acquire 
more,  her  expansion  into  Africa  and  Asia  has 
already  insured  the  enmity  of  two  powerful  na- 
tions, and  may  probably  arouse  the  apprehension 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

of  others.  Such  a  solution  of  her  problem  is  un- 
desirable as  long  as  another  method  is  available. 
Such  an  opportunity  is  presented  in  South  America. 
As  it  is  not  strategically  a  part  of  Europe,  its 
control  by  Germany  would  not  menace  in  the  least 
any  of  the  existing  coalitions  in  Europe,  Africa,  or 
Asia,  and  would  threaten  neither  the  political  wel- 
fare nor  the  independence  of  European  or  Asiatic 
powers.  Its  possession  could  not  possibly  make 
Germany  politically  stronger  or  strategically  more 
dangerous  in  Europe  than  she  would  be  without  it. 
This,  indeed,  may  not  improbably  be  the  really 
vital  fact  which  the  war  will  make  astoundingly 
clear.  In  the  event  of  a  sweeping  German  victory, 
the  occupation  of  South  America  will  be  easier 
than  interference  elsewhere;  in  the  event  of  a 
victory  over  the  English  fleet,  whether  or  not  that 
fleet  is  annihilated,  the  control  of  South  America 
will  afford  the  simplest,  readiest,  and  most  expe- 
ditious solution  of  Germany's  economic  problems. 
Above  all,  in  the  eventuality  which  seems  most 
probable, — a  German  preponderance  on  land  suffi- 
ciently clear  to  compel  the  granting  of  concessions 
by  the  Allies, — South  America  will  be  the  easiest 
thing  for  them  to  concede.  There  is  nothing  on  the 
globe  that  would  cost  the  Allies  so  little  without 
threatening  them  at  all.  It  is  the  only  thing  on 

144 


PROBABILITIES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

the  globe,  in  fact,  which  they  can  afford  to  sur- 
render to  a  victorious  Germany.  All  the  powers 
except  England  and  France  will  give  away  what 
they  never  possessed,  a  sort  of  giving  which  most 
people  find  easy,  and  even  for  England  it  is  a  much 
easier  concession  from  every  conceivable  point  of 
view  than  Egypt,  India,  or  South  Africa,  where  the 
roots  of  English  rule  are  older,  deeper,  and  better 
established. 

It  may  not  improbably  be  the  only  concession 
which  a  due  regard  for  the  future  will  enable 
Germany  to  accept.  If  there  is  one  thing  more 
essential  for  her  than  another  in  the  preparation  of 
a  lasting  peace,  it  is  a  solution  favorable  to  Ger- 
many which  does  not  require  concessions  involving 
the  honor  of  other  nations.  The  loss  of  Morocco, 
of  Egypt,  of  India,  would  be  serious  blows  to  the 
pride  of  the  English  and  French  people,  and  would 
be  so  unpopular  and  lead  so  inevitably  to  a  demand 
for  reprisal  and  revenge  that  German  statesmen 
may  well  hesitate  before  demanding  or  accepting 
them.  No  nation's  pride  would  be  involved  in  the 
cession  to  Germany  of  South  America,  because  no 
European  nation  has  political  dominion  in  South 
America,  outside  Guiana,  and  no  control  or  over- 
lordship  of  that  obvious  technical  nature  the  loss 
of  which  is  so  impossible  to  conceal.  All  European 

10  145 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

nations  have  relations  with  Latin  America  of  such 
subtlety,  and  relations  with  other  parts  of  the  world 
so  public  and  avowed,  that  a  compromise  reached 
at  the  expense  of  South  America  would  surely  be 
agreeable  to  them  all.  They  cannot,  indeed,  con- 
fer upon  Germany  privileges  of  ownership  they  do 
not  possess,  but  she  will  be  abundantly  satisfied 
if  they  covenant  not  to  interfere  with  her  develop- 
ment of  the  country  and  with  her  acquisition  of  the 
lion's  share  of  the  trade.  They  can  easily  come  to  a 
tacit  agreement  to  turn  their  attention  elsewhere 
and  leave  her  unmolested. 

From  the  economic  point  of  view  such  a  solu- 
tion would  be  exceedingly  advantageous  for  Ger- 
many. South  America  is  so  safe  from  military 
interference  and  so  easily  protected  by  the  victors' 
fleet  from  European  aggression  that  it  will  provide 
a  particularly  secure  place  in  which  to  develop, 
with  German  capital  in  the  hands  of  German 
merchants,  the  expanding  market  on  which  Ger- 
many places  her  future  dependence.  No  conquest 
by  arms  would  be  desired ;  no  military  rule  of  any 
sort  would  be  expedient ;  no  army  needed  to  retain 
the  sort  of  right  upon  which  she  would  be  prepared 
to  insist — a  preferential  tariff  or  some  sort  of 
trade  monopoly  or  preference  which  would  be 
as  profitable  to  South  Americans  as  to  Germans. 

146 


PROBABILITIES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

Nor  would  the  acquisition  by  Germany  of  Eng- 
land's peculiar  supremacy  be  likely  to  arouse 
opposition  or  even  apprehension  in  South  America. 
The  Latin  American  is  well  acquainted  with  the 
German  and  finds  him  personally  much  to  his  lik- 
ing. He  is  apprehensive  not  of  German  merchants, 
of  German  fleets,  or  German  commerce,  but  of  Ger- 
man colonists,  who  would  attempt  the  erection  in 
South  America  of  das  Deutschtum  in  Ausland. 
When  he  comes  to  understand  that  the  new  Ger- 
many will  frown  upon  emigration,  he  will  lose  his 
suspicions  of  her.  The  South  American,  therefore, 
Germany  has  not  to  fear;  with  Europeans  in  South 
America  she  will  be  able  to  deal  with  maximum 
ease. 

Such  a  solution  would  be  peculiarly  adapted  to 
the  maintenance  in  Germany  of  an  army  large 
enough  to  hold  France  and  Russia  in  check.  Pan- 
Germanism  is  intended  to  make  possible  the  re- 
tention of  enough  men  in  Germany  to  recruit 
indefinitely  an  army  of  sufficient  strength  to  hold 
in  check  the  swelling  hordes  of  Russia.  A  victory 
which  compels  the  vanquished  to  pay  the  price  in 
Africa  and  Asia,  will  mean  the  military  protection 
of  the  new  dependencies  and  their  administration 
by  German  hands,  which,  while  it  will  furnish 
employment  for  a  good  many  Germans,  will  draw 

147 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

from  Germany  a  good  many  men  whose  loss  it 
may  not  be  easy  to  replace,  and  whose  number,  in- 
deed, may  have  to  be  considerably  increased  as  the 
years  elapse.  If  the  day  should  ever  come  when  a 
new  coalition  should  rise  to  wrest  from  Germany 
her  new  empire,  the  defense  of  an  empire  scattered 
over  Europe,  Asia,  and  Africa  would  in  all  prob- 
ability be  so  difficult  as  almost  to  predicate  failure. 
On  the  contrary,  the  defense  of  an  empire  based 
upon  a  German  army  at  home  and  upon  commer- 
cial interests  with  a  country  like  South  America, 
inaccessible  to  Europeans,  making  no  demands 
for  military  protection,  and  quite  capable  of  ad- 
ministering itself,  would  be  so  entirely  feasible 
as  to  leave  almost  no  ground  for  hesitation  in  the 
contemplation  of  alternatives. 

Quite  within  the  bounds  of  possibility  will  be 
an  assault  by  Germany  upon  the  far  East.  The 
Panama  Canal,  if  she  can  secure  it,  will  afford 
access  to  the  Pacific  by  a  route  eminently  safe 
from  European  interference.  Through  it  would 
be  feasible,  an  attempt  to  free  the  Eastern  nations 
from  English  and  French  domination,  to  restore 
to  India  and  China  their  national  independence, 
free  from  curtailment  or  interference,  in  exchange 
for  that  same  shadowy  commercial  supremacy 
which  Germany  would  like  to  obtain  in  South 

148 


PROBABILITIES  OF  GERMAN  AGGRESSION 

America.  She  could  thus  strike  a  crushing  blow 
at  her  adversaries'  prosperity  without  herself 
assuming  the  sort  of  burdens  which  render  her 
enemies  vulnerable,  and  as  she  would  control  her 
own  approaches  by  way  of  Panama  to  the  far  East, 
dependent  upon  nobody's  consent  or  permission, 
she  could  in  the  future  extend  her  trade  unchecked. 
Than  this  no  more  deadly  blow  could  be  struck  at 
England,  and  it  could  be  dealt  with  entire  safety 
and  without  creating  future  problems.  The  dream 
of  German  statesmen  would  come  true — the  dis- 
ruption of  England's  artificial  and  abnormal 
empire  and  the  restoration  of  freedom  to  South 
America  and  the  far  East,  with  the  lion's  share  of 
the  trade  in  German  hands. 

There  would  remain  the  United  States  and  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  We  have  at  present  the  most 
explicit  diplomatic  assurances  that  the  Germans 
intend  to  regard  the  integrity  of  our  possessions 
and  do  not  contemplate  an  assault  on  Canada. 
On  the  whole,  the  Germans  do  not  expect  opposi- 
tion from  the  United  States.  They  realize  it 
would  be  a  gross  blunder  for  them  to  attempt 
actually  to  monopolize  the  whole  South  American 
market,  for  they  cannot  supply  everything  the 
latter  wishes  to  buy  nor  consume  all  the  raw 
produce  she  must  export;  but  they  feel  it  would 

149 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

also  be  a  sorry  blunder  to  share  it  with  England 
and  France,  where  the  profits  of  the  trade  would 
strengthen  Germany's  foes  and  help  in  the  solution 
of  economic  problems  the  insistence  and  difficulty 
of  which  would  otherwise  weaken  them.  The 
United  States  is  different.  She  neither  threatens 
Germany  nor  is  likely  to  develop  an  economic 
fabric  which  Germany  would  need  to  fear,  what- 
ever its  size  or  rate  of  progress.  An  alliance  with 
us  she  would  gladly  have,  and  she  would  willingly 
purchase  it  at  the  price  of  concessions  in  South 
America  beyond  those  dictated  by  economic 
prudence.  That  some  such  reasoning  would  in- 
fluence German  statesmen  is  quite  within  the 
bounds  of  probability. 

What,  then,  would  the  United  States  do?  Sup- 
pose we  should  decline  such  a  German  offer? 
Shall  we  not  delude  ourselves  if  we  suppose  that 
with  such  interests  at  stake,  such  problems  to 
solve,  such  foes  already  vanquished,  the  Germans 
would  hesitate  to  challenge  the  Monroe  Doctrine  ? 


V 


150 


CHAPTER  IV 
POSSIBILITIES  OF  ENGLISH  AGGRESSION 

FROM  present  indications  most  critics  con- 
clude that  the  end  of  the  war  will  find  Eng- 
land still  supreme  upon  the  sea.  They 
point  to  the  natural  ability  of  the  English  as 
sailors,  to  the  preponderance  in  size  of  the  English 
fleet  over  the  German,  to  the  centuries  of  success- 
ful experience  behind  the  English  leaders,  to  the 
possibility  of  another  Nelson  or  a  new  Drake. 
Victory  will  not  change  our  fundamental  relations 
to  the  sea-power  nor  yet  the  fundamental  premise 
that  the  sea-power  itself  is  for  England  a  defensive 
arm,  the  use  of  which  for  aggression  would  endanger 
its  own  existence.  The  same  considerations  which 
have  hitherto  made  politic  England's  generous  use 
of  her  authority  would  still  dictate  little  if  any 
interference  with  other  nations.  Nevertheless, 
the  defeat  of  the  German  navy — and  in  all  prob- 
ability its  defeat  will  mean  its  destruction — will 
affect  a  substantive  change  in  those  factors  of 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  situation  most  essential  to  the  safety  and 
prosperity  of  the  United  States. 

The  restoration  of  England's  supremacy  as  an 
actual  fact  will  destroy  the  balance  of  power  in 
European  waters  which  has  long  rendered  inex- 
pedient the  aggressive  use  of  England's  navy  and 
immunized  our  coast  and  island  possessions  from 
attack.  The  aftermath  of  every  great  European 
war  has  found  England  utilizing  the  sea-power  for 
the  extension  of  her  dominion  wherever  possible 
without  the  cooperation  of  an  extensive  military 
expedition.  Without  doubt  all  German  colonies 
will  be  in  England's  hands  before  long,  and  she 
will  expect  to  retain  the  bulk  of  them  at  the  end  of 
the  war;  but  she  will  then  be  able  to  undertake 
aggression  against  others.  We  must  not  forget, 
therefore,  that  victory  will  automatically  restore 
to  England  the  supremacy  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. Once  more  her  fleet  will  take  physical 
control  of  our  waters  and  will  be  able  to  exercise  in 
fact  the  true  supremacy  which  we  have  had  during 
the  last  decade  and  a  half.  Nor  will  there  be  any 
longer  a  necessity  for  generosity;  with  the  defeat 
of  her  great  rival  her  imperative  reasons  for 
conciliating  us  will  have  disappeared.  She  was 
anxious  for  us  to  hold  the  sovereignty  of  American 
waters  because  she  was  anxious  to  keep  it  out  of 

152 


POSSIBILITIES  OF  ENGLISH  AGGRESSION 

the  hands  of  Germany;  once  victorious,  she  will 
prefer  to  retain  it  herself. 

Why,  too,  should  she  not  extend  her  present  pos- 
sessions in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico?  The  most  desir- 
able possession  in  the  world  at  the  close  of  this 
war  will  be  the  Panama  Canal,  the  new  roadway 
to  the  English  colonies  in  Australia,  to  the  Eng- 
lish possessions  in  India,  to  the  marts  of  trade 
in  China;  a  new  roadway  which  the  fleet  alone 
can  control,  and  one  which  Pan-Germanism, 
Pan-Slavism,  and  Pan-Islam  are  incapable  of 
threatening.  Its  approaches  are  already  in  Eng- 
land's hands:  the  Bahama  and  Bermuda  islands, 
easily  controlling  the  approaches  to  the  gulf  from 
the  Atlantic  Coast;  the  really  advantageous  route 
through  the  Windward  Islands ;  the  road  along  the 
South  American  coast  past  Barbados  and  Trini- 
dad. All  these  converge  upon  Jamaica  at  the 
very  entrance  of  the  canal,  commanding  its  ap- 
proaches from  Europe,  from  the  Atlantic  coast 
of  the  United  States,  and  from  our  gulf  ports. 
With  the  keys  of  the  situation  thus  in  her 
hands,  with  an  English  squadron  in  active  con- 
trol of  the  sea,  with  the  notions  of  expediency 
dictated  by  the  exigencies  of  European  policy  no 
longer  counseling  so  great  a  degree  of  caution, 
to  take  possession  of  the  remainder  would  be  a 

153 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

matter  of  the  utmost  simplicity  and  a  step  clearly 
advantageous. 

At  our  influence  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  she 
has  always  looked  askance,  regarding  it  from  the 
earliest  times  as  contrary  to  her  interests.  Trade 
with  the  West  Indies  she  was  glad  to  foster  while 
the  continental  colonies  were  subjects  of  the  British 
crown,  but  the  moment  they  broke  from  that 
allegiance  she  became  hostile  to  the  extension  of 
American  trade,  and  opposed  it  by  means  of 
statutes  and  regulations  which  her  navy  was 
completely  adequate  to  enforce.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  the  diplomatic  negotiations  which 
preceded  and  followed  it  convinced  her  statesmen 
that  the  United  States  cherished  a  desire  to  extend 
its  authority  over  the  whole  of  the  gulf  and  the 
adjacent  territory,  an  impression  strengthened 
and  confirmed  by  the  happenings  and  diplomatic 
statements  of  the  ensuing  decades.  We  need  not 
suppose  that  this  was  forgotten  when  the  under- 
standing was  reached  which  placed  the  supremacy 
of  the  gulf  for  the  time  in  our  hands,  nor  that  the 
events  of  the  last  fifteen  years  making  the  United 
States  the  dominant  power  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
have  escaped  notice.  England  herself  still  holds 
the  strategic  and  naval  stations,  but  the  present 
English  possessions  are  not  as  commercially  valu- 

154 


POSSIBILITIES  OF  ENGLISH  AGGRESSION 

able  in  themselves  as  those  of  the  United  States, 
and  the  retention  of  strategic  control  premises  a 
return  to  her  earlier  policy  of  controlling  the  gulf 
as  soon  as  the  exigencies  of  the  European  situation 
permit.  When  the  German  fleet  has  been  de- 
stroyed and  the  victory  of  the  Allies  has  shifted 
the  balance  of  power  in  Europe  and  left  England 
free  to  pursue  her  earlier  policies  and  recoup  her 
losses,  will  it  not  be  entirely  natural  for  her  to 
turn  once  more  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  to  expect 
the  United  States  to  surrender  a  supremacy  which 
she  received  as  a  loan,  one  might  almost  say, 
rather  than  as  a  gift? 

The  northwestern  extremity  of  this  continent 
is  the  province  of  Alaska,  valuable  because  of  its 
great  deposits  of  gold,  coal,  and  other  minerals. 
Geographically,  it  is  a  part  of  Canada  and  not  a 
part  of  the  United  States;  our  title  to  it  rests 
upon  purchase  rather  than  upon  conquest  or 
discovery,  and  upon  a  purchase  made  at  a 
time  when  the  mineral  deposits  were  scarcely 
suspected.  The  simplicity  of  the  operations  re- 
quired to  add  Alaska  to  Canada  will  be  appar- 
ent to  the  least  informed.  Separated  as  it  is 
from  the  United  States  proper,  easily  approached 
from  any  part  of  western  Canada,  and  inhab- 
ited at  present  by  a  sparse  and  cosmopolitan 

155 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

population,  it  would  be  difficult  indeed  for  us  to 
defend. 

Our  relations  with  Canada  have  rarely  met  with 
English  approval.  Scarcely  had  the  French  been 
expelled  and  the  American  Revolution  begun  than 
the  thirteen  States  were  negotiating  and  scheming 
to  add  Canada  as  a  fourteenth  state,  and  the 
project  has  often  been  revived  since.  In  1812 
invasion  was  attempted,  with  the  probable  purpose 
of  conquering  the  province  and  offering  it  to 
England  in  exchange  for  the  commercial  rights  for 
which  we  had  negotiated  in  vain.  Such,  at  any 
rate,  was  the  version  accepted  in  England.  Fur- 
ther difficulties  were  occasioned  when  the  present 
Constitution  of  Canada  was  made,  while  the  recent 
attempts  to  provide  a  customs  agreement  which 
should  give  the  Canadians  greater  privileges  in  the 
United  States  than  English  merchants  possessed  in 
England  have  been  thought  to  be  the  prelimina- 
ries of  annexation.  To  such  notions  credence 
has  been  lent  by  men  in  the  highest  American 
public  offices.  Recently  a  campaign  was  fought 
in  Canada  over  the  issue  of  loyalty  to  England 
and  the  rejection  of  the  commercial  treaty  or  its 
acceptance  with  the  understanding  that  a  closer 
connection,  if  not  annexation,  with  the  United 
States  was  desirable  and  probable.  Rumor  is 

156 


POSSIBILITIES  OF  ENGLISH   AGGRESSION 

once  more  busy  with  similar  schemes,  and  is  pro- 
ceeding from  quarters  whence  the  news  will  cer- 
tainly reach  England.  Any  attempt  during  the 
war  or  at  its  close  to  establish  a  more  intimate 
connection  between  the  United  States  and  Canada 
will  not  be  viewed  with  approval  in  London. 

The  potential  power  of  England  is  enormous, 
and  in  the  present  circumstances  ought  to  be  better 
understood.  Our  whole  foreign  trade  is  in  her 
hands,  all  our  approaches  are  at  the  mercy  of  her 
fleet  once  that  fleet  is  victorious  over  its  present 
enemies,  and  an  army  could  invade  the  United 
States  from  Canada  with  ease  and  probably  with 
success.  It  could  not,  indeed,  hope  to  hold  the 
country  or  conquer  it,  but  a  dash  at  New  York, 
Chicago,  or  Seattle  is  eminently  feasible. 

An  English  victory  will  also  predicate  a  great 
change  in  England's  attitude  toward  the  growing 
trade  of  the  United  States  with  South  America. 
Until  comparatively  recently,  Great  Britain  paid 
little  attention  to  the  United  States  or  to  its  asser- 
tions of  interest  in  South  America  because  we  had 
neither  the  manufactured  goods  nor  the  capital 
which  the  Latin  Americans  needed,  and  were  un- 
able to  use  in  our  own  industries  any  considerable 
amount  of  their  products.  Then  from  the  magic 
of  the  industrial  inventions  of  the  nineteenth 

157 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

century  came  the  transformation  of  the  United 
States  and  of  South  America.  From  a  power 
whose  commercial  influence  England  might  safely 
disregard,  the  United  States  had  become  a  danger- 
ous rival ;  from  a  customer  whose  trade  the  South 
Americans  need  scarcely  consider,  the  United 
States  had  become  one  of  their  most  important 
buyers.  Physically  we  are  able,  entirely  able,  to 
compete  with  England  in  South  American  markets, 
and  have  proved  ourselves  capable  of  getting  rather 
more  than  our  share  In  some  of  them.  During 
the  last  fifteen  years  we  have  so  enormously 
increased  our  trade  that  in  Central  America 
nearly  seventy  per  cent,  is  to-day  in  American 
hands,  and  in  parts  of  South  America  the  United 
States  stands  either  second  or  third  in  volume 
of  trade. 

Of  these  facts,  however,  the  European  situation 
forbade  the  English  to  complain.  The  trade  was 
a  necessary  consequence  of  the  supremacy  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere  which  the  building  of  the 
German  fleet  had  put  into  American  hands  and 
which,  indeed,  the  English  were  not  at  the  time  in  a 
position  actively  to  dispute,  because  they  were  not 
able  to  despatch  from  Europe  adequate  force  to 
make  good  their  claims.  Once  the  German  fleet 
is  destroyed  and  the  supremacy  of  the  sea  is  again 

158 


POSSIBILITIES  OF  ENGLISH  AGGRESSION 

incontestably  in  England's  hands,  the  control  of 
the  water  routes  to  the  Western  Hemisphere 
hers  beyond  dispute,  will  she  not  take  into  account 
the  new  relationship  between  the  United  States 
and  South  America,  and  be  driven  to  ask  whether 
it  is  to  her  interest  for  the  United  States  to  possess 
so  large  a  share  of  the  trade?  We  shall  not  need 
to  assume  her  intention  of  monopolizing  the  trade 
to  the  total  exclusion  of  the  United  States  and 
other  nations  to  see  that  she  may  well  object  to 
the  proportion  of  it  which  we  at  present  have,  and 
will  in  particular  not  view  with  favor  any  future 
increase.  She  will  be  able  to  challenge  her  new 
rival's  position,  and  it  would  not  be  at  all  surprising 
if  she  objected  strongly  to  sharing  with  us  the  trade 
which  Germany  has  had.  During  the  war  Amer- 
ican trade  with  South  America  will  undoubtedly 
increase  in  volume,  because  we  may  absorb  part  of 
England's  own  market  as  well  as  the  lion's  share 
of  Germany's.  WTien  England  wishes  to  resume 
her  normal  business  at  the  close  of  the  war,  what 
then?  Will  American  merchants  be  willing  to 
cede  their  vantage  without  a  struggle?  Will 
they  not  fight  valiantly  for  the  trade  the  van- 
quished have  had?  Will  there  not  be  here 
ample  material  for  disagreement  and  dispute, 
for  recrimination  and  diplomatic  difficulties,  and, 

159 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

it  may  be,  for  arbitrary  restrictions  and  acts  lead- 
ing to  war? 

In  all  probability,  too,  more  fundamental  factors 
than  these  will  counsel  the  extension  of  English 
trade  with  South  America.  England's  home  land 
in  the  British  Isles  is  not  only  more  restricted  than 
Germany,  but  utterly  incapable  of  enlargement; 
additional  territory  is  out  of  the  question.  Its 
natural  resources  are  much  smaller  than  Germany's, 
for  much  of  its  surface  is  not  arable  land,  and 
much  of  its  arable  land  is  not  naturally  fertile,  and 
much  of  it  shows  clearly  the  working  of  the  law 
of  diminishing  returns;  the  mineral  resources  are 
neither  varied  nor  inexhaustible,  and  there  are  no 
adequate  indigenous  supplies  of  any  of  the  raw 
products  in  the  manufacture  of  which  England 
excels.  Yet  her  population  is  increasing  at  a  rate 
only  somewhat  less  than  Germany's  and  Austria's, 
at  a  rate,  although  somewhat  smaller  than  in  the 
immediate  past,  still  greater  than  the  resources  of 
the  British  Isles  can  possibly  support.  England 
does  not  now  feed  herself,  already  imports  the 
great  bulk  of  the  materials  which  keep  her  factories 
going,  and  actually  depends  to-day  upon  export- 
ing the  greater  part  of  the  output.  If  there  is  a 
country  in  the  world  entirely  dependent  upon  the 
possession  of  foreign  markets  and  of  ready  access 

160 


POSSIBILITIES  OF  ENGLISH  AGGRESSION 

to  them,  it  is  England.  Indeed,  it  is  the  English 
solution  of  this  problem  of  a  rapid  increase  of 
population  within  a  restricted  area  normally  too 
small  to  support  it  and  impossible  of  increase  that 
suggested  Pan-Germanism  to  the  Germans.  The 
English  have  encouraged  emigration,  and  have 
thus  kept  the  population  in  the  British  Isles  within 
certain  bounds ;  they  have  assiduously  sought  and 
developed  foreign  markets  in  Asia,  Africa,  and 
South  America ;  they  have  taken  care  of  thousands 
of  individuals  by  means  of  their  merchant  marine 
and  their  vast  exchange  business.  In  these  ways 
they  have  coped  with  this  problem  successfully 
ever  since  the  time  of  Elizabeth,  when  the  problem 
first  became  clear.  But  it  is  to-day  exactly  as  vital 
for  England  to  retain  foreign  markets  large  enough 
to  permit  her  citizens  at  home  to  continue  manu- 
facturing at  a  profit  in  the  ratio  at  which  popula- 
tion increases  as  it  is  for  Germany  and  Austria 
to  accomplish  the  same  end  by  the  acquisition  of 
markets  which  they  do  not  now  possess;  the  con- 
sequence to  England  of  losing  markets  will  be  not 
less  serious  than  the  effect  upon  Germany  of  an 
inability  to  attain  them. 

If  the  war  leaves  England  with  the  control  of 
the  sea,  but  compels  her  to  hand  over  to  some  other 
nation  or  nations  or  to  share  with  other  nations 

161 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

some  of  the  markets  which  she  at  present  virtu- 
ally monopolizes,  it  will  be  imperative  for  her 
to  replace  this  loss  by  the  prompt  development  of 
a  new  market  elsewhere.  It  is  also  conceivable 
that  the  growth  of  her  self-governing  colonies  and 
dependencies  has  reached  its  maximum  and  will 
now  proceed  at  a  somewhat  slower  pace.  Although 
the  market  for  manufactured  goods  in  a  new 
country  settled  by  Europeans  is  at  first  large,  it 
normally  diminishes  in  the  ratio  by  which  the  new 
settlement  produces  for  itself,  so  that  the  greater 
complexity  in  the  economic  life  of  the  English 
self-governing  colonies  will  naturally  result  in  a 
proportionately  smaller  demand  for  English  goods. 
Nor  must  we  forget  in  this  connection  the  growing 
sentiment  in  the  English  colonies  that  they  ought 
not  to  be  expected  to  purchase  commodities  from 
the  mother  country  which  they  can  obtain  more 
cheaply  from  England's  rivals;  more  and  more  as 
the  decades  pass  are  the  self-governing  colonies 
likely  to  insist  upon  their  economic  freedom ;  more 
and  more  will  this  diminish  the  demand  for  English 
products.  The  shortage  from  these  varied  causes 
— and  let  us  remember  always  that  a  proportion- 
ately smaller  demand  will  be  fatal  even  although 
the  actual  sum  total  of  goods  sold  may  still  show 
an  increase — will  compel  England  to  seek  new 

162 


POSSIBILITIES  OF  ENGLISH  AGGRESSION 

markets  in  order  to  maintain  the  rate  of  commer- 
cial progress  essential  for  the  preservation  of 
prosperity  in  the  British  Isles. 

We  may  add  to  these  probabilities  a  quite  normal 
anxiety  to  increase  the  pace  of  England's  industrial 
development  considerably  beyond  the  rate  of  the 
last  few  decades  in  order  to  replace  as  soon  as 
possible  the  capital  spent  in  waging  this  war. 
England's  comparative  inability  to  maintain  her 
normal  rate  of  production  during  the  war,  the 
comparatively  larger  number  of  men  taken  from 
industry  for  the  army  than  in  Europe,  where 
standing  armies  have  normally  kept  large  numbers 
of  men  outside  of  the  economic  fabric,  will  prob- 
ably make  the  drain  upon  English  capital  rela- 
tively heavier  than  in  the  case  of  other  nations. 
The  desirability  of  replacing  it  as  speedily  as  pos- 
sible will  be  so  evident,  and  the  method  of  doing 
it  by  the  manufacture  in  England  and  the  sale 
elsewhere  of  increased  quantities  of  goods  is  so 
thoroughly  well  understood,  that  an  English  vic- 
tory almost  predicates  an  attempt  to  accelerate 
the  development  of  English  industry  by  the 
opening  of  new  markets. 

Political  or  international  complications  may 
make  it  impossible  to  satisfy  all  these  impulses 
in  Africa  or  Asia,  while  economic  changes  in  the 

163 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

self-governing  colonies  may  render  a  solution  by 
a  proportionately  increased  trade  with  them  out 
of  the  question.  True,  we  must  suppose  that 
Germany's  defeat  will  transfer  a  certain  part  of 
her  present  foreign  markets  to  the  victor,  at  least 
until  German  industry  can  recover  from  the  war, 
but  it  is  probable  that  Central  and  South  America 
will  offer  the  most  favorable  opportunity  to  the 
English  for  solving  these  varied  problems  and  for 
recouping  as  soon  as  possible  their  losses  in  the 
war.  If  England  could  sell  them,  in  addition  to 
her  present  exports,  a  considerable  proportion  of 
what  Germany  and  the  United  States  combined 
have  sold,  she  would  be  quite  likely  to  create  there 
the  most  valuable  and  dependable  market  that 
she  has  ever  had.  The  geographical  isolation  of 
South  America  both  from  Europe  and  from  the 
United  States  would  place  the  monopoly  upon 
the  firm  basis  of  England's  supremacy  of  the  sea. 
If  the  present  war  renders  English  bankers  chary 
of  investing  capital  in  Germany,  partly  because  of 
the  possibility  of  wars  in  the  future,  partly  by 
reason  of  a  desire  not  to  help  the  Germans  on  their 
feet  too  quickly,  they  will  look  for  some  country 
freed  from  the  possibilities  of  alarms,  unaffected  by 
European  complications,  not  strategically  danger- 
ous to  other  nations  or  strategically  necessary 

164 


POSSIBILITIES  OF  ENGLISH  AGGRESSION 

to  them,  a  country  in  which  the  new  economic 
development  based  upon  that  capital  would  not 
make  it  possible  to  create  a  new  political  and 
military  power  likely  or  able  to  threaten  England's 
own  position.  There  is  only  one  such  possibility 
on  the  globe  sufficient  in  size,  in  richness  of  re- 
sources, in  the  present  degree  of  development 
attained  by  its  population,  to  meet  this  require- 
ment— South  America.  And  there  will  be  on  the 
globe  no  place  where  the  English  can  as  easily, 
with  as  little  effort  or  danger,  increase  their 
markets.  The  war  may,  therefore,  produce  a  chain 
of  circumstances  which  may  almost  force  the  Eng- 
lish to  draw  into  their  own  hands  a  considerable 
proportion  of  the  trade  with  Latin  America  which 
the  United  States  now  has,  and  to  resist  with  de- 
termination America's  attempt  to  increase  its  com- 
mercial dealings  in  that  attractive  El  Dorado  of  the 
twentieth  century. 


165 


CHAPTER  V 
RIGHTS  OF  NEUTRALS 

THE  United  States  is  already  seriously  at 
odds  with  the  power  which  seems  likely 
to  be  the  victor  in  this  war.  That  the 
crisis  will  lead  to  war  with  England  is  not  neces- 
sarily true;  that  it  may  result  in  war,  as  it  has 
before,  we  shall  be  wise  to  remember.  The  in- 
terests of  the  United  States  as  a  nation  dependent 
upon  the  merchant  marines  of  other  powers  for  its 
intercourse  with  the  rest  of  the  world  cannot  fail 
to  differ  in  time  of  war  from  those  of  the  power 
controlling  the  sea. 

In  times  of  peace  the  actual  supremacy  of  the 
English  fleet  has  been  rarely  asserted,  and  its 
interference  with  complete  freedom  of  intercourse 
between  nations  has  been  neither  frequent,  insist- 
ent, nor  burdensome;  but  the  outbreak  of  this 
present  European  war  has  shown  the  English,  as 
always,  the  important  part  which  the  control  of 
the  sea,  if  rigidly  asserted,  might  play  in  the  cam- 

166 


RIGHTS  OF  NEUTRALS 

paign  upon  land,  and  has  led  them  to  change 
promptly  their  attitude  toward  neutral  shipping 
as  well  as  toward  that  of  their  enemies.  Indeed, 
it  was  immediately  clear  that  if  the  decisive  factor 
should  prove  eventually  to  be  the  possession  of  the 
greater  resources,  the  English  would  win  because 
to  their  own  they  could  add  by  means  of  the  sea- 
power  those  of  neutral  nations,  and  could  by  the 
same  means  limit  their  enemies'  resources  to  those 
within  their  own  boundaries.  If  the  German 
army  should  demonstrate  in  actuality  any  such 
degree  of  efficiency  as  had  been  claimed  for  it,  a 
defensive  campaign  would  become  essential  until 
vast  preparations  could  be  made  to  bring  the 
superior  numbers  of  the  Entente  to  bear  in  the 
field.  By  preventing  exportation  to  Germany  and 
Austria  of  anything  at  all  useful,  the  sea-power 
could  render  a  military  service  of  the  first  order, 
greater  in  significance  beyond  all  compare  than 
the  levy  of  troops  and  manufacture  of  munitions 
of  war  in  England.  If  in  the  end  the  armies  are 
unable  to  decide  the  issue,  the  sea-power  alone,  as 
in  other  wars,  will  decide  the  issue  in  the  Allies' 
favor. 

The  English  Government,  therefore,  promptly 
assumed  precisely  the  position  in  regard  to  the  use 
of  the  sea  by  other  nations  which  it  had  hitherto 

167 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

taken  in  European  wars,  and  which  had  invariably 
proved  in  the  past  of  the  utmost  consequence  and 
importance.  Napoleon  ascribed  his  failure  chiefly 
to  the  English  control  of  the  sea  and  their  use  of 
it  to  supply  themselves  and  to  interfere  with  the 
trade  between  France  and  neutral  nations.  Virtu- 
ally the  English  regulations  permit  complete  free- 
dom of  trade  only  with  England  and  her  Allies. 
With  her  foes  all  trade  is  strictly  limited,  their 
own  ships  and  those  of  neutral  nations  ordinarily 
being  allowed  to  import  only  such  commodities  as 
are  of  no  possible  utility.  Upon  the  trade  of 
neutrals  with  one  another  England  has  always  laid 
certain  restrictions  intended  to  prevent  the  impor- 
tation of  goods  by  one  neutral  nation  from  another 
which  the  former  could  then  sell  to  belligerents. 
Strict  contraband  of  war,  therefore,  she  has  rarely 
allowed  neutral  nations  to  export  to  one  another 
and  within  this  category  she  has  ordinarily  written 
down  everything  directly  and  indirectly  essential 
to  the  prosecution  of  war.  If  the  limitation  of 
supplies  is  to  have  any  effect  upon  her  foes,  it  must 
be  as  complete  as  possible. 

To  enforce  these  provisions  and  to  insure  a 
continued  observance  of  them  by  all  the  shipping 
on  the  seas,  she  has  invariably  insisted  upon  her 
right  to  search  any  and  all  vessels  of  neutral 

168 


RIGHTS  OF  NEUTRALS 

nations,  to  view  their  cargoes  and  papers,  to 
inspect  their  crews,  and  to  arrest  the  subjects  of 
belligerents.  Contraband  of  war  thus  discovered 
has  been  promptly  seized,  and  the  vessel  carrying 
it  has  usually  been  detained  until  such  time  as 
the  English  prize  courts  could  deal  with  the  case 
and  establish  clearly  what  was  contraband  and 
what  was  not. 

Nor  have  the  English  ever  admitted  any  right 
in  the  neutral  nation  concerned  to  interpret  their 
regulations  for  itself  or  to  interpose  any  regulations 
of  its  own.  Their  regulations  have  been  enforced 
invariably  by  English  officials  upon  English  ships 
or  in  English  courts  according  to  their  interpreta- 
tion of  the  intention  of  the  English  Government 
and  of  the  interests  of  England  at  stake.  They  have 
been  war  measures,  pursued  for  military  rather 
than  for  naval  purposes  and  have  amounted,  al- 
ways to  a  literal  enforcement  of  the  English 
control  of  the  sea  on  the  basis  of  English  in- 
terests. 

The  complaints  brought  by  the  United  States 
Government  have  ostensibly  grown  out  of  specific 
acts  done  by  English  officers  and  courts  in  pur- 
suance of  these  regulations;  but  these  in  reality 
are  merely  the  examples  upon  which  the  Govern- 
ment hangs  broad  general  contentions,  identical 

169 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

in  character  and  form  with  those  urged  by  neutral 
nations  against  the  English  claims  for  upward  of 
three  centuries.  The  fundamental  tenet  of  neu- 
tral nations  is  the  freedom  of  the  sea,  the  conten- 
tion that  no  one  owns  it,  advanced  by  Grotius 
more  than  three  centuries  ago.  Outside  the 
immediate  waters  of  any  nation,  there  should  be 
no  rules  and  no  interference  by  one  nation  with 
the  ships  of  another  unless  the  two  are  at  war. 
Neutral  ships  should  have  full  right  of  transit,  and 
neutral  nations  should  always  have  the  right  to 
send  in  one  another's  ships  or  in  the  ships  of  bel- 
ligerents goods  of  all  nations,  for  neutrality  ought 
to  place  all  neutral  nations  on  an  equality  with 
both  belligerents  and  confer  upon  them  the  right 
to  trade  with  both  upon  the  same  terms.  In  pre- 
paring the  list  of  absolute  contraband,  defining 
articles  which  should  be  contraband  wherever 
found,  neutral  nations  have  included  only  the 
absolute  essentials  of  war,  while  England  has 
invariably  insisted  upon  the  broadest  possible 
interpretation  of  what  was  useful  in  time  of  war. 
The  United  States  Government  accordingly  claims 
that  copper,  for  which  there  are  a  thousand  uses, 
is  not  necessarily  contraband  of  war;  the  English 
Government,  on  the  other  hand,  knows  that  copper 
is  a  most  important  metal  for  which  there  is  in 

170 


RIGHTS  OF  NEUTRALS 

many  cases  literally  no  substitute  in  the  prepara- 
tion of  munitions  of  war. 

With  technicalities,  too,  the  English  have  had 
in  the  past  little  patience.  They  have  always 
claimed  the  right  to  look  at  the  facts  and  to  form 
their  own  conclusions  from  such  evidence  as  they 
judged  pertinent  as  to  the  real  destination  of  the 
article  in  question,  and  as  to  its  real  importance 
for  the  belligerent  for  whom  it  was  intended,  and, 
while  they  have  usually  listened  respectfully  to 
the  views  of  neutral  shippers  and  their  govern-: 
ments  on  these  questions,  they  have  never  treated 
them  as  conclusive.  When,  therefore,  they  see  a 
neutral  country,  like  Holland  or  Denmark,  begin 
as  soon  as  war  breaks  out  to  import  large  amounts 
of  a  great  variety  of  commodities  which  they 
ordinarily  import  in  small  quantities  or  not  at  all, 
they  promptly  conclude  that  the  commodity  in 
question  has  not  reached  its  destination  when  it 
arrives  in  the  neutral  country.  The  mere  techni- 
cal fact  of  its  consignment  to  a  neutral  merchant 
is  not  necessarily  conclusive,  and  they  wish  some- 
thing more  than  paper  evidence  that  their  foes 
will  not  ultimately  receive  it. 

This  clash  of  interests,  which  is  so  irreconcilable, 
is  older  than  the  United  States,  and  dates  back, 
indeed,  before  the  days  when  there  were  any 

171 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

colonies  here.  We  have  no  new  issue  to  fight; 
we  occupy  upon  it  a  very  old  position,  which 
neutral  nations  and  their  subjects,  whether  mer- 
chants or  scholars,  have  invariably  concluded  was 
logical,  sound,  and  just,  and  one  which  English 
statesmen,  merchants,  and  scholars  have  com- 
monly decided  England  could  not  accept.  For 
three  hundred  years  no  European  war  has  failed 
to  produce  this  clash  between  the  English  and 
neutral  nations.  Never  have  the  English  con- 
ceded the  position  and  never  have  the  neutrals 
succeeded  in  forcing  from  them  a  recognition  or 
acknowledgment  of  their  rights.  According  to 
the  precedents  of  neutrals,  according  to  the  posi- 
tion which  we  ourselves  have  previously  assumed, 
we  occupy  to-day  a  position  logically  unassailable, 
beyond  all  question  equitable  and  just;  but  ac- 
cording to  past  English  precedent,  our  contention 
is  one  they  cannot  grant. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  see  the  main  trend  of  the 
English  argument  that  the  fundamental  demands 
of  the  United  States  are  inadmissible.  For  us  to 
demand  freedom  of  trade  with  Germany  in  many 
of  the  articles  on  the  English  list  of  contraband  is 
tantamount  to  a  request  to  allow  us  to  prolong 
the  war  in  order  that  we  may  make  profit  out  of 
it.  England,  they  will  insist,  is  fighting  for  her 

172 


RIGHTS  OF  NEUTRALS 

life  and  is  not  considering  questions  of  profit 
or  loss;  by  limiting  her  foe's  supplies  from 
the  outside,  by  cutting  off  rigorously  everything 
conceivably  essential  to  war,  she  can  strike  him 
a  deadly  blow.  Undoubtedly  this  means  that 
neutrals  are  not  to  send  him  the  things  he  really 
wants,  the  things,  therefore,  for  which  he  is  willing 
to  pay  the  most  and  of  which  he  would  use  the 
largest  quantities,  the  things  obviously  for  which 
the  English  search  must  be  the  most  active  and  the 
confiscation  of  which  must  be  the  most  rigid.  That 
this  involves  a  certain  amount  of  inconvenience 
and  probably  actual  financial  loss  to  a  good  many 
American  citizens  the  English  readily  admit,  and 
they  regret  it,  but  they  still  insist  that  the  measure  is 
a  war  measure,  aimed  at  Germany  and  not  at  us,  and 
that  England  is  willing  to  pay  for  such  damage  to 
American  citizens  as  can  actually  be  demonstrated. 
More  than  this  she  cannot  concede  without  sacri- 
ficing a  great  military  and  naval  advantage,  which 
may  conceivably  decide  the  war  in  her  favor,  in 
order  to  increase  somewhat  the  profits  in  business 
of  certain  American  citizens.  The  matter  is  vital 
to  England,  they  will  insist,  involving  her  inde- 
pendence, her  integrity,  and,  it  may  be,  her  very 
existence.  It  is  for  Americans  a  mere  matter  of 
profit  and  loss,  affecting  only  a  few  Americans 

173 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

and  probably  only  the  degree  of  their  profit. 
How,  they  ask,  can  a  sane  man  hesitate  between 
such  alternatives? 

Yet,  the  text  of  the  American  note  of  December 
26,  1914,  made  public  with  the  consent  of  the 
English  Government  on  January  I,  1915,  shows 
that  the  difference  of  opinion  between  England 
and  the  United  States  virtually  amounts  to  a 
request  to  England  to  admit  the  validity  of  our 
opinion  as  to  the  necessity  of  certain  specific  things 
to  her  safety.  Our  interpretation  of  the  estab- 
lished rules  of  international  conduct  is  also  em- 
phasized as  something  which  she  should  regard. 
Above  all,  the  Government  asks  that  seizure  of 
goods  as  contraband  should  take  place  only  after 
actual  evidence  has  been  produced  that  its  techni- 
cal destination  is  false  and  a  belligerent  destina- 
tion intended.  "Mere  suspicion  is  not  evidence"; 
mere  presumption  or  a  likelihood  that  such  goods 
may  eventually  reach  a  belligerent  is  not  sufficient 
warrant  for  detention.  These  issues  involve 
certain  very  obvious  and  exceedingly  practical 
difficulties,  as  the  English  answer  pointed  out. 
To  produce  evidence  which  a  prize  court  could 
recognize  might  be  entirely  beyond  the  power  of 
the  English  officers,  although  the  main  facts  of 
the  situation  might  show  that  a  small  neutral 

174 


RIGHTS  OF  NEUTRALS 

nation  is  entirely  unable  to  utilize  in  a  year  in 
normal  ways  the  amount  of  certain  commodities 
consigned  to  it  from  the  United  States  in  a  single 
month.  Nor  can  the  English  Government  verify 
the  correctness  of  the  ship's  manifest  without 
bringing  the  vessel  to  some  port  where  careful  ex- 
amination can  be  made  by  qualified  officers,  who 
can  weigh  bales  of  cotton  for  concealed  copper, 
and  open  boxes  marked  " machinery"  to  make  sure 
they  do  not  contain  rifles.  A  certain  delay  is 
inevitable  unless  the  inspection  and  search  is  to 
become  perfunctory.  To  attempt  in  time  of  war 
to  decide  questions  of  public  safety  and  military 
expediency  by  rules  of  evidence  and  regulations 
agreed  to  beforehand  has  always  seemed  inexpe- 
dient, because  the  cases  which  actually  appear  defy 
classification;  the  ingenuity  of  merchants  is  great 
and  the  ease  of  outwitting  any  technical  require- 
ment obvious.  A  demand  by  the  United  States 
that  the  English  Government  should  accept  the 
manifest  as  accurate  until  clear  evidence  appears 
of  its  falsity,  therefore,  is  asking  them  to  counte- 
nance smuggling  in  defiance  of  their  regula- 
tions, unless  they  can  produce  a  type  of  evidence 
which  the  very  nature  of  the  case  renders  almost 
impossible. 

Certain  facts  clearly  writ  in  the  situation  make 
175 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

it  probable  that  the  English  will  give  serious 
attention  to  the  formulation  of  a  compromise  as 
favorable  to  the  United  States  as  the  exigencies 
of  the  situation  will  admit.  They  are  considera- 
tions, however,  which  have  nothing  to  do  with 
the  demands,  their  technicalities,  or  their  justice. 
The  English,  French,  and  Belgian  nations  are  at 
present  dependent  for  a  considerable  proportion 
of  the  necessities  of  life  upon  imports  from  the 
United  States.  They  are  counting  definitely 
upon  equipping  Kitchener's  army  with  munitions 
of  war  and  clothing  manufactured  in  the  United 
States,  in  pursuance  of  the  practice  which  per- 
mits private  persons  in  neutral  nations  to  sell 
armament  to  belligerents.  If  strained  relations 
between  the  two  countries  interfere  in  any  way 
with  the  stream  of  imports  or  with  the  fulfilling 
of  these  contracts,  the  consequences  to  England 
and  France  will  be  exceedingly  serious.  A  cessa- 
tion of  intercourse  might  prevent  the  adequate 
reinforcement  and  even  the  maintenance  of  the 
armies  in  France,  give  the  German  preparedness 
an  importance  which  it  has  not  hitherto  had  by 
exhausting  the  supplies  of  the  Allies  while  the 
German  accumulations  are  still  considerable,  and 
thus  weaken  and  perhaps  defeat  the  Allies.  This 
is  quite  conceivable.  Intercourse  with  the  United 

176 


RIGHTS  OF  NEUTRALS 

States  is  indispensable  if  the  Allies  are  to  win. 
No  doubt,  too,  the  English  would  consider  an 
unfavorable  attitude  toward  them  of  public 
opinion  in  the  United  States,  which  has  hitherto 
been  favorable,  as  something  to  be  avoided  if 
possible.  To  lend  countenance  in  any  way 
to  the  agitation  of  the  Germans  and  Irish  is 
undesirable. 

Should  the  difference  of  opinion  come  to  an 
open  breach  and  result  in  war,  the  United  States 
navy,  even  if  it  did  not  cooperate  with  the  German 
navy,  would  at  once  give  the  English  navy  foes 
to  meet  so  numerous  as  to  deprive  it  of  the  pre- 
ponderance in  numbers  which  the  English  regard 
as  essential.  To  send  a  detachment  from  the 
Channel  Squadron  to  keep  the  American  fleet  in 
American  waters  would  effect  precisely  that  divi- 
sion of  the  English  fleet  for  which  the  Germans 
have  been  praying,  and  which  might  result  in  the 
annihilation  of  the  British  sea-power  and  the 
downfall  of  the  British  Empire.  These  are  possi- 
bilities only,  but  so  eminently  possible  as  to  cause 
reflection  in  London.  They  may  well  stir  the 
minds  of  the  Americans  who  are  anxious  for  the 
Allies  to  win  and  who  might  not  be  quite  so  anxious 
for  the  United  States  to  press  its  demands  if  they 
realized  that  the  logical  conclusion  might  be  a 

13  177 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

victory  for  Germany.     Such  are  the  factors  which 
counsel  the  English  to  yield. 

Who,  now,  are  those  who  urge  the  administra- 
tion at  Washington  to  remain  firm?  Great  pres- 
sure has  probably  been  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
administration  by  the  interests  most  affected  by 
the  new  English  list  of  contraband.  The  copper 
interests  in  particular  have  been  injured  and  have 
been  no  doubt  proportionately  active;  but  in  all 
probability  the  political  pressure  has  been  greater 
than  that  of  the  business  interests,  for  the  war  has 
as  conspicuously  favored  some  interests  as  it  has 
injured  others.  As  a  whole,  the  United  States 
export  trade  shows  growth,  and  the  continuance 
of  the  war  will  lead  to  a  truly  astounding  develop- 
ment. Something  may  plausibly  be  ascribed, 
therefore,  to  the  lessened  majorities  of  the  Demo- 
cratic party  at  the  November  elections,  which 
showed  clearly  that  no  votes  can  be  lost  if 
the  party  is  to  win  in  1916.  Already  there  are 
powerful  interests  in  important  States  which  have 
been  alienated  from  the  Democratic  party  by  the 
attitude  of  the  President  upon  Belgian  neutrality 
and  other  issues.  The  Germans  and  the  Irish 
are  exceptionally  strong  in  such  important  cam- 
paign States  as  New  York,  Ohio,  and  Illinois,  in 
which  any  close  election  may  be  won  or  lost  by 

178 


RIGHTS  OF  NEUTRALS 

a  few  thousand  votes.  In  Wisconsin  and  in 
Missouri  are  great  numbers  of  Germans,  and  both 
have  been  joining  the  doubtful  column.  A  strict 
and  watchful  attitude  toward  England,  therefore, 
is  at  present  a  good  political  move,  and  to  this 
supposition  the  publicity  given  the  American 
demands  before  they  had  been  presented  to  the 
English  Government  lends  color.  So  far  as  the 
English  Government  is  concerned,  the  publicity 
must  have  had  an  unfavorable  effect,  because  it 
precipitated  ill  f  eeling  in  the  United  States  without 
giving  the  English  Government  an  opportunity 
to  yield  and  thus  obviate  the  difficulty.  Certain 
business  interests,  however,  and  the  Irish  and  the 
Germans  have  so  actively  assailed  the  admini- 
stration's neutrality  that  the  Democratic  leaders 
probably  felt  some  clear  and  public  demonstration 
was  needed  to  reply  to  charges  which  might  have 
adverse  political  effect  if  not  denied. 

When  we  view  the  probability  of  the  pressing 
of  these  demands  by  the  United  States,  we  be- 
come at  once  aware  of  results  more  serious 
to  her  than  those  with  which  a  quarrel  would 
threaten  England.  In  a  word,  war  or  even  a 
serious  quarrel  with  England  would  probably  ruin 
American  commerce,  foreign  and  domestic.  At 
present  only  the  markets  of  the  Allies  and  of 

179 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

neutral  nations  are  open  to  us,  and  the  inability 
to  export  also  to  Germany  is  actually  serious.  If 
now  we  quarrel  with  England,  the  markets  of  the 
Allies  will  be  closed,  and  we  shall  feel  promptly 
a  lessening  demand  for  American  products  abroad 
compared  with  which  the  present  difficulty  is  en- 
tirely negligible.  We  are  so  accustomed  to  the  fact 
that  we  constantly  forget  that  American  exports 
are  carried  at  the  moment  entirely  by  English  and 
French  ships.  The  shipping  of  the  United  States 
and  neutral  nations  in  the  Atlantic  trade  is 
negligible.  Without  the  use  of  the  English  mer- 
chant marine,  the  bulk  of  our  trade  would  be 
absolutely  unable  to  reach  neutral  ports  in  Europe 
or  in  Africa,  South  America,  and  the  far  East. 
Our  own  facilities  for  dealing  with  any  of  this 
trade  are  utterly  inadequate.  Furthermore,  much 
of  our  trade  with  Asia,  Africa,  and  South  America 
has  been  consummated  by  means  of  exchange  on 
London  or  Paris,  a  matter  of  custom  rather  than 
one  of  necessity,  a  practice  followed  because 
understood  and  agreeable  to  our  foreign  customers. 
Nor  must  we  forget  that  all  the  American  firms 
who  have  signed  large  contracts  with  the  English 
and  French  governments  for  every  conceivable 
variety  of  commodity  would  be  totally  ruined  by 
war  between  England  and  the  United  States.  The 

1 80 


RIGHTS  OF  NEUTRALS 

magnitude  of  the  commercial  disaster  which  would 
immediately  ensue  is  staggering  to  contemplate. 

For  England  to  set  in  motion  factors  which 
would  involve  such  destruction  would  be  simple. 
She  has  merely  to  pass  a  statute  of  the  character 
of  the  old  Navigation  Acts,  requiring  English 
ships  to  carry  all  goods  of  other  continents  to 
England  and  France.  The  whole  English  mer- 
chant marine  would  then  accept  American  goods 
only  when  consigned  to  England  and  France. 
We  should  be  robbed  of  our  trade  with  the  rest 
of  the  world,  and  if,  as  a  result  of  the  quarrel,  we 
declined  to  export  to  England  and  France,  we 
should  be  in  the  same  situation  in  which  we  found 
ourselves  in  1808 — unable  to  trade  at  all.  It  is 
the  English  merchant  marine  we  need,  and  the 
loss  of  which  we  have  to  fear  far  more  than  the  en- 
croachments of  the  English  navy.  If  the  quarrel 
develops  into  war,  all  English  ships  would  promptly 
become  belligerent  shipping,  and  would  as  a  matter 
of  course  decline  to  carry  our  trade  anywhere;  all 
American  shipping  would  become  lawful  prizes 
of  the  English  commerce-destroyers;  American 
cargoes  and  consignments  on  the  high  seas,  in 
England,  or  in  English  ships,  would  all  be  sub- 
ject to  confiscation  and  seizure;  and  American 
cargoes  found  anywhere  would  be  immediately 

181 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

regarded  by  the  English  as  contraband  of  war. 
The  commerce  of  the  United  States  in  transit 
would  be  a  total  loss,  and  all  American  goods 
shipped  subsequently  would  be  so  obviously  in 
danger  that  no  insurance  company  would  take 
the  risk.  The  only  American  trade  that  would 
remain  would  be  such  as  the  English  would  permit 
the  small  fleets  of  neutral  nations  to  carry  under 
such  conditions  as  they  laid  down.  The  American 
navy  might  conceivably  protect  the  few  ships  we 
have  and  possibly,  in  conjunction  with  the  German 
navy,  defeat  the  English  fleet;  but  the  navy  could 
not  take  the  place  of  the  English  merchant  marine, 
and  before  the  English  navy  was  beaten  we  should 
be  irretrievably  ruined. 

To  count  upon  the  English  necessity  for  Ameri- 
can imports  and  to  suppose  that  their  need  of 
our  food-stuffs  and  munitions  of  war  will  compel 
them  to  grant  our  demands  is  to  forget  the  equally 
obvious  fact  that  we  are  so  entirely  dependent 
upon  exporting  to  them,  that  we  ourselves  cannot 
in  our  own  interest  press  the  issue  to  a  point  which 
threatens  to  interfere  with  our  trade  with  them. 
So  serious  for  the  United  States  will  be  the  results 
of  a  quarrel  between  England  and  the  United 
States  that  the  Government  may  not  deem  it  wise 
to  force  this  issue  upon  England.  The  political 

182 


RIGHTS  OF  NEUTRALS 

consequence  would  be  of  a  nature  which  the 
Democratic  party  can  hardly  contemplate  with 
calmness.  The  votes  of  the  business  community 
as  a  whole  are  vastly  more  important  than  those  of 
the  Germans,  the  Irish,  and  the  few  interests  at 
present  injured.  There  should  be,  in  fact,  no  hesi- 
tation in  recognizing  that  the  present  inconven- 
ience under  which  American  trade  suffers,  and  the 
losses  of  a  few  persons,  are  far  less  important 
than  a  truly  formidable  array  of  consequences 
extending  to  the  ruin  of  American  business.  To 
secure  by  diplomacy  such  adjustment  as  the 
English  feel  able  to  grant  is  wise  and  necessary, 
but  to  attempt  to  force  the  English  beyond  diplo- 
matic negotiations  can  proceed  only  from  a  failure 
to  appreciate  the  gravity  of  the  situation. 


183 


CHAPTER  VI 
JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND  THE  PACIFIC 

THE  Pacific  will  be  the  storm-center  of  the 
future,"  the  Prime  Minister  of  New  Zea- 
land recently  declared.  He  gave  expres- 
sion to  a  belief  prevalent  in  Japan,  where  an  armed 
conflict  with  non-Asiatic  powers  is  widely  regarded 
as  inevitable,  and  where  popular  opinion  has  singled 
out  the  United  States  as  the  first  foe  to  be  met. 
Many  of  the  political  and  economic  difficulties 
experienced  by  European  nations  are  pressing 
upon  Japan.  The  rapid  growth  of  population  in 
islands  limited  in  area  has  raised  the  question 
of  markets  and  new  territory,  the  founding  of 
colonies  and  the  issue  of  emigration,  with  an  in- 
sistence almost  as  great  as  in  Germany.  The  out- 
break of  the  European  war  has  furnished  the 
Japanese  an  unexpectedly  favorable  opportunity 
for  attempting  the  solution  of  these  pressing 
economic  problems. 

The  strategic  position  of  Japan  is  commanding. 
184 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND  THE  PACIFIC 

She  occupies  an  island  group  which  makes  her 
virtually  invulnerable  as  long  as  Europeans 
must  wage  war  from  a  distance  and  the  Chinese 
army  and  navy  are  neither  large  nor  efficient. 
The  area  of  the  islands  is  not  inconsiderable — much 
larger  than  Americans  suppose.  In  this  invulner- 
able position  lives  a  population  as  large  as  that 
of  the  British  Isles,  nearly  half  as  great  as  that 
of  the  United  States,  and  almost  two  thirds  as 
extensive  as  the  entire  population  of  Latin  America, 
a  people,  physically  hardy,  military  in  temper, 
willing  to  be  organized  and  to  submit  to  authority. 
They  are  incredibly  energetic  and  industrious,  sus- 
taining life  on  an  amount  of  food  almost  unbeliev- 
ably small,  and  content  with  an  aggregate  of 
comforts  which  most  Americans  would  regard  as 
scarcely  better  than  subsistence.  To  these  quali- 
ties they  add  an  unusually  sensitive  and  artistic 
intelligence,  a  literary  taste  and  appreciation 
subtle  in  the  extreme,  together  with  a  sense  of 
beauty  of  line,  form,  and  proportion  which  sur- 
passes beyond  much  doubt  anything  Americans  or 
Europeans  have  to  show.  They  are  a  powerful 
people,  an  industrious  people,  a  highly  civilized 
nation,  and  have  more  than  once  proved  them- 
selves to  possess  the  courage,  the  endurance,  the 
6lan  of  conquerors.  They  are  thrilled  by  the 

185 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

achievements  of  the  last  two  generations;  they 
believe  they  stand  at  the  beginning  of  a  great 
period  of  prosperity,  achievement,  and  dominion, 
and  are  eager  to  insure  their  national  future  by 
any  and  all  means  within  their  power. 

Chance  has  located  this  extraordinary  people  hi 
a  very  peculiar  strategic  field.  The  islands  grouped 
along  the  Asiatic  coast  do  not  seem  to  have  exerted 
that  vital  influence  upon  its  trade  that  England 
has  had  upon  European  development.  There  is, 
of  course,  the  passage  through  the  straits  at  Singa- 
pore through  which  has  streamed  for  centuries  the 
commerce  between  China,  Japan,  and  India.  Its 
possession,  however,  has  little  significance  for  the 
defense  of  either  China,  Japan,  or  India,  and  is  cer- 
tainly of  no  great  assistance  in  a  military  or  naval 
sense  to  a  power  attempting  to  take  the  offensive 
against  any  one  of  them.  Nor  is  it  by  any  means 
as  difficult  for  shipping  to  avoid  the  passage  of  the 
straits  as  it  is  to  evade  the  passage  of  the  English 
Channel.  Indeed,  the  geography  of  Asia,  the  area 
and  height  of  its  mountain  chains,  the  great  size 
of  India  and  China,  the  pacific  teachings  of  their 
religious  philosophers,  have  made  naval  and 
military  operations  rare,  and  have  left  Euro- 
peans in  undisputed  possession  of  what  they  have 
deemed  the  strategic  points  for  the  control  of  the 

1 86 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND  THE  PACIFIC 

trade  between  Europe  and  Asia  and  between 
India,  China,  and  Japan.  To  the  English  the 
control  of  the  Red  Sea,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope, 
and  Cape  Horn  seems  desirable,  because  they  are 
the  approaches  to  Asia  for  Europeans  and  enable 
their  possessor  to  hold  Europeans  at  a  distance. 
So  far  as  Asia  itself  is  concerned,  their  possession  is 
of  little  consequence.  The  European  occupation 
of  the  Spice  Islands,  the  possession  of  the  Philip- 
pines by  the  United  States,  the  colonization  of 
Australia  and  New  Zealand  by  the  English,  have 
yet  to  demonstrate  that  they  placed  their  posses- 
sors in  a  position  of  strategic  advantage  giving 
them  or  promising  them  control  of  the  Pacific. 
So  large  an  ocean,  flanked  by  such  enormous  con- 
tinents, with  such  large  groups  of  islands  on  the 
Asiatic  side,  and  so  very  few  between  Asia  and 
America,  creates  a  strategic  problem  of  great 
peculiarity.  The  land  is  so  placed  that  it  does  not 
control  the  water  except  in  so  far  as  it  provides  a 
basis  of  operations  for  a  strong  fleet. 

Such  a  fleet  the  Japanese  possess,  the  only  fleet 
of  a  resident  power  in  the  Pacific,  with  not  merely 
naval  stations,  but  a  true  base  of  supplies,  sustained 
by  an  industrial  fabric  capable  of  building  new 
units  and  of  repairing  old.  No  doubt  the  Japanese, 
when  they  undertook  the  creation  of  a  really  large 

187 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

fleet  of  European  type,  were  well  aware  that  they 
would  infallibly  obtain  in  time  the  control  of  the 
Pacific,  whether  or  not  European  nations  continued 
to  hold  what  they  believed  to  be  strategic  points. 
While  England  claimed  the  supremacy  of  the  seas, 
they  saw  very  clearly  that  her  control  of  the  Pacific 
had  depended  largely  upon  her  ability  to  keep 
other  European  nations  at  a  distance  through  her 
control  of  the  passages  between  Europe  and  Asia. 
The  supremacy  of  the  Pacific  had  been  won  in 
European  waters,  had  been  maintained  there,  and 
had  never  been  challenged  by  an  Asiatic  power. 
The  English  had  kept  in  the  Pacific  enough  vessels 
to  patrol  its  waters,  apprehend  pirates,  and  deal 
with  such  stray  cruisers  as  might  slip  through  the 
cordon  in  Europe.  So  long  as  competitors  in  the 
Pacific  were  limited  to  Europeans  who  could  be 
disposed  of  by  the  fleet  created  by  England  for 
home  defense,  such  a  supremacy  was  easy  to  main- 
tain. Such  a  supremacy  it  would  be  easy  to  over- 
throw. The  Japanese  saw  correctly  that  the 
control  of  the  Pacific  rested  not  with  the  land,  but 
with  the  water;  and  saw  with  peculiar  clarity  that 
upon  the  control  of  the  water  would  depend  the  ad- 
mission or  exclusion  of  European  nations.  The 
building  in  Japan  of  a  fleet  of  modern  ships,  the 
teaching  to  the  Japanese  themselves  of  methods  of 

188 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND  THE  PACIFIC 

European  warfare,  therefore,  would  revolutionize 
the  conditions  upon  which  the  English  supremacy 
had  been  based  and  would  promptly  put  them  in  a 
position  to  control  the  Pacific.  Unless  the  English 
could  send  a  fleet  into  the  Pacific  sufficiently  large 
to  destroy  the  Japanese,  the  Japanese  would 
actually  control  the  situation,  because  they  would 
possess  the  largest  fleet  actually  afloat  in  Asiatic 
waters.  Still,  they  would  do  well  to  avoid  a  clash 
with  the  English  and  would  be  wise  not  to  risk 
annihilation. 

The  fleet  would  make  possible  the  realization  of 
Japanese  ambitions  and  enable  them  to  cope  with 
the  pressing  economic  problems  of  rescuing  the 
population  from  penury  and  insuring  the  posses- 
sion of  foreign  markets.  To  the  south  they  saw 
immensely  valuable  islands,  the  Celebes,  Java, 
and  others  of  the  great  group  known  as  the  Spice 
Islands,  from  which  for  generations  various  Euro- 
pean nations  had  drawn  a  great  revenue,  which  still 
produced  in  profusion  natural  products  much  in 
demand  in  Europe,  and  which  were  still  the  basis 
for  an  immensely  profitable  trade.  The  Japanese 
were  quite  able  to  read,  and  found  no  difficulty  in 
learning  from  the  commercial  history  of  Europe,  as 
written  by  Europeans,  that  the  economic  progress 
and  strength  of  the  greatest  nations  in  Europe  was 

189 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

supposed  to  be  based  upon  the  trade  with  the  far 
East.  They  saw  the  English,  the  Germans,  the 
French  eagerly  extending  their  possessions  in 
Africa  and  in  Asia  solely  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
veloping markets. 

It  was  not  difficult  to  draw  the  conclusion  that, 
if  the  superior  economic  position  of  Europe 
against  Asia  was  due  to  the  trade  with  Asia,  Asi- 
atics might  not  improbably  expect  from  the  de- 
velopment of  their  own  trade  with  Europe  benefits 
in  some  measure  similar  to  those  already  achieved 
by  the  Europeans  themselves.  In  Japan  the  crowd- 
ing population  lived  in  penury  because  of  the  lack 
of  fields  to  cultivate  and  of  work  to  perform.  Why 
should  not  they  as  well  as  the  Dutch  direct  the 
labors  of  the  natives  in  Java?  Why  should  not 
they  as  well  as  the  English  carry  Asiatic  produce  to 
Europeans?  Why  should  not  they  as  well  as  Ger- 
many or  the  United  States  be  acquiring  islands 
along  the  China  Sea  or  dependencies  on  the 
mainland?  They  saw  in  Europeans  no  qualities 
they  themselves  did  not  possess  or  could  not 
develop;  they  knew  themselves  capable  of  per- 
forming efficiently  all  the  work  Europeans  did  in 
the  far  East ;  they  admitted  no  moral  superiority, 
no  artistic  supremacy,  no  intellectual  capacity 
greater  than  their  own.  Why  should  these  crude 

190 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND  THE  PACIFIC 

Westerners  sup  from  their  dish,  drink  from  their  cup, 
grow  rich  from  their  labors  ?  Why  should  Asiatics 
of  any  race  or  condition  labor  through  long  years 
to  create  profits  for  European  merchants? 

"  The  East  for  Asiatics, "  became  the  slogan  of  a 
great  national  movement;  the  absolute,  definitive 
exclusion  of  Europe  from  Asia  became  its  object. 
They  would  deny  that  Europeans  possessed  in- 
terests in  Asia  of  a  nature  Asiatics  were  bound  to 
recognize  or  respect ;  they  would  insist  that  Asiatics 
had  rights  in  their  own  country  paramount  to  any 
possessed  by  European  nations  or  individuals,  and 
the  extent  of  which  was  to  be  judged  by  Asiatics  and 
not  Europeans.  To  take  possession  of  the  Philip- 
pines, the  Spice  Islands,  Borneo,  Sumatra,  Java, 
and  the  like,  they  saw  would  be  easy  and  profit- 
able. A  small  expenditure  of  force,  and  the  thing 
was  done.  Its  doing  would  solve  all  Japan's 
problems,  furnish  an  outlet  for  her  energetic 
population  in  places  safe  from  the  aggression  of 
European  or  American,  and  permit  the  upbuilding 
in  the  islands  fringing  the  Chinese  coast  of  an 
empire  of  Japanese  states,  governed  by  Asiatics, 
developing  Asiatic  territory  in  the  interests  of 
Asiatics.  It  was  and  is  a  great  ideal,  a  splendid 
nationalistic  vision  the  achievement  of  which  they 
deem  well  worth  sacrifice  and  suffering. 

191 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Already  they  see  dawning  the  day  when  this 
vision  is  to  become  a  reality,  in  the  development  of 
Japan,  in  the  growth  of  the  Japanese  navy,  and  in 
the  exigencies  in  Europe,  forcing  the  English  to  rec- 
ognize and  tolerate  the  growth  of  the  new  power. 
The  new  development  was  carefully  timed  to  coin- 
cide with  the  growth  of  the  German  fleet  and  the 
German  army,  for  the  ability  of  England  to  protest 
effectively  against  the  creation  of  the  Japanese 
fleet  was  in  direct  proportion  to  the  size  of  the 
fleet  which  she  could  spare  from  European  waters 
for  service  in  the  Pacific.  The  growth  of  the  Ger- 
man navy  in  very  fact  robbed  the  English  of  their 
boasted  control  of  the  Pacific.  To  meet  the  ag- 
gression of  the  Germans  and  successfully  defend 
England,  they  were  compelled  to  withdraw  the 
effective  English  ships  from  the  Pacific  as  well  as 
from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  and  to  concentrate  them 
in  the  North  Sea  and  the  English  Channel. 

Here  is  the  real  condition  on  which  is  based 
the  Anglo- Japanese  entente.  The  fact  that  they 
were  no  longer  really  supreme  in  the  Pacific,  the 
English  saw  it  futile  to  deny,  and  futile  to  invite 
its  challenge  by  the  Japanese.  They  told  the 
latter  frankly  that  while  they  would  prefer  to  main- 
tain their  own  control,  they  were  not  in  the  least 
minded  to  hand  over  to  the  Germans  the  con- 

192 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND  THE  PACIFIC 

trol  of  the  Pacific  as  the  result  of  a  defeat  in  the 
North  Sea,  and  were  anxious  to  arrange  affairs  in 
such  wise  that  their  own  downfall  as  a  world  power 
should  not  result  in  the  acquisition  of  their  au- 
thority by  Germany  or  any  other  nation.  In  this 
way  alone  could  they  effectively  limit  the  unfavor- 
able results  of  a  defeat.  To  facilitate  Japanese 
success  in  case  of  their  own  defeat  in  European 
waters,  they  proposed  to  hand  over  the  actual 
physical  control  of  the  Pacific  without  more  ado. 
As  their  own  naval  stations  and  factories  were  not 
of  naval  importance  to  Japan,  these  they  would 
expect  to  retain,  but  all  except  a  few  English  ships 
should  be  withdrawn  from  the  Pacific.  On  the 
other  hand,  they  did  not  fail  to  intimate  that  the 
continuance  of  Japanese  control  would  be  entirely 
dependent,  in  case  of  their  own  victory  in  Europe, 
upon  the  manner  in  which  it  had  been  and  was 
about  to  be  exercised.  Victorious  in  the  Atlantic, 
they  would  no  longer  be  foreclosed  sending  to  the 
Pacific  a  fleet  easily  large  enough  to  defeat  the 
Japanese  and  extend  English  sovereignty  as  far 
as  they  desired.  Until  the  issue  was  decided  in 
Europe,  the  Japanese  should  rule ;  but  they  should 
consult  the  English  and  act  invariably  as  the 
mutual  interests  of  both  powers  dictated.  Natu- 
rally, they  should  not  use  their  sea-power  to 

13 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

England's  detriment ;  the  punishment  for  treachery 
would  be  condign  when  the  victory  in  Europe 
untied  England's  hands. 

If  the  Germans  won,  the  Japanese  were  to  take 
possession  promptly  of  the  English  possessions, 
and  it  is  just  conceivable,  though  of  course  upon 
such  questions  as  this  we  can  simply  make  plausible 
conjectures,  that  they  were  also  to  have  a  rever- 
sion to  the  English  tenure  in  India.  The  ambi- 
tions of  Russia  have  long  been  viewed  with 
apprehension  in  London,  and  the  fear  has  been, 
and  is  still  great,  that  should  the  Germans  win  in 
Europe,  the  Russians  would  reach  India  first: 
they  are  already  a  mere  few  hundred  miles  from 
the  frontier  defenses,  while  the  Germans  have 
great  distances  to  travel.  Truth  to  tell,  England 
is  quite  determined  that  neither  of  them  shall  have 
it.  An  English  defeat  is  to  break  up  the  British 
Empire.  The  self-governing  colonies  will  of  course 
retain  their  independence,  and  the  Japanese  are 
to  succeed  to  the  English  overlordship  in  the  far 
East,  or  at  least  make  certain  that  other  Euro- 
pean nations  do  not  obtain  it.  Should  England 
win,  her  position  in  the  Pacific  and  perhaps  in 
India  will  be  due  to  the  Japanese,  and  the  debt 
of  gratitude  will  no  doubt  be  adequately  dis- 
charged by  the  cession  to  them  of  the  Dutch  and 

194 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND  THE  PACIFIC 

German  possessions  in  the  far  East.  In  reality, 
the  Japanese  have  undertaken  the  protection  of 
the  English  interests  for  the  present,  with  the 
clear  understanding  that  everything  they  do  will 
accrue  to  their  own  advantage  in  case  the  English 
are  defeated,  and  will  be  suitably  rewarded  in  case 
the  latter  win.  Whatever  happens,  the  Japanese 
cannot  lose. 

We  may  well  ask,  therefore,  what  effect  this 
situation  is  apt  to  have  upon  the  United  States, 
the  Panama  Canal,  and  Central  and  South  America. 
The  strategic  position  of  the  Philippines  as  the 
next  link  in  the  island  chain  which  the  Japanese 
wish  to  create  might  almost  be  said  to  make  them 
essential  to  Japan.  No  doubt  the  energy  and 
industry  of  the  Japanese  can  make  the  Philip- 
pines one  of  the  garden  spots  of  the  world  and  a 
really  valuable  economic  asset.  For  the  develop- 
ment of  a  Japanese  merchant  marine  and  an 
extensive  trade  with  the  United  States  across  the 
Pacific,  as  well  as  for  the  naval  control  of  the 
Pacific,  the  Japanese  will  need  the  islands  in  mid- 
ocean,  particularly  Hawaii,  which  the  United 
States  at  present  possesses.  To  secure  these 
islands,  war  is  regarded  in  Japan  as  inevitable,  for 
they  cannot  conceive  of  the  voluntary  sale  or 
cession  of  such  property  by  the  United  States.  To 

195 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

occupy  all  of  them  is  obviously  an  easy  task;  the 
United  States  fleet  in  the  Pacific  and  the  army  in 
the  Philippines  are  neither  of  them  large  enough 
to  cause  the  Japanese  anxiety,  while  any  grief  on 
the  part  of  the  Filipinos  at  our  dispossession 
seems  problematical.  The  real  difficulty  which 
the  Japanese  fear  is  that  of  obtaining  the  formal 
cession  from  the  United  States,  and  they  believe 
it  may  be  necessary  to  extort  it  from  us  by  opera- 
tions of  their  fleet  against  our  Western  harbors,  or 
perhaps  by  a  timely  invasion  of  the  Japanese 
army  which  would  seize  San  Francisco  and  as 
much  land  as  it  deemed  essential  to  create  a  dis- 
trict for  the  surrender  of  which  the  Philippines  and 
Hawaii  would  be  a  worthy  ransom.  The  protesta- 
tions of  the  Japanese  that  they  have  not  the 
slightest  intention  of  conquering  the  United  States 
or  of  waging  an  aggressive  war  against  us  are  in 
all  probability  sincere  and  truthful,  but  the  least 
experienced  student  of  diplomacy  can  hardly  fail 
to  see  that  they  by  no  means  exclude  some  such 
program  as  this.  If  advices  from  Japan  are 
reliable,  there  are  considerable  portions  of  her 
people  who  regard  a  nominal  war  with  the  United 
States  for  the  obtaining  of  these  objects  as  the 
inevitable  first  step  in  Japanese  national  expansion. 
Another  question  which  has  attracted  far  more 
196 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND  THE  PACIFIC 

attention,  but  which  in  comparison  is  scarcely 
worthy  of  mention,  is  the  attempt  of  Japan  to 
colonize  in  the  United  States,  Mexico,  and 
South  America.  The  opposition  in  California  to 
the  settlement  of  perfectly  respectable  and  well- 
conducted  Japanese  citizens  has  caused  a  breach 
by  the  State  of  the  United  States  treaties  with 
Japan,  and  has  led  to  the  formation  of  a  public 
sentiment  which  denies  the  Japanese  social  equal- 
ity and  the  right  to  own  land.  This  the  Japanese 
resent  keenly.  They  say  with  truth  that  we  our- 
selves expect  and  demand  in  Japan  not  only 
equality,  but  privileged  status,  and  in  return  are 
not  willing  to  accord  them  in  the  United  States  the 
barest  elements  of  equality.  They  believe  their 
national  honor  is  involved,  that  they  ought  not  to 
accept  from  us  anything  less  than  the  fullest  and 
frankest  recognition  of  legal  and  social  equality. 
On  any  other  basis  they  feel  they  must  decline  to 
deal  with  us.  So  much  they  have  felt  sufficiently 
offensive,  but  for  the  United  States  to  interfere 
on  the  strength  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  with  the 
settlement  of  Japanese  in  Latin  America  they 
think  positively  beyond  the  bounds  of  inter- 
national decency.  That  we  should  decline  to 
accept  them  in  our  own  country  was  at  least  under- 
standable, but  that  we  should  insist  upon  exclud- 

197 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

ing  them  from  Mexico  they  felt  to  be  a  position 
which  neither  logic  nor  reason,  to  say  nothing  of 
international  law,  could  defend.  As  the  projec- 
tion across  the  Pacific  into  South  and  Central 
America  of  large  colonies  of  Japanese  is  to-day 
perfectly  feasible,  and  may  indeed  be  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  Japanese  and  of  the  South 
Americans  eminently  desirable,  the  Japanese  have 
no  intention  whatever  of  recognizing  any  preroga- 
tive in  the  United  States  to  question  or  investigate 
their  right  to  colonize  South  America  or  of  per- 
mitting any  interference  with  it  by  the  United 
States. 

There  are  in  these  issues  plenty  of  grounds  for  a 
war  between  Japan  and  the  United  States  in  which 
all  the  logical  and  technical  rights  would  be  on  the 
side  of  Japan.  We  are  distinctly  inviting  reprisals 
and  armed  opposition  by  persistently  advancing 
claims  which  the  Japanese  cannot  admit  consist- 
ently with  their  national  honor  as  they  conceive 
it.  Unless  we  are  prepared  to  recede  from  such 
positions  as  we  have  recently  taken,  a  conflict 
with  Japan  is  only  a  question  of  time.  Whatever 
the  outcome  of  the  European  war,  so  powerful  a 
nation  will  scarcely  be  willing  to  allow  such  claims 
as  ours  to  go  long  unchallenged. 

There  are  therefore  vital  interests  which  may 
198 


JAPANESE  EXPANSION  AND  THE  PACIFIC 

lead  the  Japanese  to  seize  the  occasion  of  the 
present  war  in  Europe  as  an  admirable  moment 
for  an  attempt  to  drive  Europeans  from  Asia 
in  the  interests  of  Asiatics.  While  Europeans 
are  so  busy  at  home,  she  will  have  no  opposition  to 
meet.  Should  the  war  continue  several  years, 
an  active  alliance  between  Japan,  India,  and  China 
might  put  Asia  into  the  hands  of  Asiatics  in  such  a 
fashion  that  Europeans  would  be  unable  to  regain 
a  foothold.  In  several  years'  time  adequate 
military  dispositions  to  deal  effectively  with 
Europeans  could  be  completed.  It  would  not,  in 
all  probability,  be  necessary  to  do  more  than  ren- 
der the  conquest  of  Asia  a  hazardous  and  difficult 
task  to  prevent  the  victors  of  the  European  war 
from  undertaking  it.  So  far  as  Asia  has  been 
conquered  at  all,  the  work  has  been  done  by  small 
bodies  of  Europeans  with  the  cooperation  of  large 
bodies  of  native  troops.  To  fight  a  war  in  Asia 
which  would  require  an  army  of  European  soldiers 
large  enough  to  meet  a  determined  army  of  Asi- 
atics, equipped  with  European  guns  and  officered 
by  men  trained  in  Japan,  would  be  a  task  the 
magnitude  of  which  might  well  cause  the  victor  to 
hesitate. 

Nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that  the  financial 
indebtedness  of  Japan,  which  taxes  the  capacity  of 

199 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

that  country  to  meet  the  interest  and  principal 
payments,  is  all  owed  in  Europe  and  America. 
So  far  as  any  tangible  evidence  of  that  capital  is  in 
existence  in  the  world,  it  is  in  Japan,  where  the 
logic  of  the  Pan-Germanists  is  just  as  good  as  it  is 
in  Germany.  The  Japanese  have  only  to  repudiate 
their  entire  indebtedness  to  free  the  nation  from  a 
staggering  load  and  put  it  at  once  in  the  possession 
of  its  whole  economic  development  at  the  price  of 
what  they  have  already  paid.  The  control  of  the 
Pacific,  the  annexation  of  the  Spice  Islands  and 
the  Philippines,  the  expulsion  of  foreigners,  the 
assurance  for  all  time  of  financial  independence — 
these  are  indeed  things  to  conjure  with.  And  we 
who  can  see  clearly  so  much  at  so  great  a  distance 
with  so  little  aid,  may  well  pause  to  wonder  how 
much  more  the  Japanese  themselves  can  see,  and 
how  long  caution  and  prudence  will  counsel  them 
to  wait  before  attempting  the  attainment  of  such 
desirable  ends. 


200 


BOOK  III 
PAN-AMERICANISM 


20 1 


Pan-Americanism 


CHAPTER    I 
PREREQUISITES   OF   PAN-AMERICANISM 

TO  some,  Pan- Americanism  is  the  Utopia  of 
peace,  a  demonstration  of  the  superior 
morality  of  the  Western  over  the  Eastern 
Hemisphere,  of  the  New  World  and  its  Christian- 
ity over  the  Old.  To  some  it  is  a  dream  of  the 
monopolization  of  South  American  trade  by  the 
United  States;  to  others,  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  our  chivalrous  protection  of  the  weak  against 
aggression;  to  others,  a  vision  of  empire  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  To  many  in  South  America, 
Pan-Americanism  stands  for  the  peculiarly  hypo- 
critical fashion  in  which  the  elder  brother  makes 
known  his  demands  for  the  deference  due  to  him 
and  for  the  privilege  justly  his.  Pan-Americanism 
is  not  yet  a  reality.  The  word  still  connotes  a 
varied  and  inconsistent  complex  of  ideas :  pacifists, 

203 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

capitalists,  imperialists,  have  built  in  its  name 
structures  framed  in  the  image  of  their  own  desires 
and  ambitions. 

We  are  less  concerned  with  what  Pan-Ameri- 
canism has  been  or  has  meant  than  with  what  it 
may  mean  in  the  future.  What  should  it  be; 
whom  should  it  include;  what  should  be  its  object; 
what  problems  may  it  solve?  Will  it  protect  the 
Western  Hemisphere  from  Europe's  victor  or 
from  the  aggression  of  Japan?  A  knowledge  of  the 
position  of  the  United  States  in  its  relation  to 
Latin  America,  of  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
and  those  of  Latin  America,  and  of  the  funda- 
mental economic  and  administrative  factors  in 
both,  will  be  important  not  only  for  the  elucida- 
tion of  Pan- Americanism,  but  for  a  grasp  of  our 
future  problems.  If  a  closer  union  between  the 
United  States  and  the  Latin  American  republics  is 
feasible  and  desirable,  it  will  furnish  a  premise  with 
which  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  must 
reckon.  If  it  is  not  feasible,  we  shall  perforce 
ground  our  conception  of  the  fundamentals  of 
American  policy  upon  different  notions. 

Let  us  therefore  deal  with  the  possibility  of  a 
really  close  relationship  transcending  by  far  the 
meetings  of  diplomatic  representatives  and  such 
general  expressions  of  good-will  and  sympathy 

204 


PREREQUISITES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

as  are  usual  in  the  correspondence  of  sovereign 
nations  in  Europe.  Let  us  view  as  an  hypothesis 
an  administrative  union  between  the  United 
States  and  the  twenty  Latin  republics,  for  Canada 
is  always  tacitly  excluded  from  the  question  of 
Pan-Americanism,  and  extend  it  beyond  some 
vague  customs  union,  vague  defensive  alliance,  or 
voluntary  business  court,  to  a  substantive  con- 
federation of  sovereign  states.  The  word  raises  at 
once  visions  similar  to  Pan-Germanism,  Pan- 
Slavism,  Pan-Islam,  which  draw  their  vital  mean- 
ing and  purpose  from  the  assumed  necessity  of  the 
closest  conceivable  connection  between  Germans, 
Slavs,  or  Mohammedans.  Unless  there  is  a  reality 
existent  which  will  furnish  the  basis  for  something 
more  than  a  temporary  and  quasi-artificial  bond 
of  dubious  strength  and  utility,  we  shall  be  forced 
to  admit  that  Pan- Americanism  is  a  misnomer  and 
the  ideas  it  connotes  fictitious  and  vain  imaginings. 
While  the  premise  of  Pan-Americanism  ob- 
viously cannot  be  that  of  racial  unity,  as  in  the 
case  of  the  European  movements  similarly  desig- 
nated, it  does  assume  that  the  geographical 
proximity  of  North  and  South  American  results  in 
something  approaching  the  isolation  of  the  two 
from  Europe,  so  that  the  geographical  connection 
between  them  is  closer  than  that  of  either  with 

205 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Europe  or  Africa.  It  also  predicates  quite  clearly 
the  political  and  economic  independence  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere  against  the  rest  of  the 
world.  The  necessity  of  a  broad  basis  of  mutual 
economic  interest  in  any  organic  union  has  been 
proved  in  the  past  a  most  important  and  funda- 
mental factor.  Clearly,  mutual  interests  are 
essential  to  Pan-Americanism,  and  must  be  as- 
sumed to  exist  between  the  various  states  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  which  must  therefore  be 
supposed  to  have  divergent  interests  from  Euro- 
pean states,  or  at  the  very  least  to  find  their 
fundamental  interest  in  relations  with  one  another 
rather  than  with  Europe.  Not  less  vital  is  the 
obvious  assumption  of  mutual  trust  and  confidence 
between  the  various  states  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, not  transcending  perhaps  their  trust  and 
confidence  in  European  nations,  but  certainly  yield- 
ing to  one  another  all  credence  and  faith  which 
they  themselves  could  desire  in  return.  A  need 
for  mutual  aid  and  protection  against  Europe,  if 
not  against  the  rest  of  the  world,  Pan-American- 
ism peculiarly  assumes  and  predicates  necessarily 
the  ability  of  these  states  to  make  effective  use 
of  their  combined  strength  against  aggression 
from  without.  Indeed,  one  might  almost  say  that 
mutual  protection  should  be  assumed  to  furnish 

206 


PREREQUISITES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  real  nexus  of  the  new  state,  and  that  the 
existence  of  the  present  war  in  Europe,  and  the 
probable  aggression  of  its  victor  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  ought  to  furnish  the  impelling  motive 
for  the  creation  of  this  organic  union,  and  remain 
for  a  time  at  least  its  most  important  feature. 

What,  now,  are  the  prerequisites  for  the  erection 
or  creation  of  a  Pan-American  confederation  or 
union  based  upon  such  fundamental  premises? 
If  the  foundations  of  the  structure  are  significant, 
the  structure  itself  is  the  visible  and  tangible 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  the  new  entity,  and 
will  be,  if  anything,  more  essential  to  its  eventual 
success  than  the  premises.  An  organic  union 
would  have  little  strength  and  possess  only  a 
very  small  quantity  of  organic  nexus,  unless  it 
was  at  least  a  confederation  of  sovereign  states, 
with  a  common  executive  and  legislature  in  whom 
were  vested  definite  if,  perhaps  limited,  powers 
to  act,  and  with  discretion  to  decide  upon  their 
own  initiative,  in  a  way  binding  upon  all  members 
certain  matters  of  mutual  interest  explicitly  dele- 
gated to  them.  The  inequality  of  the  various 
states  in  size  might  be  solved  by  giving  them  un- 
equal numbers  of  votes,  so  graduated  as  to  make 
it  impossible  for  the  large  states  to  be  outvoted 
by  the  small  states  on  matters  vital  to  them,  and 

207 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

to  foreclose  the  possibility  of  the  control  of  the 
confederation  by  the  large  states.  By  leaving  the 
large  states  in  the  minority,  the  small  would  be 
protected,  while  by  requiring  a  two-thirds  vote 
upon  important  issues,  the  three  or  four  largest 
states  would  obtain  an  effective  veto,  for  they 
could  always  prevent  the  confederation  from 
acting  at  all.  A  schedule  of  issues  might  be  pre- 
pared with  different  percentages  graduated  accord- 
ing to  the  importance  of  the  subject.  In  this  way 
the  difficulty  might  be  solved  of  a  confederation 
in  which  one  state,  the  United  States,  would  be  as 
large  as  all  the  others,  and  three  other  states 
would  be  larger  and  wealthier  than  most  of  the 
remainder. 

Some  common  administrative  body  would  be 
essential.  The  conduct  of  foreign  affairs  by  the 
confederation,  the  abandoning  by  all  members  of 
their  previous  policies  and  independent  dealings 
with  other  countries,  with  either  the  abandonment 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  or  its  assumption  by  the 
confederation,  would  be  highly  important.  Free 
trade  within  the  confederation  and  a  uniform 
tariff  against  foreign  countries,  a  uniform  currency, 
uniform  weights  and  measures,  with  uniform 
banking,  bankruptcy,  and  commercial  laws,  would 
be  eminently  desirable.  The  courts  of  the  con- 

208 


PREREQUISITES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

federation  should  decide  suits  between  states  or 
between  the  citizens  of  various  states,  as  the 
United  States  courts  now  deal  with  the  affairs  of 
individuals  and  states.  There  would  of  course 
be  the  taxes  for  purposes  of  administration  and 
defense,  apportioned  among  the  sovereign  states 
in  the  same  ratio  as  the  votes  in  the  Federal 
legislature,  and  collected  by  the  local  authorities. 
All  actions  of  the  confederation  would  necessarily 
be  binding  on  its  members,  except  for  certain 
limitations  indicated  by  a  bill  of  rights,  which  of 
course  would  be  intended  for  the  states  rather 
than  for  private  citizens.  Officials  and  judges 
could  probably  be  selected  impartially  and  appor- 
tioned roughly  between  the  various  states,  while 
in  the  lower  ranks  of  the  administration  civil- 
service  rules  should  be  applied.  The  confederation 
in  its  relation  to  its  members  would  recognize 
freely  their  complete  sovereignty  in  all  domes- 
tic affairs,  with  certain  reservations  as  to  the 
extent  to  which  the  confederation  could  pledge 
these  sovereign  states  by  its  action  in  foreign 
affairs,  war,  or  peace.  With  limitations,  the  con- 
federation might  be  required  to  maintain  repub- 
lican government  in  all  the  states,  to  subdue 
revolutions  or  riots,  and  to  insist  upon  changes  of 
government  by  peaceful  methods  rather  than  by 
i4  209 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

revolutions.  It  might  even  go  so  far  as  to  compel 
the  existing  government  to  redress  certain  classes  of 
wrongs  when  complained  of  in  certain  formal  ways 
by  a  large  number  of  its  own  citizens  or  by  other 
states  or  their  citizens. 

Regular,  intercourse  between  the  states  would 
be  a  necessary  feature  in  the  maintenance  of  their 
mutual  acquaintance  and  friendly  understanding, 
and  would  normally  result  from  their  mutual 
economic  interests.  The  creation  of  a  merchant 
marine  to  carry  their  commerce  in  ships  belong- 
ing to  members  of  the  confederation  and  to  carry 
the  exports  of  its  members  to  foreign  nations 
would  be  indispensable  to  the  establishment  and 
continuance  of  that  economic  independence  of 
Europe  which  it  might  be  readily  assumed  was  in 
accordance  with  the  normal  interests  of  the  con- 
federation. This  would  be  further  assured  by  the 
development  of  a  system  of  federal  banks,  which 
would  provide  for  direct  exchange  among  the 
members  of  the  confederation  and  with  Europe, 
and  could  control  the  currency  and  facilitate 
the  distribution  of  capital  throughout  its  exten- 
sive territory.  Each  member  would  supply  others 
with  capital  and  itself  obtain  capital  from  others. 

Absolutely  essential  to  the  development  of  any 
strong  bond,  and  to  the  strengthening  of  the  mutual 

2IO 


PREREQUISITES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

trust  and  confidence  between  the  various  members, 
would  be  an  unqualified  recognition  of  the  legal 
and  social  equality  of  all  its  citizens  in  all  states 
of  the  confederation.  As  the  acceptance  of  social 
equality  by  the  various  South  American  peoples 
is  virtually  complete,  this  phase  of  the  problem 
would  largely  depend  upon  the  granting  of  social 
equality  to  South  Americans  by  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  Without  such  acquiescence,  the 
assurances  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
its  promises  and  laws,  would  be  futile;  but  upon 
the  desirability — one  might  almost  say  the  neces- 
sity— of  establishing  such  social  equality  would 
depend  the  strength,  if  not  the  very  existence,  of 
the  confederation. 

These  do  not  seem  to  be  excessive  demands  or 
prerequisites  of  a  closer  Pan-American  union. 
They  mean  simply  that  the  new  confederation 
should  be  a  state  with  organs  possessed  of  inde- 
pendent authority;  that  the  political,  administra- 
tive, and  economic  aspects  of  the  new  state  should 
be  realities  and  not  fictions.  They  demand  that 
the  new  state  should  actually  possess  the  political 
and  economic  independence,  that  its  assumed 
isolation  and  divergent  interests  from  Europe 
would  make  desirable,  and  to  preserve  which  the 
union  itself  had  presumably  been  formed. 

211 


PAN-AMERICANIS  M 

The  results  of  the  formation  of  such  a  confedera- 
tion ought  to  be  vital  to  the  welfare  of  all  its 
members.  It  should  end  revolutions  and  maintain 
stable  government,  forever  remove  the  apprehen- 
sion in  South  America  of  aggression  from  the 
United  States,  and  furnish  a  rapid  and  simple 
method  for  the  decision  of  disputes  between  sover- 
eign states  or  their  citizens.  It  should  protect  the 
Western  Hemisphere  from  European  aggression, 
isolate  it  from  the  wars  convulsing  that  continent, 
and  dedicate  it  to  the  peaceful  arts.  From  it 
should  flow  mutual  economic  benefits  in  the  growth 
of  trade  and  commerce,  the  development  of  indus- 
try, the  fostering  of  agriculture,  the  growth  of  a 
merchant  marine,  and  perhaps  in  good  time 
the  growth  or  development  of  a  distinctively 
American  literature,  art,  and  music. 

No  such  extended  relationship  now  exists  or 
is  at  present  seriously  discussed.  In  the  past 
Pan-Americanism  has  referred  to  such  relations  as 
the  American  republics  have  actually  had  with 
one  another,  and  has  denoted  nothing  definite  in 
regard  to  their  actual  character,  although  it  has 
connoted  invariably  something  of  comity  and  a 
desire  to  extend  the  friendly  relations  between 
them  to  something  approaching  an  agreement  on 
matters  of  common  policy.  As  early  as  1826  a 

212 


PREREQUISITES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

Pan-American  congress  was  held;  Henry  Clay 
and  James  G.  Elaine  both  used  their  wide  in- 
fluence to  father  the  movement;  since  1889  a 
variety  of  congresses,  some  of  ambassadors  and 
diplomats,  some  of  scientists,  have  met.  Very 
recently  a  Pan-American  Union  was  formed,  with  a 
governing  body  consisting  of  the  American  Secre- 
tary of  State  and  the  ambassadors  or  diplomatic 
representatives  in  Washington  of  the  twenty  Latin- 
American  republics.  As  administrative  head  was 
appointed  an  American  who  had  seen  diplomatic 
service  in  Latin  America,  and  an  assistant  direc- 
tor who  is  a  Latin  American.  A  building  has  been 
erected  in  Washington,  and  a  staff  is  at  work 
collecting  statistics,  general  information,  and  a 
library  regarding  Latin  America.  The  publications 
of  the  union  are  intended  to  furnish  accurate  in- 
formation about  commercial  opportunities  in  the 
Southern  Continent .  Its  practical  work  is  economic 
rather  than  political  and,  for  the  present  is  appar- 
ently aimed  more  at  developing  markets  in  South 
America  for  United  States  merchants  than  at  the 
general  development  of  South  America  itself. 
Some  years  ago  Secretary  of  State  Root  made  an 
extended  trip  in  an  attempt  to  draw  closer  the 
bonds  of  the  American  republics ;  the  three  largest 
republics  recently  mediated  between  the  United 

213 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

States  and  Mexico,  both  of  whom  accepted  their 
offices.  Within  the  last  weeks  the  governing 
board  of  the  Pan-American  Union  voted  to  make 
representations  to  the  European  belligerents  on 
the  question  of  neutral  trade  and  shipping  in 
American  waters. 

Yet  none  of  these  efforts  has  extended  beyond 
the  meeting  of  representatives  of  the  various 
republics  in  their  character  as  sovereign  states. 
They  have  conferred  with  one  another  more  or 
less  amicably  in  diplomatic  fashion,  but  have 
reached  few  conclusions  of  particular  import. 
Indeed,  they  were  incapable  of  acting  on  any  sub- 
ject with  binding  effect  because  they  were  dele- 
gates conveying  messages  from  sovereign  states 
rather  than  representatives  empowered  to  con- 
sider and  decide  the  matters  in  question  through 
interchange  of  argument.  The  meetings  were, 
strictly  speaking,  the  recognition  of  a  relationship 
forced  upon  them  by  the  geographical  accident  of 
the  others'  existence  rather  than  evidence  of  an 
intention  or  a  desire  to  make  closer  the  bond.  Nor 
was  there  at  any  time  a  definite  pledge  of  the 
continuance  of  the  meetings.  It  is  highly  import- 
ant that  we  should  not  exaggerate  the  actual 
facts;  these  diplomatic  conferences  contained 
no  greater  pledge  of  mutual  interests,  unity, 

214 


PREREQUISITES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

policy,  or  identity  in  ideals  than  conferences  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  representatives 
of  European  powers.  While  they  premised  the 
existence  of  questions  upon  which  some  sort  of 
agreement  was  advisable,  we  should  realize  that 
questions  equally  practical  and  of  an  absolutely 
similar  nature  are  constantly  presenting  themselves 
for  decision  between  the  Latin-American  republics 
and  European  nations. 

Not  only  is  Pan-Americanism  not  a  reality,  but 
we  have  no  actual  evidence  of  a  desire  on  the  part 
of  the  American  states  to  make  it  real.  The  Latin- 
American  republics  would  probably  protest  that 
they  had  given  no  pledges  or  promises  whatever 
indicating  an  intention  or  a  desire  to  form  an  or- 
ganic union  to  which  the  United  States  should  be 
a  party,  and  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that  South 
American  statesmen  regard  a  close  union  of  the 
Latin-American  republics  alone  as  feasible  or 
desirable.  The  more  serious  thinkers  are  inclined 
to  feel  that  the  amalgamation  of  some  of  the  re- 
publics into  federal  states  is  perhaps  possible  and 
that  the  confederation  of  others  might  be  arranged ; 
but  the  most  conservative  regard  seven  entities 
as  the  smallest  number  entirely  feasible.  It  is  at 
least  worth  while  remembering  in  this  connection 
that  it  is  whispered  in  Latin  America  that  these 

215 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Pan-American  congresses  are  useful  methods  of 
stimulating  a  realizing  sense  among  the  Latin- 
American  republics  of  their  need  for  cooperation 
against  the  aggression  of  the  United  States  in 
South  and  Central  America.  In  fact,  from  the 
recent  activities  of  the  Pan-American  Union  and 
from  the  acceptance  of  the  mediation  of  Argentina, 
Brazil,  and  Chile  between  Mexico  and  the  United 
States,  the  conclusion  has  been  drawn  that  a  vital 
change  in  the  policy  of  the  United  States  was  im- 
pending. Instead  of  treating  the  Latin-American 
republics  as  inferiors,  the  United  States  was  about 
to  recognize  formally  their  sovereign  equality. 
Far  from  this  being  understood  as  a  prelude  to 
the  formation  of  a  Pan-American  confederation  or 
state,  the  profound  and  favorable  impression 
made  upon  South  America  by  these  recent  events 
has  been  due  rather  to  the  hope  that  they  por- 
tended the  formal  and  public  renunciation  by  the 
United  States  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the 
aggressive  schemes  for  the  conquest  of  Central 
and  South  America  which  they  have  felt  to  be 
the  only  possible  explanation  of  the  past  acts  of  the 
United  States.  The  recognition  of  equality  would 
be  the  necessary  diplomatic  approach  to  a  formal 
enunciation  of  the  new  policy. 

Pan-Americanism  is  not  now  a  reality,  but  it  is 
216 


PREREQUISITES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

none  the  less  important  for  us  to  consider  whether 
it  might  become  an  actuality.  If  the  word  is  to 
denote  in  future  no  more  than  it  does  at  present,  it 
stands  for  nothing  of  consequence,  and  least  of  all 
for  anything  peculiarly  American.  We  are  dealing 
with  the  possible  creation  of  something  which 
never  existed  and  which  does  not  now  exist — an 
organic  bond  between  American  republics,  founded 
upon  mutual  interests  and  involving  mutual  bene- 
fits and  obligations,  as  contrasted  with  a  merely 
permissive  and  essentially  temporary  relationship 
of  a  quasi-diplomatic  character.  Unless  we  can 
demonstrate  that  Pan-Americanism  has  behind  it 
deep  fundamental  concepts  and  is  likely  to  sub- 
serve important  American  ends,  a  close  connection 
with  the  Latin -American  republics  will  scarcely  be 
a  policy  for  the  maintenance  of  which  the  United 
States  ought  to  sacrifice  anything  of  substantive 
value.  If  such  is  now  the  true  meaning  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  the  expediency  of  its  continu- 
ance will  then  become  a  matter  of  grave  doubt. 


217 


CHAPTER  II 
FALLACIES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

THE  theoretical  basis  of  Pan-Americanism  lies 
in  the  belief  that  the  geographical  proxim- 
ity of  the  two  continents  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  has  naturally  created  between  their 
inhabitants  mutual  interests,  and  literally  predi- 
cates different  interests  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
from  those  of  Europe,  and  a  more  normal  rela- 
tionship between  states  located  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  with  one  another  than  with  Europe. 
We  shall  scarcely  need  to  do  more  than  glance  at 
the  map  to  see  that  the  more  developed  regions 
of  North  America  are  in  actual  distance  as  far 
from  South  America  as  they  are  from  Europe,  and 
that  South  America  is  geographically  more  closely 
related  to  Africa  and  to  southern  Europe  than  it 
is  to  New  York  and  to  New  England.  The  dis- 
tance between  the  principal  South  American  ports 
and  London  is  not  much  greater  than  the  dis- 
tance from  New  York;  Spain  and  Portugal  are 

218 


FALLACIES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

both  relatively  near  Brazil ;  both  Florida  and  the 
Sahara  Desert  are  nearer  to  South  America  than 
the  parts  of  Europe  or  the  United  States  with 
which  South  Americans  are  most  anxious  to  deal. 
The  Pacific  coast  of  South  America  has  indeed 
been  nearer  to  the  western  coast  of  the  United 
States  than  to  Europe  because  of  the  long  voyage 
around  Cape  Horn,  trebling  the  distance  as  the 
crow  flies.  The  Panama  Canal  will  make  an 
important  difference  in  the  geographical  isolation 
of  the  western  coast  of  South  America,  but  there 
can  be  no  real  doubt  that  there  is  no  necessary 
geographical  proximity  or  relationship  between 
the  North  and  South  American  republics  that  all 
do  not  have  with  Europe.  The  foundation  of  a 
political  and  social  union  upon  a  geographical 
bond  no  closer  than  the  bonds  which  join  the 
United  States  to  Europe  and  Africa  is  obviously 
building  upon  the  sands.  It  is  a  fallacy  to  sup- 
pose that  the  juxtaposition  of  North  and  South 
America  necessarily  creates  political  or  economic 
interests  in  common  between  the  inhabitants  of 
the  two  continents.  We  might  as  well  interfere 
for  similar  reasons  in  the  domestic  politics  of  the 
Azores,  Morocco,  or  the  Gold  Coast.  Indeed, 
the  bonds  of  geographical  relationship  between 
the  United  States  and  the  British  Isles  are  a  great 

219 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

deal    closer   than    they    are    with  Brazil.    This, 
however,  predicates  extremely  little. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  also  a  fallacy  to  suppose 
that  any  part  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  is  iso- 
lated from  Europe  by  its  location  without  at  the 
same  time  being  equally  isolated  from  the  United 
States.  Real  isolation  results  from  a  lack  of 
communication  and  a  lack  of  acquaintance,  and  is 
due  nowadays  almost  entirely  to  the  difficulty  of 
communication  or  to  a  lack  of  common  interests, 
neither  of  which  seem  to  have  any  necessary  rela- 
tion to  geographical  distance  or  location.  The 
railroad  and  the  steamship,  the  telegraph  and  the 
newspaper,  have  tied  together  beyond  the  .power 
of  separation  in  the  future  places  sundered  by  the 
length  of  continents  and  the  width  of  oceans. 
Where  communication  exists,  there  is  neither 
separation  nor  isolation ;  until  it  exists,  even  actual 
contiguity  of  boundaries  will  not  break  that  silence 
and  indifference  between  two  countries  in  which 
lies  complete  isolation.  Peru  and  Brazil  com- 
municate with  each  other  infrequently  and  irreg- 
ularly; both  are  in  constant  touch  with  affairs 
in  London,  Paris,  and  New  York.  Similarly,  the 
information  in  New  York  about  Buenos  Aires 
is  much  more  extended,  accurate,  and  contem- 
poraneous than  the  notions  in  Maine  about  Ala- 

220 


FALLACIES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

bama.  The  great  commercial  and  political  centers 
are  inevitably  in  closer  contact  with  one  another 
than  with  the  parts  of  their  own  country;  and 
nearly  any  part  of  the  United  States  has  more 
regular  contact  with  New  York  or  Chicago  than 
with  any  other  part  of  North  America.  Isolation 
is  more  a  matter  of  time  than  of  space,  and  com- 
mon interests  are  due  to  the  ease  of  transportation 
and  communication  more  often  than  to  geograph- 
ical location. 

The  greatest  of  fallacies  is  the  assumption  that 
the  Western  Hemisphere  is  isolated  from  Europe. 
Since  the  coming  of  the  telegraph  and  the  steam- 
ship, the  railroad  and  the  newspaper,  isolation  from 
Europe  is  impossible.  Indeed,  one  might  almost 
say  that  so  far  as  there  is  any  isolation  in  the 
world  to-day  it  exists  more  nearly  than  anywhere 
else  between  the  various  parts  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  In  point  of  time  and  expense  it  is 
quite  as  easy  to  travel  from  London  or  Hamburg 
as  from  New  York  or  Boston,  to  South  American 
ports  on  the  east  coast.  The  fastest  and  largest 
steamers  in  the  South  American  trade  are  in 
the  European  service;  when  South  Americans 
travel  they  do  not  hesitate  to  choose  Paris  instead 
of  New  York ;  and  the  Americans  who  have  ever 
traveled  in  South  America  are  few  compared  with 

221 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  multitudes  who  have  made  the  rounds  in 
Europe.  There  are  thousands  of  Americans  who 
know  London  and  Paris  well  who  have  no  concep- 
tion of  the  location  of  the  smaller  South  American 
countries ;  there  are  thousands  of  South  Americans 
who  are  in  a  very  similar  condition  regarding 
the  United  States.  Ignorance  is  the  greatest  of 
separators;  indifference  creates  the  most  difficult 
isolation  to  overcome.  American  notions  of  the 
Southern  Continent  resemble  those  of  the  English- 
man who  thought  he  should  sing  "Away  down 
South  in  Michigan"  and  spend  the  day  mowing 
cotton  and  sugar  and  plucking  maize  from  the 
savannas. 

A  glance  at  the  newspapers  of  the  various  coun- 
tries shows  more  news  in  a  South  American  news- 
paper about  Europe  than  there  is  about  the  United 
States,  and  very  often  more  about  the  two  together 
than  about  all  the  other  states  in  South  America 
combined.  There  is  often  more  news  about 
South  America  in  the  London  dailies  than  there 
is  about  the  United  States,  but  invariably  more 
news  in  the  New  York  papers  about  London  than 
about  the  twenty  Latin  American  republics. 
What  little  there  is  about  them  is  usually  crowded 
into  small  type  in  some  inconspicuous  corner, 
unless  it  so  happens  that  the  news  concerns  the 

222 


FALLACIES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

possibility  of  trouble  between  them  and  the  United 
States.  Domestic  news,  as  such,  regarding  both 
South  America  and  the  United  States  receives 
on  the  whole  a  good  deal  more  attention  in  Europe 
than  it  gets  from  the  newspapers  of  the  other 
continent.  Far  from  its  being  true  that  the  loca- 
tion of  the  United  States  and  South  America  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere  has  created  and  fostered 
a  relationship  between  them,  a  most  elementary 
study  of  either  will  show  that  the  relationship 
of  both  to  Europe  is  a  thousandfold  closer  and 
more  vital  than  their  relationship  to  each 
other.  Indeed,  the  contact  of  most  South  Ameri- 
can states  with  Europe  is  closer  than  with  the 
next  Latin  American  state.  The  only  geographical 
factor  really  common  to  the  United  States  and  the 
Latin-American  republics  is  the  fact  that  none  of 
them  are  located  in  Europe  or  Africa. 

Pan-Americanism  assumes  a  certain  separation 
of  interests  between  Europe  and  the  Western 
Hemisphere  and  a  certain  identity  of  interests 
between  the  United  States  and  Latin  America. 
Let  us  not  mince  matters  in  questions  of  such  grave 
importance  as  these.  This  is  a  fiction  the  falsity 
of  which  has  been  exposed  by  the  European  war. 
It  was  not  apparent  sooner  because  of  the  lack  of 
keen  interest  on  the  part  of  both  Europe  and  the 

223 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

United  States  in  South  America.  The  significant 
interests  of  the  United  States,  the  indispensable 
interests,  the  prerequisites  of  economic  well-being, 
are  those  with  Europe.  The  significant  interests 
of  Latin  America,  the  predominant  interests, 
indispensable  to  their  economic  well-being,  are 
those  with  Europe. 

The  assumption  that  this  common  relationship 
and  interest  between  the  various  countries  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere  is  the  result  of  their  geograph- 
ical location  seems  to  have  been  originally  based 
upon  the  accident  of  their  discovery  at  about  the 
same  moment.  Two  continents  not  previously 
occupied  by  Europeans  were  both  situated  in  the 
same  relation  to  Europe  and  it  might  therefore  be 
assumed  that  things  equally  related  to  the  same 
thing  would  be  closely  related  to  each  other. 
Their  undeveloped  condition  and  the  subse- 
quent growth  of  communities  by  exploration, 
conquest,  and  settlement  not  unnaturally  raised 
a  presumption  that  their  problems  were  similar. 
Would  not  the  attitude  of  the  two  continents 
toward  Europe,  which  held  them  in  subjection,  be 
identical?  Was  not  political  independence  worth 
more  than  a  sort  of  government  not  much  better 
than  the  crudest  form  of  exploitation?  Independ- 
ence would  naturally  carry  with  it  freedom  from 

224 


FALLACIES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  obligation  to  receive  such  criminals  as  their  own 
government  saw  fit  to  locate  in  their  borders,  or 
to  obey  such  laws  and  regulations  as  the  mother 
country  saw  fit  to  make  in  her  own  interest.  The 
common  interest  of  both  in  political  independence 
from  Europe  was  so  obvious  and  natural  that  it 
promptly  became  the  basis  for  a  series  of  assump- 
tions regarding  a  more  extended  interest  between 
them,  and  in  particular  for  the  notion  which  lies 
at  the  root  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  Pan- 
Americanism  that  America  was  for  the  Americans. 
We  shall  display  as  students  no  great  amount 
of  candor  in  admitting  freely  and  frankly  the 
dependence  of  the  whole  Western  Hemisphere 
upon  Europe  for  artistic  and  intellectual  leader- 
ship and  inspiration.  Paris  is  the  Mecca  of  South 
Americans.  Thither  drift,  nay,  one  might  almost 
say  hasten,  in  a  fashion  contrary  to  the  South 
American  temperament,  all  those  who  desire  to 
study,  to  travel,  or  to  celebrate  the  acquisition 
of  wealth.  Dresses  designed  by  Worth  and  Pa- 
quin  are  as  common  in  the  great  South  American 
cities  as  they  are  in  our  own  large  cities ;  the  deco- 
ration of  homes,  the  general  aspect  of  municipal 
architecture  and  city  planning  is  distinctly  that 
of  the  recent  French  school,  and  most  important 
buildings  have  been  designed  by  prominent  French 
is  225 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

architects  or  their  pupils.  French  literature  has 
been  the  model  of  the  more  recent  schools  of 
poets  and  novelists  in  most  South  American  states; 
French  art  and  music  are  those  most  desired, 
although  Spanish  literature,  Italian  music,  and 
English  political  philosophy  exert  a  deep  influence 
and  are  well  known.  There  is  in  it  all  very  little  that 
is  American.  Such  resemblances  as  the  casual 
traveler  sees  between  the  United  States  and  South 
America  are  due  entirely  to  the  fact  that  both  have 
followed  the  same  models.  We  are  both  depend- 
ent upon  Europe,  we  both  reflect  Europe — to 
that  extent  we  are  similar.  It  is  truly  a  funda- 
mental and  important  fact  that  all  parts  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere  look  rather  to  Europe  than 
to  one  another  for  the  highest  things  as  well 
as  the  baser. 

Probably  this  common  dependence  upon  Europe 
explains  the  sensitivity  of  most  South  Americans 
to  what  they  suppose  to  be  the  attitude  of  superi- 
ority assumed  by  the  United  States  over  them  in 
purely  intellectual  achievements  and  the  arts  of 
civilization.  Our  attempts  to  police  the  less 
orderly  republics,  to  assist  in  their  financial  ar- 
rangements, seem  to  them  to  proceed  from  a  con- 
viction on  our  part  that  we  are  not  only  bigger,  but 
better;  not  only  older,  but  wiser;  and  that  we  are 

226 


FALLACIES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

discharging  a  moral  obligation  by  giving  them  the 
benefit  of  our  superior  culture  and  of  our  greater 
wisdom  and  experience.  All  South  Americans 
will  admit  that  we  are  bigger,  but  there  are  not 
many  who  will  sincerely  admit  that  we  are  better 
than  they  are,  or  more  skilled  in  the  essential  arts 
of  civilization.  They  lay  great  stress  upon  the 
fact  that  we  are  different,  and  decline  to  yield  us 
superiority  in  literary,  artistic,  or  musical  appre- 
ciation, in  the  architectural  arrangement  of  our 
cities,  or  the  possession  of  superior  conveniences 
for  the  cultivation  of  the  arts  and  sciences.  The 
older  South  Americans  do  not  admit  that  there 
were  writers  in  the  United  States  at  the  end  of  the 
eighteenth  century  who  could  rival  Bello  and 
Almedo,  and  not  many  in  the  decades  before  the 
Civil  War  who  were  better  than  Andradi;  while 
the  young  men  regard  Rodo  and  Ugarte  as  critics 
and  orators  quite  as  intelligent  as  our  own  con- 
temporary writers,  and  feel  that  Carillo  is  a  greater 
master  of  the  technic  of  the  short  story  than 
any  recent  American  writer.  Indeed,  several 
South  American  authors  have  been  favorably 
received  by  European  critics,  a  fact  of  which  the 
South  Americans  are  entirely  aware;  and  they 
are  also  well  aware  that  the  number  of  American 
authors  who  have  received  similar  recognition  is 

227 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

not  large.  In  common  with  most  Europeans, 
they  deny  that  there  is  any  such  thing  as  an  Amer- 
ican literature  or  an  American  art.  As  they  do 
not  claim  for  their  own  efforts  an  equality  with 
Europe,  they  see  no  reason  why  we  should  claim 
equality  for  ours  of  similar  grade.  They  are 
very  sensitive  upon  these  matters — sensitive  to  a 
degree  of  which  most  Americans  have  little  con- 
ception. We  are  not  likely  as  Americans  to 
believe  our  progress  no  greater  than  that  of  South 
America,  but  as  investigators  we  need  not  be 
surprised  to  find  that  the  South  Americans  them- 
selves decline  to  recognize  our  superiority,  and  are 
nettled  by  any  tacit  assertion  of  it,  however 
delicately  and  subtlely  advanced. 

The  most  serious  consequence  of  the  compara- 
tive isolation  between  North  and  South  America 
and  of  their  common  dependence  upon  Europe  is 
their  lack  of  acquaintance  with  each  other.  This 
is  a  fundamental  and  serious  obstacle  in  the 
way  of  Pan-Americanism,  for  knowledge  is 
the  indispensable  prerequisite  of  confidence, 
understanding,  and  mutuality.  Until  we  know 
each  other,  we  cannot  conceivably  form  strong 
bonds  of  association;  intercourse  and  frequent 
communication  will  alone  beget  acquaintance- 
ship. Unfortunately,  all  the  normal  aids  to 

228 


FALLACIES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

acquaintanceship  are  lacking,  and  great  funda- 
mental barriers  exist  in  the  difference  of 
race,  language,  and  religion.  In  South  America 
the  intermixture  of  races  is  common;  the 
white,  the  red,  and  the  black  have  intermar- 
ried. Although  in  the  United  States  such  inter- 
marriage results  in  social  ostracism,  the  difficulty 
of  blood  might  not  stand  in  the  way  if  it  were  not 
for  the  difficulty  of  language  and  religion.  Men 
must  speak  the  same  tongue  in  order  to  become 
acquainted;  real  acquaintanceship  is  not  made 
through  interpreters.  The  prevalence  of  Spanish 
or  Portuguese  in  South  America  coupled  with  a  total 
ignorance  of  both  in  large  portions  of  the  United 
States,  forms  a  barrier  between  the  peoples  which 
only  time  and  a  very  real  desire  to  become  ac- 
quainted can  remove.  The  Catholic  religion  in 
its  Latin-American  form  tinctures  the  whole  life 
of  the  people,  but  is  not  ordinarily  sympathetic 
to  citizens  of  the  United  States;  the  fundamental 
religious  philosophy  of  most  Americans  is  widely 
different.  Race,  language,  and  religion, — there 
could  scarcely  be  three  greater  barriers  in  the  way 
of  the  creation  of  that  degree  of  acquaintanceship 
upon  which  alone  firm  political  association  can  be 
built. 

From   our   ignorance   of   each    other   proceed 
229 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

constantly  misunderstandings  on  essential  points. 
The  peaceful  disposition  of  the  vast  majority  of 
American  people,  one  might  almost  say  the  strength 
of  their  determination  not  to  attempt  conquests 
in  Latin  America,  is  not  so  generally  credited  as 
it  should  be.  Our  real  anxiety  to  treat  them  as 
equals  does  not  convince  them.  Fundamental 
words  like  law,  democracy,  faith,  honor,  interest, 
business  efficiency,  do  not  connote  to  them  the 
same  things  that  they  do  to  us,  and  our  utterances 
and  theirs  usually  require  interpretation  even  when 
we  speak  ostensibly  in  each  other's  own  language. 
To  speak  in  words  is  easy;  to  express  ideas  is 
difficult;  and  nowhere  does  the  lack  of  acquaint- 
anceship show  itself  more  prominently  than  in 
such  matters  as  these.  The  difference  in  racial 
temperament  aggravates  all  other  difficulties,  and 
raises  new  barriers  in  the  way  of  explanation  and 
comprehension. 

They  do  not  speak  our  language  or  think  in 
our  terms;  their  eyes  look  upon  a  different  uni- 
verse; and  their  ideals  contemplate  a  different 
future.  We  have  no  common  interests  with  them, 
nor  are  we  closely  connected  with  them;  we  are, 
in  fact,  sundered  by  totally  dissimilar  interests  and 
by  a  generally  different  outlook  upon  life.  If  there 
is  any  such  thing  in  this  world  as  isolation,  separa- 

230 


FALLACIES  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

tion,  divergence,  we  are  isolated  from  Latin  Amer- 
ica by  the  fundamental,  impenetrable  barriers 
of  race,  language,  and  religion,  law,  customs,  and 
tradition.  Powerful  agencies  operating  with  great 
force  and  persistence  will  be  needed  to  create  and 
preserve  any  relationship  between  the  American 
republics  in  the  face  of  these  obstacles.  Not  only 
are  the  premises  of  Pan- Americanism  fallacies; 
their  very  antitheses  are  realities. 


231 


CHAPTER  III 
LACK  OF  ECONOMIC  MUTUALITY 

THE  people  of  the  United  States  have  always 
desired  a  Zoilverein,  a  fiscal  union  of  all 
the  republics;  they  wish  to  gather  into 
their  imperial  hands  the  commerce  of  the  South, 
the  produce  of  the  tropics."  They  aim  at  mak- 
ing a  trust  of  the  South  American  republics," 
Alberdi  has  said.  "They  aim,  after  the 
Spanish  fashion,  at  isolating  the  southern  con- 
tinent, becoming  its  exclusive  purveyor  of  ideas, 
and  industries."  Thus  does  Calderon  give  ex- 
pression to  the  very  common  belief  in  South 
America  as  to  the  real  aim  and  purpose  of  Pan- 
Americanism.  It  is  merely  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
in  a  new  guise,  the  wolf  in  sheep's  clothing.  It  is 
the  supremacy  of  the  United  States  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  masquerading  as  amity  and  friend- 
ship. So  long  as  the  economic  situation  is  fairly 
thrust  before  them  and  so  long  as  that  situation 
makes  so  essential  to  them  close  and  friendly  rela- 

232 


LACK  OF  ECONOMIC  MUTUALITY 

tions  with  Europe,  they  cannot  fail  to  appreciate 
the  consequences  of  "America  for  Americans." 
To  exclude  the  European  powers,  to  attempt  to 
raise  commercial  barriers  against  them,  and  to  insist 
upon  fostering  by  diplomatic  or  political  methods 
the  trade  of  the  United  States  to  the  detriment  of 
trade  with  European  nations — all  these  connote  in- 
fallibly the  establishment  of  a  relationship  between 
the  United  States  and  South  America  vastly  more 
favorable  to  the  United  States  than  it  can  con- 
ceivably be  to  South  America.  The  very  prin- 
ciple itself  upon  which  Pan- Americanism  is  based, 
the  common  interest  of  the  people  living  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  and  the  normal  divergence 
of  their  interests  from  those  of  Europe,  is  false, 
fallacious,  and  dangerous.  The  South  Americans 
do  not  have  and  cannot  have,  as  they  view  it,  the 
same  interest  in  the  development  of  trade  with 
the  United  States,  to  the  exclusion  of  European 
trade,  that  the  United  States  obviously  has  in  ob- 
taining a  portion  at  least  of  that  trade  which 
European  nations  have  at  present.  The  profit  is 
all  on  our  side.  The  South  American  sees  in 
Pan- Americanism  no  economic  mutuality,  but  a 
very  definite,  if  somewhat  subtle,  selfishness  on 
the  part  of  the  larger  country. 

The  proof  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  United  States 
233 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

cannot  perform  for  South  America  those  services 
indispensable  to  the  welfare  of  South  America 
that  European  nations  render.  The  case  of 
Central  America  is  somewhat  different:  the  geo- 
graphical connection  is  closer  and  transportation 
therefore  more  rapid  and  less  expensive,  while  the 
extent  to  which  enterprise  in  Central  America  is 
already  in  American  hands  is  so  considerable  that 
the  question  of  economic  mutuality  is  at  least 
arguable,  although  the  natives  are  not  by  any 
means  willing  as  yet  to  concede  that  it  is  convinc- 
ing. In  the  case  of  South  America,  however,  the 
facts  seem  clearly  to  indicate  that  the  South 
Americans  are  right  in  denying  the  claim  of  mutu- 
ality. The  peculiar  character  of  our  economic 
position  in  the  world  makes  it  impossible  for  us  to 
play  the  part  of  middleman  between  the  South 
American  producer  and  his  customers  throughout 
the  world.  South  American  trade  at  present 
(except  for  a  quasi-coastwise  trade  with  the 
United  States)  is  distributed  to  all  parts  of  the 
world  by  English  and  German  ships,  a  contact 
insured  from  interruption  during  the  last  century 
and  more  by  the  English  fleet  and  English  policy. 
Most  commercial  transactions  are  completed  by 
exchange  on  London,  where  the  bills  of  South 
America  are  paid  and  their  credits  understood, 

234 


LACK  OF  ECONOMIC  MUTUALITY 

though  a  similar  service  is  now  performed  by 
certain  of  the  great  German  banks  for  a  par£  of 
that  trade.  It  should  be  obvious  that  Pan- 
Americanism  cannot  become  a  reality,  nor  can  an 
organic  union  independent  of  Europe  be  formed 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere  until  the  union  is 
capable  by  its  united  efforts  of  performing  those 
services  indispensable  to  its  continued  economic 
well-being  that  certain  European  powers  at 
present  render.  Neither  the  United  States  nor 
any  of  the  South  American  republics  possess  a 
merchant  marine  capable  of  carrying  the  trade 
between  the  United  States  and  South  America 
alone,  to  say  nothing  of  the  trade  between  South 
America  and  the  world  at  large.  The  combined 
naval  force  of  the  twenty-one  republics  would  be 
incapable  of  protecting  the  roads  across  the  At- 
lantic against  the  English  fleet.  Far  from  being 
able  to  provide  South  Americans  with  ade- 
quate international  exchange  facilities,  American 
merchants  are  not  at  present  able  to  do  business 
directly  with  them,  because  there  is  no  chain  of 
American  banks  in  Latin  America  through  which 
direct  exchange  can  be  had  on  New  York.  The 
United  States,  like  the  rest  of  the  world,  does 
business  with  Latin  America  to  a  large  extent 
through  London.  When  we  do  not  carry  on  our 

235 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

own  business  by  direct  exchange,  the  absurdity 
of  supposing  that  we  could  promptly  supply  Latin 
America  with  the  necessary  exchange  facilities 
for  her  trade  with  the  rest  of  the  world  ought  to 
be  so  apparent  as  to  prove  conclusively  that  Pan- 
Americanism  could  not  finance  itself.  No  doubt 
adequate  arrangements  could  in  time  be  made, 
but  business  is  extremely  conservative,  and  the 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  movement  to  substitute 
New  York  for  London  as  the  exchange  center  of 
South  American  business  are  fundamental.  Few 
American  business  houses  at  present  maintain 
branches  of  any  importance  in  South  America; 
not  a  great  many  houses  maintain  resident  agents, 
compared  with  the  number  generally  maintained  by 
English  and  German  firms;  the  American  consuls 
are  only  too  seldom  well  enough  acquainted  with 
the  language  and  sufficiently  adaptable  to  es- 
tablish firm  friendships  with  South  American 
merchants  and  win  their  confidence;  American 
drummers  rarely  speak  Spanish  or  Portuguese 
and  are  too  inexperienced  in  South  American 
methods  of  business  to  approach  prospective 
customers  in  ways  which  they  approve.  The 
strong  foundation  of  established  business  acquaint- 
anceship consists  in  long  years  of  satisfactory  deal- 
ing with  well-known  firms,  and  in  long  years  of 

236 


LACK  OF  ECONOMIC  MUTUALITY 

relationship  with  well-known  banks;  these,  the 
very  bricks  of  commercial  exchange,  are  lacking, 
and  are  not  to  be  made  in  a  day.  We  must  not 
forget  that  the  active  interests  of  American  mer- 
chants in  South  America  are  not  much  more  than 
two  decades  old,  while  the  traditions  of  business 
with  London  can  show  as  many  centuries. 

These  are  merely  the  externals  of  financial  rela- 
tionship, the  arrangements  necessary  to  complete 
the  close  business  connection.  Finally,  inter- 
national finance  is  not  a  question  of  currency 
or  yet  a  question  of  banks.  If  it  is  difficult  to 
make  trade  flow  along  channels  contrary  to  the 
established  habits  of  merchants  and  the  normal 
route  of  exchange;  it  is  impossible  to  create  it 
unless  the  elementary  facts  of  supply  and  demand 
coexist.  International  exchange,  as  a  matter  of 
fact,  is  carried  on  in  goods.  Though  the  individual 
merchant  ostensibly  sells  his  goods  for  money, 
he  really  receives  the  articles  which  he  buys  with 
the  money.  So  far  as  the  nation  as  a  whole  is 
concerned,  money,  exchange,  banks,  finance  are 
merely  the  methods  by  which  the  goods  received 
in  exchange  for  its  own  output  are  distributed  in 
proper  quantities  to  its  own  merchants.  The 
nation  makes  goods  and  buys  goods  with  them,  and 
in  the  long  run  sells  goods  only  where  it  can  buy 

237 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

goods  in  return,  or  at  least  where  it  can  buy  com- 
modities which  can  be  sold  to  some  other  nation 
for  the  goods  which  it  needs  at  home.  All  truly 
profitable  commercial  association  must  be  based 
upon  the  exchange  of  actual  commodities.  When, 
therefore,  a  proposition  is  made  which  involves  the 
sale  of  the  bulk  of  the  goods  produced  by  one  na- 
tion, it  will  be  economically  sound  only  when  the 
other  nation  is  ready  to  sell  in  return  the  goods 
which  the  first  needs.  To  be  of  mutual  advantage, 
the  goods  sold  must  be  offset  by  the  goods  bought. 
Before  the  United  States  can  take  the 
place  of  the  European  nations  in  the  South 
American  trade,  it  must  be  prepared  to  supply 
South  America  with  the  goods  which  the  South 
Americans  desire;  it  must  either  produce  those 
goods  itself  or  procure  them  elsewhere.  It  will  be 
exceedingly  obvious,  however,  that  if  the  United 
States  takes  South  American  exports,  sells  them 
in  Europe,  purchases  European  goods  with  them, 
and  then  sells  the  latter  to  the  South  Americans, 
it  has  simply  compelled  the  South  Americans  to 
pay  American  merchants  an  additional  profit  for 
handling  European  goods  which  the  South  Ameri- 
cans could  have  bought  more  cheaply  by  trading 
directly  with  the  European  nations  that  pro- 
duced them.  The  producer  in  Europe  has  his 

238 


LACK  OF  ECONOMIC  MUTUALITY 

price,  and  if  he  deals  with  a  South  American 
merchant,  he  will  sell  at  that  rate.  But  if  he  sells 
at  that  rate  to  an  American  merchant,  who  then 
sells  to  the  South  American  merchant,  it  will  be 
clear  that  the  American  must  charge  the  South 
American  a  profit  for  himself,  in  addition  to  the 
cost  of  the  article  and  the  charges  of  transporta- 
tion ;  otherwise  the  American  will  himself  make  no 
profit  on  the  transaction.  To  be  profitable  to 
the  South  American,  the  United  States  must  buy 
goods  which  South  America  produces  in  exchange 
for  goods  which  the  United  States  itself  makes. 
Any  other  arrangement  will  cost  one  party  or  the 
other  an  additional  sum  paid  simply  for  the  privi- 
lege of  allowing  the  other  to  play  the  part  of 
the  middleman. 

These  facts  are  familiar  to  any  one  well  informed 
about  international  trade.  The  United  States 
does  not  produce  the  goods  which  South  American 
nations  demand  to  any  such  extent  as  would  be 
necessary  to  make  the  monopolization  of  the  trade 
by  the  United  States  of  mutual  advantage.  The 
tastes  of  South  American  buyers  are  luxurious 
and  fastidious  in  the  extreme,  and  they  have  been 
accustomed  in  the  past  to  buy  fine  clothing,  furni- 
ture, and  the  like  from  France,  Belgium,  Germany, 
or  that  part  of  the  world  which  produced  the  finest 

239 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

articles.  In  most  cases  they  have  dealt  directly 
with  the  producing  nations,  in  other  cases  they 
have  bought  through  London ;  but  what  they  have 
bought  have  been  for  the  most  part  commodities 
which  the  United  States  is  not  prepared  to  make. 
The  bulk  of  American  trade  seems,  in  fact,  to  be 
in  staple  articles  of  a  character  or  quality  which 
they  could  buy  elsewhere,  but  which  they  take 
from  us  because  they  must  in  the  long  run  accept 
the  goods  which  we  make  in  exchange  for  the 
commodities  which  we  buy  from  them.  Because 
they  buy  of  us,  we  must  not  assume  a  preference 
on  their  part  for  our  goods.  It  may  well  be  that 
they  merely  accept  them  because  we  are  anxious  on 
our  own  part  to  obtain  what  they  have  to  sell. 

If  we  are  incapable  of  supplying  the  total  South 
American  demand,  we  are  even  more  incapable  of 
absorbing  the  total  supply.  It  is  highly  conceiv- 
able that  we  might  produce  what  they  wish;  it  is 
not  at  all  likely  that  we  could  consume  an  equal 
value  of  the  sort  of  goods  we  should  have  to  accept 
in  exchange.  South  America  exports  a  great 
variety  of  natural  and  crude  products.  It  is,  for 
instance,  the  world's  chief  supply  of  rubber,  one 
of  the  great  sources  of  supply  for  coffee,  hides,  and 
dressed  meat.  The  amount  of  this  type  of  produce 
which  we  can  actually  consume  in  the  United 

240 


LACK  OF  ECONOMIC  MUTUALITY 

States  is  very  obviously  much  less  than  the  world 
can  consume.  In  order  to  develop  a  really  mutual 
interest  in  the  trade  between  the  two  continents, 
we  must  not  only  increase  our  ability  to  produce, 
but  our  ability  to  consume;  and  while  we  can 
certainly  expand  the  one  at  a  rapid  rate,  the  pace 
at  which  we  can  develop  the  other  will  be  propor- 
tionately much  less.  We  should  therefore  be 
forced  to  sell  the  surplus  of  South  American  pro- 
duce elsewhere.  If  the  South  American  was 
receiving  and  consuming  American  goods  for  this 
surplus  produce,  we  should  have  to  buy  with  it 
European  goods  and  consume  them  ourselves; 
but  we  should  be  unable  to  quote  as  good  a  price 
as  the  South  American  could  get  for  his  goods  if 
he  sold  them  direct  to  Europe,  because  American 
merchants  could  not  afford  to  exchange  the  com- 
modities without  some  profit. 

This  is  all  as  simple  as  A  plus  B  or  2  and  2.  If 
men  deal  with  each  other  directly,  each  will  get 
the  other's  actual  price:  he  will  pay  what  it  cost 
to  make  the  article  plus  a  reasonable  profit.  If 
they  deal  through  a  third  party,  each  will  have  to 
pay  for  the  other's  article  what  it  cost  to  make  it, 
plus  the  producer's  profit,  and  in  addition  some- 
thing for  the  middleman's  time.  It  is  often  neces- 
sary for  individuals  to  pay  this  additional  profit, 

16  241 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

and  so  enhance  the  cost  to  themselves  of  what  they 
buy;  it  is  not  often  necessary  for  nations  to  pay 
an  additional  profit  of  this  kind.  It  is  above  all 
difficult  to  secure  an  additional  profit,  of  advantage 
only  to  the  middleman,  by  creating  a  political 
situation  which  forces  some  nation  to  trade  through 
a  middleman  where  it  previously  traded  direct. 
The  long  and  short  of  it  is  that  unless  we  can  sell 
direct  to  the  South  American  goods  of  our  own 
production  which  he  himself  wants,  we  shall  com- 
pel him  to  pay  us  a  profit  that  he  would  not 
otherwise  have  to  pay,  and  shall  therefore  tax 
him  for  the  privilege  of  doing  business  with  the 
United  States.  A  Pan-American  confederation 
that  involved  such  commercial  relations  with 
the  United  States  would  not  answer  the  South 
American's  notions  of  mutuality. 

When  a  nation  in  the  position  of  South  America 
sells  a  great  volume  of  crude  produce  to  some 
nation  like  England,  which  occupies  the  position 
of  distributor  rather  than  middleman,  it  may  well 
be  that  the  producing  nation  will  wish  to  deal 
through  the  distributing  nation  with  those  nations 
that  it  is  difficult  and  inconvenient  to  reach 
directly,  and  which  are  already  dealing  in  a  similar 
way  with  the  distributor.  A  nation  performing 
the  function  of  an  international  clearing-house  for 

242 


LACK  OF  ECONOMIC  MUTUALITY 

merchandise  saves  time  and  expense  for  all  parties 
involved,  and  therefore  pays  its  own  commissions. 
Such  a  position  the  English  have  successfully  held 
for  decades,  but  its  usefulness  and  profitableness 
to  other  nations  lie  in  its  universality.  If  we  could 
move  to  New  York  ttye  world's  clearing-house  in 
exchange  and  trade,  it  would  then  become  profit- 
able for  the  South  Americans  to  buy  through  us, 
just  as  it  is  at  present  profitable  for  us  both  to 
buy  through  London.  But  for  them  to  deal  with 
us,  and  for  us  then  to  deal  with  London,  would  not 
be  advantageous  to  them.  The  United  States,  in 
fact,  is  not  in  an  economic  position  to  take  the 
place  which  Europe  holds  in  the  South  American 
economic  fabric.  We  could  not  supply  them  with 
a  merchant  marine,  with  the  protection  of  a  fleet, 
with  exchange  facilities,  export  from  the  United 
States  what  they  wish  to  buy,  or  utilize  in  the 
United  States  the  bulk  of  what  they  have  to  sell. 
Until  we  ourselves  are  able  actually  to  utilize  the 
bulk  of  their  produce,  we  cannot  monopolize  the 
South  American  trade  without  creating  an  artificial 
situation  the  basis  of  which  will  be  uneconomic  and 
lacking  in  mutuality,  resulting  in  greater  profit  to 
us  than  it  affords  them. 

There  is  one  more  step  to  take.     The  rate   of 
future  development  in  South  America  will  depend 

243 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

upon  the  amount  of  foreign  capital  that  can  be  pro- 
cured at  any  one  time;  the  continuity  of  progress 
will  be  measured  by  their  ability  to  borrow  in 
successive  years.  Inasmuch  as  South  America 
is  an  extremely  favorable  field  for  the  investor,  it 
will  be  very  much  to  the  advantage  of  the  United 
States  to  loan  them  capital ;  but  their  interests  are 
furthered  only  when  they  obtain  as  much  capital 
as  possible  at  the  most  advantageous  possible 
rates.  Pan- Americanism, ' '  America  for  the  Ameri- 
cans," the  exclusion  of  Europe  and  of  European 
interests,  means,  if  interpreted  literally,  that  it 
ought  to  be  more  to  the  advantage  of  the  South 
Americans  to  borrow  capital  in  the  United  States 
than  to  borrow  it  in  Europe.  Unfortunately,  there 
is  no  particular  advantage  for  them  in  securing 
capital  from  the  United  States,  and  there  would 
be  very  distinct  disadvantages  in  limiting  their 
opportunity  to  borrow  European  funds.  Capital 
in  a  rough  sense  obeys  the  economic  law  of  supply 
and  demand,  and  can  usually  be  bought  cheaper 
where  there  is  more  of  it  for  sale.  Money  is 
usually  cheaper  in  Europe  than  it  is  in  America, 
and  it  is  usually  easier  to  obtain  it  even  when  the 
current  rates  are  the  same  in  London  and  New 
York.  The  reason  is  obvious.  The  European 
nations  are  older  and  wealthier;  their  surplus  is 

244 


LACK  OF  ECONOMIC  MUTUALITY 

greater;  they  have  a  smaller  proportion  of  the 
national  wealth  invested  in  permanent  fixtures; 
and  the  surplus  available  for  foreign  investment 
is  accordingly  greater. 

If  South  America  were  to  be  limited  to  the 
amount  of  capital  it  could  obtain  in  the  United 
States,  or  were  compelled  for  political  and  military 
reasons  to  borrow  in  the  United  States  rather  than 
in  Europe,  its  rate  of  development  would  cer- 
tainly be  slower  than  if  it  were  free  to  borrow  in 
the  financial  markets  of  the  world.  The  amount  of 
American  capital  compared  with  the  total  European 
capital  is  small;  the  proportion  of  it  available 
for  South  America  would  normally  be  smaller 
than  that  available  in  Europe.  If  new  political 
relationships  of  the  nature  of  Pan-Americanism 
were  established  on  a  basis  which  contemplated 
the  exclusion  of  the  European  on  principle,  or 
placing  him  in  a  less  favorable  position  than 
Americans,  European  investors  would  hesitate 
about  loaning  to  South  Americans ;  South  America 
would  speedily  see  the  stream  of  capital  from  Europe 
diminishing,  and  would  be  dependent  upon  the 
United  States  for  a  new  supply.  This  could  not 
in  the  circumstances  be  nearly  as  great  in  vol- 
ume as  the  supply  they  might  have  drawn  from 
Europe.  Here  again  is  a  lack  of  mutuality.  The 

245 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

United  States  is  able  to  lend,  and  South  America 
is  not;  it  could  not  loan  the  South  Americans  as 
much  as  they  will  want,  nor  in  all  probability  on 
as  favorable  conditions  as  they  would  like  to 
obtain.  The  United  States  is  the  gainer  under 
any  circumstances.  It  will  be  advantageous  for 
the  South  Americans  to  establish  a  closer  connec- 
tion with  Europe  than  with  the  United  States. 

In  any  case,  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  South 
American  trade  must  continue  to  flow  to  Europe, 
whatever  the  demand  in  the  United  States  for 
South  American  produce  or  the  demand  for  Ameri- 
can goods  in  South  America.  For  years  to  come 
the  South  Americans  must  pay  with  exports  the 
interest  on  the  heavy  European  loans  they  bor- 
rowed in  the  past.  Unless  they  repudiate  their 
debts,  they  must  pay  in  time  with  exports  the 
capital  as  well  as  the  interest.  In  the  case  of 
undeveloped  countries  trade  is  the  expression  of 
the  basic  financial  situation.  The  bulk  of  the  im- 
ports is  new  capital  coming  in ;  the  bulk  of  the 
exports  discharge  obligations  for  interest  and  capi- 
tal. Trade  of  necessity  flows  to  the  country 
which  has  invested  money  and  flows  with  difficulty 
to  countries  which  do  not  invest  money.  Nor- 
mally, therefore,  the  trade  of  undeveloped  countries 
with  the  rest  of  the  world  bears  some  rough  pro- 

246 


LACK  OF  ECONOMIC  MUTUALITY 

portion  to  the  investments  of  the  rest  of  the  world 
within  their  borders.  Hence,  the  trade  of  Eng- 
land with  the  Argentine  Republic  is  enormous 
because  of  the  vast  total  of  past  English  invest- 
ments and  the  large  amount  of  new  capital  sent 
annually.  The  trade  of  the  United  States  with 
South  America  has  recently  developed  with  great 
rapidity,  because  we  have  begun  to  invest  largely 
in  the  Southern  Continent.  If,  therefore,  we  are 
to  supplant  England  and  Germany  in  the  South 
American  trade,  we  must  be  prepared  to  take  the 
place  of  England  and  Germany  as  investors  of 
capital,  and  be  ready  not  only  to  quote  the  South 
Americans  favorable  terms,  but  to  provide  them 
now  and  in  the  future  with  the  bulk  of  what  they 
wish  to  borrow.  If  we  can  actually  furnish  them 
any  such  amount,  we  shall  capture  their  trade  as 
a  simple  matter  of  course;  they  will  have  to  import 
goods  from  us  equal  in  value  to  the  capital  they 
borrow,  and  they  will  be  compelled,  if  they  are 
honest,  to  export  to  us  in  return  commodities 
equivalent  each  year  to  the  interest  plus  the 
capital  payments  which  fall  due.  This  is  the  real 
basis  of  English  and  German  trade  with  South 
America,  and  something  like  it  must  be  established 
before  we  can  achieve  a  similar  economic  monopoly. 
Nor  must  we  forget  that  we  cannot  monopolize 
247 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

it  in  reality  until  our  investments  exceed  the  total 
investments,  past  and  present,  of  other  nations. 
Even  if  we  should  be  able  to  assume  such  a  posi- 
tion, it  would  still  be  more  advantageous  to  us 
than  to  South  America,  unless  it  should  also  be 
true  that  the  amount  of  capital  available  in  the 
United  States  for  investment  should  be  greater 
than  the  amount  available  in  Europe,  and  obtain- 
able on  better  terms.  Even  the  most  optimistic 
prophets  will  scarcely  venture  to  predict  such  a 
commercial  future  for  the  United  States.  Yet 
until  some  such  situation  becomes  a  reality,  Pan- 
Americanism  cannot  be  mutually  advantageous  to 
all  the  American  republics.  We  have  yet  to  learn 
of  the  formation  of  a  strong  organic  bond  which 
has  not  possessed  some  strong  mutual  economic 
benefit  for  all  its  members,  nor  can  we  imagine  a 
connection,  however  weak  and  shadowy,  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Latin- American  re- 
publics, which  did  not  somehow,  involve  this 
economic  question.  A  customs  union  would 
perhaps  be  the  slightest  association  which  would 
deserve  the  name  Pan-Americanism,  but  the  mere 
suggestion  is  regarded  in  South  America  as  tanta- 
mount to  a  declaration  of  the  determination 
of  the  United  States  to  monopolize  South  Ameri- 
can trade  for  its  own  selfish  purposes.  They 

248 


LACK  OF  ECONOMIC  MUTUALITY 

cannot  conceive  of  a  commercial  relation  to  the 
United  States  which  would  be  as  favorable  to 
them  as  their  relationship  to  Europe;  and  they 
therefore  regard  as  inexpedient  any  unions,  asso- 
ciations, policies,  or  connections  which  predicate 
a  closer  connection  with  the  United  States  than 
with  Europe. 


249 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  PAST 

WITH  such  fundamental  obstacles  in  the 
road  of  Pan- Americanism,  with  such 
barriers  to  break  down  before  it  can  be- 
come a  reality,  its  future  will  be  indeed  dark  unless 
they  can  be  removed  by  the  common  efforts  of  the 
states  concerned.  Here  we  meet  with  perhaps  the 
greatest  stumbling-block  of  all,  of  a  character  that 
makes  peculiarly  difficult  the  removal  of  any  of 
the  fundamental  barriers  already  enumerated — the 
lack  of  mutual  trust  and  confidence  between  the 
Latin  republics  and  the  United  States.  Before 
"America  for  the  Americans"  can  become  a 
reality,  the  Americans  must  possess  a  thorough 
belief  in  one  another's  disinterestedness  and  freely 
accept  one  another's  actions  as  performed  in  that 
perfect  good  faith  which  alone  can  avoid  serious 
disputes,  or  permit  effective  compromise  between 
jarring  interests.  All  this  the  United  States  is 
unquestionably  ready  to  accord  the  Latin- Ameri- 

250 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  PAST 

can  republics;  nay,  there  can  be  no  reasonable 
doubt  that  the  United  States  actually  does  accord 
them  all  this.  The  difficulty  lies  in  the  inability 
of  the  Latin-American  republics  thoroughly  to 
convince  themselves  of  the  disinterested  motives 
of  the  United  States.  They  fear  that  Pan- Ameri- 
canism is  conquest  in  some  subtle  guise;  they 
discount  our  protestations;  they  look  askance  at 
our  actions,  and  remain  unbelievers.  The  barrier 
which  stands  between  us  and  them  is  the  one  most 
difficult  to  remove — the  shadow  of  the  past,  their 
interpretation  of  our  own  past  acts,  the  logic  of 
American  policy  as  revealed  to  them  by  acts  which 
are  beyond  our  power  to  change.  Quis  custodiet 
custodem  ?  asks  Calderon. 

Mutual  confidence  must  find  its  roots  in  mutual 
understanding  and  agreement  not  alone  upon  the 
policies  of  the  present,  but  upon  the  interpretation 
attached  to  the  history  of  the  past.  It  will  be 
surprising  to  most  Americans  to  learn  in  these 
days  when  we  stand  aghast  at  the  magnitude  of  the 
conception  of  Pan-Germanism,  and  censure  it  as 
unprovoked  aggression,  when  many  of  us  regard 
the  kaiser  as  a  barbarian  and  talk  about  him  as 
a  hypocrite,  who  prepares  for  war  while  delivering 
himself  daily  of  mouthings  about  peace,  that  many 
honest,  sincere,  and  patriotic  South  Americans 

251 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

regard  the  United  States  and  Pan-Americanism  as 
cast  in  this  same  image,  and  describe  us  in  terms 
not  less  uncomplimentary  and  even  more  vigorous. 
There  are  few  things  said  recently  in  the  United 
States  about  German  aggression  the  counterpart 
of  which  cannot  easily  be  found  in  the  influential 
South  American  newspapers  and  the  works  of 
serious  thinkers.  They  censure  us  less  for  our 
schemes  of  aggression  than  for  what  they  consider 
our  hypocritical,  sanctimonious  assumption  of 
virtue.  To  be  assured  that  the  rod  which  they 
actually  feel  bruising  their  flesh  is  an  olive  branch 
extended  by  the  dove  of  peace  is  to  them  the 
height  of  absurdity. 

It  will  not  be  at  all  necessary  for  us  to  accept 
their  version  of  American  history  or  agree  with 
their  strictures  upon  our  diplomatists,  to  realize 
that  in  this  misunderstanding  between  honest 
and  sincere  men  on  both  sides  as  to  the  meaning 
of  acts  now  past  recall,  is  one  of  the  most  serious 
barriers  which  could  possibly  exist  in  the  way  of 
extending  the  connection  between  the  American 
republics.  Unfortunately,  American  foreign  policy 
has  not  always  been  consistent,  nor  have  the 
utterances  of  our  diplomatic  Secretaries  of  State 
been  uniformly  discreet.  The  advocate  of  the 
American  view  has  a  difficult  task  before  him  in 

252 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  PAST 

meeting  the  South  American  charges.  It  is  not 
to  our  present  purpose  to  investigate  the  dispute, 
and  it  suffices  to  point  out  how  easy  it  is  for  us  to 
quote  Mr.  Root  and  Mr.  Wilson,  and  to  have  them 
retort  with  equally  explicit  utterances  of  Mr.  Fish, 
Mr.  Olney,  and  Mr.  Roosevelt.  Our  chief  wit- 
nesses have  not  left  us  an  entirely  consistent 
stream  of  testimony,  and  it  is  difficult  to  convince 
the  South  Americans  that  the  pacific  utterances 
which  we  ourselves  believe  represent  the  true 
current  of  American  policy  are  more  valid  than 
the  belligerent  statements  on  which  they  rely.  It 
would  not  be  nearly  so  serious  if  both  parties 
agreed  heartily  upon  something  which  students 
knew  was  actually  wrong;  it  is  not  necessary  that 
what  they  believe  should  be  true,  but  that  they 
should  actually  agree  upon  something, — the  premise 
of  close  union  and  the  basis  of  energetic  action. 
We  need  not  attempt  to  discover  which  view  of 
American  history  is  true ;  the  vital  fact  is  that  the 
South  Americans  have  repeatedly  declined  to 
accept  our  version. 

They  are  inclined  to  interpret  the  utterances  of 
our  statesmen  by  the  logic  of  their  actions.  Like 
the  European,  the  South  American  is  skeptical  as 
to  the  importance  of  pledges,  of  promises,  or  in- 
tentions, and  relies  almost  entirely  upon  the  logic 

253 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

of  facts.  We  remember  many  times  in  the  past 
when  we  have  foreborne  to  act  in  the  spirit  of 
aggression;  they  cannot  forget  the  times  when 
we  have  not  foreborne  to  act.  Leaving  aside 
all  disputed  facts  or  events  susceptible  of  more 
than  one  interpretation,  as  thoroughly  moderate 
and  representative  a  South  American  as  Calderon 
states  the  case  against  us  thus : 

The  northern  Republic  has  been  the  beneficiary  of 
an  incessant  territorial  expansion;  in  1803  it  acquired 
Louisiana;  in  1819,  Florida;  in  1845  and  1850,  Texas; 
the  Mexican  provinces  in  1848  and  1852,  and  Alaska 
in  1858.  The  annexation  of  Hawaii  took  place  in 
1898.  In  the  same  year  Porto  Rico,  the  Philippines, 
Guam,  and  one  of  the  Marianne  Islands,  passed  by 
the  Treaty  of  Paris,  into  the  hands  of  the  United 
States.  They  obtained  the  Samoan  Islands  in  1 890, 
wished  to  buy  the  Danish  West  Indies  in  1902,  and 
planted  their  imperialistic  standard  at  Panama  in  1903. 
Interventions  have  become  more  frequent  with  the 
expansion  of  frontiers.  The  United  States  have 
recently  intervened  in  the  territory  of  Acre,  there  to 
found  a  republic  of  rubber  gatherers ;  at  Panama,  there 
to  develop  a  province  and  construct  a  canal ;  in  Cuba, 
under  cover  of  the  Platt  amendment,  to  maintain 
order  in  the  interior;  in  San  Domingo,  to  support  the 
civilizing  revolution  and  overthrow  the  tyrants;  in 
Venezuela,  and  in  Central  America,  to  enforce  upon 
these  nations,  torn  by  intestine  disorders,  the  political 
and  financial  tutelage  of  the  imperial  democracy.  In 
Guatemala  and  Honduras  the  loans  concluded  with 

254 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  PAST 

the  monarchs  of  North  American  finance  have  re- 
duced the  people  to  a  new  slavery.  Supervision  of  the 
customs  and  the  dispatch  of  pacificatory  squadrons 
to  defend  the  interests  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  have 
enforced  peace  and  tranquility;  such  are  the  means 
employed.  .  .  .  The  Yankee  ideal,  then,  is  fatally 
contrary  to  Latin-American  independence. x 

Recent  events  have  roused  South  American 
apprehensions  much  more  rapidly  than  the  pacific 
utterances  of  our  statesmen  have  been  able  to 
allay  them.  Until  the  present,  South  America  has 
been  protected  from  European  aggression  and,  as 
they  believe,  from  American  aggression  by  the 
English  fleet.  For  more  than  half  a  century  after 
the  declaration  of  independence  by  the  South 
American  republics,  England  interposed  a  deter- 
mined resistance  to  the  attempts  of  the  United 
States  to  extend  its  influence  in  Latin  America. 
This  is  the  view  accepted  in  Europe  and  in  Latin 
America.  When  the  rise  of  the  German  fleet 
and  other  circumstances  elsewhere  described 
caused  the  concentration  of  the  English  fleet  in 
the  North  Sea,  and  the  decision  to  hand  over  the 
supremacy  of  the  Western  Hemisphere  for  the 
time  being  to  the  United  States,  the  South  Ameri- 
cans became  extremely  uneasy  and  apprehensive 
of  the  worst.  The  Spanish-American  War  had 

'Calderon,  Latin  America,  pp.  303-304;  306. 
255 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

seemed  to  them  the  baldest  sort  of  aggression,  but 
the  founding  of  the  Panama  Republic,  our  recent 
dealings  with  the  small  Central  American  states, 
and  in  particular  our  recent  refusal  to  recognize 
Huerta  as  President  of  Mexico,  were  in  their  eyes 
flagrant,  unprovoked  aggression,  aggravated  a 
thousandfold  by  statements  of  pacific  intent  and 
the  denial  of  any  desire  at  conquest.  As  if  we  had 
not  conquered  vast  areas  of  Latin  America  in  the 
last  few  years  as  fully  as  if  we  had  declared  war 
and  waged  it!  As  if  we  have  not  robbed  many 
thousands  of  Latin  Americans  of  everything  except 
the  barest  shadow  of  political  independence!  If 
this  does  not  spell  aggression,  they  ask  us  to  furnish 
them  with  some  version  of  our  acts  which  will  be 
more  consistent  with  the  actual  events  than  are 
our  protestations  of  amity  and  peace.  They  know 
that  we  are  not  at  present  equipped  for  the  con- 
quest of  South  America,  but  they  know  that  we 
can  easily  prepare.  They  believe  that  while  we 
can  achieve  our  purposes  by  peaceful  penetration, 
spheres  of  influence,  benevolent  assimilation,  and 
manifest  destiny,  we  shall  not  bother  to  create 
armies  and  build  fleets ;  but  they  ask  us  to  have  at 
least  the  decency  to  acknowledge  that,  by  whatever 
name  we  call  it,  this  is  conquest. 

One  other  issue  has  risen  to  prominence,  and  is 
256 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  PAST 

more  important  than  is  usually  admitted.  South 
American  peoples  are  the  result  of  a  mixture  of 
Spanish,  Indian,  and  negro  blood,  in  which  usually 
the  Indian  or  the  negro  predominates  over  the 
Spanish.  They  are  what  we  are  pleased  to  term 
in  the  United  States  a  half-breed  nation,  and 
therefore  view  the  attitude  of  Americans  toward 
the  Indian,  the  negro,  and  the  half-breed  with 
peculiar  interest.  Our  treatment  of  those  three 
classes  is  a  very  ominous  shadow,  indeed,  cast  in  the 
path  of  Pan-Americanism.  In  our  relations  with 
them  during  the  last  three  centuries,  in  the  present 
opinion  of  the  American  people  about  all  three 
classes,  they  see  foreshadowed  the  probable  atti- 
tude towards  them  of  a  nation  of  this  power  in 
the  north,  whose  existence  they  feel  is  perilous 
to  them,  and  whose  aggression  is  dangerous  and 
near.  Indeed,  it  is  our  attitude  on  this  question 
which  provides  them  with  the  uncontrovertible 
proof  of  aggression.  The  mere  fact  that  it  is  not 
difficult  to  demonstrate  that  few  persons  in  the 
United  States  have  any  such  ideas  or,  perhaps  one 
should  say,  are  even  aware  of  any  such  notions, 
makes  no  vital  difference.  They  are  written  so 
plainly  upon  the  past  history  of  the  white  man  in 
the  New  World  that  all  the  protestations  of  states- 
men and  the  rhetoric  of  orators  cannot  veil  them 
ir  257 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

from  the  eyes  of  the  descendants  of  the  red  man 
and  the  black  man. 

When  the  whites  came  to  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere they  brought  with  them  two  premises  of 
action,  both  of  which,  to  all  intents  and  purposes, 
were  one  and  the  same:  only  white  men  and  only 
Christians  had  rights  or  could  own  land.  The 
whites  talked  about  discovery,  about  the  first 
finding  of  what  the  red  man  and  his  ancestors  for 
countless  generations  had  known!  The  assump- 
tion was  plain:  until  some  white  man  found  it,  it 
had  not  existed  at  all.  Only  the  white  man  could 
claim  title  to  the  land.  Strange  kings  who  had 
never  seen  the  New  World  granted  to  favorites 
and  dependents  millions  of  acres  of  land  occupied 
by  Indians  who  had  inherited  them  from  remote 
ancestors.  Occupation,  possession,  use — all  were 
futile  to  protect  the  Indian  against  dispossession. 
He  owned  nothing;  he  had  no  title;  he  possessed 
no  rights  which  demanded  recognition.  Two 
damning  facts  were  proved  against  him :  he  was  not 
a  white  man;  he  was  not  a  Christian.  He  could 
never  become  a  white  man,  though  he  might 
become  a  Christian ;  and  the  whites  recognized  no 
rights  or  privileges  of  any  human  being  in  the 
New  World  unless  he  was  white.  On  the  whole, 
these  general  premises  were  strictly  followed. 

258 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  PAST 

Only  white  men  were  citizens  for  more  than  three 
centuries;  only  white  men  could  govern;  and  no 
Indian's  consent  was  asked  nor  his  opposition 
regarded.  Again  and  again  he  was  pushed  from 
his  property  without  scruple  and  without  apology 
by  white  men  who  did  not  regard  him  as  existing 
at  all.  That  he  might  have  rights  was  not  to  the 
majority  even  a  tenable  supposition  or  a  specula- 
tive possibility.  Ever  since  the  white  man  landed 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere  to  the  present  day  the 
red  man  and  his  descendants  have  been  exploited 
and  hounded  from  place  to  place. 

The  negro  had  still  fewer  rights;  worse  yet  was 
his  lot.  That  the  Indian  could  go  where  he  pleased 
so  long  as  he  did  not  interfere  with  the  white  man 
was  generally  admitted:  but  the  black  man  was 
not  free.  Year  after  year  white  men  and  Chris- 
tians went  to  Africa,  seized  the  black  man,  carried 
him  from  his  home,  and  sold  him  like  live  stock 
or  lumber  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  in  North 
America,  in  South  America,  and  in  the  islands  of 
the  sea.  He  was  a  heathen;  he  was  not  white;  he 
never  could  be  white,  neither  he  nor  his  descend- 
ants. Virtuous  and  sincere  men  debated  in  the 
eighteenth  and  even  in  the  nineteenth  century 
whether  the  negro  could  have  a  soul.  We  ought 
to  blush  to  record  that  until  a  short  time  ago  that 

259 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

question  was  usually  answered  in  North  America 
in  the  negative.  The  Indian's  land  they  took 
from  him,  the  Indian's  property  was  theirs,  and 
they  exploited  it.  They  robbed  the  black  man  of 
his  home  and  often  of  his  family ;  they  denied  him 
his  soul;  took  even  the  little  that  he  had,  his 
liberty,  and  only  too  often  his  life.  It  must  be 
remembered  that  we  are  dealing  here,  not  alone 
with  negro  slavery  in  the  United  States,  but  with 
negro  slavery  in  the  West  Indies,  in  Central  and 
South  America.  The  negro  slavery  against  which 
the  North  protested  was  mild,  just,  and  expedient 
in  comparison  with  the  negro  slavery  which  is  still 
remembered  in  South  and  Central  America  and 
in  the  West  Indian  islands.  Their  traditions  show 
it  at  its  worst. 

The  modern  South  American  is  proud  of  his 
race,  proud  of  his  country,  aware  of  personal 
attainments  and  a  right  to  life,  liberty,  and  prop- 
erty; but  he  knows  that  in  all  probability  there 
flows  .in  his  veins  some  of  the  blood  of  the  red  man 
and  some  of  the  blood  of  the  black  man.  He 
knows  that  the  white  man  has  treated  the  half- 
breed  precisely  as  a  full-blooded  Indian  or  negro, 
and  that  in  the  United  States  the  slightest  tincture 
of  either  is  likely  to  create  unfortunate  distinctions. 
To-day  this  is  passing.  The  Indian  and  the  negro 

260 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  PAST 

are  both  taking  their  place  in  the  American  com- 
munity, but  it  is  too  recent  to  remove  from  the 
mind  of  South  Americans  the  haunting  suspicion 
that  the  United  States  looks  upon  Latin  America 
as  a  half-breed  country  whose  people  cannot  own 
their  land,  who  are  not  entitled  to  its  resources  as 
against  white  men.  They  see  in  Pan- Americanism 
and  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  something  still  of 
the  old  attitude  of  the  Spanish  conqueror  and  the 
English  adventurer,  and  explicitly  compare  the 
United  States  with  both.  While  so  black  a  shadow 
remains  as  the  past  dealings  of  white  men  with  the 
Indian  and  the  negro,  mutual  confidence  between 
the  United  States  as  a  white  nation  and  the  Latin 
American  republics  as  half-breed  states  is  difficult 
to  predicate.  They  cannot  forget,  nor  can  they 
believe  that  we  have  forgotten  or  changed.  Our 
assumption  of  a  tutelage  over  them,  our  insistence 
that  we  must  keep  the  peace  in  Latin  America, 
help  the  erring  and  unfortunate,  contains  for  them 
a  denial  of  their  own  rights,  and  a  degree  of  inter- 
ference with  them  which  would  be  incredible  if  we 
really  believed  them  white  men.  They  can  credit 
our  acceptance  of  their  economic  progress,  they 
can  conceive  that  their  increase  in  strength  would 
make  us  hesitate  in  the  pursuit  of  schemes  of 
aggression;  but  time  and  time  alone  can  convince 

261 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

them  that  we  no  longer  regard  their  ancestry  as  an 
indelible  stain. 

If  the  nearness  of  countries  to  each  other  is  to 
be  the  principle  of  association,  why  does  not  the 
United  States  seek  to  dominate  Canada?  If  lack 
of  development  and  ignorance  of  the  arts  of  civil- 
ization is  a  criterion,  why  does  not  the  United 
States  interfere  in  Africa,  and  assert  a  right  of 
tutelage  in  Morocco  and  the  Congo  Free  State? 
They  are  in  point  of  distance  no  farther  than  the 
majority  of  South  American  states  from  New  York. 
Why  do  we  not  spread  our  protecting  aegis  over 
Turkey  or  Japan,  which  are  neither  in  the  hands  of 
white  men  nor  of  Christians?  The  palpable  fact 
that  we  do  not  assert  even  a  shadow  of  right  in  any 
of  these  countries  the  Latin  Americans  explain 
very  simply:  it  is  because  some  European  nation 
of  white  Christians  is  already  performing  this 
duty  in  that  territory.  We  recognize  the  claims  of 
Christians  and  white  men,  and  do  not  interfere 
even  with  the  most  shadowy  of  their  titles.  With 
Latin  America  we  interfere  because  we  do  not, 
they  persistently  insist,  recognize  them  as  pos- 
sessing rights  equal  to  our  own,  because  we  do 
not  actually  recognize  them  as  white  men  in  our 
deeds.  If  we  did  think  of  them  as  white  men,  as 
Christians  and  as  equals,  tutelage,  protection,  inter- 

262 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  PAST 

ference,  exploitation,  would  be  as  unthinkable  and 
impossible  between  the  United  States  and  Latin 
America  as  between  the  United  States  and  Bul- 
garia, Morocco,  or  Liberia.  Was  anything  heard, 
they  ask,  with  considerable  force,  about  the 
policing  of  Latin  America  by  the  United  States 
between  1783  and  1823?  The  United  States 
obviously  recognized  Spain  as  paramount  and 
supreme,  because  Spain  was  a  white  nation,  and 
had  equal  rights  with  other  white  nations.  Does 
not  the  Monroe  Doctrine  date  from  the  moment 
of  the  Spanish  defeat?  The  instant  other  white 
men's  hands  were  removed,  did  not  the  United 
States  advance  its  claims  to  impose  its  own  white 
hands,  on  the  assumption,  apparently,  that  some 
white  men  must  exercise  at  least  a  supervision 
over  their  weaker  brethren? 

To  over-emphasize  this  aspect  of  the  situation  is 
easy;  to  ignore  it  is  fatal.  No  really  close  student 
of  Latin  America  can  deny  that  something  of  this 
sort  lies  behind  a  good  many  otherwise  inexplicable 
things.  The  difficulty  lies  not  in  the  truth  of  such 
charges,  but  in  the  fact  that  they  are  believed  to 
be  true. 

The  general  policy  of  the  white  man  in  his  rela- 
tions toward  those  whom  he  chooses  to  regard  as  his 
inferiors  has  been  to  insist  that  they  shall  become 

263 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

like  him.  They  must  learn  his  language,  go  to  his 
schools,  wear  his  kind  of  clothes,  think  the  same 
ideas,  believe  in  the  greatness  of  the  white  man. 
The  Spanish  brought  this  policy  to  South  America, 
as  the  English  brought  it  to  North  America,  as  the 
United  States  carried  it  to  the  Philippines  and 
Cuba.  Is  not  the  complaint  of  the  United  States 
against  Mexico  fundamentally  the  objection  that  its 
people  are  not  like  Americans,  and  do  not  govern 
themselves  according  to  the  notions  of  democracy 
and  law  which  Americans  believe  to  be  right? 
Does  not  even  the  mild  policy  of  President  Wilson 
insist  that  the  Mexicans  shall  become  as  Americans, 
and  understand  the  words,  law,  order,  and  democ- 
racy as  Americans  understand  them?  The  Latin 
Americans  passionately  resent  all  insinuations  that 
any  of  them  or  all  of  them  need  to  be  changed, 
developed,  educated,  or  civilized  on  the  Ameri- 
can model.  They  regard  themselves  as  entirely 
worthy  and  respectable  citizens;  they  approve  of 
their  own  ideas ;  and  consider  their  government  no 
further  short  of  ideal  rule  than  many  Americans 
think  the  government  of  the  United  States  is. 
The  burning  of  negroes,  the  lynching  of  thieves, 
the  work  of  vigilance  committees  in  the  far  West, 
the  failure  to  apprehend  and  punish  murderers — 
all  these  the  South  Americans  evidence  as  a  lack 

264 


THE  SHADOW  OF  THE  PAST 

of  civilization  in  the  United  States  quite  as  serious 
as  their  own  particular  difficulties.  If  graft  is 
common  in  Latin  America,  does  it  not  flourish 
north  of  the  Rio  Grande?  Is  it  worse  for  some 
Latin  American  official  to  receive  money  from  an 
American  trust  for  privileges  than  it  is  for  Ameri- 
can State  legislatures  to  take  it  from  the  same 
hand  for  a  similar  object  ?  Is  the  stealing  from  the 
people  by  officials  in  Central  America  different  in 
kind  or  in  purpose  from  the  fleecing  of  lambs  in 
Wall  Street  or  the  operations  of  certain  trusts? 
Finally,  the  South  Americans  do  not  consider  the 
United  States  a  model  according  to  which  they 
wish  to  be  reformed.  If  they  were  to  pick  out 
teachers  and  tutors,  they  would  much  prefer  the 
English,  the  French,  or  the  Germans,  all  three  of 
whom  they  regard  as  their  superiors  not  only  in 
strength,  but  in  the  arts  of  civilization,  and  from 
whom  they  are  willing  and  eager  to  learn. 

These  are  the  obstacles  which  seem  to  stand  in 
the  way  of  a  mutuality  of  confidence  and  faith 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  Scarcely  anything 
more  fundamental  can  be  conceived  than  the 
present  lack  of  these  essentials  to  unity  and  co- 
operation. To  demonstrate  the  falsity  of  these 
notions,  we  must  prove  something  more  than  our 
own  consciousness  of  innocence  and  rectitude; 

265 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

we  must  convince  them  of  the  falsity  of  their 
fears  and  assumptions.  How  this  can  be  accom- 
plished, and  when,  it  would  be  rash  to  predict,  but 
it  certainly  can  be  done  only  by  acts  and  deeds 
both  striking  and  disinterested.  The  occasional 
speeches  and  protestations  of  individual  states- 
men will  not  avail.  Of  the  good- will  of  individuals 
the  South  Americans  are  already  convinced.  It  is 
the  nation,  the  United  States  as  a  nation,  which 
must  speak,  and  speak  decisively  and  plainly, 
before  the  Latin  Americans  will  believe  what  we 
know  to  be  true. 


266 


CHAPTER  V 

ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL 
PROBLEMS 

THE  tangible  expression  of  Pan-Americanism 
would  necessarily  be  the  administrative  and 
legal  fabric  created  by  the  various  American 
republics  to  cope  with  those  problems  common  to 
them  all,  in  the  existence  of  which  the  new  bond  of 
union  could  alone  find  justification.  The  com- 
plexity of  the  administrative  fabric  would  indicate 
the  closeness  of  the  bond  and  the  immediacy  of 
the  problems,  as  well  as  their  variety,  number,  and 
fundamental  or  temporary  character.  To  it  all 
foreign  nations  would  look  for  an  earnest  of  the 
reality  of  the  new  state,  and  by  its  strength  and 
efficiency  would  they  judge  the  importance  and 
extent  of  the  connection.  Pan-Americanism  find- 
ing its  expression  solely  in  infrequent  diplomatic 
congresses,  the  delegates  of  which  were  without 
power  to  act,  would  have  no  administrative  fabric 
that  would  deserve  the  name.  A  customs'  union, 

267 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

with  certain  agreements  in  regard  to  uniform 
tariffs,  currency,  weights,  measures,  and  the  like, 
would  be  a  reality,  but  not  a  state,  and  would 
represent  a  very  limited  type  of  common  interest. 
Until  Pan-Americanism  can  find  tangible  existence 
in  a  strong,  independent,  efficient  state,  until  it 
provides  at  least  for  a  common  administration, 
common  courts  and  law,  even  though  the  legisla- 
tive powers  should  be  quasi-diplomatic  in  charac- 
ter and  of  the  nature  of  international  treaties, 
it  will  be  a  dream,  a  vision,  a  hope,  of  little  in- 
fluence in  international  affairs. 

Before  the  dream  can  be  realized  and  the  vision 
exist,  this  strong  administration  must  be  the  very 
real  expression  of  mutual  interests,  existing  condi- 
tions, and  popular  ideals.  A  democratic  state  not 
closely  linked  to  conditions  will  be  a  fiction.  In 
this  administrative  and  legal  fabric  the  mutuality 
of  the  economic  interests  of  the  various  members 
of  the  Confederation  and  their  mutual  faith  and 
confidence  in  each  other's  good  intentions  should 
find  expression.  The  uniformity  of  regulations  and 
laws  would  necessarily  be  closely  associated  with 
something  like  a  similarity  of  conditions  in  the 
various  states.  From  the  general  notions  already 
existent  in  the  community,  of  right,  justice,  ethics, 
and  expediency,  would  the  new  rules  and  laws  draw 

268 


ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL  PROBLEMS 

their  breath  of  life.  Unless  in  fact  the  administra- 
tive and  legal  fabrics  are  the  actual  expression  of  an 
approximate  agreement  among  the  various  peoples 
of  the  confederation  upon  these  fundamental 
notions  of  right,  justice,  and  expediency,  unless 
they  express  the  mutual  confidence  of  the  people 
in  one  another  and  the  realization  of  mutual  eco- 
nomic interests,  unless  they  are  based  upon  homo- 
geneity of  conditions,  the  confederation  would 
scarcely  be  operative.  It  could  not  provide  effec- 
tively for  the  needs,  common  to  all  the  states  and 
their  citizens,  which  it  was  created  to  solve.  An 
equality  between  the  citizens  of  the  various 
states  would  also  normally  find  expression  in  the 
laws  of  the  new  confederation,  while  the  provisions 
regarding  procedure  would  necessarily  place  all 
duly  accredited  citizens  in  one  state,  whenever  ab- 
sent from  home,  on  a  par  with  the  citizens  of  all 
other  states.  The  confederation  would  be  an 
artificial  bond,  a  mere  potentiality,  until  such  an 
administrative  and  legal  fabric  had  actually  come 
into  existence.  Until  such  a  fabric  gave  expression 
to  some  such  fundamental  conceptions  as  these,  it 
could  not  itself  be  a  reality.  It  is  scarcely  possible 
to  exaggerate  the  vital  significance  to  Pan-Ameri- 
canism of  these  prerequisites. 
.  The  foundation,  for  such  an  administrative  and 

269 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

legal*  structure  seems  to  be  lacking,  however;  the 
facts  themselves,  as  we  have  already  suggested, 
do  not  answer  to  the  assumptions.  The  mutuality 
of  economic  interests,  the  mutual  faith  and  con- 
fidence in  one  another's  good  intentions  are  at 
present  only  too  clearly  non-existent.  The  general 
lack  of  acquaintance  between  the  United  States 
and  Latin  America  makes  difficult  any  agreement 
upon  the  general  postulates  of  political  science. 
But  we  are  here  more  particularly  concerned  with 
specifically  technical  difficulties  in  the  way  of  a 
strong,  stable,  and  efficient  administration. 

The  difference  in  size  between  the  United 
States  and  Latin  America  is  a  formidable  bar. 
The  United  States  contains  alone  about  one- 
quarter  more  people  than  the  whole  of  Latin 
America,  even  though  these  people  are  located 
upon  an  area  only  one  third  as  large.  The  eco- 
nomic development  of  the  United  States  is  so  much 
more  advanced  and  complex  that  the  disparity  in 
wealth  and  resources  is  still  more  striking.  Stable 
government,  again,  is  so  old  in  the  United  States 
and  so  comparatively  recent  in  South  America  as 
to  create  a  difference  in  administrative  and  legal 
tradition  of  the  most  formidable  type.  Yet  it  has 
not  been  found  possible  in  the  United  States  to 
administer  the  Western  communities  according  to 

270 


ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL  PROBLEMS 

the  traditions  and  precepts  eminently  successful  in 
New  England.  The  difference  of  economic  condi- 
tions, of  social  advancement,  the  difference  in  the 
age  alone  of  the  State,  has  made  it  necessary  to 
treat  the  two  in  radically  different  ways,  even 
though  the  problem  in  general  presented  striking 
fundamental  similarities.  If  a  community  of  New 
Englanders  located  in  Ohio  has  found  expedient 
different  practical  methods  from  those  adopted 
by  New  Englanders  in  Oregon  or  from  the  New 
Englanders  in  New  England,  the  imagination  is 
scarcely  capable  of  depicting  the  necessary  practi- 
cal adjustments  for  communities  as  different  in 
economic  development,  as  unequal  in  age,  and  as 
sundered  by  race,  language,  and  religion,  as  are  the 
United  States  and  the  Latin-American  republics. 
Common  administrative  and  legal  requirements 
which  would  meet  the  approval  of  all  the  States  and 
work  to  the  practical  satisfaction  of  all  citizens 
would  probably  represent  the  experience  of  years 
and  be  the  final  product  of  a  long  series  of  experi- 
ments, and  in  all  probability  of  numerous  dismal 
failures.  Nothing  short  of  strong  mutual  ties  of 
interest  and  confidence  could  maintain  a  Pan- 
American  Confederation  during  this  period  of 
administrative  and  legal  experimentation. 

If  the  difficulties  and  differences  between  the 
271 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

United  States  and  the  Latin-American  republics 
as  a  whole  were  not  sufficient,  the  past  has  provided 
a  very  similar  situation  in  Latin  America.  We 
speak  in  loose  fashion  of  two  entities ;  we  write  for 
the  sake  of  convenience  about  the  two  Americas; 
and  tend  to  assume  an  essential  homogeneity  of 
conditions  in  both,  or,  at  least,  extremes  no  greater 
than  between  the  various  States  of  our  own  Federal 
Union.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact  "America"  is  a 
fiction,  because  we  tacitly  exclude  Canada,  Alaska, 
and  Central  America,  while  "Latin  America"  has 
no  reasonable  basis  for  existence.  It  is  a  historical 
and  geographic  caption  used  for  convenience  by 
historians  and  scientists  to  denote  the  fact  that  at 
one  time  a  large  territory  was  nominally  subject  to 
Spain  and  achieved  political  independence  at  the 
same  epoch.  A  few  relics  of  the  Spanish  occupation 
— some  proportion  of  Spanish  blood  in  the  people, 
a  general  adhesion  to  the  Roman  Catholic  Church, 
some  general  notions  of  law  due  to  Spanish  ideas 
about  political  science — have  lent  a  certain  re- 
spectability and  a  semblance  of  accuracy  to  the 
name.  But  the  phrase  denotes  no  greater  uni- 
formity of  conditions  or  of  ideas  than  the  word 
Europe  or  Asia. 

The  number  of  states  in  Latin  America  is  large, 
the  variety  of  natural  conditions  is  astounding  and 

272 


ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL  PROBLEMS 

creates  radically  different  economic  and  adminis- 
trative problems  in  different  parts  of  the  continent. 
The  disparity  in  development  between  certain 
states  is  almost  as  great  as  between  the  United 
States  and  Latin  America  as  a  whole,  while  the 
antiquity  of  stable  government  varies  from  states 
whose  administrative  traditions  extend  for  genera- 
tions, to  those  who  have  to  our  thinking  not  yet 
achieved  it.  The  Argentine  Republic  and  Brazil 
occupy  between  them  four  sevenths  of  the  total 
area  of  the  Southern  Continent,  have  half  of  the 
total  population,  and  more  than  half  of  the  com- 
merce. They  contain  two  highly  developed  re- 
gions, one  in  southern  Brazil,  and  the  other  in 
the  northern  part  of  Argentina.  Here  the  interior 
has  been  knit  to  the  coast  by  an  excellent  system 
of  railroads;  agriculture  has  been  developed;  edu- 
cation and  the  arts  have  made  progress,  and  find 
their  expression  in  large  and  beautiful  cities.  But 
northern  Brazil  and  southern  Argentine  Repub- 
lic are  by  no  means  as  advanced,  and  the  great  bulk 
of  the  enormous  area  of  the  former  is  inhabited  only 
by  savages ;  there  are  parts  of  it  which  the  white 
man's  foot  has  not  yet  trodden.  Indeed,  the  general 
uncertainty  as  to  its  topography  and  conditions 
is  so  marked  that  controversy  has  risen  over  facts 
which  would  in  most  countries  have  been  estab- 
18  273 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

lished  beyond  doubt  half  a  century  ago.  Chile  is  a 
large  and  wealthy  state  on  the  western  coast,  with 
an  ambitious  and  energetic  population  and  a  very 
large  foreign  trade.  Indeed,  the  ABC  countries, 
as  these  three  states  are  called,  have  about  four 
fifths  of  the  total  foreign  trade  of  South  America. 
Their  existence  creates  an  administrative  situa- 
tion, so  far  as  the  other  states  are  concerned,  not 
different  in  kind  or  degree  from  that  between  the 
United  States  and  Latin  America  as  a  whole.  The 
smaller  states  fear  absorption  by  these  large 
entities  almost  as  much  as  the  Central  American 
states  fear  absorption  by  the  United  States. 
Between  these  large  states  and  the  smaller  South 
and  Central  American  states  there  are  no  mutuality 
of  economic  interest,  and  no  faith  or  confidence  in 
one  another's  intentions.  A  uniform  administration 
and  law  for  the  whole  of  Latin  America  would  in  all 
probability  antagonize  the  small  states  if  it  satis- 
fied the  large,  and  fail  of  the  support  of  the  large 
states  if  it  were  satisfactory  to  the  smaller.  The 
racial  unity,  while  striking  when  Latin  America  is 
compared  with  the  United  States,  is  not  much 
greater,  when  the  republics  are  compared  with  one 
another,  than  the  racial  resemblances  of  many 
states  in  Europe  which  have  maintained  their 
racial  differences  for  centuries.  As  against  the 

274 


ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL  PROBLEMS 

United  States,  as  against  Europe,  the  Latin- 
American  republics  are  ready  to  unite,  because 
they  find  in  resistance  to  foreign  aggression  a 
mutual  interest  of  undoubted  strength.  But  if 
the  specter  of  conquest  could  be  removed,  the  one 
common  bond  between  them  would  disappear, 
and  the  probability  of  agreement  upon  other 
points  would  be  not  much  greater  than  that  of 
agreement  between  them  and  the  United  States, 
Germany,  or  England  upon  administrative  and 
legal  questions.  Indeed,  Pan- Americanism  finds 
in  its  way  not  only  physical  and  economic 
inequality  between  the  Northern  and  Southern 
continents,  not  only  administrative  and  intellec- 
tual inequality  between  the  United  States  and 
Latin  America,  but  an  inequality  in  all  those 
directions  between  the  Latin-American  republics 
which  is  not  less  striking  and  significant,  and 
perhaps  not  less  difficult  to  obviate. 

The  administrative  task  of  forming  a  federated 
state  to  extend  over  two  such  enormous  continents, 
to  govern  175,000,000  people  and  about  12,000,- 
ooo  square  miles  of  territory,  must  not  be  forgotten. 
Administration  depends  for  efficiency  upon  rapid- 
ity of  communication.  The  distance  in  space 
between  the  extremes  of  the  new  confederation 
would  be  as  great  as  that  between  England  and 

275 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

South  Africa,  which  is  regarded  by  many  as  so 
great  as  to  preclude  governmental  connection. 
The  area  covered  would  approach  the  vastness  of 
European  and  Asiatic  Russia,  a  state  supposedly 
too  large  for  effective  administration,  and  it  would 
not  present  the  same  facilities  for  transporta- 
tion that  Russia  possesses.  Contact  between  the 
various  parts  would  be  slow  and  therefore  difficult. 
Such  physical  conditions  would  place  before  a 
common  administration  the  maximum  of  adminis- 
trative difficulties.  The  number  of  transactions 
involving  the  various  countries,  to  say  nothing 
of  their  respective  citizens,  the  multitude  of 
possible  difficulties  for  the  courts  to  solve,  of  ad- 
ministrative disputes  to  be  settled,  of  officials  to 
be  appointed  and  supervised,  of  bills  to  be  paid, 
of  accounts  to  be  rendered,  would,  without  any 
complications  at  all,  even  in  the  most  favorable 
circumstances,  provide  problems  which  no  single 
government  in  the  world  has  hitherto  successfully 
struggled  with,  and  which  have  disrupted  empires 
smaller  in  area  and  less  ambitious  in  scope.  The 
English  Empire  is  not  an  administrative  reality, 
for  the  Imperial  Government  attempts  only  a  very 
general  supervision  of  the  great  bulk  of  the  terri- 
tory involved.  The  Roman  Empire  was  much 
smaller  in  size.  Indeed,  Pan-Americanism,  even 

276 


ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL  PROBLEMS 

if  all  its  premises  were  realities,  might  easily  fail 
for  lack  of  ability  to  solve  the  elemental  problems 
of  efficient  and  rapid  action  and  of  prompt  obedi- 
ence, responsibility,  and  honesty  of  officials.  It  is 
surely  worth  remembering  in  this  connection  that 
we  are  none  too  well  satisfied  in  the  United  States 
with  the  success  of  the  Federal  Government  in  all 
these  matters,  and  that  the  Latin-American  repub- 
lics are  in  most  instances  obviously  less  successful 
than  we  are.  Neither  would  be  likely  to  deal 
efficiently  with  an  administrative  problem  in  its 
very  nature  more  difficult  than  any  yet  solved  by 
a  civilized  community. 

It  will  perhaps  be  enough  to  advert  to  the  diffi- 
culties of  choosing  officials  for  the  confederation 
satisfactory  to  all  its  members.  By  common 
consent  democracy  has  been  less  successful  in  the 
choosing  and  appointing  of  officers  than  in  any 
other  regard.  Yet  upon  securing  capable  and 
efficient  men  would  depend  the  whole  success,  and 
perhaps  the  very  existence,  of  Pan-Americanism, 
however  weak  and  nominal  the  bond  might  be. 
Here  in  particular  would  appear  the  influence  of 
the  United  States  and  of  the  three  largest  South 
American  states.  They  would  normally  expect  to 
divide  between  them  the  most  important  posts  and 
the  bulk  of  the  smaller  posts.  This  would  hardly 

277 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

be  agreeable  to  the  seventeen  other  states.  If 
the  general  experience  in  all  twenty-one  republics 
is  any  criterion,  there  would  soon  appear  undue 
influence  of  various  kinds,  underground  wires,  and 
back-stairs  influence  of  the  sort  which  makes 
government  difficult  at  Washington  and  in  our 
own  States,  and  which  has  almost  made  stable 
government  impossible  in  several  of  the  small 
Latin-American  republics.  Estimate  all  these 
influences  at  a  minimum,  and  they  would  still 
aggravate  the  other  administrative  difficulties  to  a 
point  which  would  perhaps  overthrow  the  whole 
fabric. 

One  of  the  most  vital  aspects  of  the  possible 
bond  which  might  be  called  Pan-Americanism 
would  be  the  uniformity  of  commercial  law  and 
a  criminal  code  and  procedure  for  all  the  Ameri- 
can republics.  This  might  be  perfected  without 
necessarily  involving  the  creation  of  an  administra- 
tive fabric  and  would  be  of  obvious  utility,  but  the 
difficulties  of  agreement  about  the  general  pro- 
visions and  the  practical  details  of  any  kind  of 
legal  system  are  fundamental.  Naturally  the 
United  States  would  object  to  adopting  Latin- 
American  ideas  as  a  whole,  and  the  Latin  Ameri- 
cans would  object  to  accepting  our  Federal  law 
as  a  whole.  We  should,  indeed,  have  much 

278 


ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL  PROBLEMS 

difficulty  in  providing  a  set  of  principles  and  prac- 
tical provisions  in  the  United  States  which  law- 
yers would  uniformly  accept  as  representative  or 
workable.  So  much  of  the  law  of  the  United 
States  is  state  law,  and  so  varied  are  its  provisions 
upon  fundamental  questions  of  personal  liberty 
and  commercial  expediency,  that  the  enactment 
of  a  uniform  Federal  law,  obviously  desirable  and 
generally  agreed  to  be  expedient,  has  usually 
presented  such  practical  difficulties  in  reaching  a 
compromise  mutually  satisfactory  that  action  has 
sometimes  involved  years,  and  has  more  often 
proved  impossible.  To  provide,  therefore,  a  uni- 
form series  of  principles  for  the  twenty-one  Ameri- 
can republics  would  require  not  only  some  general 
agreement  upon  the  broad  principles  of  justice 
and  expediency,  but  some  sort  of  compromise 
between  the  different  practical  expedients  already 
used  in  forty-eight  States  of  our  Federal  Union  and 
twenty  South  American  republics.  Yet  upon  the 
satisfactory  character  of  the  general  principles 
evolved  and  the  practical  expedients  selected 
would  depend  the  real  usefulness  of  a  system  of 
common  courts. 

Even  greater  difficulties  would  present  them- 
selves to  the  judges  of  the  confederation  in  an 
attempt  to  apply  broad  principles  to  individual 

279 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

cases.  The  law  as  enforced  invariably  reflects 
something  of  the  community's  ideals  of  morals,  of 
ethics,  of  what  is  fair,  best,  and  reasonable,  while 
it  usually  falls  to  the  judge  to  apply  these  stand- 
ards as  well  as  the  technicalities  of  the  law  to 
individual  cases.  It  is  here  that  the  lack  of  racial 
unity,  of  a  common  language,  of  a  general  agree- 
-ment  upon  the  postulates  of  religion  would  present 
the  most  serious  practical  difficulties  that  the 
officers  of  the  confederation  would  have  to  solve. 
A  confederated  state  might  satisfactorily  adjust  it- 
self to  the  governments  of  the  twenty-one  repub- 
lics, and  by  the  exercise  of  great  tact  and  discretion 
might  possibly  be  able  to  secure  harmony.  If 
its  budget  was  not  large  and  its  taxes  were  collected 
by  the  governments  of  the  various  republics,  the 
people  would  seldom  realize  the  expense  of  the 
confederation  or  feel  called  upon  to  consider  its 
position  and  pretentions.  In  the  courts,  however, 
individuals  would  meet  individuals,  and  personal 
prejudices  and  passions  would  find  an  outlet  only 
too  persistently,  and  would  usually  present  per- 
sonal, racial,  and  religious  stimuli  of  such  a  nature 
that  a  settlement  of  the  case  satisfactory  to  both 
parties  would  be  abnormally  difficult  to  reach. 
What  could  be  done  in  murder  trials,  where  the 
culprit  and  the  murdered  were  of  different  race 

280 


ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL  PROBLEMS 

and  religion?  Would  it  be  possible  for  public 
opinion  in  the  United  States  to  view  with  entire 
equanimity  the  trial  of  a  white  man  and  an  Ameri- 
can citizen  by  a  South  American  jury  composed 
of  Indians,  negroes,  and  half-breeds?  Would  the 
South  Americans  find  any  less  objectionable  the 
trial  of  a  South  American  citizen  by  a  jury  in 
Texas  or  Arizona?  The  burning  of  negroes  and 
the  lynching  of  "greasers"  have  made  a  decided 
impression  in  Latin  America,  and  are  a  good  deal 
more  common  in  the  United  States  than  most  of  us 
realize.  Here  the  mutual  faith  and  confidence  of 
the  various  communities  would  be  most  essential, 
and  here  its  absence  would  do  the  most  harm.  As 
conditions  are  at  present,  it  would  be  scarcely 
possible  to  convince  public  sentiment  in  certain 
parts  of  the  United  States  that  an  American 
citizen  convicted  by  a  South  American  jury  was 
not  hanged  on  general  principles,  or  to  demonstrate 
to  a  good  many  portions  of  the  South  American 
public  that  a  South  American  criminal  was  not 
dealt  with  harshly  in  our  Southern  States  because 
of  his  race  and  color. 

Commercial  cases  would  be  the  most  common, 
and  would  present  difficulties  less  serious  in  degree, 
but  not  less  grave  in  nature.  The  most  valuable 
service  a  uniform  system  of  courts  might  render 

281 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

would  be  the  decision  of  cases  between  the  citizens 
of  different  states  and  those  widely  sundered  in 
space.  Among  the  cases  which  would  appear 
before  such  tribunals  would  be  naturally  those 
upon  the  border-line  between  law  and  equity, 
where  the  adjustment  of  the  interests  of  the  parties 
could  not  be  effected  by  the  plain  interpretation  of 
principles  or  yet  by  clearly  established  precedent. 
These  are  always  the  most  difficult  types  to  decide, 
because  they  involve  the  interpretation  of  prin- 
ciples and  precedents  in  the  light  of  the  general 
notions  of  lawyers  and  judges  as  to  what  is  fair, 
right,  and  expedient.  Decisions  of  this  sort  would 
be  less  certain  to  meet  the  approval  of  parties  as 
little  acquainted  with  each  other  as  Latin  Ameri- 
cans and  citizens  of  the  United  States.  The  inter- 
pretation of  oral  contracts,  the  definition  of  equities 
in  property,  the  decision  about  the  facts  in  cases 
arising  from  the  failure  specifically  to  perform  con- 
tracts— all  these  would  inevitably  appear.  They 
would  present  the  maximum  difficulties  of  solution, 
because  of  the  ease  with  which  one  party  or  the 
other  could  plead  an  insufficient  knowledge  of  the 
other's  language,  and  therefore  a  misunderstand- 
ing of  what  he  said,  or  a  difference  in  commercial 
customs,  permitting  him  to  demand  certain  allow- 
ances for  a  delay  in  specific  performance,  which  the 

282 


ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL  PROBLEMS 

other  would  regard  as  unjust  and  unnecessary 
in  the  light  of  the  business  ethics  of  his  own 
community.  The  judges  would  be  continually 
meeting  a  series  of  irreconcilable  differences, 
where  compromises  would  be  difficult,  because 
both  parties  were  right  according  to  their  own 
customs.  The  American  business  temperament 
furthermore  accommodates  itself  with  impatience 
to  the  dilatory  proceedings  in  our  own  courts. 
It  would  regard  proceedings  that  we  considered 
normally  swift  in  South  America  as  entirely  im- 
possible. Here,  again,  would  be  a  constant  source 
of  friction. 

The  most  difficult  issue  before  the  confedera- 
tion as  a  whole  would  be  that  of  some  sanction 
which  would  enforce  obedience  to  its  commands, 
and  insure  the  payment  of  its  taxes  by  its  own 
members  and  their  respective  citizens.  The 
seventeen  smaller  states  would  easily  be  dealt 
with ;  but  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  would  happen  if 
the  confederation  decided,  after  due  deliberation, 
that  some  rule  or  statute  was  vital  for  the  vast 
majority  of  its  members  that  the  United  States 
or  Brazil  should  declare  with  equal  solemnity  and 
vehemence  was  destructive  of  its  interests.  How 
could  the  confederation  possibly  compel  one  of  its 
largest  states  to  yield  obedience?  Would  not  a 

283 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

confederation  dependent  upon  voluntary  obedi- 
ence degenerate  promptly  into  something  as  weak 
and  despicable  as  the  Diet  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  in  the  eighteenth  century?  Coercion 
would  be  out  of  the  question,  partly  because  of  the 
distance  between  the  strong  powers  who  would 
necessarily  furnish  the  major  part  of  any  army 
which  the  confederation  might  form,  but  chiefly 
because  the  confederation  could  not  possibly  keep 
under  arms  an  army  large  enough  to  coerce  one  of 
the  four  large  states.  It  would  be  as  hopeless  to 
attack  Brazil  as  to  coerce  the  United  States.  There 
has  been  some  dispute  among  political  scientists  as 
to  how  far  force  is  necessary  for  the  existence  of  a 
strong  government,  but  the  general  opinion  seems 
to  be  that  adequate  force  must  be  at  least  latent 
and  potential,  and  the  will  of  the  community  to  use 
it  thoroughly  well  understood.  In  the  United 
States  the  existence  of  that  force  is  now  admitted, 
but  it  is  not  so  generally  conceded  in  Latin  America. 
Certainly,  any  confederation  supposedly  created 
for  the  common  interests  of  twenty-one  sovereign 
states,  four  of  which  could  virtually  nullify  any  of 
its  decisions,  could  never  have  had  any  really 
strong  corporate  existence. 

The  experience  of  confederations  of  sovereign 
states  in  the  past  proves  only  too  conclusively  that 

284 


ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL  PROBLEMS 

a  union  between  numerous  small  communities  and 
two  or  three  large  states,  with  one  state  as  large 
as  all  the  rest,  invariably  results  either  in  the 
domination  of  the  confederation  by  that  single 
state  or  in  the  administrative  weakness  and  prac- 
tical nullity  of  the  confederation  as  a  result  of  the 
union  of  the  majority  against  the  one.  Either 
eventuality  would  be  fatal  to  Pan-Americanism; 
the  actual  superiority  of  the  United  States  would 
lead  either  to  its  domination  of  the  confederation 
or  to  its  disruption.  A  political  deputation  once 
waited  upon  Lincoln  with  some  request  which  he 
deemed  unreasonable,  and  was  asked  by  the 
President  how  many  legs  a  sheep  would  have  if  you 
called  its  tail  a  leg.  They  promptly  replied,  as  was 
expected,  "Five."  "No,"  said  Lincoln,  "calling 
its  tail  a  leg  would  not  make  it  one. "  Calling  the 
United  States,  therefore,  the  equal  of  each  of  the 
twenty  Latin-American  republics  would  not  change 
the  fact  that  the  United  States  is  more  populous, 
wealthy,  and  powerful  than  the  twenty  added 
together.  We  who  live  in  the  United  States  are 
apt  to  forget  this.  It  is  rarely,  if  ever,  forgotten 
south  of  the  Rio  Grande. 

We  shall  have  made  as  students  little  progress 
toward  the  comprehension  of  currents  of  thought 
in  Latin  America  if  we  have  failed  to  appreciate 

285 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  strength  of  the  democratic  movement.  They 
are  glad  to  have  the  United  States  protect  them 
from  European  aggression,  they  are  anxious  to  call 
in  England  or  Germany  to  protect  them  from  the 
United  States;  but  they  have  not  the  slightest 
intention  of  forming  an  alliance  of  any  sort  with 
any  power  which  will  give  the  latter  any  in- 
fluence or  control,  or  which  will  involve  any  sort 
of  organic  union  with  it.  They  wish  to  achieve  for 
Latin  America  an  actual  independence  of  the  rest 
of  the  world.  They  consider  that  they  have  as 
much  right  to  political  independence  as  any  nation, 
and  as  little  reason  to  accept  dictation,  guidance, 
instruction,  or  assistance  as  the  United  States 
itself  or  any  nation  in  Europe.  They  look  upon 
themselves  as  our  peers.  We  shall  be  lacking  in 
candor  if  we  decline  to  admit  that  the  impulse 
behind  this  movement  is  identical  with  the  motive 
of  our  own  Revolution.  We  denied  the  right  of 
England  to  advise  us,  guide  us,  help  us;  we  de- 
clined to  recognize  any  need  for  advice  or  help. 
Pan-Americanism  means  in  Latin  America  a 
united  movement  by  the  Latin-American  republics 
against  the  pretentions  of  the  United  States. 
There  is  a  good  deal  more  active  agitation  going  on 
south  of  the  Rio  Grande  for  this  purpose  than  for 
any  other  purpose  the  republics  have  in  common. 

286 


ADMINISTRATIVE  AND  LEGAL  PROBLEMS 

But  they  are  no  less  determined  to  preserve  their 
political  independence  of  one  another  and  have  not 
the  slightest  intention  of  sacrificing  one  jot  or 
tittle  of  sovereignty  to  a  Latin-American  con- 
federation, any  more  than  they  have  of  yielding  to 
the  domination  of  the  United  States  or  of  Europe. 
By  democracy  they  understand  self-government, 
the  government  of  a  political  entity  by  its  own 
people,  and  the  recognition  by  the  rest  of  the  world 
of  any  government  they  see  fit  to  organize,  whether 
or  not  it  is  in  harmony  with  the  definition  of 
government  in  other  countries.  They  themselves 
have  the  right,  and  the  exclusive  right,  to  decide 
what  is  good  government  for  them ;  any  attempt  to 
interfere  with  their  right  to  reach  a  conclusion  is 
domination  and  conquest,  whatever  ethical  and 
commercial  precepts  acceptable  to  other  nations 
may  be  quoted  in  its  defense.  It  is  condemned  as 
undemocratic,  and  unwarranted  by  the  mere  fact 
that  it  is  made,  either  by  arms,  by  proclamation, 
or  by  diplomatic  correspondence.  The  methods 
and  the  reasons  are  not  to  the  point;  the  thing 
itself  is  offensive  and  wrong,  and  they  will  have 
none  of  it.  They  see  no  more  reason  for  the  United 
States  to  undertake  the  alteration  of  Mexican 
government  than  to  attempt  the  reformation  of 
the  government  of  Russia.  The  present  current 

287 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

of1  South  American  thought  tends  strongly  toward 
national  independence  for  the  republics  individu- 
ally, not  only  of  the  United  States  and  of  Europe, 
but  of  one  another. 


288 


CHAPTER  VI 
SOCIAL  OBSTACLES 

INTIMATE  intercourse  between  the  peoples  of 
the  various  American  states,  and  in  particular 

between  Latin  Americans  as  a  whole  and  the 
citizens  of  the  United  States,  will  be  an  essential 
and  fundamental  factor  in  any  close  or  successful 
bond  between  them.  Upon  it  alone  will  depend 
the  mutual  faith  and  confidence  which  each  ought 
to  have  for  the  other;  to  the  extent  that  it  is  in- 
timate and  real  will  be  the  depth  and  verity  of 
the  common  confidence.  Without  some  such  in- 
tercourse, the  establishment  of  any  kind  of 
bond  between  the  American  republics  must  be 
problematical  and  temporary.  Without  it  any 
administrative  connection  will  be  weak  and  mean- 
ingless. Without  an  actual  acquaintanceship  of 
citizens,  all  diplomatic  arrangements  between 
the  republics  as  sovereign  states  will  be  empty 
and  artificial  forms.  Democracy  is  a  very  real 
thing,  and  a  democratic  government  over  the 

i9  289 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

twenty-one  republics  presumes  the  cooperation 
and  therefore  the  acquaintanceship  of  the  indi- 
vidual citizens. 

A  necessary  postulate  of  Pan-Americanism  is 
the  legal  equality  of  the  citizens  of  all  of  the  re- 
publics with  one  another;  its  unavoidable  corollary 
is  social  equality.  The  South  Americans  frankly 
and  freely  discuss  the  mixed  racial  character  of 
the  various  countries,  and  make  no  secret  of  the 
intermingling  of  the  blood  of  the  red  man  and  of 
the  black  man  with  that  of  the  white  man.  Mixed 
marriages  are  common  with  full-blooded  Indians 
or  negroes,  and  do  not  receive  social  reprobation 
of  any  sort.  Full-blooded  Indians  or  negroes 
have  risen  to  positions  of  great  prominence,  have, 
indeed,  been  presidents  of  some  of  the  states, 
and  have  occupied  in  the  political  and  social  life 
of  Latin  America  truly  significant  positions. 
Their  democracy  knows  nothing  of  race,  color, 
or  previous  condition  of  servitude. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  South  America  con- 
tains many  people  as  broadly  intellectual,  as  widely 
read,  as  highly  cultivated,  with  as  high  moral 
standards  and  noble  character  as  the  average  men 
and  women  in  the  United  States.  Let  us  not 
argue  the  question  whether  the  ablest  South 
Americans  are  the  equals  of  the  ablest  men  and 

290 


SOCIAL  OBSTACLES 

women  in  the  United  States.  There  can  certainly 
be  no  doubt  that  there  are  many  in  South  America 
who  are  easily  the  equals  in  every  respect  of  those 
who  consider  themselves  in  the  United  States  people 
of  education  and  culture.  Abroad,  especially  in 
Paris,  the  South  Americans  have  no  more  diffi- 
culty in  securing  social  recognition  than  the  citizens 
of  the  United  States  have.  Indeed,  any  North 
American  who  has  spent  any  length  of  time  in 
Paris  has  very  likely  had  the  experience  of  saying 
that  he  is  an  American,  and  of  hearing  the  query, 
' '  A  South  American  ? ' '  Unquestionably  the  South 
Americans  would  demand  and  expect  the  fullest 
possible  recognition  of  social  equality  in  all  parts 
of  the  United  States.  There  is  no  reason  to-day 
why  they  should  not  expect  it  as  a  result  of  the 
present  diplomatic  relations.  In  particular  they 
would  expect  freedom  of  access  to  hotels,  theaters, 
trains,  and  public  places  of  all  sorts  without  so 
much  as  a  whisper  or  a  fleeting  suspicion  in  any- 
one's mind  that  they  did  not  belong  there.  Inter- 
marriage would  inevitably  follow,  and  this,  too, 
without  thought  or  expectation  of  any  loss  of  cast 
or  status  by  either  one  of  the  contracting  parties. 
Any  other  basis  of  intimate  association  than  this 
with  the  South  Americans  is  unthinkable  and  would 
be  rejected  by  them  with  the  scorn  it  would  deserve. 

291 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Nevertheless,  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the 
establishment  of  such  social  equality  are  undeni- 
ably great;  and  the  obstacles  in  the  way  of  its 
acceptance  by  large  bodies  of  men  and  women  in 
certain  sections  of  the  United  States  are  indubit- 
ably greater.  "Half -breeds  and  their  descend- 
ants," says  Calderon,  "govern  the  Ibero- American 
democracy."  "The  native  race,  the  Spanish  race, 
and  the  Negro  race  are  everywhere  mingled  in 
similar  proportions."  "The  people  of  the  United 
States  hate  the  half-breed.  .  .  .  No  manifestation 
of  Pan-Americanism  could  suffice  to  destroy  the 
racial  prejudice  as  it  exists  north  of  Mexico." 
These  temperate  but  determined  sentences  repre- 
sent a  feeling  of  almost  passionate  strength  which 
usually  finds  expression  among  South  Americans 
in  anything  but  a  restrained  and  judicial  manner. 

The  color  problem  is  indeed  the  most  serious 
question  open  to  consideration  in  connection  with 
the  future  of  that  great  continent;  but  it  is  not, 
indeed,  the  social  equality  of  the  various  peoples 
which  is  under  consideration.  The  real  problem 
of  South  America  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  present 
inhabitants  are  the  result  of  the  mixture  of  the 
Spanish  conquerors  with  a  native  people  whose 
cultural  development  had  reached  the  period  of 
middle  barbarism  only  in  the  most  advanced 

292 


SOCIAL  OBSTACLES 

tribes,  who  were  at  the  time  of  the  conquest 
perhaps  hundreds  of  thousands  of  years  in  de- 
velopment behind  the  oldest  peoples  of  whom  we 
have  any  record  in  Europe.  To  this  mixture  of 
the  civilized  white  and  the  barbarian  was  added 
before  it  had  fairly  became  a  mixture  a  third 
element  still  more  incongruous.  The  negroes, 
brought  as  slaves  during  the  seventeenth  and 
eighteenth  centuries  to  Latin  America  were  liter- 
ally savages,  and  were  further  behind  the  Indian 
in  ethnical  development  than  the  Indian  was  be- 
hind the  white  man.  Of  the  three  elements  the 
whites  were  numerically  the  weakest,  and  in  the 
natural  growth  of  the  population  the  whites  and 
their  descendants  have  not  grown  as  rapidly  as 
the  full-blooded  types.  In  the  course  of  time, 
however  the  three  have  become  intermingled 
beyond  recognition,  and  there  are  few  to-day  who 
can  prove  themselves  possessed  of  pure  blood  in 
the  ordinarily  accepted  sense  of  the  word.  These 
three  elements  thus  combined  were  located  by  the 
accident  of  history  upon  a  tropical  soil  where 
industry  was  difficult,  and  where  agriculture  and 
surface  mining  were,  for  many,  many  decades, 
the  only  possible  occupations.  Generous  nature 
poured  before  them  a  profusion  of  products  suited 
to  their  needs  for  sustenance  and  deprived  them  of 

293 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  incentive  of  work  for  the  purpose  of  preserving 
life.  According  to  American  and  European  ideas 
they  have  not  been  industrious  as  a  race,  and 
the  problem  of  labor  is  a  very  vital  one. 

The  real  issue,  causing  at  present  grave  concern 
in  the  minds  of  the  extremely  intelligent  leaders 
is  the  future  of  this  mixed  people.  Have  they 
the  qualities  necessary  to  enable  them  to  continue 
indefinitely  to  own  their  own  land?  Are  they 
sufficiently  industrious,  intelligent,  and  susceptible 
of  instruction,  to  perform  in  South  America, 
with  capital  borrowed  from  Europe,  and  with  the 
aid  of  European  or  American  engineers  and  sci- 
entists, a  feat  similar  to  that  achieved  by  the 
Japanese?  Unquestionably,  a  considerable  pro- 
portion of  the  population  has  already  demonstrated 
its  possession  of  these  qualities,  but  we  must  not 
forget  that  there  are  millions  of  people  in  South 
America  who  are  not  yet  so  advanced,  and  whose 
capacity  and  industry  still  remain  open  to  ques- 
tion. This  section  of  the  population  is  poor, 
densely  ignorant,  superstitious,  and  apparently 
lacks  any  disposition  of  its  own  toward  the  ac- 
cumulation of  information,  wealth,  or  cultivation. 
They  are  satisfied  with  what  they  have;  the  natural 
produce  of  the  country  suffices  for  their  simple 
wants  and  they  are  unconscious  of  their  own  de- 

294 


SOCIAL  OBSTACLES 

fidelities  judged  by  other  standards.  They  do 
not  conceive  any  useful  purpose  in  hard  labor  and 
unremitting  toil  for  the  acquisition  of  wealth  which 
they  would  not  know  how  to  spend  and  whose 
mere  possession  would  not  give  them  satisfaction. 
A  large  proportion  of  this  section  of  the  popula- 
tion are  full-blooded  Indians,  and  a  considerable 
number  are  full-blooded  negroes.  In  the  interior 
regions,  still  almost  unexplored,  are  a  good  many 
hundred  thousand  savages  whose  number  and 
condition  is  a  matter  of  conjecture.  Although 
the  one  may  not  be  large,  the  other  is  in  all  prob- 
ability such  that  it  will  increase  the  difficulty  of 
existing  problems. 

Can  this  apparently  inert  population  be  roused 
to  actual  efficiency?  Are  the  more  developed 
really  capable  of  grappling  with  this  stupendous 
problem  of  the  less  developed?  Have  they  the 
necessary  qualifications  of  leadership  as  well  as 
the  indispensable  information  and  powers  of 
analysis?  Have  they  the  practical  organizing 
capacity,  the  disillusionizing  common  sense  that 
solves  great  practical  issues  and  reaches  the 
bottom  of  vital  problems?  If  South  America  is 
to  continue  in  the  hands  of  South  Americans  for 
the  next  century,  the  people  now  living  in  South 
America  and  their  descendants  must  show  some  of 

295 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

these  qualities.  The  leaders  already  realize  that 
political  independence  will  be  only  nominal  until 
economic  and  intellectual  development  has  reached 
a  point  which  makes  the  South  American  states 
equals  in  every  respect  to  the  great  communities 
in  Europe.  Equality  must  be  a  reality,  or  inde- 
pendence, real  independence,  and  the  actual  con- 
trol of  the  future  and  destiny  of  those  peoples  will 
always  be  in  question. 

Thus  the  social  problem  underlies  all  others 
and  looms  portentous  upon  the  political  and  eco- 
nomic horizon.  They  see  the  fate  of  the  Indian 
in  the  United  States:  the  continued  dispossession, 
the  lack  of  social  equality  of  Indians  as  Indians 
(except  for  the  few  individuals),  the  lack  of  legal 
status,  the  certainty  that  the  Indian  people  as  a 
race  is  about  to  disappear  as  the  individuals  now 
composing  it  are  slowly  absorbed  into  the  com- 
munity of  the  whites.  The  Indian  himself  has 
never  shown  at  any  time  in  the  United  States  a 
capacity  of  organization  sufficient  to  make  effec- 
tive resistance.  Communities  like  the  Creeks  and 
Cherokees,  who  were  certainly  as  highly  trained 
in  agriculture  and  industry,  as  capable  in  organ- 
ization and  administration  as  the  vast  majority 
in  many  South  American  states,  were  unable  to 
resist  the  steady  pressure  of  the  white  man's 

296 


SOCIAL  OBSTACLES 

superior  development  and  capacity,  and  lost  little 
by  little  their  identity  and  national  existence  as 
well  as  their  national  independence.  As  Indians, 
they  are  gone.  The  Cherokee  Nation  is  no  more. 
When  the  Latin  Americans  see  the  great  waves  of 
European  and  Asiatic  immigration  rolling  toward 
their  shores,  when  they  view  the  communities 
already  founded,  their  scorn  for  the  half-breed's 
methods,  their  readiness  to  dispossess  him  and 
take  his  land,  their  belief  that  they  will  one  day 
rule  him  in  the  person  of  their  descendants,  they 
are  apprehensive  lest  it  portend  the  beginning  in 
Latin  America  of  that  same  process  now  almost 
complete  in  the  United  States.  They  are  con- 
sidering restrictions  on  immigration,  the  possibility 
of  erecting  a  political  barrier  that  will  exclude  the 
white  man,  or  at  any  rate  retard  this  process. 
Whether  or  not  Latin  America  can  attain  this 
reality  of  racial  independence  and  perpetuate  its 
present  political  independence  will  depend  upon 
the  extent  to  which  as  a  whole  they  possess  the 
racial  qualities  essential  to  the  formation  and 
maintenance  of  strong,  efficient  governments, 
capable  of  peaceful  administration,  and  also  to  the 
development  of  their  economic  resources  by  their 
own  labor  and  intelligence.  In  particular  the 
future  demands  leadership  from  those  South 

297 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Americans  who  have  already  attained  individu- 
ally to  European  standards  of  efficiency  and  cul- 
ture. If  they  can  solve  these  problems,  if,  in 
particular,  they  can  energize  the  great  bulk  of  the 
population,  they  will  be  able  in  time  to  make  real 
this  vision  of  South  American  independence,  this 
hope  of  South  American  democracy,  this  dream  of 
a  South  America  for  South  Americans;  states 
which  will  be  powerful,  wealthy,  cultured,  and 
respected  in  the  Congress  of  Nations. 

They  see  in  the  refusal  of  the  United  States  to 
recognize  their  racial  capacity  and  social  equality 
the  evidence  of  a  disposition  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  to  interfere  with  this  process  before 
it  is  well  begun.  The  claims  for  intervention  to 
preserve  stable  government,  the  insistence  upon  a 
need  for  outside  help  in  administration  and  finance, 
is  to  them  the  denial  of  the  capacity  of  the  more 
intelligent  and  educated  to  grapple  successfully 
with  this  problem.  They  fear  the  intention  of  the 
United  States  to  take  the  problem  from  their  hands 
and  repeat  in  Central  and  South  America  in  due 
time  that  dread  process,  slow  as  the  limping  foot 
of  time,  sure  as  the  coming  of  death,  which  spells 
the  racial  and  national  annihilation  of  these  half- 
breeds.  They  resent  passionately  the  very  notion 
that  they  are  incapable  of  solving  their  own  prob- 

298 


SOCIAL  OBSTACLES 

lems.  They  are  furious  that  the  United  States 
should  be  unwilling  to  allow  them  to  try  to  solve 
their  own  problems  and  should  not  have  faith 
and  confidence  that  time  and  experience  might 
teach  them  to  deal  successfully  with  them.  Mr. 
Wilson's  attitude  toward  Mexico  they  understand 
and  admire.  It  means  for  the  first  time  the 
handing  over  of  the  problem  to  the  natives  of  the 
country  for  them  to  settle,  even  although  they 
regard  as  regrettable  Mr.  Wilson's  statement 
that  the  settlement  must  eventually  accord 
with  American  concepts  of  business,  order,  and 
efficiency. 

All  of  these  things  then,  the  social  problem  con- 
notes to  the  Latin  American  of  intelligence.  The 
racial  prejudice  against  half-breeds  in  the  United 
States  connotes  the  same  fears.  Nor  is  it  certain 
that  this  social  line  in  the  United  States  is  not  a 
most  tangible  obstacle  in  the  way  of  convincing 
the  Latin  American  that  we  do  not  intend  aggres- 
sion and  conquest. 

It  is,  therefore,  thoroughly  unfortunate  that 
any  attempt  to  create  a  closer  bond  of  Pan- Ameri- 
canism should  lead  at  once  to  claims  of  social 
equality  which  it  would  be  fatal  for  us  to  deny, 
and  which  it  would  be  almost  equally  ruinous  to 
grant.  How  could  we  logically  continue  to  main- 

299 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

tain  the  present  social  barrier  in  the. United  States 
against  the  negro  and  the  Indian?  There  have 
been  numerous  instances  where  individuals  of 
both  races  have  received  under  certain  circum- 
stances public  and  distinguished  consideration; 
there  are  even  parts  of  the  country  where  some- 
thing approaching  social  equality  for  all  exists; 
but  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  there  is  a  feeling 
as  wide-spread  as  the  country  that  it  would  not  be 
advisable  to  invite  a  negro  or  an  Indian  to  dine 
in  a  conventional  way,  nor  desirable  to  marry 
him  to  one's  daughter.  These  are  the  vital  things. 
To  tolerate  negroes  and  Indians  in  hotels,  theaters, 
and  sleeping-cars  is  a  very  slight  concession,  al- 
though one  which  is  yet  to  be  obtained  in  broad 
areas  of  the  United  States;  but  actual  social 
intercourse  on  precisely  the  same  plane  with 
white  people,  and,  chiefest  of  all,  intermarriage; 
these  are  not  seriously  contemplated  anywhere 
in  the  United  States,  while  the  mere  sugges- 
tion arouses  in  the  South  and  West  passionate 
aversion.  The  social  position  of  negroes  and 
Indians  of  culture  and  intelligence  is  already 
difficult ;  it  would  become  unendurable  the  moment 
Pan- Americanism  became  a  reality.  Its  flagrant 
inconsistency  with  our  own  democratic  and 
social  premises  would  become  so  patent  that  it 

300 


SOCIAL  OBSTACLES 

could  not  be  maintained  in  decency  after  actual 
equality  had  been  conceded  to  the  Latin  Ameri- 
cans. It  is  highly  probable  that  an  actual  major- 
ity of  the  people  of  the  United  States  would  reject 
any  closer  union  with  Latin  America,  if  they  once 
clearly  understood  that  it  involved  beyond  doubt 
or  question  the  granting  of  social  as  well  as  legal 
equality  to  Indians  and  negroes  in  the  United 
States.  It  is  only  too  clear  that  any  closer  union 
would  be  unanimously  rejected  south  of  the  Rio 
Grande  which  did  not  provide  the  most  explicit 
pledges  of  social  equality.  Indeed,  before  any 
sort  of  organic  connection  becomes  possible, 
real  demonstrations  of  social  equality  for  Latin 
Americans,  proving  that  they  are  actually  accepted 
as  equals  in  the  United  States,  would  be  expected 
and  sought  by  the  leaders.  If  we  have  the  slight- 
est impartiality  or  candor  as  students,  we  shall 
recognize  that  they  would  be  foolish  even  to 
contemplate  anything  less. 

How  far  we  are  from  actual  union  with  Latin 
America,  from  cooperation  based  upon  mutual 
trust,  confidence,  acquaintanceship  should  be  pa- 
tent to  the  least  informed.  Those  to  whom  these 
considerations  are  new  can  scarcely  conceive  how 
hollow  and  vain  the  talk  of  close  association  sounds 
to  those  who  have  long  known  these  facts.  While 

301 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

such  a  social  barrier  exists,  faith,  confidence, 
respect,  mutual  credit  in  each  other's  protesta- 
tions seem  difficult  to  predicate.  The  Latin 
Americans  see  it,  however,  as  a  corollary  of  the 
great  premise  that  the  world  is  made  for  the  white 
man,  and  that  only  white  men  are  truly  civilized 
or  able  to  help  the  darker  races  toward  civiliza- 
tion, or  capable  of  assuming  their  guardianship 
through  the  long  generations  while  they  are  being 
transformed  into  the  white  man's  image.  That 
the  red  man  and  the  black  man  do  not  desire 
transformation  seems  never  to  have  occurred  to 
the  white  man,  nor  do  their  protestations  and  re- 
sistance usually  avail.  The  time  is  at  hand  when 
those  races  in  the  world  which  are  not  white  are 
about  to  challenge  these  claims  of  the  white  man 
and  question  their  justice  and  ethics  from  the 
vantage  ground  of  the  white  man's  own  premises 
of  democracy.  They  see  in  the  white  man's 
country  multitudes  of  unsolved  problems,  com- 
bining sorrow,  cruelty,  want,  and  ignorance.  If 
the  premises  of  democracy  and  of  the  white  man's 
logic  confer  upon  him  the  right  to  solve  those 
problems  in  his  own  country  and  to  exclude  the 
interference  of  others,  simply  because  the  country 
is  his  and  because  he  ought  for  that  reason  to 
solve  problems, — they  fail  to  understand  how 

302 


SOCIAL  OBSTACLES 

that  same  logic  can  vest  in  the  white  man  not 
only  a  right  but  a  bounden  duty  to  interfere  in 
their  country  for  a  solution  of  those  same  prob- 
lems. Why  should  the  white  man  deny  a  social 
equality  to  the  red  man,  and  the  yellow  man,  and 
the  black  man,  while  he  refuses  them  the  right  to 
deny  him  equality  in  their  country?  It  is  the 
premises  and  not  the  conclusions  upon  which  we 
differ  from  the  Latin  Americans ;  upon  things  that 
are  as  indelible  and  impossible  to  change  or  con- 
ceal as  race,  color,  and  previous  condition  of 
servitude. 


303 


CHAPTER  VII 
DEFENSIVE  WEAKNESS 

WHAT  now  of  Pan-Americanism  as  a 
solution  of  the  problems  which  the 
republics  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
will  have  to  meet  when  Europe's  victor  appears? 
Would  a  Pan-American  union  bar  his  progress  and 
foil  his  designs?  Would  a  simple  defensive  alli- 
ance between  the  United  States  and  the  Latin 
republics  accomplish  the  same  end  ?  It  will  surely 
be  important  for  us  to  cast  aside  at  this  stage  of 
our  inquiry  hypotheses  and  expectations,  to  con- 
sider only  what  seem  to  be  veritable  facts,  and  to 
estimate  the  probable  success  of  such  a  joint  at- 
tempt to  defend  the  Western  Hemisphere  from 
European  aggression.  If  we  can  show  that  the 
United  States  and  Latin  America  may  by  their 
joint  efforts  conceivably  shield  each  other  from 
the  conqueror,  and  achieve  in  concert  what  neither 
could  have  hoped  to  accomplish  alone,  we  shall  de- 
monstrate something  of  the  very  first  importance. 

304 


DEFENSIVE  WEAKNESS 

We  shall  prove  something  of  equal  significance, 
if  it  becomes  probable  or  even  possible  that  the 
joint  efforts  of  the  republics  would  not  be  likely 
to  resist  the  victor  with  success. 

Edward  Everett  Hale  struck  the  keynote  of 
the  Pan-American  situation  in  a  phrase  intended 
for  a  very  different  purpose:  "No  one  ever  heard 
of  a  man  shouldering  his  musket  to  defend  his 
boarding-house."  To  arouse  individuals  to  self- 
sacrifice  and  lead  them  forth  coolly  to  face 
death,  there  must  be  some  object  to  defend  pre- 
cious beyond  the  need  of  explanation  or  exhorta- 
tion. Even  if  we  assume  the  possession  of  entirely 
adequate  force  by  the  nations  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  to  resist  the  victor,  united  action 
would  still  be  exceedingly  problematical,  because 
the  United  States  and  the  Latin  republics  lack  a 
mutual  interest  to  defend.  The  weakness  of 
Pan-Americanism  as  a  supposed  solution  of  future 
difficulties  lies  in  the  almost  certain  impossibility 
of  securing  the  cooperation  for  any  such  object. 

It  is  a  fallacy  of  the  first  importance  to  suppose 
that  Latin  America  needs  our  protection:  its 
political  independence  is  not  threatened  by  Europe 
because  the  motive  for  conquest  is  almost  entirely 
lacking.  If  generations  in  England  have  deemed 
it  inadvisable  to  make  any  attempt  to  secure 
20  305 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

dominion  by  a  conquest  requiring  the  use  in  a 
distant  continent  of  a  large  European  army,  Ger- 
many has  even  more  vital  objections  to  such  a 
policy  for  her  position  between  France  and  Russia 
makes  dangerous  in  the  extreme  the  dispatching 
of  any  considerable  force  from  the  Fatherland. 
Nor  would  the  conquest  of  South  America  be 
possible  without  the  use  of  a  truly  huge  army. 
Its  defensive  strength  is  great,  not  only  because 
of  its  size,  but  because  the  lack  of  communication 
at  all  suitable  for  military  needs  between  its  vari- 
ous entities  and  between  the  coast  and  the  interior 
would  make  a  series  of  campaigns,  rather  than  a 
single  campaign,  an  absolute  necessity.  To  subdue 
one  state  would  be  eminently  possible;  to  subdue  a 
group  of  states  would  require  military  operations 
of  the  most  serious  description;  the  continent 
would  have  to  be  conquered  piecemeal.  Even 
if  we  estimate  the  military  ability  of  Latin  America 
at  the  minimum  and  take  little  account  of  its 
fierce  determination  to  preserve  its  independence, 
we  shall  be  compelled  to  admit  that  conquest  is 
so  difficult  as  to  be  almost  beyond  the  resources 
of  even  a  first-class  European  power. 

Latin  America,  however,  is  already  lost!  It 
has  been  in  England's  hands  for  nearly  a  century, 
and,  far  from  regretting  the  circumstance,  has 

306 


DEFENSIVE  WEAKNESS 

found  the  connection  profitable  and  one  desirable 
to  continue.  All  the  republics  know  thoroughly 
well  that  England  cherishes  no  designs  against 
their  political  independence;  they  believe  Ger- 
many to  be  also  without  intention  to  conquer  them 
or  even  to  invade  them ;  they  fear  colonization  but 
have  no  other  reason  to  dread  a  closer  economic 
connection  with  England  or  Germany.  Their 
interests  are  the  same  as  those  of  the  Europeans 
and  so  long  as  neither  conquest  nor  colonization 
is  involved,  the  advantages  are  mutual  beyond 
dispute. 

It  would  not  be  wise  at  this  great  crisis  for  us 
to  deny  or  indeed  to  fail  to  recognize  frankly  the 
Latin-American  belief  that  the  real  enemy  against 
whom  they  need  protection  and  of  whose  political 
domination  they  are  certainly  afraid  is  the  United 
States.  They  would  consider  the  weakening  of 
the  position  of  the  United  States  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  at  the  hands  of  Europe's  victor  far 
from  detrimental  to  them,  because  the  present 
arrangement  between  the  United  States  and  Eng- 
land, by  which  the  United  States  has  actual  con- 
trol of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  has  been  almost  their 
only  reason  for  grave  apprehension.  If  the  result 
of  the  present  war  should  be  the  expulsion  of  the 
United  States  from  their  waters,  there  would  be 

307 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

few  serious  thinkers  south  of  the  Rio  Grande 
who  would  not  regard  the  change  as  prima  facie 
beneficial. 

The  second  danger  of  which  they  are  vividly 
conscious  lies  in  the  possibility  of  the  creation  by 
the  United  States  of  some  artificial  situation  which 
would  either  exclude  Europeans  from  the  Latin- 
American  trade  in  favor  of  Americans,  or  which 
would  in  some  way  make  intercourse  with  Europe 
more  difficult.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  they  are 
well  aware  was  aimed  originally  at  England  rather 
than  at  Spain  and  is  still  supposed  to  portend  the 
continued  supremacy  of  the  United  States  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  and  the  right  actually  to 
exclude  Europeans.  If  such  be  its  meaning,  its 
maintenance  or  enforcement  would  not  be  to  the 
best  interests  of  Latin  America.  Inasmuch  as 
the  present  supremacy  of  the  United  States  and 
its  claim  of  paramount  interest  over  European 
nations  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  will  be  the 
factor  really  threatened  by  the  victor,  the  interests 
of  South  America  are  identical  with  those  of 
European  nations  and  are  therefore  not  threatened. 
Indeed  an  alliance  with  the  United  States  against 
Europe's  victor  would  be  an  alliance  intended  to 
maintain  and  preserve  the  very  situation  which 
the  Latin  Americans  consider  least  desirable  and 

308 


DEFENSIVE  WEAKNESS 

whose  continued  existence  is  their  chief  source 
of  anxiety. 

Not  less  deadly  to  cooperation  between  Latin 
America  and  the  United  States  than  this  diverg- 
ence of  interests  is  the  lack  of  mutual  confidence. 
The  fear  in  the  southern  countries  of  aggression 
from  North  America  would  vitally  hamper  any 
defensive  armament  or  any  concerted  action. 
They  would  surely  fear  that  the  defeat  of  the 
victor  by  combined  effort  would  so  strengthen 
the  United  States  as  to  put  the  whole  Western 
Hemisphere  permanently  in  her  hands  and  make 
possible  the  schemes  of  aggression  which  they 
believe  have  been  thwarted  hitherto  by  the  pro- 
tection of  England.  Our  pacific  intentions  pro- 
claimed by  certain  presidents  and  diplomats  arouse 
interest  but  not  credulity.  They  see  too  clearly 
what  we  could  do  to  be  willing  to  credit  the  sup- 
position that  if  circumstances  should  ever  permit, 
we  would  not  embrace  the  opportunity.  This 
lack  of  mutual  confidence  would  make  doubtful 
the  formation  even  of  a  defensive  alliance,  while 
the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  legal  and  administra- 
tive efficiency  would  make  any  closer  bond  too 
weak  to  be  of  value  for  defense.  When  it  is  so 
highly  improbable  that  a  Pan-American  Confede- 
ration would  be  able  to  hold  itself  together  and 

309 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

govern  its  own  largest  members,  where  shall  we 
suppose  it  would  find  the  necessary  strength  and 
efficiency  to  protect  itself  and  its  members  from 
European  invasion?  If  a  confederation  should  be 
formed  between  the  United  States  and  the  Latin 
republics,  it  would  be  an  artificial  unit  with  so 
slender  a  basis  that  it  could  hardly  survive  a 
clash  of  interests  or  the  shock  of  attack. 

These  formidable  obstacles  make  the  defense  of 
the  Western  Hemisphere  by  joint  effort  against 
the  European  victor  improbable.  It  remains  for 
us  to  ask  whether  such  a  defense  is  possible  from  a 
military  and  naval  point  of  view.  The  control 
of  the  sea  would  undoubtedly  be  indispensable. 
Until  the  combined  navies  were  prepared  to  main- 
tain intercourse  by  water  between  the  members 
of  the  Confederation,  or  between  the  various  mem- 
bers of  a  defensive  alliance,  defense  would  be  out 
of  the  question.  The  strategic  weakness  of  the 
position  is  apparent  and  alarming.  Thousands 
of  miles  of  coast  must  be  patrolled,  the  great  com- 
mercial centers,  whose  defense  would  be  imperative 
against  action  by  hostile  fleets,  are  separated  from 
each  other  by  distances  so  great  that  they  could 
not  be  protected  by  a  single  fleet.  New  York  is 
farther  in  point  of  time  from  the  Amazon  and  the 
Amazon  in  turn  from  the  Rio  de  la  Plata  than  the 

310 


DEFENSIVE  WEAKNESS 

United  States  is  from  Europe.  It  is  hardly  credi- 
ble even  that  a  single  fleet  could  defend  Galveston, 
Panama,  and  the  Amazon.  It  certainly  could  not 
do  so  while  England  held  the  Bahamas,  the  Ber- 
mudas, the  Windward  Islands,  Jamaica,  Trinidad, 
and  Barbados.  These  points  alone  control  all 
the  water  routes,  and  a  very  strong  fleet  would 
be  needed  to  take  them  or  to  check  the  operations 
of  a  comparatively  few  commerce  destroyers 
from  such  bases. 

We  should  have  to  maintain  three  fleets,  each 
large  enough  to  dispose  successfully  of  any  forces 
likely  to  be  dispatched  from  Europe:  one  off  the 
United  States  plying  between  New  York  and  the 
Chesapeake;  one  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico;  and  one 
in  the  South  Atlantic.  Another  enormous  fleet, 
large  enough  to  control  the  whole  Atlantic  in 
actual  fact  and  patrol  it  effectively  from  one  end  to 
the  other,  would  be  needed  in  addition.  Cooper- 
ation between  them  in  case  of  attack  would  be 
literally  impossible;  the  victor  could  reach  any 
of  them  from  Europe  in  practically  the  same  time 
that  assistance  could  reach  them  from  the  other 
fleets. 

At  present  there  is  no  such  fleet  in  existence 
and  scarcely  more  than  a  basis  for  one  of  such  size, 
since  our  navy,  even  if  we  assume  its  defenders' 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

statements  to  be  true,  is  barely  sufficient  to  pro- 
tect the  United  States.  Nor  are  the  facilities  on 
either  continent  adequate  for  building  so  large  a 
fleet  in  time  to  be  of  any  avail.  Even  if  it  could  be 
done,  only  the  United  States  could  build  it,  and 
by  whatever  name  it  was  called  it  would  be  none 
the  less  in  reality  the  United  States  fleet  and  would 
have  to  be  manned  in  all  probability  by  Americans. 
The  Latin  Americans  would  be  more  afraid  of  it 
than  of  the  combined  English  and  German  navies, 
because  they  believe  we  have  a  motive  to  use  a 
fleet  against  them  which  they  do  not  believe 
either  the  Germans  or  the  English  possess.  Indeed 
they  very  much  prefer  that  the  supremacy  on  the 
sea  should  remain  where  it  is,  and,  if  lost  by  Eng- 
land, should  pass  to  any  other  nation  than  the 
United  States.  To  allay  such  suspicions  by  the 
creation  of  a  unit  to  be  owned  by  the  various 
republics  and  stationed  at  times  of  peace  in  their 
harbors,  would  create  a  fleet  of  no  use  in  time  of 
war  because  the  distance  between  the  various  points 
is  so  great  as  to  preclude  prompt  cooperation. 
Even  should  the  United  States  and  certain  groups 
of  the  Latin  republics  create  separate  fleets,  the 
suspicions  of  the  intentions  of  the  United  States 
would  still  remain  and  the  superior  naval  ability 
of  the  Americans  would  still  arouse  apprehension 

312 


DEFENSIVE  WEAKNESS 

and  in  time  lead  to  quarrels  and  war.  No  candid 
student  can  fail  to  conclude  that  the  United 
States  is  not  now  in  a  position  to  protect  South 
America  against  European  fleets  and  possesses 
at  present  no  facilities  adequate  for  creating  a 
navy  large  enough  to  perform  the  task. 

Could  the  United  States  army  protect  South 
America  from  invasion  by  European  armies? 
We  are  supposing,  of  course,  that  the  fleet  has 
failed  to  keep  the  Europeans  at  a  distance.  The 
difficulty  of  the  military  defense  of  South  America 
against  invasion  is  similar  to  the  defense  of  the 
Atlantic  Ocean.  A  strategic  position  controlling 
the  whole  continent  is  entirely  lacking;  the  districts 
needing  defense  are  widely  separated;  and  the 
overland  communications  are  so  inadequate  for 
military  needs  that  armies  located  at  certain  cen- 
ters would  be  incapable  of  movement  to  other 
points,  in  time  to  prevent  a  successful  invasion 
by  European  contingents  landed  by  the  fleet 
controlling  the  sea.  The  facility  with  which  the 
aggressor  could  shift  his  attack  would  seem  to 
make  the  defence  of  Latin  America  by  an  American 
army  out  of  the  question,  even  if  we  assume  that 
there  was  such  an  army  and  that  it  could  be  sent 
to  South  America  in  time.  In  addition,  we  should 
have  to  face  a  problem  of  maintaining  an  army  in 

313 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  southern  continent  quite  as  difficult  as  that 
before  the  invader,  because  the  distance  by  sea 
to  the  principal  South  American  centers  from  our 
own  chief  ports  is  practically  the  same  as  from  the 
great  European  ports.  The  distance  by  land 
through  Central  America  is  much  greater  and  the 
difficulty  of  maintaining  an  army  overland  would 
be  enormous  even  if  there  were  all-rail  communica- 
tions between  the  two  continents.  Without  such 
communications,  our  lack  of  control  on  the  sea 
would  spell  our  inability  to  place  an  army  in 
South  America,  or  to  maintain  or  re-enforce  it,  if 
by  good  fortune  we  should  land  it  there.  Nor 
must  we  forget  that  we  are  not  a  military  nation, 
and  not  being  prepared  to  manufacture  munitions 
of  war  at  the  rate  which  modern  warfare  demands, 
we  should  not  be  able  to  maintain  an  army,  be- 
cause we  should  not  be  able  to  make  the  needed 
supplies  fast  enough. 

Needless  to  say,  no  adequate  army  at  present 
exists  for  the  defense  of  Pan-Americanism.  The 
United  States  army  is  small ;  the  South  American 
armies  are  not  much  larger;  the  quality  of  all  is 
much  in  dispute.  While  the  United  States  army 
technically  numbers  about  eighty  thousand  men, 
its  most  ardent  advocates  are  able  to  demonstrate 
the  existence  of  only  about  forty  thousand — a 

3H 


DEFENSIVE  WEAKNESS 

single  army  corps — which  would  be  available  for 
defense  against  invasion  in  the  United  States  or 
for  dispatch  to  South  America.  There  is  grave 
doubt  expressed  even  by  the  defenders  of  the 
army's  efficiency,  of  the  adequacy  of  its  equip- 
ment, of  its  artillery,  and  of  its  supplies  of  ammu- 
nition. Sincere  and  honest  men  who  have  at 
least  no  obvious  prejudice  make  no  secret  of  their 
opinion  that  it  is  not  at  all  what  it  should  be,  while 
the  more  radical  are  apt  to  deny  it  any  efficiency 
at  all.  These  disputes  however  have  little  rela- 
tion to  the  real  issue  we  are  discussing.  Ade- 
quacy is  determined,  not  by  the  quality  of  the 
force,  but  by  the  requirements  of  the  operation. 
A  hundred  thousand  excellent  troops  are  of  no 
avail  at  all  where  a  million  are  necessary.  The 
lowest  figures  cited  by  military  students  for  an 
army  to  defend  the  United  States  is  half  a  million. 
If  there  is  any  question  at  all  as  to  our  ability 
to  equip  and  maintain  indefinitely  one  hundred 
thousand  men,  it  will  be  entirely  obvious  that  we 
are  not  in  the  least  prepared  to  equip  and  maintain 
half  a  million  men.  Nor  should  we  forget  that 
the  defense  of  Pan-Americanism  against  invasion 
will  mean  the  maintenance  at  a  number  of  points 
of  a  force  of  men  amply  large  enough  to  meet  any 
forces  which  an  invader  might  attempt  to  land, 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

and  that  no  invader  would  probably  consider 
coming  with  a  force  as  small  as  one  hundred 
thousand  men.  When  we  cannot  protect  our- 
selves, how  shall  we  also  defend  Latin  America? 

Conquest  by  a  European  aggressor,  it  seems 
more  than  probable,  none  of  the  American  repub- 
lics need  fear,  though  South  America  is  much 
more  nearly  immune  than  is  the  United  States. 
Invasion  is  beyond  doubt  a  physical  possibility 
for  a  first-class  European  power  as  there  are  at 
present  neither  naval  nor  military  forces  in  North 
or  South  America  adequate  in  size  to  prevent  it. 
There  are  many  reasons  to  suppose  that  Euro- 
pean aggression  against  the  United  States  may  be 
undertaken  to  put  an  end  for  a  generation  at  least 
to  any  chance  of  American  expansion  in  Latin 
America.  Far  from  its  being  true  that  Pan- 
Americanism  is  in  danger  from  Europe,  the  proba- 
bilities seem  to  indicate  that  it  is  the  United 
States  which  is  about  to  be  assailed  by  Europe 
in  the  interests  of  Latin  America.  Such  are  the 
ideas  which  convince  the  Latin  Americans  that 
our  claim  to  defend  them  from  European  aggres- 
sion is  prima  facie  an  excuse  for  aggression  on  our 
own  part. 


CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  FUTURE  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

IT  is  difficult  for  an  impartial  student,  who 
studies  honestly  the  facts  of  the  situation 
without  purposes  of  his  own  to  subserve,  to  see 
that  Pan-Americanism  has  a  future.  Beyond  all 
question  it  has  had  no  past  existence  and  is  not  a 
present  reality.  If  we  now  conclude  that  it  has 
no  future,  we  must  declare  it  a  dream  or  a  night- 
mare, a  vision  of  peaceful  associations  or  of  crude 
barbarian  conquest  according  as  our  fundamental 
premises  direct.  The  postulates  which  were  laid 
down  in  a  previous  chapter  would  seem  to  be 
reasonable,  conservative,  and  inevitable.  Pan- 
Americanism  assumes  at  least  the  geographical 
proximity  of  the  two  American  continents  and 
their  apparent  isolation  from  Europe,  with  mutual 
interests  between  them  and  a  divergence  of  in- 
terests with  Europe.  Only  from  such  broad  geo- 
graphic and  economic  features  can  a  closer  bond 
of  any  sort  derive  strength.  For  America  thus  to 

317 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

declare  and  insist  upon  its  independence  from 
Europe  predicates  as  well  the  self-sufficiency  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere  and  its  political  and  eco- 
nomic independence  of  Europe.  It  does  not  ne- 
cessarily connote  absolute  isolation  or  the  refusal 
to  trade  with  Europe,  but  an  ability  to  dispense 
with  the  European  connection  should  it  become 
advisable  or  expedient  in  time  of  war.  Not  less 
important  would  be  mutual  trust  and  confidence 
between  the  various  American  states,  with  its  roots 
deep  in  mutual  intercourse  and  association.  The 
purpose  of  a  closer  union  would  be  the  need  for 
mutual  aid  and  protection  against  Europe  (for 
against  Europe  Pan-Americanism  is  directed),  and 
the  probability  that  the  American  states  would  be 
able  to  furnish  each  other  from  their  own  resources 
the  military  or  naval  strength  to  make  good  their 
independence  of  Europe,  should  it  be  questioned 
in  arms. 

Unless  we  are  grievously  misled  by  Latin  Ameri- 
cans themselves,  as  well  as  by  foreign  observers, 
none  of  these  prerequisites  exist,  and  without  them, 
he  will  be  indeed  a  bold  man  who  will  suppose  that 
any  sort  of  a  connection  worthy  of  the  name  can 
be  established.  The  weakest  conceivable  relation 
— a  defensive  military  and  naval  understanding 
between  the  sovereign  republics  as  sovereign 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

states  without  administrative  relations  of  any  sort 
— predicates  mutual  confidence  and  a  mutual 
need  for  protection.  Neither  exists.  The  weakest 
economic  and  financial  bond — a  customs  or  fiscal 
union  of  some  sort  providing  for  freedom  of  trade 
and  a  uniformity  of  currency,  weights,  and 
measures — would  rest  upon  the  belief  that  the 
commercial  relations  between  the  American  states 
were  more  important  to  them  than  their  relations 
with  Europe.  The  contrary  seems  to  be  the  truth. 
A  Pan-American  Court  for  business  disputes,  re- 
quiring a  compromise  between  the  legal  precepts 
of  the  southern  continent  and  those  of  the  United 
States,  would  be  a  possibility,  but  could  hardly  be 
efficient,  strong,  or  popular  without  a  greater 
degree  of  mutual  understanding  and  acquaint- 
anceship than  seems  to  exist.  A  Pan-American 
confederation  and  administrative  bond  between 
sovereign  states,  with  something  approaching  a 
federal  executive  and  possibly  a  legislature,  can 
be  real,  only  as  the  expression  in  institutional  life 
of  a  mutuality  of  economic  interests  and  an  iden- 
tity of  political  ideas,  of  a  mutual  confidence  and 
an  identity  of  policy.  None  of  these  exist.  In 
short,  not  one  of  these  conceptions  from  the  slight- 
est to  the  more  elaborate  seems  based  upon  realities. 
On  the  contrary,  Pan-Americanism  is  likely  to 

319 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

impress  an  impartial  mind  as  an  absolutely  ar- 
tificial and  sentimental  concept,  diametrically 
opposed  to  the  racial,  economic,  political,  legal, 
and  social  interests  of  the  American  republics.  A 
concept  so  contrary  to  all  the  fundamental  factors 
in  the  situation  on  whose  existence  all  observers 
quite  agree,  an  ideal  which  so  clearly  lacks  an 
adequate  motive  in  its  own  fundamental  assump- 
tions, demonstrates  to  the  South  Americans  very 
convincingly  that  the  advocacy  of  Pan-American- 
ism is  intended  to  further  the  aggressive  schemes 
of  the  United  States  by  clothing  them  in  so  gracious 
and  idealistic  a  form. 

The  day  is  at  hand  when  the  Latin  American 
republics  will  challenge  Pan-Americanism,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  the  assumption  by  the 
United  States  of  the  supremacy  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  As  soon  as  a  convenient  occasion 
offers,  some  public  manifestation  of  this  intention 
will  appear.  The  movement  is  sweeping  and  in- 
clusive. It  will  deny  that  there  is  any  such  thing 
as  the  rightful  supremacy  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere; it  will  deny  the  United  States  any  greater 
interests,  any  more  significant  position,  any 
broader  rights,  or  any  more  extended  privilege 
than  the  smallest  Central  American  republic. 
Equality  for  all  independent  nations  in  the  West- 

320 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

ern  Hemisphere,  the  economic  and  political 
equality  of  European  powers  and  of  all  American 
powers  will  be  proclaimed  as  the  true  doctrine  of 
Pan-Americanism.  It  will  place  the  assumption  of 
supremacy  or  of  paramount  interests  in  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere  by  any  one  of  the  resident  powers 
on  the  same  basis  and  subject  to  the  same  obloquy 
and  scorn  as  the  advancement  of  a  similar  claim 
by  one  of  the  European  powers.  It  will  demand 
recognition  of  the  salient  features  of  the  situation 
as  they  really  are  and  insist  upon  the  acceptance 
of  political  and  economic  postulates  based  upon 
them,  instead  of  upon  economic  and  political 
phenomena  of  the  past  which  have  been  obsolete 
for  generations.  There  seems  to  be  at  present  no 
essential  reason  why  the  same  sort  of  relationship 
should  not  prevail  between  the  republics  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  as  obtain  between  those  same 
states  and  European  nations.  There  are  no  fun- 
damental obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  creation  and 
acceptance  of  an  identity  of  relations  which  do  not 
exist  between  European  nations;  there  are  present 
all  the  fundamental  factors  of  international  asso- 
ciation upon  which  rest  the  diplomatic  intercourse 
of  the  great  powers  themselves.  In  Latin  America, 
Pan-Americanism  stands  for  equality  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  not  for  supremacy ;  it  stands 

ax  321 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

for  the  inter-relationship  of  the  American  states 
with  each  other  and  with  European  states  on  the 
same  basis;  it  predicates  no  supremacy  for  one 
but  the  independence  of  all,  not  the  paramount 
interests  of  one,  but  complementary  interests  in 
all.  So  far  as  the  other  is  concerned,  each  should 
become  foreign  territory  and  stand  upon  the  same 
political,  diplomatic,  and  economic  footing  as  the 
great  powers  in  their  relations  with  one  another. 

Future  alliances  in  Latin  America  are  not  likely 
to  include  all  the  republics  within  one  administra- 
tive or  fiscal  bond  and  still  less  within  a  single 
military  alliance.  Several  confederations  are  more 
probable  than  one  and  the  continuance  of  the  pres- 
ent political  independence  of  all  is  more  probable 
than  either  contingency.  If  any  closer  relationship 
should  be  established  between  the  Latin  American 
republics  and  some  other  power,  it  will  not  be 
inter-continental  but  international;  its  basis  will 
not  be  a  geographical  assumption  or  the  accident  of 
historical  discovery  and  colonization,  but  the 
strong  racial,  temperamental,  and  administrative 
ties  binding  South  and  Central  America  to  the 
Latin  races  in  Europe — Spain,  Portugal,  Italy, 
and  France.  With  them  an  economic  bond  would 
be  also  far  more  mutual  than  any  alliance  with  the 
United  States  could  conceivably  be,  although  at 

322 


THE  FUTURE  OF  PAN-AMERICANISM 

present  the  closest  economic  ties  are  those  with 
England  and  Germany.  Political  conquest  by 
European  nations  of  South  America  is  as  remote  as 
the  conquest  of  the  United  States.  Immigration 
from  Europe  is  as  probable  and  will  very  likely  be 
as  potent  in  its  effect  upon  the  southern  continent 
as  has  been  European  immigration  in  the  United 
States.  The  real  conquest  indeed  which  South 
and  Central  America  have  to  fear  is  the  steady 
influx  of  alien  blood,  institutions,  language,  and 
interests,  which  slowly  but  surely  may  dominate 
the  existing  peoples,  their  ideals  and  govern- 
mental methods  by  reason  of  their  greater  virility, 
and  create  a  new  South  America  in  which  the 
descendants  of  the  present  population  might  con- 
ceivably be  robbed  of  all  direction,  so  that  their 
imprint  upon  the  country  and  its  habits  of  thought 
would  be  erased. 


323 


BOOK  IV 
THE  FUTURE 


325 


The  Future 

CHAPTER  I 
CONCRETE  ISSUES 

A?  present  four  concrete  problems  or  groups 
of  problems  face  the  American  people.1 
First  and  foremost,  we   must  take  into 
consideration  the  entire  control  of  the  ocean  high- 
ways to  the  United  States  by  a  European  power 
and  the  complete  dependence  of  the  foreign  trade 
of   the   United    States    upon    foreign    merchant 
marines.     This  is  the  natural  effect,  the  inevitable 

1  The  author  wishes  to  remind  his  readers  that  he  is  dealing  in 
the  Fourth  Book,  "  The  Future,"  with  possibilities  and  probabili- 
ties, and  is  attempting  to  balance  against  each  other  the  more 
plausible  and  important  solutions  suggested.  He  is  not  to  be 
understood  as  in  any  sense  advocating  one  rather  than  another. 
In  particular,  he  disclaims  any  attempt  to  represent  his  own 
views.  In  these  as  in  other  chapters,  many  statements,  if  iso- 
lated and  compared  with  similarly  isolated  fragments  from 
earlier  chapters,  will  appear  contradictory  unless  the  student 
carefully  remembers  that  they  are  intended  to  represent  the 
contradictory  views  held  by  different  sections  of  the  community. 

327 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

legacy  of  the  supremacy  of  the  sea.  It  is  now  neces- 
sary for  us  to  ask  whether  this  is  desirable.  Should 
we  view  its  continuance  with  favor  and  regard  with 
complacency  our  dependence,  for  our  contact  with 
the  rest  of  the  world  and  with  the  rest  of  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere,  upon  the  good  will  of  some  Euro- 
pean nation?  Should  we  calculate  literally  that 
its  forbearance  or  its  own  peculiar  interests  and 
the  complications  of  international  politics  together 
with  the  strength  of  the  strategic  position  of  the 
United  States  would  counsel  it  to  extend  our  privi- 
leges to  the  point  of  freedom  of  trade?  Will  a 
change  in  the  mistress  of  the  seas,  a  shifting  of  the 
balance  of  power  in  Europe,  and  the  rise  of  new 
and  powerful  economic  entities  in  Europe  change 
the  policy  of  the  nation  controlling  the  sea  to  our 
detriment?  If  we  decide  that  our  dependence  and 
existence  by  the  sufferance  and  good  will  of  some 
foreign  nation  is  either  undesirable  or  inexpedient, 
the  prerequisites  of  substantial  independence  of 
all  nations  will  be  a  subject  of  the  utmost  moment. 
The  type  of  preparedness  which  it  would  involve, 
the  extent  of  armament  required  should  war  be- 
come inevitable, — these  will  be  more  than  merely 
interesting  subjects. 

If  on  the  other  hand  it  seems  for  any  reason 
whatever  desirable  to  depend  upon  the  present 

328 


CONCRETE  ISSUES 

connection  or  relationship,  will  it  be  expedient  for 
us  to  raise,  with  insistence,  questions  that  may  im- 
peril our  cordial  relations  with  the  sea-power,  and 
shall  we  continue  to  espouse  policies  in  direct  con- 
travention to  its  well-known  precepts  and  inter- 
ests? The  consequences,  if  we  act  in  this  manner, 
we  must  carefully  appreciate.  Nor  must  we 
forget  that  the  supremacy  of  the  Pacific  affects 
us  as  well  as  the  supremacy  of  the  Atlantic  and 
of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Should  a  German  victory 
throw  the  one  into  the  hands  of  Germany,  the 
other  will  unquestionably  fall  into  the  hands  of 
Japan,  and  the  tensity  of  our  present  relations 
with  that  nation  will  then  force  us  to  ask  whether 
we  are  now  in  a  position  to  maintain  our  present 
contentions  with  Japan  the  moment  she  becomes 
mistress  of  the  Pacific.  Will  not  a  new  policy  in 
the  far  East  become  imperative,  at  the  sacrifice 
of  consistency  and  even  of  existing  interests? 

We  have  long  claimed  the  supremacy  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere  and  have  predicated  our 
paramount  interests  in  it  as  against  any  European 
power,  but  our  claim  has  not  yet  been  admitted 
in  Europe  and  in  South  America  and  is  more  than 
likely  to  be  challenged  in  the  near  future  by  both. 
If  either  or  both  raise  the  question  of  the  validity 
of  such  an  interpretation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 

329 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

can  we  maintain  it?  Is  it  desirable  or  expedient 
that  we  should  do  so?  Assuming  that  we  might 
attain  the  actual  supremacy  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, does  a  paramount  interest  exist  which 
makes  such  action  essential  or  desirable? 

The  third  issue  which  we  have  to  face  is  that 
of  imperialism,  of  expansion  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, of  the  maintenance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
in  the  sense  of  policing  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and 
the  smaller  Latin-American  countries.  If  we 
assume  this  is  just,  can  we  also  prove  that  it  is 
expedient?  If  we  believe  that  it  is  consonant 
with  their  interests,  can  we  also  show  that  it 
accords  with  our  own?  Indeed,  it  will  be  imper- 
ative for  us  to  ask  ourselves  whether  we  have 
national  ambitions  for  the  acquisition  of  territory 
outside  the  present  continental  limitations  of  the 
United  States  and  to  reach  some  conclusion  as  to 
the  object  of  acquiring  such  territory,  of  the  like- 
lihood of  opposition,  and  of  our  ability  to  meet  it 
successfully. 

In  the  imperialist  problem  of  the  far  East  lies 
the  fourth  question  for  decision.  Are  the  Philip- 
pines the  key  to  the  open  door  of  the  Eastern 
trade?  Shall  we  defend  them  if  they  are  assailed, 
not  out  of  any  love  for  the  Filipinos,  not  with 
any  notion  that  they  are  commercially  profitable 

330 


CONCRETE  ISSUES 

to  the  Government  or  to  us  as  individuals,  but 
because  their  strategic  position  makes  us  a  far 
Eastern  power  and  gives  us  a  position,  if  not  a 
right,  from  which  to  defend  and  promote  our  eco- 
nomic interests  in  China?  If  we  decide  to  exclude 
the  Japanese  from  the  United  States,  will  it  not 
affect  our  relations  in  the  far  East?  Shall  we  ask 
full  privileges  in  Japan  for  Americans  and  deny  the 
Japanese  similar  privileges  in  the  United  States? 
Will  not  our  ambitions  in  Asia,  provided  we  have 
them,  dictate  our  treatment  of  Asiatics  in  the 
United  States? 

These  problems — an  independent  position  on 
the  sea,  the  supremacy  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, imperialism  in  Asia — are  neither  comple- 
mentary nor  entirely  consistent  unless  we  maintain 
a  strong  affirmative,  and  therefore  an  aggressive, 
position  upon  all  of  them.  We  cannot  expect  to 
maintain  our  supremacy  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere and  continue  to  depend  upon  some  Euro- 
pean power  for  the  use  of  its  merchant  marine ;  we 
cannot  hope  to  play  an  important  part  in  Asia 
unless  we  are  within  measurable  distance  of  con- 
trolling the  Pacific;  we  can  scarcely  expect  to  ac- 
quire territory  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  without 
meeting  opposition  and  without  sacrificing  the 
ideals  of  Pan-Americanism. 

33i 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Inevitably,  one  and  all  reduce  themselves  to  the 
question  of  armament.  If  certain  policies  are 
desirable,  if  certain  objects  are  to  be  attained,  if 
we  cherish  certain  ambitions,  extensive  armament 
will  be  a  prerequisite  of  their  consummation. 
The  non-military  character  of  our  organization, 
our  traditional  policy  of  peace,  and  our  dislike  of 
aggression  must  be  carefully  considered  in  rela- 
tion to  these  four  problems.  If  we  shall  decide 
against  extensive  armament,  it  will  be,  so  far  as 
these  problems  are  concerned,  equivalent  to  a 
decision  for  disarmament.  Inadequate  force  will 
be  the  same  as  no  force  at  all;  the  expenditure  of 
a  thousand  dollars  is  sheer  waste  when  a  million 
is  necessary. 


332 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  PREREQUISITES  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

THAT  American  goods  should  be  carried  in 
American  ships  and  protected  by  a  strong 
United  States  navy  is  a  proposition  unlikely 
to  be  disputed  but  nevertheless  one  which  we 
must  examine  rather  closely  before  answering 
categorically.  If  patriotism  seems  to  counsel  an 
affirmative  reply,  discretion  and  expediency,  with 
economic  advantages  in  mind,  may  argue  in  the 
negative.  Nor  will  a  decision  that  must  be  ad- 
vanced at  all  costs  prove  by  any  means  that  the 
prerequisites  of  its  attainment  are  within  our 
power. 

The  ethics  of  independence  are  literally  those 
of  self-defense:  the  unassailable  right  of  every 
nation  to  control  the  factors  essential  to  its  terri- 
torial integrity,  its  economic  prosperity,  and  its  in- 
ternational status.  As  against  other  communities 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  must  be  supreme 
and  of  this  principle  we  can  admit  no  contraven- 

333 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

tion.  Our  national  interests  and  in  particular 
our  national  honor  can  never  make  anything  less 
than  independence  a  fact  to  be  regarded  by  the 
American  people  with  complacency  and  satisfac- 
tion. 

The  economic  desirability  of  independence  is 
by  no  means  to-day  a  matter  of  assumption.  Since 
the  United  States  became  an  integral  part  of  the 
interdependent  international  economic  fabric,  its 
access  to  the  markets  of  the  world  is  not  merely 
desirable,  nor  in  the  least  something  permissive, 
but  an  economic  necessity  imperative  for  our 
welfare.  On  the  assumption  of  the  continuance 
of  intercourse  our  whole  economic  fabric  is  built. 
We  definitely  depend  upon  the  sale  of  our  prod- 
ucts and  manufactured  goods  to  other  nations 
and  are  as  thoroughly  dependent  for  our  physical 
existence  upon  the  prompt  return  of  their  com- 
modities. This  fact  has  changed  in  all  its  more 
important  aspects  the  relations  of  the  power  in 
control  of  the  sea  to  other  nations.  In  the  past, 
England  found  a  great  navy  the  bulwark  of  her 
existence  because  it  protected  the  imports  of 
food  and  raw  materials  upon  which  her  national 
existence  depended.  Other  nations  were  able 
to  acquiesce  in  her  supremacy  because  their 
importations  were  by  no  means  as  essential  to 

334 


THE  PREREQUISITES  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

their  own  welfare.  While  it  is  still  true  that  Eng- 
land draws  from  foreign  sources  a  larger  propor- 
tion of  her  maintenance  than  other  nations,  it  is  no 
longer  true  that  her  prosperity  is  more  dependent 
than  that  of  others  upon  freedom  of  access  to  the 
world's  markets.  The  difference  is  now  one  in 
degree  rather  than  in  kind  and  is  apparent  rather 
than  substantive.  The  Germans  have  built  a 
large  merchant  marine  and  have  created  a  great 
fleet  for  the  express  purpose  of  holding  in  their 
own  hands  factors  able  to  establish  that  continued 
contact  with  the  markets  of  the  world  which  is 
to-day  the  paramount  interest  of  Germany.  Ad- 
visedly, she  has  decided  that  independence  of  the 
sea-power  is  indispensable.  This  change  in  the 
situation  may  prevent  other  nations  from  con- 
ceding longer  England's  paramount  interest  in  the 
sea  and  lead  them  to  insist  that  all  nations  now 
possess  the  same  interest  in  freedom  of  intercourse, 
even  though  it  may  differ  in  degree.  Freedom  of 
access  to  the  world's  markets  beyond  the  possi- 
bility of  interference  by  any  nation  may  become 
an  international  premise. 

The  economic  results  to  the  United  States  of 
independence  of  the  sea-power  are  therefore  clear. 
It  would  provide  for  the  continuance  of  our  con- 
tact with  the  international  market  upon  which 

335 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

depends  our  prosperity.  The  profits  of  freight, 
brokerage,  and  insurance,  which  now  are  paid  to 
England,  would  come  to  us.  It  would  free  Ameri- 
can trade  from  all  the  influence  of  alterations  in 
European  alliances  and  from  the  effects  of  political 
and  military  events  in  Europe,  placing  us  beyond 
that  inevitable  influence,  which  all  such  events 
exert  to-day  upon  international  markets  and  the 
world's  trade.  From  arbitrary  interference  of 
any  kind  it  would  deliver  us.  We  would  be  able 
to  compel  others  to  accord  our  interests  the  same 
attention  they  would  expect  all  nations  of  equal 
wealth  and  international  standing  to  accord  their 
own.  It  would  assure  beyond  cavil  our  interna- 
tional economic  status  and  privileges. 

Nor  are  the  economic  gains  of  independence  by 
any  means  those  of  greatest  interest  to  us  in  this 
inquiry.  Independence  of  the  sea-power  is  in 
itself  a  prerequisite  of  independent  action  by  the 
United  States  in  foreign  affairs,  a  prerequisite  of 
territorial  expansion,  of  imperialism,  of  Pan- 
Americanism,  and  indeed  of  any  clash  with  Europe's 
victor  into  which  we  entered  with  reasonable  ex- 
pectation of  a  successful  issue.  Until  we  are  free 
from  the  English  merchant  fleet  and  from  the  con- 
trol of  all  the  approaches  to  the  Western  Hemisphere 
by  the  English  navy,  we  shall  not  be  able  to  act 

336 


THE  PREREQUISITES  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

in  foreign  affairs  contrary  to  the  policies  and  in- 
terests of  the  sea-power  without  immediately  en- 
tailing upon  ourselves  an  economic  crisis  of  the 
first  magnitude.  To  attempt  independent  action 
in  diplomacy  before  we  take  control  of  the  sea 'in 
earnest  will  actually  compel  the  sea-power,  whether 
in  the  hands  of  England  or  Germany,  to  destroy 
our  commerce  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  and  ruin 
our  economic  fabric.  Independence  is  not  a 
commercial  problem  alone  but  a  question  of 
international  status.  Yet  in  the  last  analysis  the 
desirability  of  our  complete  independence  of  the  sea- 
power  involves  the  probable  cost  not  only  of  win- 
ning it  but  of  retaining  it,  as  well  as  the  desirability 
of  independent  action  in  foreign  affairs  and  the 
probability  of  our  desire  to  prosecute  policies 
contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  power  likely  to 
control  the  seas.  If  policies  contrary  to  the  past 
or  present  interests  of  the  sea-power  are  essential 
to  our  future  prosperity,  independence  will  be- 
come a  fundamental  prerequisite  of  our  policy. 
If  the  ends  we  must  subserve  are  practically 
identical  with  those  of  the  sea-power,  an  alliance 
with  it  will  secure  them. 

The  first  prerequisite  of  independence  is  not  at 
all  a  merchant  marine,  but  an  adequate  merchant 
marine, — one  large  enough  to  render  us  independ- 

aa  337 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

ent  in  fact  of  the  world  itself,  one  considerable 
enough  to  carry  the  whole  of  our  exports  and 
imports  in  time  of  war,  when  the  belligerent  status 
of  part  of  the  world's  fleets  might  otherwise  de- 
prive us  of  our  necessary  contact.  In  other  words 
we  must  gauge  the  essentials  of  independence 
not  by  the  requirements  necessary  to  cope  with 
normal  conditions  but  with  those  imperative  in 
handling  any  abnormal  situation  which  might 
arise.  When  we  speak  of  independence  there- 
fore we  are  talking  less  of  existing  facts  than  of 
possibilities. 

The  second  essential  is  a  system  of  exchange 
in  the  hands  of  American  bankers,  providing  not 
only  adequate  exchange  facilities  with  Europe 
but  the  establishment  in  all  parts  of  the  world  of 
such  branch  banks  as  are  needed  to  deal  without 
question  with  the  entire  volume  of  American  trade. 
At  present,  like  most  countries,  we  are  largely 
dependent  upon  London  exchange,  and  through 
London  our  business  with  all  the  less  developed 
parts  of  the  world  is  done.  No  independence  can 
be  real  until  we  are  freed  absolutely  from  this 
situation.  Nor  is  this  demand  to  be  satisfied 
by  the  creation  of  agencies  which  merely  make 
direct  exchange  with  all  parts  of  the  world  possible. 
The  facilities  provided  must  be  such  as  to  make 

338 


THE  PREREQUISITES  OF  INDEPENDENCE  ' 

direct  exchange  profitable  and  desirable,  not  only 
for  American  merchants  but  for  their  foreign 
customers. 

The  third  indispensable  prerequisite  is  the 
control  of  the  ocean  highways  by  the  United 
States  fleet,  so  that  our  contact  with  Europe  and 
the  Mediterranean,  our  control  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  our  trade  in  South  America,  and  our  com- 
merce with  the  far  East  and  the  Islands  of  the 
East,  is  assured  beyond  peradventure.  Here 
however  we  are  not  able  to  measure  the  means 
and  methods  necessary  to  secure  independence  by 
calculations  based  upon  the  probable  exigencies 
of  our  own  polity.  While  the  European  situation 
retains  its  present  characteristics,  the  power 
controlling  the  sea  will  consider  its  authority  a 
domestic  necessity  of  primary  importance  and 
will  never  maintain  it  purely  for  the  sake  of  con- 
trolling the  approaches  to  the  United  States  or  of 
dictating  to  us  our  relationship  with  other  nations. 
It  will  be  necessary  for  us  to  realize  that  when  we 
challenge  it  in  our  own  interests  we  raise  the  much 
larger  issue  of  the  national  integrity  of  the  sea- 
power  and  its  domestic  defenses  against  European 
aggression.  For  Germany  this  is  no  more  a 
purely  international  issue  than  it  is  for  England; 
both  regard  it  as  a  domestic  issue  of  the  very  first 

339 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

consequence.  We  must  prepare  to  assail  the 
means  England  has  taken  to  protect  her  inter- 
national .status  and  her  actual  existence,  not 
merely  her  dispositions  for  patrolling  the  Atlantic 
or  her  fleet  in  American  waters;  to  challenge  her 
control  of  our  approaches  will  at  once  raise  the 
issue  of  her  supremacy  anywhere,  even  in  the 
English  Channel.  To  build  a  fleet  large  enough 
to  conquer  the  European  power  in  control  of  the 
sea  may  not  be  necessary,  but  we  must  have  a 
fleet  at  least  large  enough  to  threaten  its  exist- 
ence by  making  a  battle  too  dangerous  to  be 
accepted.  Undoubtedly  this  will  mean  a  very 
large  fleet  of  high  efficiency. 

England  will  object  almost  as  vitally  to  a  great 
American  merchant  marine.  Her  notion  of  an 
adequate  merchant  marine  for  herself  is  based 
upon  the  number  of  ships  needed  in  time  of  war 
to  carry  the  supplies  on  which  she  depends.  In 
other  words,  her  merchant  marine  must  be  placed 
in  time  of  peace  on  a  war  footing  and  requires  for 
its  support  in  time  of  peace  a  very  great  volume 
of  freight  for  transport.  So  large  a  merchant 
marine  cannot  be  maintained  by  subsidies  and 
the  nation  can  afford  to  own  it  only  as  long  as 
it  sustains  itself.  Inasmuch  as  the  amount  of 
trade  in  the  world  at  any  one  time  is  more  or  less 

340 


THE  PREREQUISITES  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

limited,  the  English  must  secure  an  abnormal 
amount  of  ocean  commerce  to  keep  their  merchant 
marine  on  this  war  footing  in  time  of  peace.  The 
prosperity  of  her  fleet  and  therefore  its  existence 
is  immediately  threatened  by  the  creation  of  other 
great  fleets  which  rob  her  own  of  its  livelihood  by 
taking  from  it  a  part  of  the  world's  carrying 
trade.  As  the  English  fleet  already  conveys  the 
bulk  of  the  world's  trade,  the  creation  of  any  other 
merchant  marine  is  certain  to  affect  its  profits, 
and  if  to  the  German  fleet  is  added  a  great  Ameri- 
can merchant  fleet,  a  serious  crisis  will  result  for 
English  shipping  of  a  nature  which  the  sea-power 
can  solve  only  by  aggressive  action. 

An  army  is  absolutely  essential  to  prevent  the 
existing  sea-power  from  putting  undue  pressure 
upon  us  while  our  own  fleets  are  building.  If 
England  or  Germany  invades  us  with  an  army  they 
can  of  course  take  possession  of  that  which  the 
sea-power  is  intended  to  protect,  the  country  it- 
self. Unless  we  are  ready  to  defend  ourselves 
on  land,  we  can  be  periodically  compelled  to 
sacrifice  everything  gained  on  the  sea  in  order  to 
rid  ourselves  of  the  invading  army.  Independence 
cannot  therefore  be  attempted  without  the  crea- 
tion at  home  of  an  army  large  enough  to  render  a 
successful  invasion  of  the  country  so  problematical 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

that  no  European  power  will  attempt  it.  We  do 
not  wish  to  fight,  but  under  the  circumstances  we 
can  avoid  fighting  only  by  making  it  more  dan- 
gerous to  the  aggressor  than  a  victory  will  be  worth. 
An  army  of  less  than  half  a  million  men  will  be 
entirely  inadequate,  and  only  circumstances  can 
show  whether  a  half-million  men,  thoroughly 
trained  and  elaborately  equipped,  will  be  sufficient 
to  make  us  immune. 

Let  us  not  evade  the  real  issue  by  needless 
quibbling.  Under  present  circumstances  an  at- 
tempt by  the  United  States  to  ensure  its  independ- 
ence of  the  sea-power  involves  an  attack  upon 
England  and  an  extensive  alteration  in  England's 
present  position  in  the  world;  nor  will  the  situa- 
tion be  strikingly  different  should  Germany  take 
England's  place.  Whatever  our  purpose,  whatever 
its  justification,  we  shall  still  be  adopting  a  policy 
whose  results  for  other  nations  cannot  fail  to  be 
interpreted  as  aggression.  From  them  we  shall 
be  attempting  to  take  something  which  they  now 
have — a  circumstance  which  will  go  far  to  close 
their  ears  to  any  arguments  tending  to  prove  that 
they  never  should  have  had  it  and  that  they  pos- 
sess at  the  present  day  no  right  to  it.  The  fact 
will  still  remain — they  are  losing  something  and  we 
are  getting  it.  To  them  it  will  be  aggression  and 

342 


THE  PREREQUISITES  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

with  it  they  will  deal  accordingly.  However  just 
therefore  or  expedient  independence  may  be  for 
us,  we  must  not  forget  that  it  will  practically 
involve  us  in  military  and  naval  measures  essen- 
tially identical  with  a  lively  aggressive  attack 
upon  the  power  in  control  of  the  sea.  If  we  hesi- 
tate before  adopting  a  policy  which  is  aggression 
even  in  appearance,  or  to  maintain  it  with  the 
utmost  determination  by  extensive  military  and 
naval  measures,  we  shall  do  well  to  refrain  from 
talking  of  the  desirability  of  independence.  It  is 
to  be  secured  and  maintained  in  no  other  way, 
once  we  have  won  it. 

The  difference  between  security  and  independ- 
ence is  almost  as  great  as  the  distance  between 
the  antipodes.  For  security  we  ask  merely 
a  probable  safety  from  actual  violence,  and  it 
does  not  make  a  great  deal  of  difference  to  us 
whether  our  security  rests  upon  arms  or  upon 
strategic  factors  in  our  own  or  the  European 
situation.  That  we  are  not  in  actual  present 
danger  of  violent  conquest  suffices.  For  inde- 
pendence on  the  other  hand,  it  is  scarcely  enough 
to  be  certain  beyond  any  reasonable  doubt  that 
we  can  resist  any  possible  assault  which  can  be 
delivered.  All  eventualities  and  possibilities  be- 
come of  importance  and  we  must  prepare  for  all 

343 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

as  if  they  were  actually  upon  us.  In  providing 
for  security  we  may  eliminate  everything  beyond 
the  clearest  probabilities;  in  preparing  for  inde- 
pendence we  must  make  ready  to  meet  even  the 
remotest  possibilities.  In  the  one,  we  shall  be 
satisfied  if  we  can  avoid  the  worst ;  in  the  other,  we 
consciously  set  our  aim  upon  the  attainment  of 
the  best  possible  and  make  up  our  minds  to  be 
satisfied  with  nothing  less. 

The  character  of  modern  warfare  makes  oppo- 
sition to  the  victor  by  the  United  States  futile 
unless  we  undertake  truly  elaborate  preparations 
in  the  very  near  future.  Those  who  expect  him 
to  be  too  exhausted  at  the  end  of  the  war  for  ag- 
gression in  pursuit  of  his  ambition  are  reckoning 
without  their  host.  Whatever  the  economic  ex- 
haustion in  Europe  may  be,  the  army  and  navy 
which  control  the  land  and  sea  will  undoubtedly 
be  the  largest  and  best  equipped  that  the  world 
has  ever  known,  while  their  training  and  equip- 
ment will  have  been  carried  by  the  war  itself  to  a 
point  of  perfection  of  which  men  scarcely  dream 
to-day.  To  meet  such  a  victor  must  we  prepare, 
and  unless  we  make  adequate  preparations  for 
the  conflict  it  were  better  that  we  made  none  at 
all.  Security  we  may  attain  at  a  relatively  small 
cost;  but  for  independence  we  shall  have  to  pay 

344 


THE  PREREQUISITES  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

the  price  which  the  victor  sets  upon  it  and  not  a 
price  which  we  ourselves  predetermine. 

Can  we  afford  independence?  Will  not  the  cost 
of  adequate  armament  be  prohibitive?  No  im- 
partial student  will  hesitate  to  reply  in  the  negative. 
We  can  easily  afford  with  our  vast  resources  to 
do  what  the  European  states  have  done  with  half 
as  much,  if  only  we  consider  the  object  worthy. 
Indeed  we  already  have  the  expense  of  armament 
without  its  protection.  While  the  United  States 
army  is  hardly  as  bad  as  the  most  radical  of  its 
critics  claim,  there  can  be  no  doubt  whatever  that 
in  comparison  with  European  armies  it  is  by  far 
the  most  expensive  and  the  least  efficient  in  the 
world.  Our  army  annually  costs  (according  to 
figures  recently  compiled  by  one  of  the  Peace 
Foundations)  $1314  a  man  while  the  German 
army  costs  $306,  the  French  army  $291,  and  the 
English  $378.  Our  average  expense  is  more  than 
four  times  that  of  any  European  nation  for  the 
men  actually  in  the  field,  and,  while  we  pay  our 
men  higher  wages  than  any  other  nation,  the  real 
difference  in  expense  is  not  in  that  item. 

If  we  put  the  issue  thus,  the  result  is  little  short 
of  staggering.  We  have  paid  recently  over  one 
hundred  millions  of  dollars  a  year  for  our  army 
while  Germany  has  expended  on  hers  two  hundred 

345 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

millions.  She  has  produced  the  largest  and  best- 
equipped  standing  army  the  world  has  known, 
one  seven  times  as  numerous  as  ours  and,  at  a 
moderate  computation,  more  than  ten  times  as 
efficient,  at  just  about  double  the  cost.  The  total 
expenditure  of  France  in  1912  was  two  hundred 
and  fifty-nine  millions  of  dollars  for  which  she  had 
to  show,  a  navy  fourth  in  size  and  at  least  third 
in  efficiency  in  the  world,  an  active  army  of  over 
six  hundred  thousand  men  and  a  reserve  army  of 
about  four  millions,  which  were  put  into  the  field 
at  a  few  days'  notice.  The  French  artillery  corps 
was  supposedly  the  largest  and  finest  in  the  world. 
The  United  States  spent  in  that  same  year  on  its 
army  and  navy  combined  only  fifteen  millions  of 
dollars  less  and  had  to  show  a  navy  of  consider- 
able size  but  not  of  commensurable  efficiency  and 
an  army  of  barely  eighty  thousand  men,  with  no 
reserves,  no  artillery  to  speak  of,  and  no  supplies 
of  ammunition.  Belgium  put  three  hundred 
thousand  well-equipped  men  into  the  field  at  a 
very  few  days'  notice  and  her  annual  military 
budget  is  listed  at  thirteen  millions  of  dollars — 
four  times  as  many  men  well  equipped  at  a  cost 
of  about  one-eighth  of  what  we  pay  for  one  quar- 
ter as  many  men,  the  adequacy  of  whose  equip- 
ment is  open  to  the  gravest  doubt.  This  army  of 

346 


THE  PREREQUISITES  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

course  was  largely  composed  of  reserves,  but  the 
Italian  standing  army,  counting  over  three  hun- 
dred thousand  men,  is  maintained  at  a  cost  of  a 
little  more  than  half  our  military  budget.  The 
size  of  our  army  has  increased  little  in  -the  last 
four  decades  but  its  expense  has  quadrupled. 

The  figures  in  regard  to  the  navy  are  also  thor- 
oughly instructive.  The  Germans  are  supposed 
to  have  been  spending  prodigious  amounts  in 
recent  years  and  have  certainly  built  up  a  fleet 
enormous  in  size  and  of  undoubted  efficiency. 
They  spent  in  1912  and  1913  one  hundred  and 
eleven  millions  of  dollars;  the  United  States  spent 
twenty-Jive  millions  of  dollars  more;  England,  with 
the  largest  navy  in  the  world  and  supposedly  the 
greatest  bill  of  expenditure,  spent  two  hundred 
and  sixteen  millions  of  dollars;  and  France  with 
the  fourth  largest  navy  spent  eighty-one  millions 
of  dollars.  The  English  navy  has  cost  something 
over  a  third  more  than  the  United  States  navy  and 
its  efficiency  is  perhaps  three  times  as  great.  Our 
present  army  and  navy  are  in  fact  the  result  of 
good  money  misspent,  the  bulk  of  which  seems 
unrepresented  by  anything  military  or  naval. 
These  figures  have  been  published  so  often  that 
the  truth  ought  to  have  been  thoroughly  well- 
known  long  before  this.  We  can  easily  afford 

347 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

armament  because  we  are  already  paying  for 
adequate  armament,  if  the  sums  spent  by  Euro- 
pean nations  are  any  criterion  of  what  armament 
costs. 

If  further  expenditure  becomes  necessary  there 
are  two  very  simple  methods  by  which  vast  sums 
can  easily  be  saved.  The  first  is  by  economy 
in  national  administration.  Lack  of  business 
methods  and  incompetent  clerks  cost  us  annually 
many  millions.  A  resolute  application  to  the  de- 
partments in  Washington,  and  particularly  to  the 
Post  Office  and  Customs  Service,  of  advanced 
business  methods  will  save  more  millions  a  year 
than  an  American  likes  to  contemplate.  Every 
European  post  office  is  an  asset  in  the  annual 
budget  of  a  good  many  millions,  whereas  the 
United  States  post  office  can  produce  a  small 
credit  balance  only  by  a  process  which  is  called 
in  private  business  "juggling  the  accounts,"  and 
by  compelling  the  railroads  to  perform  much  of 
the  service  of  carrying  the  mails,  including  the 
whole  of  the  parcels  post,  without  recompense. 
If  the  so-called  "  Pork  Barrel"  alone  can  be  stopped, 
a  good  many  battleships  can  annually  be  built 
from  that  great  sum  of  money  which  is  now  appor- 
tioned out  in  contracts  for  the  constituents  of 
congressmen.  We  have  built  a  good  many  har- 

348 


THE  PREREQUISITES  OF  INDEPENDENCE 

bors  which  ships  never  enter  and  deepened  a  good 
many  rivers  which  have  no  water  in  them  at 
certain  seasons  of  the  year.  There  is  some  truth 
in  the  parody  of  the  famous  remark:  "Millions 
for  graft,  but  not  one  cent  for  safety." 

War  and  armament  are  both  expensive,  but  we 
can  easily  afford  independence,  if  we  decide  it  is 
desirable,  by  foregoing  a  variety  of  luxuries  and 
extravagancies  which  are  quite  as  void  of  per- 
manent importance  as  armament.  Any  one  who 
will  take  the  trouble  to  turn  to  the  census  and 
see  the  millions  and  millions  spent  annually  upon 
tobacco,  beer,  fine  clothes,  theaters,  automobiles, 
will  see  that  a  small  fraction  of  the  total  sum, 
which  is  as  decidedly  wasted  each  year  so  far  as 
the  future  is  concerned  as  if  it  had  been  burned 
up,  would  provide  us  with  an  armament  sufficiently 
large  to  achieve  every  conceivable  purpose  the 
American  people  might  ever  have.  We  can  afford 
armament  without  really  burdening  ourselves  at 
all,  if  we  can  spend  honestly  the  sums  already 
appropriated,  and  we  can  place  the  matter  beyond 
all  doubt  by  a  little  economy  in  national  admini- 
stration plus  a  very  slight  sacrifice  in  our  own 
luxuries. 

Realizing  then  that  independence  of  the  sea- 
power  is  a  prerequisite  of  aggressive  action  by 

349 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  United  States,  let  us  assume  that  independ- 
ence attainable  and  consider  the  desirability 
of  the  territorial  expansion  which  it  will  make 
possible. 


350 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  ECONOMICS  OF  EXPANSION 


M 


ANY  European  statesmen  have  advisedly 
reached  the  conclusion  that  the  truly 
significant  factor  in  the  national  warfare 
is  its  rate  of  economic  progress,  the  continuance  of 
which  must  be  assured  at  all  costs  and  the  conse- 
quences of  whose  diminution  is  to  be  dreaded  as  a 
calamity  fatal  to  the  national  prosperity.  Do  the 
economic  premises  of  European  expansion  apply 
at  all  to  the  United  States?  Shall  we  need  in  the 
future  new  territory  to  develop  and  new  markets 
to  exploit?  Are  we  wrong  in  supposing  that  our 
interests  are  different  in  character  from  those  of 
European  nations  and  that  the  logic  which  they 
find  convincing  does  not  apply  to  our  needs  or 
interests?  What  are  the  prospects  for  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  recent  rapid  economic  develop- 
ment in  this  country  and  what  will  be  the  probable 
consequence  of  its  retardation? 

First  and  foremost,  the  rate  of  American  growth 
35i 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

has  been  the  result  of  immigration.  A  young 
country  with  plenty  of  land,  and  an  abundance  of 
natural  resources  needed  merely  the  application 
of  labor  to  produce  commodities  and  profit. 
Roughly  speaking,  the  capital  was  in  existence  and 
the  amount  of  it  that  could  be  utilized,  its  rate 
of  development,  depended  entirely  upon  the 
number  of  hands  which  could  be  put  to  work. 
The  normal  rate  of  progress  would  be  the  normal 
annual  increase  in  the  number  of  hands  that  were 
put  to  work,  which,  if  dependent  upon  the  ordi- 
nary growth  of  the  population,  would  not  in  any 
one  year  be  large.  Rapid  immigration,  by  fur- 
nishing us  with  an  abnormal  increase  of  hands 
every  year,  caused  an  utterly  unprecedented  and 
abnormal  rate  of  development.  In  the  next  place, 
we  put  these  hands  to  work  upon  virgin  resources 
— upon  lands  which  had  never  been  cropped,  in 
forests  untouched  by  the  ax,  or  upon  deposits  of 
free  mineral  which  could  be  dug  with  a  spade. 
Our  resources  were  as  extraordinary  in  quality 
as  the  increase  in  the  number  of  hands  was  ab- 
normal; even  the  crudest  and  most  wasteful  of 
methods  yielded  astonishing  profits.  The  first 
impulse  of  machinery  and  the  new  facilities  of 
transportation,  communication,  and  intercourse, 
gave  an  added  stimulus  to  the  rate  of  progress. 

352 


THE  ECONOMICS  OF  EXPANSION 

Never  before  in  history  had  it  been  so  easy  to  move 
men  from  one  place  to  another,  to  locate  the  re- 
sources awaiting  development,  and  to  put  hands 
promptly  at  work.  From  the  first  use  of  machin- 
ery came  an  astounding  increase  in  the  output, 
and  from  the  new  transportation  an  unexpected 
ease  of  distribution. 

We  are  already  beginning  to  feel  a  slackening 
of  this  rate  of  growth,  for  all  three  of  the  factors 
which  created  it  are  far  less  potent  than  before. 
Immigration  has  fallen  off  not  only  in  actual  num- 
bers, not  only  in  proportion  to  population,  but  in 
quality.  The  hands  which  now  come  are  not  di- 
rected by  as  good  heads  as  formerly.  Then  our  ex- 
uberance has  exhausted  practically  all  of  our  virgin 
resources:  the  best  land  is  already  tilled;  the  free 
minerals  are  nearly  exhausted;  our  great  forests 
have  been  so  denuded  as  to  cause  the  utmost 
concern.  The  pace  of  development  is  no  longer 
accelerated  by  the  advent  of  new  inventions  of 
former  potency,  and  the  future  will  scarcely  see 
the  introduction  of  as  epoch-making  devices. 
The  rate  of  growth  is  already  retarded  and  may 
slacken  to  a  degree  that  we  would  not  now  consider 
progress. 

From  these  changes,  as  well  as  from  the  benefits 
of  the  previous  development,  has  resulted  a  strik- 
**  353 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

ing  transportation.  The  market  in  America  in  the 
past  for  crude,  rough  labor  was  phenomenal  and 
entirely  abnormal  because  we  were  compelled  to 
perform  a  multitude  of  operations  badly  rather 
than  not  at  all ;  to-day  we  are  seeking  skilled  labor 
rather  than  unskilled.  Such  a  demand  proceeds 
from  the  necessity  of  careful,  intensive  work  upon 
resources  which  no  longer  yield  the  same  rate  of 
return.  The  days  of  extensive  farming  are  num- 
bered and  the  days  of  intensive  cultivation  are 
here. 

In  the  past  our  rate  of  growth  was  fostered 
almost  entirely  by  forces  in  America,  because  we 
did  actually  stand  somewhat  apart  from  the  Euro- 
pean fabric,  and  because  the  world  as  a  whole  was 
by  no  means  closely  related  in  business.  The 
creation  of  an  interdependent  international  eco- 
nomic fabric  has  made  prosperity  in  one  country 
dependent  upon  the  existence  of  healthy,  normal 
conditions  elsewhere.  When  we  write  of  identity 
of  interests  and  of  interdependence,  we  mean 
simply  that  one  nation  is  as  dependent  upon 
another's  buying  what  it  produces,  as  the 
second  is  upon  selling  to  the  first  what  it  has 
produced  itself.  Neither  produces  all  it  needs; 
neither  makes  the  slightest  attempt  to  produce 
everything;  each  counts  definitely  upon  obtaining 

354 


THE  ECONOMICS  OF  EXPANSION 

from  others  what  it  does  not  make  and  of  sup- 
plying to  them  in  turn  the  surplus  of  commodities 
which  it  does  not  consume  at  home.  This  is 
to-day  the  premise  of  international  trade.  Its 
concrete  result  is  to  make  domestic  prosperity  for 
any  nation  largely  dependent  upon  the  continu- 
ance of  its  foreign  trade,  to  make  our  prosperity 
in  America  depend  not  so  much  upon  what  we 
produce  as  upon  what  other  nations  buy  from  us. 
Obviously,  a  situation  which  prevents  our  custom- 
ers in  foreign  countries  from  purchasing  leaves 
our  own  commodities  unsold  and  unsalable,  while 
the  failure  of  foreign  nations  to  produce  prevents 
us  from  obtaining  commodities  which  we  vitally 
need.  If  the  war  has  destroyed  the  market  for 
American  copper  abroad,  it  has  badly  crippled 
manufacturers  here  who  use  aniline  dyes  or  potash. 
Kid  skins  we  have  imported  from  France;  dyes 
and  potash  from  Germany ;  the  war,  which  we  did 
not  create,  immediately  interfered  with  the  nor- 
mality of  American  business  because  the  United 
States  is  an  integral  part  of  the  interdependent 
economic  structure  of  the  world.  There  could 
scarcely  be  a  fact  more  significant  than  this:  that 
American  prosperity  is  as  dependent  upon  con- 
ditions in  foreign  countries  and  upon  their  domestic 
well-being  as  it  is  upon  forces  and  factors  primarily 

355 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

American.  In  the  future,  we  shall  need  to  take 
carefully  into  account  probabilities  and  develop- 
ments in  Europe,  South  America,  Africa,  and  the 
far  East,  if  we  are  to  envisage  those  factors  vital 
to  the  future  prosperity  of  American  citizens. 

Undoubtedly  the  reaction  upon  economic  con- 
ditions of  the  facility  of  communication  and  inter- 
course between  nations  tends  to  diminish  the  rate 
of  progress  in  all  nations  and  to  equalize  it.  To 
the  least  developed  sections  and  districts,  where 
the  imperative  need  for  capital  and  labor  results 
in  high  rates  of  interest  and  high  wages,  capital 
and  labor  usually  hasten,  until  the  demand  has 
been  filled  and  the  supply  more  nearly  assumes  the 
normal  ratio  to  the  demand  in  other  sections  of 
this  interdependent  fabric.  Each  year  pro- 
gress is  made  because  the  increase  in  population 
provides  new  mouths  to  feed,  new  bodies  to  house 
and  clothe,  and  more  individuals  with  eco- 
nomic cravings  to  satisfy.  To  this  increased 
demand  each  nation  normally  contributes;  of  the 
larger  supply  needed  to  meet  it  each  produces  its 
part,  which  will  naturally  bear  some  rough  pro- 
portion to  its  own  previous  economic  efficiency. 
An  abnormal  share  of  this  new  demand  will  be 
necessary  for  the  nation  which  is  eager  to  develop 
at  an  abnormal  rate,  and  the  actual  amount  of 

356 


THE  ECONOMICS  OF  EXPANSION 

goods  to  be  annually  sold  will  be  greater  because 
the  same  proportion  of  the  new  demand  is  annu- 
ally larger  by  that  year's  increase  in  the  population 
of  the  world.  The  continuance  of  this  abnormal 
degree  of  growth  Germany  has  decided  she  must 
ensure  by  forcible  methods;  all  other  European 
nations  are  not  less  determined  to  obtain  it  if 
they  can,  and  are  driven  to  seek  new  markets  in 
which  they  can  develop  new  trade  more  easily 
than  they  can  secure  a  larger  share  of  the  increased 
demand  in  each  other's  markets. 

There  is  no  nation  in  Europe,  not  even  Germany, 
where  economic  growth  has  moved  at  as  unpre- 
cedented a  speed  as  it  has  in  the  United  States. 
A  century  ago  the  pioneers  of  settlement  had 
scarcely  crossed  the  Mississippi  and  now  the 
surging  tide  of  industrialism  has  transferred  the 
center  of  population  and  industry  from  the  Atlan- 
tic coast  to  the  Mississippi  valley.  No  state  in 
Europe  was  as  dependent  upon  another  as  we 
were  a  century  ago  upon  Europe;  none  was  as 
backward  in  manufactures,  as  deficient  in  the 
finer  arts  of  civilization,  as  unfamiliar  with  the 
greatest  traditions  of  the  race.  To-day  the  dispar- 
ity no  longer  exists,  for  we  are  the  peers  of  any 
European  state  in  economic  development.  Where 
Germany  has  risen  from  poverty  to  affluence,  we 

357 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

have  conquered  a  continent  with  our  own  bare 
hands  and  dragged  from  the  earth  by  unremitting 
toil  an  aggregate  wealth  comparable  to  that  of 
nations  whose  accumulations  of  capital  are  as 
old  as  Europe.  Such  an  achievement  is  without 
parallel  in  the  annals  of  the  race. 

We  are  apt  to  forget  that  the  United  States  has 
been  in  the  past  a  seeker  for  labor  and  capital, 
the  possessor  of  an  insatiable  demand  rather  than 
of  a  surplus  supply.  We  ourselves  have  furnished 
Europe  with  that  vast  and  ever  expanding  market 
which  enabled  European  industry  to  advance  by 
leaps  and  bounds  during  the  last  century.  Here 
England  and  France  found  the  outlet  for  their 
surplus;  here  the  profitable  location  for  their 
investments  of  capital;  here  has  been  sold  the 
swelling  volume  of  the  new  Germany's  produce; 
here  has  been  in  the  past  Europe's  greatest  field 
for  development,  the  world's  most  extended 
market,  the  one  demand  which  was  increasing 
faster  than  the  rate  of  production  in  Europe  could 
keep  pace  with.  And  the  benefit  was  mutual! 
We  needed  their  capital  and  labor  and  their  mar- 
ket for  our  raw  products  and  their  supplies  of 
manufactured  goods  while  we  were  developing 
our  own  industry. 

But  this  market  is  now  a  thing  of  the  past ;  the 
358 


THE  ECONOMICS  OF  EXPANSION 

demand  no  longer  exists;  and  in  its  place  stands 
a  new  supply  seeking  a  market.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  the  cause  of  the  present  struggle 
for  markets  in  Europe  is  the  attempt  to  replace  the 
market  which  the  United  States  once  afforded 
their  produce  but  which  it  provides  no  longer. 
Here  is  the  root  of  Pan-Germanism,  the  secret  of 
the  interest  in  Morocco,  in  China,  in  South  Amer- 
ica. Europe  has  always  depended  upon  selling 
to  a  rapidly  developing  market  and  has  adjusted 
her  economic  fabric  to  an  ever  increasing  demand. 
For  at  least  two  centuries  the  United  States  fur- 
nished that  market  and,  now  that  it  does  so  no 
longer,  it  must  be  replaced.  There  is  this  great 
and  significant  difference  in  the  situation:  the 
company  of  nations  seeking  markets  numbers 
one  more.  The  United  States  itself  is  now  an 
independent  and  integral  part  of  the  world's  inter- 
dependent and  interlocking  economic  fabric;  its 
interests  with  Europe  are  still  mutual  but  no 
longer  different ;  complementary  to  those  of  Euro- 
pean nations  rather  than  their  counterpart;  iden- 
tical in  character,  purposes,  and  needs.  We  no 
longer  furnish  them  a  market  whose  demands  it  is 
as  much  our  interest  as  theirs  for  them  to  supply, 
but  we  produce  a  portion  of  the  world's  supply 
as  necessary  to  them  as  theirs  to  us,  and  are 

359 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

seeking  ourselves  markets  for  the  annual  increase 
in  our  output. 

Already  the  problem  is  in  existence  and  a  solu- 
tion desirable;  soon  the  need  will  be  imperative. 
Inevitably,  from  the  retardation  of  the  rate  of 
progress  will  come  a  change  in  the  aspect  of  busi- 
ness for  the  ordinary  man,  because  two  hands  and 
two  legs  are  every  year  capable  of  rendering  less 
valuable  service  to  the  community  and  the  un- 
skilled work  will  be  increasingly  hard  to  find. 
The  old  superabundance  of  food  which  has  become 
almost  a  tradition  in  America  is  already  a  thing 
of  the  past.  There  has  been  too  much  food;  the 
tendency  will  steadily  be  to  provide  just  enough. 
Scientific  farming  and  production  makes  it  easy 
to  avoid  overproduction  and  the  growth  of  more 
diversified  interests  will  rapidly  reduce  the  pro- 
portion of  the  population  which  devotes  its  time 
to  agriculture.  Inevitably  will  come  a  rise  in  the 
price  of  necessities,  and,  as  unskilled  labor  will 
steadily  command  a  smaller  price,  the  degree  of 
comfort  to  be  had  for  the  same  quality  and  quan- 
tity of  work  will  diminish.  From  the  exhaustion 
of  virgin  resources  and  of  the  first  impulse  from 
machinery  will  result  in  a  gradual  cessation  of  im- 
migration, the  rate  at  which  the  home  market  has 
increased  in  the  past  will  diminish  steadily,  and  we 

360 


THE  ECONOMICS  OF  EXPANSION 

shall  tend  to  produce  in  the  future  only  to  meet 
the  normal  increase  of  demand  due  to  our  own 
normal  increase  in  population,  and  to  meet  our 
share  of  the  same  normal  increase  in  foreign  coun- 
tries. We  shall  face  therefore  in  a  not  distant 
future  the  same  issues  England  has  already  faced 
and  which  Germany  is  now  attempting  to  meet; 
we  shall  experience  the  same  difficulties  in  meeting 
them  and  may  conceivably  find  the  only  available 
expedients  to  solve  them  those  which  England 
has  already  used  and  which  Pan-Germanism  is 
attempting  to  provide — new  markets. 

We  can  easily  house  in  the  United  States  three 
hundred  millions  of  people  and  provide  them 
with  work,  but  we  cannot  continue  for  many  more 
decades  to  provide  work  for  our  own  people  at 
present  wages  and  supply  them  with  the  same 
amount  of  commodities  at  present  prices.  If  we 
continue  to  retain  our  increasing  population 
within  our  own  borders,  if  we  continue  to  add 
to  it  artificially  by  immigration,  inevitably  there 
will  be  proportionately  less  work  and  therefore 
less  wages,  because  there  will  be  proportionately 
more  laborers;  inevitably  there  will  be  less  food 
and  more  mouths  and  therefore  higher  prices  and 
less  to  eat  per  individual.  We  can  grow  indefi- 
nitely in  the  United  States  but  not  at  the  present 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

rate  of  growth  nor  with  the  present  degree  of 
individual  comfort.  If  precedent  affords  us  the 
slightest  glimpse  of  the  future,  we  shall  soon  be 
seeking  new  markets,  new  fields  to  which  capital 
and  labor  may  emigrate. 

From  such  new  economic  demands  will  follow, 
unless  precedent  is  again  misleading,  new  demands 
upon  national  policy  and  statecraft.  The  capital 
and  labor  who  wish  to  emigrate  will  desire,  as  they 
have  in  the  past,  assurances  from  the  national 
government  of  protection  in  their  new  residence, 
or  will  demand  as  in  the  case  of  the  cotton  culture 
the  creation  of  new  economic  opportunities  by 
political  agencies.  In  the  path  of  our  economic 
expansion  we  shall  find  as  other  nations  have  a 
great  number  of  obstacles  placed  there  partly  by 
chance,  partly  by  past  history,  and  partly  by  the 
designs  of  other  nations  to  secure  for  themselves 
unusual  privileges.  Already  it  is  almost  an  axiom 
of  European  politics  that  a  chief  duty  of  the 
modern  government  lies  in  the  removal  of  artificial 
obstacles  standing  in  the  way  of  the  economic 
interests  of  the  nation  and  in  the  prevention  of 
arbitrary  interference  with  its  interests  by  other 
nations,  whether  by  tariffs,  fleets,  or  armies. 
They  see  clearly  in  Europe  that  the  most  vital 
interest  of  the  state  is  economic,  because  econ- 

362 


THE  ECONOMICS  OF  EXPANSION 

omic  prosperity  is  the  foundation  of  political  in- 
dependence, of  national  unity,  and  of  international 
status;  they  see  that  prosperity  depends  upon 
the  continuance  of  the  rate  of  growth,  and  that 
political  and  military  action  ought  to  protect  and 
further  these  economic  interests.  The  present 
European  conflicts  are  based  primarily  upon  these 
economic  contentions.  This  then  is  an  economic 
war — a  war  for  markets,  for  colonies  or  dependen- 
cies in  which  markets  may  be  developed,  for  ac- 
cess and  perhaps  preferential  rights  in  those  of 
Asiatic  communities.  Precisely  these  factors  are 
already  present  in  the  United  States,  and,  if  pre- 
cedent be  any  criterion,  will  before  long  lead  our 
statesmen  and  citizens  to  a  conviction  that  the 
supreme  duty  of  the  state  is  to  provide  for  the 
economic  welfare  of  its  citizens,  whence  it  is  but 
a  step  to  territorial  expansion,  to  an  insistence 
upon  new  markets,  secured  by  political,  diplo- 
matic, and  it  may  be  by  military  and  naval 
agencies. 

The  interests  of  the  United  States  therefore  are 
identical  with  those  which  have  led  the  present 
nations  into  this  war  so  far  as  our  interest  in  their 
prosperity  extends.  American  business  is  affected 
by  all  events  in  Europe — political  alliances  be- 
tween different  nations,  changes  in  their  internal 

363 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

conditions,  their  domestic  or  governmental  ef- 
ficiency as  reflected  in  their  economic  structure, 
and  in  the  part  they  play  in  the  international  fabric 
of  which  we  are  an  integral  part,  in  the  welfare 
of  which  we  are  as  much  concerned  as  they.  We 
have  no  choice,  the  world  is  interdependent  and 
we  are  a  part  of  it,  whether  we  like  it  or  not; 
whether  we  know  it  or  not. 

International  friendships  and  antipathies  are 
based  upon  contact,  upon  constant  intercourse 
and  acquaintanceship  between  the  nations  con- 
cerned, though  in  the  past  close  alliances  and 
vigorous  hatreds  were  pretty  generally  confined 
to  nations  physically  contiguous.  Before  the 
days  of  railroads  and  steamships,  a  nation's  in- 
terests were  not  likely  to  extend  much  beyond  its 
own  borders  or  to  be  vitally  affected  by  events 
which  did  not  happen  in  its  immediate  vicinity. 
But  to-day  the  interests  of  the  United  States,  like 
those  of  all  great  nations,  are  bounded,  not  by 
the  territorial  limits  of  North  America,  but  by 
the  activities  of  American  citizens. 

The  extension  of  the  economic  fabric  promptly 
spread  our  interests  to  the  confines  of  the  globe 
and  made  us  potentially  the  allies  or  enemies  of 
any  country  upon  it.  The  old  traditions  taught 
that  no  European  alliance  could  subserve  the  true 

364 


THE  ECONOMICS  OF  EXPANSION 

interests  of  the  United  States ;  that  the  Atlantic 
isolated  us  from  Europe,  freed  us  from  its  tangle 
of  political  alliances,  and  left  us  without  mutual 
interests  with  any  European  state  beyond  those 
which  could  be  advanced  by  diplomacy.  There 
was  indeed  a  feeling  of  antipathy  towards  Europe, 
a  belief  almost  that  their  existence  was  hostile 
to  our  welfare,  and  that  we  were  by  no  means  as 
interested  in  their  welfare  as  they  were  in  ours. 
To  the  Revolutionists  the  colonies  were  being 
exploited  for  the  profit  of  English  merchants;  to 
the  eager  advocates  of  protective  tariffs,  American 
labor  was  being  exploited  by  foreign  countries  and 
undersold  by  the  products  of  underpaid  foreign 
labor.  All  this  is  past.  Vital  interests  of  the 
United  States  exist  to-day  in  every  country  in  the 
world.  The  railroad,  steamship,  and  telegraph 
have  put  all  nations  in  all  parts  of  the  globe  into 
immediate  contact,  have  created  interests  where 
none  existed,  and  have  made  possible  inter- 
national alliances  and  wars  based  upon  interests 
that  seem  widely  sundered.  To-day  we  have 
interests  which  can  be  furthered  by  foreign 
alliances,  and  which  may  actually  dictate  the 
nature  of  our  own  alliances.  The  variety  and 
extent  of  the  interests  which  make  our  entrance 
inevitable  into  international  politics  render  the 

365 


t     PAN-AMERICANISM 

United  States  an  ally  of  consequence  for  any  nation, 
and  a  power  to  be  feared  and  courted.  Our  past 
traditions,  our  present  intentions,  our  nobler 
ideals  will  not  alter  the  work  of  economic  force 
whose  potency  has  transformed  the  face  of  Nature 
and  habits  of  mankind.  With  their  work  we  must 
reckon  and  realize  speedily  that  our  unwillingness 
to  recognize  and  failure  to  accept  these  funda- 
mental changes  will  simply  plunge  us  into  crises 
whose  origin  and  character  we  shall  not  compre- 
hend and  therefore  shall  not  be  able  to  solve, 
or  will  leave  us  at  the  mercy  of  foreign  nations 
who  have  seen  their  comprehension  worth  un- 
limited time  and  infinite  trouble.  We  too  must 
understand  that  we  may  not  be  taken  by  surprise; 
we  must  prepare  to  meet  the  attempts  of  other 
nations  to  utilize  these  forces,  and  to  mold  the 
international  future  in  their  own  image  for  the 
promotion  of  their  own  special  interests. 


366 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

IF  we  are  able  to  demonstrate  convincingly  the 
desirability  and  expediency  of  territorial 
expansion  or  of  imperialism,  shall  we  also  be 
able  to  prove  their  consonance  with  ethical  stand- 
ards? If  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  expedient,  is  it 
also  just?  If  the  supremacy  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  is  profitable  to  maintain,  is  it  also 
praiseworthy?  We  shall  need  to  justify  Pan- 
Americanism  and  show  that  it  accords  with  motives 
deserving  the  regard  of  the  American  people. 
Assuming  that  the  Japanese  in  California  and  in 
Latin  America  are  inimical  to  our  economic  inter- 
ests, have  we  the  ethical  right  to  protest?  We  are 
challenging  England's  treatment  of  neutral  ship- 
ping and  protesting  in  one  way  or  another  against 
her  control  of  the  sea;  there  is  a  movement  on 
foot  to  increase  the  American  merchant  marine 
and  to  establish  as  nearly  as  possible  our  actual 
independence  of  the  sea-power;  the  justification 

367 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

of  both  is  by  no  means  an  issue  of  indifference  to 
the  American  people.  Are  any  of  these  legitimate 
ambitions?  Do  all  or  any  of  them  fulfill  the  ideal 
which  the  American  people  seem  to  cherish  of  noble 
and  disinterested  action  at  this  present  crisis? 

The  ethics  of  expansion  and  the  justification  of 
any  policy  pursued  by  the  United  States  in  the 
past  or  adopted  in  the  future,  depend  entirely 
upon  our  definition  of  the  word  ethics.  For  a 
good  many  generations  there  has  been  a  more  or 
less  active  debate  over  the  existence  or  non-exist- 
ence of  a  permanent  standard  by  which  ethical 
values  at  different  periods  and  in  different  countries 
could  be  compared  and  measured.  Obviously, 
if  such  a  standard  exists  we  must  test  our  behavior 
by  it  and  accept  the  verdict;  but,  fortunately  or 
unfortunately,  there  are  almost  as  many  ethical 
standards  as  there  are  notions  of  right  conduct. 
The  most  we  can  do  is  to  apply  the  better  known 
successively  to  the  facts  and  note  the  result. 
Many  are  inclined  to  contend  that  the  lack  of 
agreement  upon  an  ethical  standard  robs  any 
conclusion  of  practical  value  as  a  guide  to 
statesmen  or  individuals.  To  maintain  such  a 
position  is  plainly  to  make  expediency  the  only 
test  of  lightness  and  to  treat  any  further  inquiry 
as  academic  and  therefore  inconsequential. 

368 


THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

At  least  two  of  the  notions  of  ethical  conduct, 
at  present  widely  supported,  declare  any  and  all 
policies  of  expansion  or  imperialism  prima  facie 
unethical  and  ipso  facto  wrong.  The  pacifist 
assumes  that  anything  gained  by  compulsion  or 
armed  force  is  wrong:  war  is  abnormal,  unnatural, 
and  criminal,  proceeding  from  the  worst  of  mo- 
tives involving  the  most  despicable  conceivable 
behavior,  and  resulting  in  brutality,  inhuman 
cruelty,  and  unnecessary  destruction.  From  this 
there  is  no  escape  if  once  we  grant  the  premise. 
More  subtly  the  principles  of  individualist  ethics, 
to  be  found  in  the  bulk  of  ethical  treatises  and 
espoused  by  nearly  all  teachers  and  thinkers  who 
look  upon  themselves  as  ethicists,  militate  against 
these  conceptions  of  expansion  which  we  are  con- 
sidering. If  the  analysis  of  a  layman  in  such 
controverted  matters  is  not  entirely  at  fault,  the 
object  of  individualist  ethics  is  really  the  content- 
ment of  the  individual  in  this  present  life  and  the 
welfare  of  his  soul  after  death.  The  layman  has 
in  mind  that  sort  of  right  conduct  which  will  lead 
to  his  happiness  here  and  to  his  spiritual  salvation 
hereafter,  and  naturally  demands  the  furtherance 
of  such  ends  by  the  development  of  spiritual  and 
mental  qualities,  minimizing  as  a  matter  of  course 
the  importance  and  even  questioning  the  value  of 
24  369 


PAN-AMERICANISM] 

the  acquisition  of  wealth  and  the  struggle  for 
economic  advantage.  Indeed  the  temporalities 
of  life  sink  into  the  background  and  become  almost 
non -ethical  because  of  their  comparative  power- 
lessness,  long  demonstrated  by  experience,  to  ad- 
vance the  contentment  of  the  inner  man  in  this 
present  existence  beyond  a  relatively  elemental 
point,  or  to  satisfy  him  of  their  ability  to  save  his 
soul  in  the  next  world.  The  quasi-religious  tinge, 
so  marked  in  present  ethical  teaching,  has  its 
effective  origin  in  the  blending  of  certain  features 
of  Christianity  with  certain  aspects  of  Greek  and 
Roman  philosophic  teaching. 

Economic  forces  are  essentially  non-ethical 
because  unadapted  to  the  advancement  of  the 
highest  ethical  ends;  economic  prosperity  is  non- 
ethical  because  it  is  also  almost  powerless  to  ad- 
vance the  aims  cherished  by  ethicists.  While 
thinkers  have  not  denied  the  lightness  of  a  desire 
nor  a  certain  moderate  degree  of  physical  comfort 
and  have  even  laid  stress  upon  the  importance, 
for  the  development  of  the  loftier  motives,  of  an 
entire  freedom  from  anxiety  concerning  actual 
subsistence,  they  have  strongly  doubted  the  expe- 
diency of  recognizing  among  ethical  motives  the 
desire  for  worldly  position  or  for  economic  ad- 
vantage. Those  who  have  admitted  such  impulses 

370 


THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

to  a  place,  have  usually  accorded  them  a  very 
secondary  and  subordinate  position  and  have 
plainly  regarded  the  decision  as  a  concession  grudg- 
ingly made  to  the  fallibility  of  human  nature, 
rather  than  the  recognition  of  a  tenet  desirable 
or  necessary.  The  result  is  most  strikingly  seen 
in  the  divergence  between  the  teachings  of  ethicists 
and  the  notions  of  right  conduct  ordinarily  fol- 
lowed in  the  business  community.  The  economic 
world  has  not  unnaturally  regarded  as  inadmissible 
a  series  of  principles  which  virtually  accorded 
the  business  world  the  position  of  an  excrescence 
on  the  community,  and  recognized  its  continued 
existence  as  scarcely  likely  to  further  the  highest 
aims  of  individual  or  state  and  only  too  apt  to 
foster  notions  destructive  of  the  truest  good  of 
both.  According  to  such  ethical  premises,  there 
are  no  ethics  in  business. 

If  we  test  by  these  same  tenets  the  territor- 
ial expansion  of  nations  and  imperialist  policies, 
the  premise  will  infallibly  demonstrate  the  non- 
ethical  character  of  both  and  their  lack  of  con- 
sonance with  the  true  ends  and  desires  of  the 
community.  If  not  actually  base  and  despicable 
they  will  hardly  appear  noble  or  praiseworthy. 

The  premise  of  expansion  and  imperialism  is 
in  fact  the  necessity  and  desirability  of  economic 

37i 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

gain  and  of  material  well-being,  continued  beyond 
the  needs  of  national  subsistence  to  the  acquisition 
of  as  great  a  degree  of  prosperity  and  wealth  as 
can  be  attained.  Any  rate  of  progress  less  than 
the  maximum  involves  sacrifice  and  (construc- 
tively) suffering.  With  freedom  from  actual  pen- 
ury and  starvation  and  even  with  the  attainment 
of  comparative  comfort,  imperialists  are  dissatis- 
fied; they  demand  wealth,  the  possession  of  as 
much  more  than  just  enough  as  can  be  had.  The 
ethics  of  expansion,  if  we  may  fairly  claim  that  it 
exists,  has  sought  to  define  and  delimit  the  eco- 
nomic selfishness  of  individuals  and  nations  in  order 
to  determine  how  far  and  why  certain  particular 
notions  for  obtaining  wealth  are  expedient.  It  has 
tried  to  list  means  and  methods  permissible  in  fur- 
thering designs  for  the  increase  of  bodily  comfort 
and  material  prosperity  here  on  earth.  It  is  builded 
upon  the  tenets  of  political  economy  rather  than 
upon  those  of  ethics,  and  it  naturally  reproduces 
faithfully  the  non-ethical  and  non-moral  character 
of  economic  postulates  which  the  founders  of 
political  economy  readily  admitted  were  true  if 
they  were  tested  by  such  notions  of  ethics  or 
morals.  Indeed,  if  ethics  apparently  excludes 
from  consideration  the  science  of  accumulating 
wealth,  political  economy  no  less  firmly  insists 

372 


THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

that  the  admission  of  "ethical"  or  "moral'*  im- 
pulses will  at  once  vitiate  its  logic.  If  ethics 
assumes  that  the  chief  end  of  life  is  spiritual  con- 
tentment and  salvation,  political  economy  predi- 
cates the  increase  of  individual  wealth  as  the  sole 
purpose  of  life.  Each  admits  the  other's  existence ; 
both  practically  declare  that  the  logic  of  one 
destroys  that  of  the  other. 

Shall  we  not  be  wise  to  recognize  here  a  conflict 
of  standards,  or  a  lack  of  consonance  between 
standards,  rather  than  a  lack  of  ethical  qualities 
in  what  we  are  judging?  In  other  words 
ethical  values  seem  to  be  comparative  and  tem- 
porary rather  than  positive  or  permanent,  result- 
ing not  from  the  character  of  the  thing  judged  but 
from  its  consonance  with  certain  preconceived 
premises.  Conduct  or  policy  will  be  ethical  or 
not  according  to  its  relation  to  certain  postulates 
which  we  must  always  include  as  the  most  essen- 
tial element  of  our  decision.  Ethical  values  are 
not  only  comparative  but  relative. 

From  the  slightest  investigation  of  the  deeds 
and  policies  of  nations  and  individuals  in  the  past, 
we  shall  learn  that  these  ideas  of  ethics  have 
never  been  applied  by  a  community  to  the  prob- 
lems of  its  existence  or  of  its  economic  welfare. 
While  adhesion  to  the  general  desirability  of  these 

373 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

concepts  has  been  readily  accorded,  the  conduct 
of  individuals  and  of  nations  has  been  regulated 
by  a  very  different  set  of  precepts.  No  great 
amount  of  thought  will  be  needed  to  discover  also 
that  nations  have  never  recognized  as  applicable 
to  them  the  rules  of  individual  ethics.  The  reason 
is  only  too  obvious:  the  conduct  of  nations  for 
the  increase  of  their  economic  welfare  or  the  pre- 
servation of  their  territorial  integrity  cannot  very 
well  be  judged  by  rules  intended  to  promote  the 
peace  of  mind  and  the  spiritual  salvation  of  in- 
dividuals. 

The  premise  of  international  ethics  seems  to  be 
an  application  of  the  notion  of  individual  self- 
defense  to  the  larger  entity.  From  the  very  earliest 
times  the  individual  has  been  accorded  the 
right  to  take  another's  life  in  defense  of  his  own ; 
he  has  demanded  and  ordinarily  received,  subject 
of  course  to  examination  and  verification,  the 
right  to  judge  of  the  imminence  of  danger  to  his 
own  safety  and  the  consequent  necessity  for  taking 
the  other's  life.  In  this  principle  statesmen  have 
seen  a  direct  analogy  to  the  threatening  of  national 
existence  by  invasion,  and  from  it  they  have  drawn 
justification  for  such  measures  as  they  deemed  im- 
perative for  defense.  In  crises  they  have  justi- 
fied severe  measures  with  individuals  and  other 

374 


THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

nations  by  the  plea  that  they  were  indispensable 
to  the  preservation  of  the  national  independence. 
The  discretionary  right  to  judge  of  the  existence 
of  the  necessity  and  to  pass  upon  the  means 
requisite  to  meet  it,  they  have  always  arrogated 
and  they  have  invariably  denied — though  not  with 
invariable  success — any  right  to  censure  the  use 
of  this  discretion  after  the  event  had  proved  their 
judgment  bad.  Of  the  desirability  of  such  right 
of  self-defense  there  has  never  been  much  question, 
but  such  circumstances  are  not  those  recently 
challenged  by  ethicists. 

We  have  to  deal  to-day  with  a  very  subtle  type 
of  self-defense,  which  does  not  assume  direct 
aggression  in  arms  nor  yet  any  injury  of  the  sort 
hitherto  recognized  as  a  justification.  Does  a 
desire  to  ensure  the  future  economic  welfare  of 
the  nation  stand  upon  the  same  footing  as  its 
right  to  repel  armed  invasion  of  its  own  territory? 
Has  a  nation  a  right  to  regard  as  hostile  a  series 
of  economic  developments,  which  no  individual 
or  nation  created  or  originated,  which  are  entirely 
impersonal,  and  which  affect  nearly  all  nations 
in  some  degree,  because  they  seem  likely  to  inter- 
fere in  the  future  with  that  nation's  degree  of 
economic  prosperity?  The  danger  is  of  course 
contingent;  it  is  in  the  next  place  impersonal;  and 

375 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

in  the  third  place,  it  is  not  an  intentional  injury 
even  although  it  may  conceivably  involve  great 
peril  to  national  integrity.  This  is  the  danger 
which  the  demand  for  expanding  markets,  terri- 
torial expansion,  and  imperialism  pleads.  That 
it  would  not  be  in  accordance  with  international 
ethics  for  one  nation  to  assail  another's  domain, 
simply  for  the  sake  of  increasing  its  own  territory 
or  to  add  forcibly  to  its  own  movable  property, 
is  pretty  generally  agreed.  Is  the  ethical  aspect 
of  the  situation  altered  when  it  is  possible  to 
allege  a  plausible  future  economic  difficulty? 
Can  economic  "threats"  justify  reprisal  in  arms? 
May  one  nation  draw  into  its  hands  the  trade  and 
consequent  profit  which  another  has  at  present, 
so  long  as  the  trade  itself  is  not  the  actual  object 
or  the  direct  result  of  an  armed  invasion?  Above 
all,  does  even  a  great  and  impending  economic 
catastrophe  justify  a  nation  in  defending  itself 
by  the  conquest  of  those  individuals  or  nations  who 
are  not  themselves  in  any  conceivable  way  responsible 
for  the  economic  forces  likely  to  produce  this  calamity? 
Such  a  defense  Germany  has  alleged  for  her  in- 
vasion of  Belgium;  such  a  defense  must  France 
give  for  her  rights  in  Morocco;  such  must  be  the 
defense  of  the  United  States  in  the  maintenance 
of  its  supremacy  on  the  Western  Hemisphere,  of 

376 


THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

the  Monroe  Doctrine,  or  of  any  degree  of  inter- 
vention in  Latin  America. 

The  issue  is  exceedingly  subtle  and  entirely 
without  precedent  in  previous  international  dis- 
putes. The  danger  exists  only  in  the  future  and 
its  character  is  purely  economic.  No  nation  can 
be  proved  the  aggressor,  and  in  addition  the  solu- 
tion is  to  be  obtained  at  the  expense  of  those  people 
least  involved  in  the  production  of  the  crisis  itself. 
If  it  is  wicked  to  kill  a  man  with  a  gun,  and  con- 
sidered murder  to  poison  him;  if  it  is  unethical  to 
make  war  by  means  of  many  men  armed  with  guns, 
and  wrong  to  poison  the  water  supply  of  great 
cities;  is  it  ethical  to  deprive  these  same  people 
of  their  means  of  livelihood  and  reduce  them  to 
penury  because  some  one  else  believes  his  welfare 
depends  upon  it?  We  agree  that  we  must  not 
rob  individuals  and  nations  with  arms.  May  we 
rob  them  by  economic  methods?  We  are  not 
allowed  to  steal  territory  from  each  other  or  from 
third  parties  simply  that  we  may  possess  it.  Are 
we  justified  in  taking  that  property  or  rights  in 
it  by  armed  invasion  on  the  plea  that  it  is  essential 
to  our  future  economic  welfare? 

In  reality,  our  ethical  inquiry  involves  not  so 
much  an  investigation  of  methods  as  an  inquiry 
into  ends  and  purposes.  The  old  international 

377 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

ethics  concerned  itself  pretty  exclusively  with 
methods  and  permitted  the  use  of  arms  for  the 
purpose  of  defense,  upon  the  assumption  that 
defense  would  normally  be  limited  to  actual  in- 
vasion of  the  national  territory.  Few  nations  then 
possessed  interests  at  any  distance  from  their 
own  frontier  and  still  fewer  were  able  to  pursue 
an  aggressive  policy.  From  the  moment  however 
that  modern  transportation  and  communication 
extended  the  interests  of  nations  to  the  confines 
of  the  globe  and  made  possible  the  pursuance  of 
aggression  by  any  nation  in  any  part  of  the  globe 
it  might  select,  aggression  and  therefore  defense 
promptly  assumed  a  new  complexion,  which  the 
old  definition  of  international  ethics  by  no  means 
contemplated.  The  same  economic  forces  which 
spread  the  national  interests  placed  new  weapons 
in  the  national  hands — economic  weapons  of  the 
utmost  potency,  whose  use  did  not  in  the  least 
involve  warfare  in  the  old  sense,  but  whose  results 
were  not  essentially  different  from  those  of  con- 
quest, lacking  only  the  destruction  of  life  and 
property.  Was  this  kind  of  aggression  justifiable? 
The  old  international  ethics  would  have  pronounced 
in  the  affirmative  because  it  involved  no  actual 
armed  invasion  of  the  other's  territory.  If  there- 
fore we  limit  ourselves  to  methods  employed  rather 

378 


THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

than  the  thing  done  and  adopt  the  position  of 
most  pacifists  that  the  really  objectionable  thing 
is  armed  warfare,  we  shall  justify  and  permit  a 
great  variety  of  practices  by  which  nations  may 
impoverish  and  conquer  each  other  without  the 
firing  of  guns,  much  more  effectively  and  perma- 
nently than  they  could  have  in  the  past  by  means 
of  actual  armed  conquest.  This  logic  also  deprives 
the  nations  thus  assailed  by  economic  weapons  of 
all  right  to  defend  themselves.  By  declaring  the 
use  of  arms  unjustifiable  in  resistance  to  anything 
except  armed  aggression  against  the  national 
territory,  the  nation  appealing  to  arms  against  the 
new  economic  weapons  becomes  the  aggressor, 
and  is  promptly  called  upon  to  shoulder  the  blame 
for  the  war. 

Some  sort  of  an  agreement  as  to  the  meaning 
of  the  words  "expansion"  and  "imperialism"  is 
therefore  essential  to  any  conclusion  as  to  the 
ethics  of  either.  It  should  be  obvious  that  be- 
tween the  actual  assumption  of  political  control 
as  the  result  of  armed  invasion,  and  no  interference 
at  all,  there  are  a  great  variety  of  possible  stages. 
The  whereabouts  of  the  line  between  justifiable 
intercourse  will  promptly  establish  the  ethics  of 
any  particular  event.  Shall  we  consider  it  just 
for  the  United  States  to  preserve  the  peace  in 

379 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Central  American  republics  when  the  process  may 
involve  interference  with  their  elections  or  minis- 
tries? May  we  rightly  insist  upon  economic  privi- 
leges for  American  citizens  in  Latin  America? 
Both  of  these  involve  no  control  over  that  nation 
by  our  own  Government.  It  is  then  possible  to 
take  a  further  step  and  take  control  of  the  revenue 
of  these  states  on  the  ground  that  debts  are  due 
American  citizens  which  cannot  be  paid  because 
of  the  financial  methods  in  vogue  among  the 
natives.  This  involves  practically  an  economic 
control  over  the  native  government  exerted  by  the 
Government  of  the  United  States.  It  results  as 
effectively  in  depriving  it  of  the  perception  of  its 
own  taxes  as  if  we  had  conquered  that  country 
and  had  appointed  tax  collectors  to  represent  us, 
instead  of  claiming  that  the  ones  we  do  appoint 
represent  the  natives.  It  will  be  obvious  to  the 
least  informed  that  they  are  appointed  in  the 
interests  of  American  capitalists  and  that  their 
only  reason  for  existence  is  the  inability  or  unwil- 
lingness of  the  natives  to  conform  to  what  we 
believe  to  be  American  interests.  This  we  assume 
to  be  ethical.  It  is  then  possible  for  the  United 
States  to  assume  military  control  of  a  country  to 
restore  order  and  create  conditions  which  we  deem 
advisable,  but  of  which  very  clearly  the  natives  do 

380 


THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

not  approve,  for  if  they  did  approve  our  inter- 
vention would  not  be  necessary.  This,  it  is 
claimed,  does  not  involve  economic  control  nor 
does  it  interfere  in  the  least  with  the  political 
independence  of  the  natives. 

Ordinarily,  Europeans  and  Americans  have 
declared  that  any  variety  or  degree  of  interference 
or  control  over  undeveloped  peoples  was  beneficial 
to  them,  lenient,  and  entirely  ethical,  so  long  as 
it  did  not  actually  involve  the  assumption  of 
technical  sovereignty.  To  deprive  the  natives 
of  political  independence,  to  annex  their  territory 
and  actually  call  it  a  part  of  the  territory  of  some 
European  nation  has  generally  been  deemed  un- 
ethical, whether  done  by  armies  or  by  influence. 
Everything  except  the  fiction  of  political  inde- 
pendence has  been  continually  taken  from  the 
natives  of  undeveloped  countries  by  all  European 
nations  and  by  the  United  States  and  has  generally 
been  deemed  in  accordance  with  international 
ethics,  even  though  obtained  by  the  actual  use 
of  force.  The  ethical  line  therefore  between  con- 
quest and  the  actual  economic  or  military  posses- 
sion of  the  country  has  been  tenuous  and  dubious. 
The  important  fact  to  establish  is  therefore  the 
purpose  or  aim  of  the  action  taken  rather  than 
the  method  employed. 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

In  any  proper  sense  of  the  word,  expansion  is 
an  attempt  to  procure  rights  and  privileges  which 
we  should  not  normally  have  and  which  the  in- 
habitants of  the  country  concerned  would  not 
voluntarily  give  us.  It  employs  abnormal  politi- 
cal influence  to  establish  an  abnormal  economic 
relationship  between  the  countries  and  obtain  an 
abnormal  economic  profit.  Any  conception  at  all 
worthy  of  the  name  of  ethics  will  place  in  the 
same  category  every  variety  of  control  which 
tends  to  this  end,  whether  it  is  economic,  military, 
or  political;  whether  it  is  called  intervention, 
protection,  assistance,  assimilation,  penetration, 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  or  conquest.  If  it  aims  at 
obtaining  something  we  should  not  normally  get, 
it  will  be  on  a  par  with  the  assumption  of  control. 
If  it  is  wrong  to  obtain  certain  things,  it  will 
make  no  difference  by  what  method  we  acquire 
them.  If  the  method  used  be  the  criterion  of 
blame,  nothing  acquired  in  any  other  way  can 
be  wrong. 

Any  application  at  all  of  what  are  ordinarily 
called  ethical  precepts  will  show  that  the  threat 
to  use  force  by  the  United  States  is  as  much  ag- 
gressive action  against  some  small  Latin- American 
state  as  the  actual  dispatch  of  a  military  expe- 
dition or  of  a  squadron.  An  ultimatum  to  Mexico 

382 


THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

employs  as  a  political  club  the  potential  force 
which  the  greater  size  and  wealth  of  the  United 
States  would  allow  us  to  exert.  If  armed  aggres- 
sion is  wrong,  threats  really  supported  by  poten- 
tial armed  aggression  also  are  wrong.  If  we  are 
asking  for  something  for  which  it  might  be  neces- 
sary to  use  armed  force,  and  we  deny  the  right- 
ness  of  violence,  then  it  will  be  equally  wrong 
for  us  to  obtain  in  any  other  way.  The  Unitetf 
States  has  established  its  economic  preponder- 
ance in  certain  of  the  West  Indian  islands  and 
in  certain  of  the  Central  American  republics 
by  methods  known  to  the  Europeans  as  peaceful 
penetration,  and  the  natives  of  those  countries 
consider  that  they  have  lost  all  rights  save  the 
shadow  of  political  independence.  If  so  much 
was  ethical,  the  assumption  of  actual  political 
control  will  not  deprive  the  natives  of  anything 
really  valuable,  since  everything  of  importance  is 
already  lost.  If  this  last  step  is  not  justifiable, 
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  any  part  of  the  process 
can  be  called  ethical.  Let  us  however  once  more 
remind  ourselves  that  ethics  is  a  question  of  defi- 
nition and  not  a  positive  quality  and  that  right 
conduct  depends  more  upon  our  premise  than 
upon  what  we  do.  We  ought  simply  to  realize 
that  an  ethical  line  cannot  be  drawn  between 

383 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

certain  types  of  behavior  which  are  distinguished 
by  the  technical  and  artificial  rather  than  by 
substantive  differences. 

In  what  way  can  we  demonstrate  the  ethics  or 
justice  of  the  claim  of  the  United  States  to  suprem- 
acy in  the  Western  Hemisphere?  By  what  right 
shall  we  rule  the  Latin  Americans?  This  issue 
involves  the  very  difficult  ethical  question  of  the 
treatment  of  red  men,  black  men,  and  heathens 
by  white  Christians.  Are  all  entitled  to  precisely 
the  same  rights?  If  we  are  in  duty  bound  to 
recognize  the  rights  of  red  men  and  black  men  as 
equal  to  our  own,  we  shall  not  be  able  to  make  good 
our  claim  to  supremacy,.  Admittedly  we  should 
resist  any  claim  advanced  by  England  or  Germany 
to  supremacy  over  us;  admittedly  they  would 
resent  our  claim  of  superiority  over  them;  but 
we  are  able  calmly  to  discuss  and  assert  our  su- 
premacy in  the  Western  Hemisphere  as  something 
almost  too  axiomatic  to  debate,  just  as  the  Ger- 
mans and  English  assert  with  equal  nonchalance 
their  superiority  and  supremacy  in  Africa  and 
Asia.  Are  any  of  them  based  upon  ethical  or 
moral  contentions?  If  we  regard  the  tenets  of 
Christianity  we  shall  admit  that  all  men  stand 
upon  an  equal  footing  without  regard  to  race  or 
color,  and  ethicists  and  pacifists  as  a  body  accord- 

384 


THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

ingly  deny  the  rightfulness  of  any  assertion  of 
supremacy  by  the  white  race. 

No  such  contention  has  ever  been  admitted 
in  actual  practice.  The  white  race  has  arrogated 
the  right  to  rule  all  other  races  and  has  thus  far 
made  good  its  title  to  supremacy  and  superiority. 
Nor  has  the  United  States  taken  an  attitude  upon 
this  issue  different  from  that  of  other  white  nations. 
The  Indians  and  negroes  have  only  very  recently 
been  accorded  legal  status  and  we  have  yet  as  a 
nation  to  act  upon  the  assumption  that  the  Indians 
possess  rights  paramount  in  the  land  to  those  of 
the  white  man.  Such  land  as  the  white  man  did 
not  wish  to  use,  the  Indians  have  been  allowed  to 
occupy,  but  the  moment  the  white  man  desired 
it,  reasons  in  plenty  have  been  discovered  for 
handing  possession  over  to  him.  The  basis  of  the 
opinion  seems  to  be  the  distinction  between  the 
Christian  and  the  heathen,  and  the  general  assump- 
tion, true  for  many  centuries,  that  the  white  race 
alone  would  be  Christian.  There  could  be  of 
course  no  question  but  that  the  Christians  were 
to  rule  and  that  they  must  so  deal  with  the 
heathen  as  to  save  their  souls.  Inevitably  this 
meant  that  the  white  race  took  under  its  guidance 
and  tutelage  all  other  races  and  was  to  provide  as 
best  it  could  for  their  salvation,  by  the  institution 
*s  385 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

of  churches  and  by  good  government  and  educa- 
tion. According  to  the  ethics  of  the  Crusaders 
and  of  the  Inquisition,  the  Spaniards  and  the 
English  who  occupied  the  Western  Hemisphere 
assumed  the  right  to  coerce  the  bodies  of  Indians 
and  of  negroes  for  the  purpose  of  saving  their 
souls.  It  was  early  recognized  that  political 
control  and  the  direction  of  the  labor  of  the  natives 
by  the  white  man  was  a  necessary  consequence  of 
conversion  and  was  indispensable  to  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  tutelage  of  the  whites. 

The  Protestant  Reformation  in  the  sixteenth 
century  had  a  peculiar  influence  upon  this  tenet, 
tending  on  the  whole  greatly  to  strengthen  it. 
Whereas  Catholics  had  taught  that  the  act  of 
baptism  was  sufficient  to  save  the  heathen's  soul, 
even  if  the  individual  could  not  comprehend  the 
doctrine,  the  Protestants  insisted  upon  the  actual 
comprehension  of  the  teaching,  and,  while  the 
Catholics  in  practice  placed  the  heathen  upon  a 
par  with  infants  and  assumed  that  the  offices  of 
the  church  must  procure  their  salvation  because 
they  were  not  capable  of  assisting,  the  Protestants 
were  of  the  opinion  that  Christians  would  not 
perform  their  whole  duty  unless  they  made  the 
heathen  capable  of  saving  his  own  soul.  That 
anyone  else  could  save  it  for  him  they  denied.  To 

386 


THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

educate  him  to  the  point  of  comprehension  meant 
however  the  continuance  of  the  tutelage  and  super- 
vision until  such  time  as  the  less  developed  races 
should  become  Christians  in  something  more  than 
name  and  educated  in  something  more  than  the 
outward  signs  of  Christian  character.  Hence 
came  the  assumption  that  the  Christian  nations 
must  watch  over  the  lesser  developed  peoples  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere  in  order  to  make  real 
their  Christianity  and  their  ultimate  salvation. 
It  became  a  religious  duty  which  could  not  be 
shirked  or  avoided;  some  white  nation  must  be 
responsible  for  these  peoples  who  so  recently  were 
heathen.  If  therefore  Spain  lost  the  supremacy, 
England  must  take  it  up,  and,  if  it  did  not  pass 
to  England,  the  United  States  must  assume  it. 
It  was  a  part  of  the  white  man's  burden,  a  trust 
to  be  discharged  as  a  part  of  his  own  duty  toward 
God. 

International  ethics  therefore  is  a  subtle  and 
most  peculiar  mixture  of  the  law  of  individual  self- 
defense,  the  ethics  of  business,  and  the  ethics  of 
the  Crusaders.  So  far  as  we  are  concerned,  we 
can  hardly  claim  to-day  a  real  necessity  for  self- 
defense  against  actual  aggression  from  South 
America,  such  as  would  in  any  sense  justify  us  in 
taking  military  and  naval  control  of  the  Western 

387 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

Hemisphere.  In  order  to  base  our  supremacy 
upon  the  necessity  of  the  continuance  of  guardian- 
ship by  a  Christian  nation,  we  must  assume  that 
the  intellectual  attainments  of  Latin  Americans 
are  as  yet  too  rudimentary  to  permit  their  real 
comprehension  of  the  tenets  of  Christianity,  to 
say  nothing  of  the  imputation  that  the  offices 
of  the  Catholic  Church  are  entirely  unable  to 
ensure  their  salvation.  To  state  such  a  proposi- 
tion is  to  show  its  present  absurdity  as  a  basis  of 
American  policy.  Unless  we  can  justify  our  ex- 
pansion by  the  ethics  of  business,  the  ethics  of 
peaceful  penetration,  the  ethics  of  future  markets, 
or  of  territory  to  develop,  we  shall  not  be  able  to 
justify  it  at  all. 

In  the  end  we  return  to  the  issue  with  which  we 
started:  what  is  ethics;  what  are  the  criteria  of 
justice?  Our  premise  will  determine  our  conclu- 
sion ;  there  is  no  escaping  this  fact ;  but  what  ethical 
premise  will  justify  peaceful  penetration?  There 
is  only  one  such  standard :  the  actual  conduct  of 
nations  in  the  past.  If  then  we  consider  ethics 
right  conduct  and  take  as  its  standard  the  present 
conduct  of  nations,  as  well  as  our  own  past  actions 
and  those  of  the  greater  European  nations,  em- 
ploying actual  cases  as  against  hypothetical 
assumptions,  we  shall  have  little  difficulty  in 

388 


THE  ETHICS  OF  EXPANSION 

concluding  that  the  expansion  of  the  United  States 
into  Central  and  South  America  for  the  purpose 
of  assuring  its  economic  welfare  in  the  future 
would  be  entirely  in  accordance  with  international 
ethics,  as  applied  by  white  men  in  their  relations 
with  the  lesser  developed  countries  during  the 
last  three  centuries.  The  practices  of  the  past 
justify  such  ambitions.  We  can  demonstrate 
the  consonance  of  any  sort  of  conduct  with  ethics 
if  only  we  assume  the  right  premise.  Is  it  not 
possible  after  all  that  a  search  for  the  principles 
by  which  certain  conduct  could  be  proved  ethical, 
would  not  only  bear  a  close  resemblance  to  the 
ancient  logical  fallacy  of  arguing  in  a  circle  but 
would  also  be  scarcely  recognizable  as  an  ethical 
inquiry? 


389 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  EXPEDIENCY  OF  THE  MONROE 
DOCTRINE 

THE  history  of  international  diplomacy  con- 
tains nothing  more  elusive  and  difficult 
of  definition  than  the  Monroe  Doctrine.1 
It  has  been  quoted  in  the  past  in  justification  of 
a  great  variety  of  conflicting  purposes  and  has 
shown  an  apparent  flexibility  and  fluidity  which 
approach  contradiction.  At  times  it  has  been 
limited  to  defensive  measures;  at  others  extended 
to  justify  forcible  aggression;  from  a  mere  right 
to  preserve  our  own  independence  has  been  de- 
veloped a  right  to  annex  Latin- American  territory, 
to  build  a  canal,  and  to  intervene  in  other  nations' 
affairs.  Where  some  presidents  have  seen  in  it 
a  permissive  relationship,  others  have  found  it 
mandatory.  The  historians  have  not  been  less 
confused  than  the  diplomats  have  been  contra- 

1  The  author  wishes  to  remind  the  reader  that  he  is  attempting 
in  this  chapter  to  state  the  pros  and  cons  and  not  to  prove  that 
expansion  and  imperialism  are  expedient  or  desirable. 

390 


EXPEDIENCY  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

dictory;  yet  the  American  people  are  clearly 
agreed  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  contains  some- 
thing fundamental  which  they  are  not  at  all 
inclined  to  sacrifice  and  to  which  they  attach  a 
prodigious  importance. 

A  possible  explanation  of  this  peculiar  situation 
may  be  suggested.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  seems 
to  be  couched,  in  true  Anglo-Saxon  fashion,  rather 
in  the  specific  application  of  the  principle  involved 
than  in  a  statement  of  the  principle  itself. 

Continually  we  have  been  given  the  effect  rather 
than  the  cause;  the  actual  decision  rather  than 
the  generalization  from  which  it  proceeded.  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  has  stood  in  reality  for  two  de- 
finitive and  fundamental  conceptions  of  American 
polity,  and  the  American  people  have  rightly 
gaged  its  essential  quality.  First,  it  stands  for 
our  incontrovertible  right  of  self-defense,  expressed 
originally  in  a  practical  application  of  that  prin- 
ciple to  the  situation  of  1823.  At  that  moment 
our  political  independence  seemed  absolutely  safe 
from  European  powers  in  Europe,  but  by  no  means 
as  secure  from  European  states  located  in  America. 
To  ensure  our  independence  therefore  we  had  to 
prevent  European  states  from  projecting  them- 
selves into  the  Western  Hemisphere.  In  the 
second  place,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  stood  for 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  equally  undoubted  right  of  the  United  States 
to  champion  and  protect  its  primary  economic 
interests  against  Europe  or  America;  we  as- 
serted our  fundamental  duty  of  defending  and 
guaranteeing  by  all  means  in  our  power  our  eco- 
nomic independence.  Monroe  applied  the  prin- 
ciple to  the  situation  of  1823  at  a  moment  when 
our  paramount  interests  had  been  for  a  century 
and  still  were  freedom  of  trade  with  the  West 
India  Islands,  and  when  the  economic  bond  be- 
tween the  colonists  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
was  mutual  in  the  strictest  sense.  America  for 
Americans,  the  exclusion  of  Europeans,  was  not 
only  a  possibility  but  a  desirability.  Subsequent 
presidents  and  diplomats,  as  the  particular  issues 
changed,  reasserted  constantly  not  the  general 
principle  but  its  application  to  the  situation.  They 
made  the  Monroe  Doctrine  therefore  a  complex 
of  all  the  varied  ideas  and  notions  which  our 
statesmen  have  had  in  the  past  with  regard  to  the 
maintenance  of  our  political  independence  of 
Europe  and  the  desirability  of  our  economic  inde- 
pendence. To  protect  the  one  and  provide  for 
the  other  has  been  the  nearest  approach  to  a 
primary  interest  which  the  United  States  has  ever 
had. 

Each  particular  expedient  for  advancing  these 
392 


EXPEDIENCY  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

fundamental  interests  has  rarely  held  the  fore- 
ground for  more  than  a  brief  period.  While 
freedom  of  access  to  the  West  Indies  was  really 
essential  to  American  trade,  the  bulk  of  our  diplo- 
matic policies  was  directed  against  the  English 
control  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  While  there  were 
still  great  areas  of  unoccupied  land  in  North 
America,  American  statesmen  were  apprehensive 
of  colonization  by  European  states  and  proceeded 
to  purchase  the  land  in  question,  to  annex  it  or 
conquer  it.  During  the  French  Revolution  and 
the  Napoleonic  wars,  neutral  trade  with  France 
in  foodstuffs  was  a  prominent  interest  and  led 
promptly  to  the  War  of  1812.  The  Peace  of 
Vienna  brought  into  the  foreground  this  whole 
complex  of  motives,  so  that  they  appeared  simul- 
taneously in  the  various  phases  of  the  diplomatic 
negotiations  of  Monroe's  period  and  included  in 
its  utterances  precedent  for  most  contingencies, 
rendering  it  the  most  important  single  period  in 
our  diplomatic  history. 

No  sooner  had  the  Doctrine  been  enunciated 
than  the  interest  which  it  had  primarily  been 
intended  to  further  disappeared  by  the  operation 
of  economic  and  political  forces  over  which  we 
had  no  control.  Other  forces  for  whose  growth 
we  were  as  little  responsible  appeared  in  the 

393 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

United  States  and  in  Europe  and  entirely  changed 
the  aspect  of  the  two  fundamental  problems  of 
political  independence  and  our  economic  depend- 
ence upon  Europe.  The  growth  of  the  cotton 
culture  had  now  made  the  annexation  of  land 
suitable  for  cotton  our  primary  interest,  and  had 
promptly  taken  the  place  in  American  policy  of  an 
insistence  upon  freedom  of  trade  in  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico.  The  fundamental  problems  were  the 
same;  the  particular  expedient  by  which  we  were 
attempting  to  provide  an  adequate  medium  of 
exchange  with  Europe  was  entirely  different,  and 
led  therefore  to  the  assertion  of  a  practical  solu- 
tion, unrelated  to  the  earlier  suggested  solution. 
It  was  still  called  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  partly  no 
doubt  to  claim  for  it  the  antiquity  and  correspond- 
ence with  past  precedent  it  deserved  and  partly 
because  no  better  descriptive  term  suggested 
itself.  The  Civil  War,  the  freeing  of  the  slaves, 
the  new  economic  development  again  changed  the 
situation  and  therefore  changed  the  practical  ex- 
pedient suggested  for  advancing  our  two  most 
important  interests.  The  moment  the  United 
States  had  become  an  integral  part  of  the  inter- 
dependent international  fabric  and  had  assumed, 
because  of  the  rise  of  the  German  navy,  actual 
supremacy  in  the  Western  Hemisphere,  every 

394 


EXPEDIENCY  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

practical  consideration  relating  to  these  problems 
was  again  revolutionized  and  hence  their  practical 
expression  was  apparently  entirely  at  odds  with 
the  earlier  statements  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
It  could  not  have  been  otherwise,  for  the  funda- 
mental problems  themselves  were  transformed 
beyond  recognition. 

The  inconsistencies  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
its  fluidity  and  flexibility,  are  therefore  apparent 
rather  than  real.  The  fundamental  principles 
are  to-day  what  they  always  have  been:  our 
undoubted  right  to  political  independence,  our  in- 
controvertible duty  to  ensure  our  economic  wel- 
fare and  prevent  arbitrary  interference  with  it 
by  European  nations  in  their  own  interests.  Such 
principles  we  cannot  abandon  without  sacrificing 
all  that  is  vital  to  our  national  integrity  and 
national  honor.  Less  than  this  we  could  not 
assert ;  more  than  this  we  cannot  yield.  It  is  not 
however  international  law  and  it  has  never  been 
accepted  by  other  nations,  though  its  basic  mean- 
ing they  are  not  inclined  to  dispute  because  the 
same  principles  are  implicit  in  their  own  polity. 
They  recognize  our  right  to  maintain  them  as  they 
expect  us  to  grant  their  own  necessity  of  acting 
in  accordance  with  the  same  postulates. 

It  will  be  essential  for  us  to  recognize  to-day, 
395 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

as  has  been  so  frequently  admitted  in  the  past, 
that  a  change  of  circumstances  renders  obsolete 
certain  particular  applications  of  the  Doctrine. 
We  are  not  obligated  now  and  never  have  con- 
sidered ourselves  obligated  in  the  past  to  reaffirm 
any  particular  solution,  or  to  require  from  other 
nations  a  recognition  of  any  of  its  past  applications. 
To  question  the  expediency  of  any  particular 
application  has  never  been  and  is  not  now  to 
question  the  validity  of  the  Doctrine  itself,  but 
involves  simply  a  consideration  of  the  ways  and 
means,  of  the  ends  and  methods  expedient  under 
existing  circumstances.  We  are  therefore  entirely 
free  to  apply  the  Doctrine  at  any  time  to  any  new 
set  of  circumstances  without  considering  ourselves 
bound  by  past  problems  or  precedents.  Consist- 
ency of  action  and  statement  with  the  past  the 
circumstances  of  the  new  situation  may  render 
inexpedient,  and  compel  us  either  to  sacrifice  the 
fundamental  principle  itself  or  our  own  previous 
attempts  to  further  it.  What  has  been  already 
changed  so  often  may  be  modified  in  the  future 
as  the  exigencies  of  the  case  suggest. 

Hence  it  is  expedient  for  us  to  recognize  in  the 
first  place  that  the  specific  applications  of  the 
Doctrine  in  the  past  have  been  rendered  entirely 
obsolete  by  the  disappearance  of  the  situations 

396 


EXPEDIENCY  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

to  which  they  applied.  Monroe  and  Adams  saw 
in  1823  a  natural  geographical  separation  between 
the  Old  World  and  the  New,  a  natural  affinity  of 
interests  between  republican  peoples  in  the  New 
World,  and  their  common  antipathy  to  monarchi- 
cal governments  in  the  Old,  besides  the  mutual 
economic  interests  between  the  peoples  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  in  the  West  India  trade. 
All  these  have  since  disappeared.  To-day  a  geo- 
graphical relationship  between  the  Americas  closer 
than  that  between  the  Western  Hemisphere  and 
Europe  is  a  fiction.  The  development  of  the 
nineteenth  century  has  produced  a  greater  simi- 
larity between  our  Government  and  that  of  Eng- 
land or  France,  than  between  the  United  States  and 
the  Latin-American  republics,  while  the  latter's 
methods  of  administration  and  general  premises 
of  political  thought  are  so  utterly  different  from 
ours  that  the  United  States  Government  hesitates 
to  recognize  them  as  truly  republican.  The 
mutual  interest  in  the  West  India  trade  disap- 
peared ten  years  after  Monroe's  message  was  read 
and  has  never  existed  since.  As  for  a  threat  to 
our  political  independence  involved  in  the  loca- 
tion of  a  European  state  in  North  America  or  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico,  such  as  terrified  Jefferson,  Monroe, 
and  Calhoun,  there  is  not  now  and  for  fifty  years 

397 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

has  not  been  the  slightest  danger  to  our  political 
independence  from  any  such  source;  the  growth 
of  the  United  States  in  population  and  in  wealth 
has  effectually  exorcised  such  perils.  Nor  are 
the  interests  which  seemed  so  vital  to  American 
statesmen  in  the  decades  preceding  the  Civil  War 
more  significant.  The  territorial  expansion  of 
America  in  order  to  increase  the  area  of  cotton 
land  has  been  rendered  of  consequence  by  the  new 
machinery  for  ginning  cotton,  by  the  new  fer- 
tilizers which  have  made  the  upland  cotton  avail- 
able, and  which  have  solved  the  cotton  problem 
by  making  profitable  the  cultivation  of  other  land 
besides  virgin  soil.  The  crop  has  grown  by  leaps 
and  bounds  and  nothing  but  a  slackening  demand 
can  prevent  its  continued  growth. 

Adams  doubted  in  1823  whether  any  pronun- 
ciamento  by  the  United  States  could  protect 
South  America  from  Europe;  certainly  it  could  not 
exclude  England  who  already  controlled  Latin 
America,  and  he  saw  no  reason  to  doubt  her  abil- 
ity to  defend  South  America  single-handed.  Cir- 
cumstances proved  the  correctness  of  his  ideas. 
Before  Monroe's  message  was  enunciated  an 
agreement  between  England  and  France  to  protect 
the  republics  solved  the  difficulty.  If  both  were 
opposed  to  reconquest  the  restoration  of  Spanish 

398 


EXPEDIENCY  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

authority  was  impossible.  Nor  has  there  appeared 
to  this  day  good  reason  to  doubt  the  correctness  of 
the  claim  advanced  by  England  and  the  South 
Americans  that  their  defense  from  aggression  has 
depended  upon  the  English  control  of  the  sea  and 
upon  the  lack  of  sufficient  motive  to  challenge  it. 
We  are  therefore  at  present  under  no  obligation 
to  continue  a  protection  of  South  America  which 
never  was  real,  and  if  we  decline  to  reaffirm  a 
particular  application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
primarily  applied  to  the  West  Indies,  we  shall 
not  rob  the  South  Americans  of  anything  on 
which  they  depend.  The  political  independence 
of  South  America  seems  as  well  assured  as  that 
of  the  United  States  and  in  as  little  danger  from 
Europe.  The  South  Americans  do  not  dread  any 
such  eventuality;  our  aid  against  Europe  they  do 
not  desire,  nor  do  they  ask  us  to  defend  them. 
They  do  not  believe  us  better  prepared  to  fight 
for  them  than  they  are  to  protect  themselves. 

If  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  we  mean  Pan- 
Americanism,  America  for  the  Americans,  the 
exclusion  of  Europeans  and  of  European  influence 
as  a  matter  of  principle,  we  must  recognize  that 
we  are  advocating  a  scheme  which  the  South 
Americans  believe  inimical  to  their  interests. 
Any  closer  connection  between  the  United 

399 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

States  and  the  Latin-American  republics  they 
consider  so  abnormal  and  artificial,  so  lacking  in 
mutuality,  and  so  entirely  devoid  of  popular  con- 
fidence that  we  must  recognize  frankly  the  full 
meaning  of  its  adoption  as  an  American  policy. 
It  spells  imperialism  and  territorial  expansion. 
Of  this  the  South  Americans  have  no  doubt. 
"The  Republicans  think  only  of  imperialism," 
says  Calderon,  "Will  a  generous  elite  succeed 
in  withstanding  this  racial  tendency?  Perhaps, 
but  nothing  can  check  the  onward  march  of  the 
United  States.  Their  imperialism  is  an  unavoid- 
able phenomena."  It  is  from  the  very  lack  of 
mutuality  in  Pan-Americanism  that  he  draws  this 
conclusion.  The  ostensible  objects  of  that  move- 
ment are  so  clearly  artificial,  so  entirely  in  favor 
of  the  United  States,  so  clearly  hostile  to  the  best 
interests  of  Latin  America,  that  Latin  Americans 
feel  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  it  is  merely  a 
cloak  for  the  ambition  of  the  United  States  and 
of  its  intention  to  conquer  South  America  in  the 
interests  of  its  own  economic  future.  The  defeat 
of  Europe's  victor  would  be  the  necessary  pre- 
liminary to  the  extension  of  American  supremacy, 
and  for  the  United  States  to  claim  its  bounden 
duty  to  exclude  Europe's  victor  from  the  Western 
Hemisphere  would,  in  face  of  the  facts,  merely 

400 


EXPEDIENCY  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

prove  its  intention  to  play  the  part  of  conqueror 
itself.  Even  if  we  decline  to  accept  this  logic  as 
true,  we  shall  still  be  conscious  that  it  is  not  a 
phase  of  the  situation  which  we  can  neglect. 

If  we  invoke  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  its  primal 
meaning  of  our  bounden  duty  and  right  to  ensure 
our  present  and  future  economic  welfare  by  any 
means  in  our  power,  we  shall  find  ready  at  hand 
the  ethics  of  economic  expansion  recently  de- 
veloped in  Europe  and  there  considered  valid  and 
significant.  That  we  may  need  in  the  near  future 
new  markets  and  new  territory  to  develop  is  by 
no  means  improbable,  and  there  is  no  district 
so  thoroughly  well  fitted  for  our  economic  needs 
as  Latin  America.  If  we  decide  to  utilize  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  to  justify  territorial  expansion, 
we  must  recognize  fully  and  frankly  that  the 
defense  we  are  seeking  is  in  the  future  and  is  not 
at  present  existent,  and  that  it  is  a  far  cry  from 
the  type  of  defense  which  the  framers  of  this 
Doctrine  originally  had  in  mind.  It  will  still  be 
conquest,  aggression  against  those  innocent  of  any 
intention  to  harm  us,  who  are  not  themselves  the 
perpetrators  of  the  evil  we  are  trying  to  remedy. 

Unquestionably,  territorial  expansion,  imperial- 
ism, by  whatever  name  we  call  it, — and  if  we 
follow  past  precedent  we  shall  once  more  term  it 
26  401 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

the  Monroe  Doctrine, — means  only  one  thing :  war 
with  Europe's  victor  in  the  first  place  and  with 
South  America  in  the  second  place.  We  should 
also  apparently  put  ourselves  in  the  very  peculiar 
diplomatic  position  of  fighting  the  Latin  Americans 
to  compel  them  to  allow  us  to  protect  them  from 
European  aggression.  We  should  also  be  quarrel- 
ing with  our  own  best  friends  in  Europe,  who 
cherish  no  designs  against  South  America,  in  order 
to  render  assistance  to  those  who  fear  us,  even 
when  we  come  bearing  gifts  which  they  do  not 
require  and  which  they  would  not  need  even 
should  they  be  attacked.  This  is  at  present 
the  only  proposed  application  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  Our  medium  of  foreign  exchange  is 
assured  beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt;  our  po- 
litical independence  is  not  likely  to  be  threatened. 
Our  dangers  lie  in  the  future  and  are  contingent 
rather  than  actual,  while  the  steps  to  promote 
them  are  desirable  rather  than  imperative,  but 
they  all  involve  aggression  or  expansion,  inter- 
ference with  the  control  of  the  sea,  and  with  Latin 
America.  They  cannot  be  described  as  defensive 
measures  of  the  older  type  and  we  must  look  for 
their  justification  to  the  ethics  of  modern  ex- 
pansion as  seen  in  Pan-Germanism  and  in  recent 
international  developments. 

402 


EXPEDIENCY  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

Assuming  however  that  expansion  is  desirable 
and  ethical,  is  it  attainable?  Should  we  have  a 
reasonable  chance  of  success,  if  we  attempted  it? 
This  is  the  true  meaning  of  the  phrase,  "the  expe- 
diency of  the  Monroe  Doctrine."  In  a  word,  it 
means  militarism;  nothing  else  can  justify  it, 
nothing  less  can  protect  it.  Its  prerequisites 
include  the  establishment  of  our  independence  of 
the  sea-power,  both  in  the  Atlantic  and  in  the 
Pacific,  by  the  development  of  a  great  navy  and 
of  a  great  merchant  marine,  one  large  enough 
to  terrorize  England,  Germany,  and  Japan,  the 
other  sufficient  in  size  to  transport  the  whole 
volume  of  our  foreign  trade.  We  shall  then 
need  to  provide  an  exchange  system  adequate  for 
the  transaction  of  the  whole  volume  of  our  inter- 
national trade,  for  if  we  challenge  the  sea-power 
we  shall  immediately  deprive  ourselves  of  her 
services  as  distributor  and  exchanger.  A  further 
indispensable  military  measure  would  be  the 
occupation  of  Mexico  and  Central  America  in 
order  to  assure  ourselves  of  the  land  approaches 
to  the  Panama  Canal.  So  much  would  be  needed 
to  cope  with  Europe's  victor.  Until  we  have 
dealt  with  him  and  have  made  ourselves  in  the 
truest  sense  supreme  over  all  the  powers  in  the 
New  World,  aggression  and  expansion  are  not  to  be 

403 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

thought  of.  He  too  will  have  claims  upon  South 
America,  and  if  we  attempt  to  challenge  them 
we  must  be  prepared  to  do  so  in  sufficient  force 
to  make  good  our  protest. 

There  would  then  remain  the  Latin  Americans 
to  deal  with.  Our  control  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere would  of  course  permit  us  to  stop  their  trade 
with  Europe,  but  the  task  of  invasion  would  be 
stupendous.  The  area  of  Latin  America  is  three 
times  that  of  the  United  States.  Not  having 
been  arranged  by  Nature  for  the  purpose  of  facili- 
tating military  campaigns  it  is  strewn  with  moun- 
tains, intersected  by  numerous  rivers,  fringed  by  a 
broad  band  of  territory  along  the  coast  where  the 
climate,  swamps,  and  insects  provide  conditions 
of  maximum  difficulty  for  armies.  The  popula- 
tion is  by  no  means  negligible  in  numbers  and  is  of 
proved  courage.  Even  the  peoples  of  the  smaller 
states  in  Central  America  have  merely  to  retire 
to  the  interior,  and  leave  us  to  struggle  with  the 
enormous  difficulty  of  crossing  the  hot  coast 
district  to  achieve  the  privilege  of  chasing  them 
around  through  the  mountains  and  plateaus.  To 
transport  an  army  and  provision  it  in  Central 
America  would  require  a  merchant  marine  of 
great  size  and  would  certainly  interfere  consider- 
ably with  the  adequacy  of  our  merchant  marine 

404 


EXPEDIENCY  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

for  foreign  commerce.  Between  the  various 
states  of  Latin  America  there  seems  to  be  no 
legitimate  strategic  relationship.  Each  would 
have  to  be  subdued  separately  if  it  were  subdued 
at  all  and  a  series  of  campaigns,  which  would 
require  years  for  completion,  would  be  necessary 
unless  the  movement  were  undertaken  by  an  army 
of  truly  phenomenal  size  and  efficiency.  In  any 
case,  an  army  of  occupation  would  have  to  be  left 
to  retain  control,  unless  an  entirely  unlikely  result 
should  eventuate,  and  gain  us  the  willing  sub- 
mission of  the  inhabitants  and  their  cooperation 
in  the  future.  The  conquest  of  even  the 
smallest  Central  American  state  is  beyond  the 
power  of  the  present  United  States  army.  The 
protection  of  its  communications  would  not  be 
possible  with  the  present  United  States  fleet.  A 
navy  at  least  as  efficient  as  the  present  German 
navy  and  an  army  of  a  million  men  would  be  very 
likely  adequate,  but  we  could  not  definitely  as- 
sume their  adequacy  until  circumstances  proved 
it.  The  expediency  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
the  sense  of  territorial  expansion  or  imperialism 
involves  this  question :  is  the  end  itself  sufficiently 
important  to  justify  any  such  portentous  efforts 
as  would  clearly  be  necessary  to  accomplish  it? 
To  answer  this  question  will  require  wisdom,  dis- 
405 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

cretion,  and  insight.  Though  we  need  not  suggest 
a  solution,  we  must  not  forget  that  our  economic 
interests  are  primarily  with  Europe  and  not  with 
South  America.  Adams  and  Monroe  were  en- 
tirely mistaken  in  expecting  that  the  development 
of  the  future  would  accentuate  the  mutuality  of 
interests  between  the  United  States  and  Latin 
America.  Subsequent  development  has  proved 
that  the  connection  between  the  two  is  abnormal 
and  that  the  true  economic  interests  of  both  were 
with  Europe.  This  much  is  certainly  clear:  it  is 
not  expedient  for  us  to  quarrel  with  Europe  to 
extend  our  relations  with  Latin  America.  Indeed, 
it  is  an  open  question  whether  it  would  be  to  our 
economic  advantage  to  close  the  markets  of  Europe 
temporarily  by  a  conflict  with  the  sea-power  in 
order  to  monopolize  eventually  the  markets  of 
Latin  America.  The  temporary  loss  in  the 
European  trade  might  conceivably  exceed  the 
total  profits  for  many  years  in  the  trade  with 
the  new  market.  Whether  we  can  extend  our 
aegis  over  Latin  America  and  exclude  the  Euro- 
pean, without  causing  a  general  war  with  Europe, 
only  the  situation  at  the  close  of  the  present 
European  war  can  decide.  If  we  are  not  armed 
and  ready  when  peace  is  signed,  we  may  be 
foreclosed  even  before  the  attempt  is  made. 

406 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  ARGUMENT  FOR  DISARMAMENT 

THE  finest  and  in  many  ways  the  most  at- 
tractive argument  advanced  in  favor  of 
total  disarmament  by  the  United  States 
is  the  pacifist  declaration  of  the  duty  'of  the  United 
States  to  take  advantage  of  its  peculiar  strategic 
position  and  set  Europe  an  example.1  Our  posi- 
tion makes  such  a  step  more  possible  for  us 
without  endangering  our  national  independence 
than  for  any  European  or  Asiatic  power.  It  is 
therefore  for  us  to  lead  and  not  to  wait  in 
the  expectation  that  some  nation  less  favored 
than  we  will  take  the  initiative.  Such  a  step 
would  be  entirely  in  accordance  with  the  general 
non-military  character  of  our  institutions  and 
organization;  and  to  conjure  with  such  a  pre- 
cedent is  ordinarily  effective.  If  such  an  act 
is  to  accomplish  its  object,  however,  it  will  be 

1  This  chapter  is  an  attempt  to  state  forcibly  the  arguments 
for  disarmament  as  the  succeeding  is  intended  to  state  those 
against  it. 

407 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

highly  necessary  that  the  step  should  be  taken  as 
the  result  of  a  determination  reached  by  the  vast 
majority  of  the  American  people  after  due  delib" 
eration  and  discussion, — perhaps  only  after  some 
great  presidential  campaign  upon  this  specific 
issue  of  disarmament, — so  that  all  the  world  might 
know  that  the  chief  ground  and  reason  for  the 
action  was  ethical  and  pacifist  and  not  merely  a 
motive  of  economy  or  a  mixture  of  selfish  and 
base  influences.  Expediency,  economy,  selfish- 
ness must  be  rigorously  exorcised  or  the  very 
purpose  of  the  act  will  be  frustrated. 

Our  disinterested  conduct  and  our  attempt  at 
generous  action  must  also  be  made  crystal-clear 
to  European  nations  by  our  behavior  in  things  of 
lesser  moment.  To  disarm  from  the  most  splen- 
did of  ethical  motives  and  then  to  insist  upon 
exacting  from  England  a  degree  of  consideration 
in  matters  of  neutral  trade  which  England  felt 
greater  than  she  could  grant  consistently  with  her 
safety;  to  act  from  motives  of  good  will  toward 
men  and  then  to  insist  that  the  Japanese  could 
not  own  property  in  the  United  States,  or  to 
decline  to  recognize  that  sort  of  government  in 
Central  American  countries  which  they  themselves 
deemed  expedient,  these  would  be  so  inconsistent 
with  our  general  premises  as  to  throw  suspicion 

408 


THE  ARGUMENT  FOR  DISARMAMENT 

and  doubt  upon  the  purity  of  our  original  motive. 
Nobility  in  great  things  will  compel  us  to  act  with 
generosity  in  small  things,  even  though  by  it  we 
should  sacrifice  much.  Shall  we  make  the  greater 
sacrifice  and  balk  at  the  less?  Shall  we  yield  the 
essential  and  hesitate  before  the  unimportant? 

Truly  glorious  would  be  the  renunciation  by  the 
people  of  the  United  States  of  all  ambition  outside 
continental  United  States,  the  explicit  surrender 
of  all  our  outlying  possessions,  the  abandoning 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  any  and  every  form, 
either  as  intervention,  interference,  or  conquest. 
Economic  advantages  we  would  resolutely  put 
behind  us  which  the  sword  or  threats  might 
secure.  The  use  of  our  wealth  and  potential 
strength  as  a  club  we  would  also  explicitly  forego, 
and  declare  openly  to  all  men  our  intention  in 
future  to  depend  upon  fair  and  honorable  dealing 
and  the  great  natural  advantages  of  our  position 
to  promote  our  economic  prosperity  and  secure 
for  us  all  things  truly  necessary,  declaring  aught 
else  wrong  and  unethical. 

Another  argument  for  disarmament  is  to  be 
found  in  humanitarian  motives — the  horrors  of 
war,  the  loss  of  life,  suffering  entailed  upon  the 
helpless  and  innocent,  needless  destruction  of 
property  resulting  in  no  advantage  to  the  belliger- 

409 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

ents,  and  in  poverty  and  suffering  to  non-combat- 
ants. To  many,  such  motives  make  a  powerful 
appeal. 

There  are  many  reasons  for  believing  that  dis- 
armament might  be  effected  without  involving 
real  danger  to  our  integrity.  We  are  defended  at 
present  by  our  strategic  position,  the  principal  fac- 
tors of  which  are  the  subtlety  and  delicate  balance 
of  European  alliances  and  relationships  rather  than 
our  actual  geographical  location,  factors  not  easily 
supplemented  by  armies  and  navies  and  for  which 
armament  is  a  poor  substitute.  Were  it  more 
probable  that  a  radical  change  would  take  place 
as  a  result  of  this  war  in  the  European  balance  of 
power,  armament  would  be  more  justifiable.  It 
seems  likely  that  the  vanquished  will  be  beaten 
and  humiliated  but  not  crushed  and  that  the  bal- 
ance of  power  will  not  be  more  changed  than  in 
1815  or  in  1870 — and  neither  of  these  events  pro- 
duced a  situation  dangerous  to  the  United  States. 
That  armament  will  be  indispensable  to  our  national 
integrity  seems  unlikely  and  disarmament  in  the 
near  future  for  that  reason  appears  to  be  com- 
paratively safe.  To  this  consideration  we  should 
add  the  fact  that  political  control  of  the  present 
territory  of  the  United  States  is  not  as  yet  advan- 
tageous to  any  European  nation  or  coalition  in 

410 


THE  ARGUMENT  FOR  DISARMAMENT 

the  settlement  of  its  disputes  in  Europe  and  would 
be  hardly  essential  to  the  extension  of  its  authority 
elsewhere. 

Our  danger  of  invasion  is  really  slight  and  dis- 
armament comparatively  safe,  because  the  victor 
would  lack  the  motive  for  invasion  rather  than 
the  power.  He  will  be  seeking  markets  in  unde- 
veloped territory  which  will  furnish  him  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  investment  of  capital  and  for  an 
increase  of  the  productive  and  consumptive  ca- 
pacity of  that  community  at  an  entirely  abnormal 
rate.  Such  a  field  the  United  States  will  not 
present.  It  is  already  too  highly  developed  and 
already  too  independent  and  elaborate  an  eco- 
nomic structure  to  furnish  him  anything  beyond 
the  normal  market  which  he  will  expect  to  find  in 
the  greater  states.  We  cannot  in  the  nature  of 
things  be  his  prey. 

Nor  should  we  probably  sacrifice  our  access  to 
foreign  markets  by  abandoning  any  attempt  to 
dispute  the  control  of  the  sea  with  Europe's  victor. 
The  mere  fact  that  our  trade  is  carried  in  foreign 
ships,  our  exchange  performed  by  foreign  banking 
houses,  and  our  intercourse  dependent  upon  the 
good  will  and  sufferance  of  foreign  nations,  is 
not  necessarily  dangerous  and  undesirable,  even 
though  it  might  conceivably  be  both.  The  really 

411 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

significant  fact  is  that  of  interdependence,  for  the 
continuance  of  trade  is  as  important  and  essential 
to  all  other  nations  as  it  is  to  us,  and  could  not  be 
stopped  by  the  victor  on  the  sea  without  causing 
an  international  crisis  of  such  magnitude  that  the 
whole  world  must  rise  and  crush  the  sea-power 
in  order  to  rid  itself  of  the  incubus.  No  nation 
controlling  the  sea  can  so  act  and  subserve  its 
own  immediate  ends,  nor  interfere  with  the  free- 
dom of  passage  of  neutral  nations  without  en- 
dangering its  control  and  existence.  Our  interest 
in  the  sea  is  one  that  we  share  with  the  world  at 
large  and  therefore  one  in  which  the  world  at 
large  is  as  much  interested  as  we  are ;  hence  it  is 
one  which  the  victor  will  be  driven  to  recognize. 

It  is  idle  for  us  to  seek  independence  on 
the  sea  from  England  or  Germany.  Reasons 
of  domestic  policy  entirely  unaffected  by  us  or 
our  policies  impel  both  of  them  to  assert  rights 
in  the  ocean  which  neither  could  allow  us  to  chal- 
lenge. Our  protestations  they  could  not  recog- 
nize as  against  their  own  paramount  interests  in 
the  sea-power  for  defense.  While  intercourse 
is  essential  for  our  commercial  prosperity,  the 
control  of  the  ocean  highways  is  the  prerequisite 
of  England's  existence  or  of  Germany's  interna- 
tional status.  So  long  as  England  controls  the 

412 


THE  ARGUMENT  FOR  DISARMAMENT 

sea,  we  need  only  remember  the  generosity  and 
forbearance  of  her  conduct  in  the  past  to  assure 
ourselves  of  its  continuance  in  the  future.  She 
understands  thoroughly  well  the  limitations  and 
obligations  of  her  position  and  is  not  in  the  least 
inclined  to  make  intolerable  to  others  what  she 
deems  necessary  for  herself.  It  is  her  peculiar 
geographical  position,  her  peculiar  economic  con- 
dition, which  makes  real  encroachment  upon  the 
rights  of  others  difficult  and  dangerous  for  her. 
There  can  be  in  the  nature  of  things  no  power  in 
the  world  so  well  fitted  to  possess  the  sea-power 
as  England,  if  we  concede  that  any  nation  should 
have  it.  There  can  certainly  be  no  power  in  the 
world  whose  possession  of  the  sea-power  would 
be  so  much  to  our  own  advantage;  indeed,  it 
is  an  open  question  whether  we  should  be  in  a 
stronger  and  more  advantageous  position  if  we 
were  more  independent  on  the  sea  than  we  are  at 
present.  Not  only  her  position  but  her  experience 
in  the  past  fits  England  to  rule:  she  has  learned 
her  lesson  and  has  demonstrated  her  ability  to  rule 
with  efficiency  and  due  regard  for  justice.  The 
United  States  also  possesses  a  heavy  pledge  of 
her  generous  interpretation  of  our  requirements 
in  the  advantage  she  derives  from  our  economic 
support  in  times  of  crises.  Unless  she  can  rely 

413 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

upon  the  complementary  economic  structure  of  the 
United  States,  England's  position  has  a  special 
weakness  because  in  times  of  great  stress  her 
fleets  cannot  open  the  way  to  the  markets  in  the 
Baltic  and  Black  Seas  whence  come  her  necessities 
of  life.  So  essential  are  our  supplies  to  her  that 
she  must  sacrifice  even  the  reality  of  her  over- 
lordship  on  the  sea  to  obtain  our  ungrudging 
support.  The  importance  of  this  fact,  many  allege 
it  is  impossible  to  overestimate  when  we  are  con- 
sidering the  expediency  of  disarmament.  With 
a  change  in  the  supremacy  of  the  sea  which  would 
so  revolutionize  conditions  as  to  make  it  essential 
for  us  to  dispute  its  control  with  the  victor  we 
need  not  deal;  for  the  English  regard  it  so  essential 
to  their  own  existence  that  they  will  not  allow 
another  nation  to  possess  it  so  long  as  England 
survives.  Such  a  contingency  as  her  literal  de- 
struction by  the  victor  is  so  improbable  as  to  be 
beyond  the  realm  of  hypothetics.  Should  Ger- 
many take  her  place,  there  are  few  advocates  of 
disarmament  who  seem  to  believe  that  she  would 
not  fall  heir  to  England's  caution  and  generosity. 
If  we  believe  armament  unnecessary  for  defense 
of  our  independence  or  of  our  economic  welfare, 
is  it  not  imperative  for  aggression?  Do  we  not 
after  all  need  to  prepare  to  obtain  by  arms  things 

414 


THE  ARGUMENT  FOR  DISARMAMENT 

merely  desirable?  Those  who  argue  for  disarma- 
ment deny  specifically  and  generally  that  any 
adequate  motives  exist  for  aggression.  With  its 
ethics  they  disagree,  and  pronounce  them  as 
insufficient  as  the  ethical  notions  behind  Pan- 
Germanism  which  the  vast  majority  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  have  already  condemned.  Is  this  not 
sufficient,  we  are  asked?  Have  not  the  people 
spoken?  In  addition,  aggression  is  contrary  to 
the  non-military  character  of  past  precedent  and 
to  the  tenets  so  often  enunciated  by  our  leaders 
of  letting  Europe  alone.  Turning  from  general 
principles  to  specific  facts,  we  are  told  that  aggres- 
sion is  not  a  possible  policy  for  us  because  our 
strategic  position  is  physically  so  weak  that  only 
a  huge  army  can  accomplish  our  object.  Where 
the  effort  is  so  great,  the  stake  must  indeed  be 
large  to  justify  the  undertaking,  and  the  United 
States  has  not  and  never  can  have,  it  is  claimed, 
interests  which  such  aggression  would  be  needed 
to  subserve.  And  even  if  it  had,  we  are  now  so 
late  in  commencing  the  elaborate  preparations 
indispensable  to  the  conduct  of  modern  warfare 
that  ten  years  of  effort  would  scarcely  put  us  in  a 
condition  to  meet  the  victor  of  this  present  war. 
If  he  is  exhausted  by  the  struggle,  he  will  not  be 
capable  of  aggression  and  we  shall  need  no  defense ; 

415 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

while  the  great  force  to  ensure  the  accomplish- 
ment of  any  legitimate  ambitions  which  the  United 
States  may  cherish  will  be  unnecessary  because 
he  will  be  in  no  position  to  oppose.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  as  it  seems  more  probable,  his  army 
and  navy  are  not  only  extraordinary  in  size  but 
unusual  in  efficiency,  any  attempt  at  aggression 
would  be  futile  for  the  United  States  because  the 
war  will  probably  not  last  long  enough  to  permit 
us  to  complete  adequate  preparations.  Nor  should 
we  forget,  they  tell  us,  that  until  we  have  secured 
independence  on  the  sea  we  are  forbidden  aggres- 
sion and  the  assurance  of  ambitions  which  devel- 
opment alone  cannot  obtain.  The  creation  of  a 
merchant  marine  and  a  great  navy  is  too  serious 
a  task  to  be  completed  in  a  shorter  period  than  a 
number  of  years,  and  before  it  could  be  finished 
the  opportunity  for  an  aggressive  move  of  which  it 
was  the  prerequisite  would  have  entirely  disap- 
peared. Would  we  not  also  be  foolish  if  we  sup- 
posed that  England  and  Germany  would  fail  to 
fathom  the  scheme  and  wait  until  we  had  com- 
pleted our  preparations  before  attacking  us? 

To  many  the  economic  inexpediency  of  disarma- 
ment is  convincing.1    To  attempt  by  aggression 

'The  student  should  read  carefully  Mr.   Norman  Angell's 
books. 

416 


THE  ARGUMENT  FOR  DISARMAMENT 

to  protect  economic  factors  and  provide  for  our 
future  prosperity  seems  to  a  growing  constituency 
one  of  the  worst  of  fallacies.  Economic  purposes 
are  neither  aided  or  created  by  fighting;  economic 
factors  are  the  results  of  economic  causes;  eco- 
nomic benefits  are  obtained  by  the  operation  of 
economic  forces  which  legislation  and  good  will 
are  as  powerless  as  guns  and  battleships  to  create. 
Money  cannot  be  made  by  war;  profit  is  not  a 
matter  of  force  but  the  result  of  the  application 
of  labor  to  capital.  So  far  as  the  United  States 
possesses  a  strong  economic  position,  it  is  beyond 
the  reach  of  others;  to  the  extent  the  United 
States  is  weak,  force  is  incapable  to  remedy  its 
economic  deficiency.  If  we  have  any  true  inter- 
est in  South  American  trade,  we  shall  have  no 
difficulty  in  obtaining  our  profit,  because  they 
will  be  as  anxious  to  sell  or  buy  from  us  as  we 
shall  be  to  buy  or  sell  to  them.  If  we  have 
capital  to  loan  on  terms  they  consider  favorable, 
they  will  be  more  anxious  to  borrow  than  we  are 
to  loan.  When  they  buy  goods  from  us,  they  must 
pay  us  in  goods;  when  they  borrow  capital,  they 
must  pay  the  interest  and  principal  by  exports 
whose  amount  will  therefore  be  regulated  by  the 
true  interests  of  the  countries  concerned.  In  the 
long  run — and  it  must  be  remembered  that  all 

27  417 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

economic  calculations  are  based  upon  the  normal 
operation  of  economic  forces  during  long  years — 
nothing  can  interfere  with  this  process  and  nothing 
can  take  its  place.  Whatever  the  economic  facts 
are,  war  is  powerless  to  alter  them. 

In  addition,  it  is  claimed  that  the  United 
States  itself  presents  possibilities  of  development 
so  vast  and  resources  so  extraordinary  that 
American  capital  and  labor  may  easily  find  ade- 
quate employment  here  for  decades.  If  we  add 
to  the  capital  and  labor  available  for  our  own 
development  the  amount  which  we  would  other- 
wise spend  upon  armament,  we  shall  have  in  the 
process  of  time  an  enormous  accumulation  of 
commodities,  of  capital,  of  economic  satisfactions 
and  comforts  for  the  community  itself,  far  greater 
in  volume  than  anything  aggression  could  have 
provided,  and  we  shall  have  avoided  all  possibility 
of  loss.  To  add  to  our  own  capital  by  the  work 
of  our  own  hands  is  a  process  whose  profits  are 
absolutely  certain;  to  attempt  aggression  for  the 
development  of  resources  located  at  a  distance, 
means  experiencing  risk  out  of  all  proportion  to 
the  degree  of  profit  expected  and  without  certainty 
of  any  profit  at  all.  At  the  price  of  armament  we 
do  not  need  expansion. 

To  these  weighty  factors  is  added  commonly 
418 


THE  ARGUMENT  FOR  DISARMAMENT 

the  assertion  that  the  expense  of  armament  is 
enormous  and  continuous,  and,  worse  than  either, 
an  economic  waste.  With  our  labor  and  capital 
we  create  certain  commodities  which  possess  no 
utility,  except  for  a  species  of  exertion  which  is 
in  itself  not  only  useless  but  destructive.  To 
spend  great  sums  of  money  and  years  of  time  in 
the  creation  of  things  which  are  useless  is  not  the 
sort  of  a  proposition  supposed  to  commend  itself 
to  men  and  women  of  sanity,  but  when  this  time 
and  effort  are  used  to  create  things  whose  only 
purpose  is  the  destruction  of  human  life  and  of  the 
necessities  and  comforts  of  existence,  such  expen- 
diture becomes  not  only  foolish  but  criminal.  It 
is  not  so  much  the  amount  to  which  the  pacifists 
object  as  the  expenditure  of  labor  and  capital  for 
things  which  are  useless  save  for  the  promotion  of 
destruction.  While  conceivably  such  actions  may 
be  in  accordance  with  the  passions  of  man,  they 
can  hardly  be  supposed  to  accord  with  his  inter- 
ests and  cannot  by  any  stretch  of  the  imagination 
be  termed  expedient  in  an  economic  sense.  The 
science  of  economics  is  a  science  of  wealth,  of 
production,  of  the  creation  of  what  was  not  before. 
War  is  the  science  of  destruction  and  cannot  by 
any  conceivable  possibility  be  economic;  its  very 
premise  excludes  it  from  consideration. 

419 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

What  policy  then  shall  the  United  States,  once 
disarmed,  espouse?  What  position  will  she  occupy  ? 
How  can  she  possibly  maintain  the  respect  of 
other  nations  and  procure  consideration  for  her 
institutions  from  those  powers  at  whose  mercy 
she  will  place  herself? 

The  nobility  of  her  action  should  in  itself  secure 
for  her  an  international  status  and  leadership 
otherwise  impossible  of  attainment.  If  the 
general  economic  premises  above  listed  are 
valid,  the  United  States  could  not  lose  any- 
thing of  value.  One  thing  and  only  one  would 
be  desirable.  The  true  policy  of  the  United 
States  would  then  without  question  lie  in  a 
firm  alliance  with  the  sea  power,  which  would 
in  its  own  interest  fight  our  defensive  battles  for 
us  and  in  exchange  for  our  economic  assistance 
further  our  legitimate  ambitions  in  South  America 
and  in  the  far  East.  Such  an  understanding  the 
United  States  already  possesses  with  England 
and  by  virtue  of  it  we  are  supreme  to-day  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  the  owners  of  the  Panama 
Canal,  the  possessors  of  the  Philippines,  and  exert 
great  influence  in  Latin  American  affairs.  To  all 
intents  and  purposes  we  are  at  present  disarmed 
and  there  would  be  no  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the 
continuance  of  this  understanding  with  England 

420 


THE  ARGUMENT  FOR  DISARMAMENT 

and  no  great  probability  she  would  desire  to  ex- 
clude us  from  the  position  which  we  at  present 
occupy.  By  such  an  alliance  we  have  already 
achieved  more  than  we  could  have  possibly  ob- 
tained by  a  truly  enormous  armament:  the  sea 
power  was  in  a  position  to  give  us  what  we  wished 
without  having  to  fight  for  it  ourselves  and  with- 
out requiring  us  to  fight  either  to  obtain  it  or 
maintain  it.  So  long  as  we  ally  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  with  the  sea  power,  whether  that  alli- 
ance is  written  in  documents  or  exists  merely  as 
a  tacit  understanding  capable  of  change  at  any 
moment,  we  may  expect  all  that  consideration 
which  we  could  reasonably  hope  to  obtain  from 
armament.  Should  the  sea-power  change  hands, 
it  would  be  necessary  for  us  to  consummate  as 
soon  as  possible  a  similar  understanding  with  its 
new  possessor.  It  would  not  be  essential  for  us 
to  arm.  In  this  argument  there  is  much  that  is 
plausible,  while  it  certainly  accords  with  the  facts 
of  the  recent  situation.  Should  the  result  of  the 
war  leave  the  international  situation  in  the  Wes- 
tern Hemisphere  in  all  essentials  what  it  is  now, 
such  reasoning  would  be  valid,  though  not  neces- 
sarily conclusive. 


421 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT 

IF  armament  will  cost  money,  so  will  disarma- 
ment. The  most  futile  of  all  suppositions 
is  that  either  will  be  without  expense  or 
without  gain:  from  both  will  come  gain,  but  a 
different  sort  of  gain;  both  will  cost  money,  com- 
modities, and  it  may  be  human  life,  though  per- 
haps in  different  degree  and  for  a  different  purpose. 
A  little  cool  thought  will  show  that  neither  can 
be  clear  gain  and  that  the  true  difficulty  in 
the  American  problem  lies  in  the  balancing  of 
the  gains  of  one  against  its  losses,  of  weighing  the 
gains  of  one  against  those  of  the  other,  and  the 
losses  of  one  against  those  of  the  other.  The  law 
of  compensation  is  inexorable:  we  get  nothing 
without  paying  for  it.  If  certain  ends  are  to  be 
achieved,  disarmament  may  be  our  best  method; 
if  we  have  set  our  hearts  upon  accomplishing 
certain  other  ends,  disarmament  may  compel 
us  to  sacrifice  them.  Neither  armament  or  dis- 

422 


THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT 

armament  is  in  itself  an  end ;  both  are  simply  the 
means  to  ends.  Only  a  lack  of  perspective  can 
lead  a  statesman  or  student  to  regard  armament 
or  disarmament  as  desirable  in  themselves.  Both 
are  relative  to  losses  that  are  to  be  avoided  and  to 
gains  to  be  achieved. 

What  is  the  difference  between  disarmament 
and  our  present  military  and  naval  condition? 
A  difference  of  name  rather  than  of  substance,  for 
a  force  inadequate  for  the  purpose  in  hand  is  as 
valuable  as  no  force  at  all.  At  present  our  army 
is  a  police  force  intended  chiefly  to  cope  with  the 
Indian  problem  which,  because  of  the  peculiar 
constitutional  status  of  the  Indian,  could  not  be 
handed  over  to  an  ordinary  constabulary.  The 
army  in  the  Philippines  performs  a  similar  duty. 
Our  navy  is  a  coast  patrol  because  it  is  not  ade- 
quate in  the  least  to  control  the  ocean  approaches, 
our  Island  possessions,  and  the  Panama  Canal 
against  the  power  supreme  upon  the  sea.  We 
shall  be  indeed  lacking  in  a  perception  of  the  real- 
ities of  the  situation  if  we  attempt  to  measure  the 
adequacy  of  our  navy  by  comparison  with  the 
strength  of  navies  as  insufficient  as  our  own;  it 
cannot  be  adequate  until  large  enough  to  compel 
something  more  than  respect  from  England.  So 
long  as  a  fleet  can  blockade  our  harbors  without 

423 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

entering  them,  our  coast  defenses  are  of  no  partic- 
ular importance  for  the  control  of  the  sea  or  for 
our  intercourse  with  foreign  nations.  There  is 
little  purpose  in  keeping  open  a  harbor  which 
shipping  cannot  reach.  If  our  navy  were  really 
capable  of  undertaking  an  aggressive  campaign 
against  the  sea-power,  harbor  fortifications  would 
relieve  it  of  the  necessity  of  detaching  squadrons 
to  keep  open  our  harbors  and  so  add  to  its  offensive 
strength.  Coast  defenses  can  add  to  existing 
naval  strength  but  can  never  supply  its  deficien- 
cies; they  defend  the  land  and  not  the  sea,  and 
require  in  reality  the  cooperation  of  a  large  army 
rather  than  of  a  large  fleet.  They  will  not  be 
really  defensive  until  the  American  army  is  large 
enough  to  protect  them  from  military  assault 
from  the  rear.  So  long  as  the  victor  with  the 
control  of  the  sea  in  his  hands  can  land  military 
forces  at  will,  he  will  find  the  problem  simple  of 
capturing  our  coast  defenses.  The  latter  are 
indeed  vital  to  an  adequate  army  in  conflict 
with  the  sea-power  but  are  of  no  real  utility  to  a 
country  whose  only  strength  lies  in  a  navy  too 
small  to  cope  with  the  sea-power.  Let  us  not  fall 
into  the  error  of  supposing  that,  because  our 
army  and  navy  are  not  adequate  for  such  a  task, 
they  are  therefore  of  no  value  at  all.  They  per- 

424 


THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT 

form  well  enough  the  tasks  for  which  they  are 
calculated,  but  the  army  is  obviously  not  measured 
by  the  needs  of  the  country  for  defense  against 
invasion,  nor  is  the  navy  built  to  take  control  of 
the  sea  from  England,  or  to  protect  in  transit  a 
merchant  marine.  So  far  as  defense  or  offense  are 
concerned,  the  securing  of  our  independence  of  the 
sea-power  and  the  ensuring  of  our  economic  inter- 
course with  foreign  nations,  we  are  already  dis- 
armed, because  we  possess  no  force  in  the  least 
adequate  to  provide  for  any  of  these  ends. 

The  real  debate  lies  therefore  between  a  more  logi- 
cal continuance  of  our  present  policy.  We  must 
resolutely  reduce  our  navy  to  the  same  status  as  the 
army,  making  it  a  police  patrol  rather  than  a  weapon 
of  defense  or  offense,  or  prepare  for  clear  and  well- 
considered  reasons  for  an  armament  adequate 
to  win  our  independence  of  the  sea-power  and  to 
promote  such  national  ambitions  and  interests  as 
the  people  may  decide  are  imperative  or  significant. 
The  chief  cost  of  disarmament  (one  might  almost 
say  its  first  price)  lies  in  the  inability  of  easily 
reversing  the  decision  and  of  afterwards  meeting 
such  contingencies  as  present  themselves.  So  elabo- 
rate and  vast  are  the  preparations  for  modern 
warfare  that  adequate  measures  for  defense  or 
offense  cannot  be  taken  when  the  need  is  pressing. 

425 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

To  disarm  therefore  means  to  renounce  before- 
hand, without  knowing  whether  it  may  some  day 
be  imperative,  expedient,  advisable,  or  desirable 
for  us  to  exert  our  potential  strength,  any  possi- 
bility of  using  it  for  any  purpose  however  reason- 
able. To  say  that  there  could  be  no  such  purpose 
is  to  speak  without  real  comprehension  of  the 
unexpected  and  unforeseen  events  of  the  last  two 
decades.  The  present  war  is  the  result  of  factors 
not  as  old  as  the  men  who  are  fighting  in  it,  and 
whose  significance  has  been  realized  by  scarcely 
two  generations  of  statesmen.  Such  radical  and 
rapid  shifts  of  the  situation  have  occurred  in  time 
of  peace  and  as  a  result  of  non-military  fac- 
tors. Shall  we  forget  that  armies  and  navies  are 
busily  at  work  transforming  the  international 
situation,  perhaps  revolutionizing  every  element  in 
it  of  consequence  to  us  ?  We  shall  not  need  to  wait 
for  a  generation  to  witness  cataclysmic  upheavals 
in  conditions.  Invaders  and  conquerors  have  by 
no  means  limited  their  assaults  against  foes  who 
gave  them  adequate  reason.  The  history  of  our 
own  country  affords  conspicuous  examples  of  a 
need  for  armament  to  accomplish  an  object  whose 
desirability  no  one  now  questions.  If  we  decide 
to  disarm,  the  present  conditions  of  warfare  will 
make  it  practically  impossible  for  us  afterward 

426 


THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT 

to  alter  the  decision.  If  we  are  to  modify  our 
policy  we  must  do  so  now  in  order  that  we  may 
be  able  in  the  near  future  to  meet  imperative 
exigencies  or  further  desirable  ends. 

It  may  be  well  for  us  to  remember  that  we 
are  annually  paying  enough  money  to  provide 
an  army  and  navy  able  to  cope  with  any  probabil- 
ity if  only  it  can  be  efficiently  spent  instead  of 
wasted.  Indeed  from  some  points  of  view  the 
issue  of  disarmament  might  be  phrased  as  the 
abandonment  of  our  present  pretense  of  armament, 
for  which  we  pay  so  vast  a  sum  without  return  or 
the  attempt  to  make  adequate  the  army  and  navy 
which  we  already  support.  What  will  it  cost  us 
to  stop  spending  money  beyond  the  needs  of  the 
police  work  which  both  now  perform?  What  will 
that  saving  of  a  hundred  and  fifty  million  dollars 
a  year  cost  us? 

Will  it  cost  us  our  security?  Not  necessarily, 
but  quite  possibly.  We  must  remember  that  the 
props  have  been  withdrawn  from  under  our  stra- 
tegic structure  which  at  one  time  made  us  practi- 
cally invulnerable.  We  can  be  invaded  to-day  and 
might  be  assailed  with  conspicuous  success;  there 
will  certainly  be  at  the  close  of  this  war  one  if  not 
two  armies  in  existence  large  enough  to  conquer 
the  United  States.  That  any  European  country 

427 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

will  have  a  motive  for  such  a  step  is  unlikely  but 
by  no  means  impossible.  Our  own  defenses  at 
present  are  the  subtleties  of  the  European  situa- 
tion itself,  the  delicate  balance  which  makes  it 
dangerous  for  a  European  nation  to  dispatch  across 
the  sea  a  large  enough  army  to  do  us  any  damage 
or  a  large  enough  navy  to  attempt  to  assail  our 
coast.  But  over  these  factors  we  exercise  no 
control,  and  to  disarm  is  to  allow  the  exigencies  of 
European  politics  and  the  interests  of  European 
nations  to  decide  our  destinies  beyond  a  per- 
adventure,  without  allowing  us  in  any  way  to 
participate  in  molding  the  situation  upon  which 
our  future  depends  or  to  protest  against  a  result 
inimical  to  our  interests  and  integrity.  The 
tradition  of  American  life  is  definitely  non-military 
but  if  we  are  to  decide  advisedly  that  it  is  the  most 
important  American  ideal  to  be  continued  at  any 
cost,  we  should  realize  the  price.  Armies  and 
navies  are  no  longer  permissive  or  abnormal  ele- 
ments in  our  strategic  situation,  though  it  is  by 
no  means  certain  that  our  security  or  integrity 
depends  upon  either. 

Will  disarmament  cost  us  that  access  to  the 
markets  of  the  world  upon  which  our  economic 
existence  depends?  In  all  probability  no,  because 
it  would  not  be  expedient  for  the  sea-power  to  try 

428 


THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT 

to  prevent  it.  So  long  as  the  business  of  the  world 
is  as  closely  interlocked  as  at  present,  the  prosper- 
ity of  all  nations  depends  upon  continued  access 
to  each  other.  We  are  an  integral  part  of  the 
fabric  and  as  long  as  their  access  to  us  is  precisely 
as  important  as  ours  to  them,  they  will  be  as 
anxious  as  we  could  possibly  be  to  provide  for  the 
complete  freedom  of  intercourse  we  desire.  For 
the  nation  in  control  of  the  sea  to  threaten  in  any 
fashion  the  interests  of  all  other  nations  would 
produce  at  once  that  very  protest  against  its 
position  which  the  sea-power  must  avoid  at  all 
costs.  This  aspect  of  the  situation  must  influence 
German  policy  as  definitely  as  it  does  English. 
Disarmament  can  hardly  injure  our  commercial 
position  so  far  as  the  continuance  of  intercourse 
is  concerned. 

Disarmament  will  surely  cost  us  all  our  national 
ambitions,  present  and  future.  While  it  may  not 
rob  us  of  anything  imperative  for  our  existence, 
it  will  be  likely  to  deprive  us  of  nearly  everything 
desirable  or  advisable  which  the  interests  of  other 
nations  do  not  impel  them  to  yield  to  us.  First 
we  shall  be  compelled  to  renounce  finally  all  no- 
tions of  controlling  the  sea,  and  shall  therefore 
be  forced  to  throw  ourselves  upon  the  mercy  of 
England  or  Germany  in  the  Atlantic  and  of  Japan 

429 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

in  the  Pacific,  and  depend  upon  their  forbearance, 
generosity,  and  keen  sense  of  their  own  interests 
to  allow  us  such  rights  as  are  indispensable.  Con- 
troversies with  the  sea-power  growing  out  of  its 
supremacy  or  out  of  other  aspects  of  its  interna- 
tional position,  we  shall  be  forbidden.  Represen- 
tations we  may  make,  and  we  shall  gain  our 
point  if  they  are  willing  to  grant  it,  but  we 
must  realize  at  the  outset  that  we  shall  never 
be  able  to  force  the  issue  upon  them  by  presenting 
them  with  an  ultimatum.  Our  privileges  will 
necessarily  be  measured  by  their  interests  rather 
than  by  ours,  while  their  policies  rather  than  our 
needs  will  dictate  the  lineaments  of  our  interna- 
tional position.  An  adequate  merchant  marine 
we  shall  be  compelled  to  renounce  and  perforce 
rest  satisfied  with  such  facilities  of  ocean  transport 
as  the  sea-power  provides  us,  or  which  it  allows 
others  to  furnish  us,  in  addition  to  such  a  mer- 
chant fleet  as  it  is  willing  to  have  us  build.  A 
merchant  marine,  capable  of  carrying  all  our  com- 
merce and  of  maintaining  our  independence, 
we  can  never  have,  for  its  very  existence  will 
at  once  arouse  the  apprehensions  of  the  Euro- 
pean power  whose  control  of  the  sea  rests 
fundamentally  upon  its  own  defensive  needs 
and  which  will  therefore  scent  aggression  and 

430 


THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT 

danger  and  decline  to  permit  us  to  develop  such  a 
merchant  fleet. 

South  America  we  must  recognize  as  foreign 
territory,  occupied  by  foreign  nations,  in  which 
we  have  neither  rights  nor  interests.  The  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  will  promptly  become  impertinent 
and  impossible.  America  for  the  Americans 
will  be  no  longer  a  conceivable  policy  for  us  to 
maintain  beyond  the  point  which  they  are  will- 
ing to  accept.  Although  we  may  still  assert 
our  right  of  political  independence  and  our  right 
to  ensure  our  economic  independence,  the  two 
fundamental  postulates  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
they  will  both  be  expressions  of  opinion  rather 
than  policies,  because  we  shall  have  definitely 
decided  never  to  use  force  to  support  either. 
Without  the  possibility  of  its  use  we  shall  be 
totally  unable  to  preserve  political  or  economic 
independence,  and  will  be  compelled  to  accept 
as  much  of  either  as  other  nations  find  it  in  accord- 
ance with  their  interests  to  allow  us  to  retain. 
That  this  will  be  considerable,  our  geographical 
position  makes  certain,  but  it  will  by  no  means 
guarantee  as  full  a  recognition  of  those  principles 
as  the  American  people  may  deem  essential. 

Our  possessions  outside  the  borders  of  the  United 
States  we  shall  retain,  if  we  disarm,  at  the  suffer- 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

ance  of  the  sea-power  and  of  such  nations  as  are 
able  to  reach  them  by  land.  In  all  probability 
we  shall  not  keep  them  long.  The  control  of  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  supremacy  of  the  Western 
Hemisphere  to  such  an  extent  as  we  have  possessed 
it,  we  must  surrender  forever,  unless  it  becomes 
the  interest  of  other  nations  literally  to  place  their 
possessions  in  our  hands  for  temporary  safe-keep- 
ing. Everything  outside  the  boundaries  of  con- 
tinental United  States  including  the  Panama 
Canal  will  be  sacrificed  by  disarmament  and  lost 
irretrievably.  With  them  will  disappear  all  pos- 
sibility of  aggression,  control,  overlordship,  inter- 
ference of  any  sort  or  kind  in  other  countries, 
and  any  rights  or  privileges  which  aggressive 
action  may  be  needed  to  obtain  or  maintain. 
Latin  America,  the  Chinese  trade,  preferential 
rights  in  undeveloped  countries  we  shall  not  have, 
and  tariff  laws  and  navigation  acts  militating 
against  our  trade  we  may  be  compelled  to  endure 
in  silence.  We  shall  possess  outside  the  United 
States  only  what  the  good  will  and  the  interests 
of  other  nations  voluntarily  concede  and  we  shall 
be  compelled  to  accept  patiently  such  action  as 
they  may  take  where  they  conceive  that  their  in- 
terests run  counter  to  ours. 

The  practical  effect  of  our  position  when  we 
432 


THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT 

are  once  disarmed  may  thus  be-  illustrated. 
We  shall  find  it  necessary  to  accept  England's 
interpretation  of  the  rights  of  neutrals  and  regard 
as  final  her  list  of  contraband  the  moment  she 
insists  upon  it.  Intervention  and  watchful  wait- 
ing in  Mexico  will  become  impossible,  for  the  whole 
weight  of  our  action  depends  upon  Mexico's  fear 
that  we  may  use  our  strength  against  her.  Once 
they  know  we  have  pledged  ourselves  not  to  em- 
ploy it,  they  will  not  pay  the  slightest  attention 
to  our  representations  beyond  that  dictated  by 
international  courtesy.  In  our  various  quarrels 
with  Japan,  we  shall  immediately  be  driven  to 
accept  their  view  of  the  situation  and  accord  them 
such  privileges  as  they  demand  in  the  United 
States^  or  insist  upon  our  own  contention  at 
the  expense  of  sacrificing  all  privileges  in  Japan 
and  in  the  Japanese  trade  which  they  would  take 
away  from  us  in  retaliation.  If  Germany  or 
England  seize  the  Panama  Canal,  take  Cuba, 
appropriate  the  property  of  American  citizens  in 
Central  America,  a  dignified  diplomatic  protest 
will  be  the  extent  of  our  power.  Our  position 
and  the  rights  of  American  citizens  will  be  meas- 
ured by  the  lack  of  motives  in  other  nations 
to  do  us  harm,  because  the  moment  a  reason 
arises  urging  them  to  deprive  American  citizens 
«  433 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

of  rights  there  will  be  nothing  to  prevent  their 
doing  it. 

Will  disarmament  cost  us  economic  prosperity? 
Not  at  present,  but  in  the  future  the  degree  of  our 
prosperity,  due  to  the  operation  of  economic 
forces,  will  in  all  probability  seriously  reduce  our 
margin  of  profit.  To  suppose  as  many  do  that 
our  lack  of  strategic  relation  to  the  European 
field  of  war  gives  us  no  interest  in  their  difficul- 
ties and  makes  their  problems  and  affairs  matters 
of  indifference  to  us,  is  to  cherish  a  fallacy  of 
the  most  dangerous  description.  Our  economic 
interests  are  complementary  to  theirs  and  ab- 
solutely identical  in  character.  The  economic 
phenomena  in  Europe  which  are  at  the  roots  of 
the  present  war  exist  in  America  and  will  be 
operative  here  in  the  very  near  future  to  a 
degree  not  greatly  different  from  that  in  Europe. 
True,  we  do  not  have  their  precise  difficulties  to 
cope  with,  but  we  have  the  other  end  of  the 
same  situation,  and  if  it  does  not  manifest  itself 
here  in  the  same  specific  instances,  we  shall  still 
be  foolish  to  conclude  that  it  will  not  affect  our 
interests  and  our  prosperity. 

Disarmament  will  prevent  us  from  obtaining  ac- 
cess to  the  markets  of  the  world  except  on  terms 
favorable  to  other  nations  and  consequently  on 

434 


THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT 

terms  less  advantageous  to  us  than  to  them.  There 
is  at  any  one  moment  only  so  much  trade.  If  all 
remain  satisfied  with  the  share  which  the  normal 
workings  of  economic  forces  allots  to  them,  we 
shall  have  nothing  of  which  to  complain,  but  the 
most  striking  feature  of  the  present  situation  is 
the  insistence  of  some  nations  that  they  ought  to 
get  more  than  their  normal  share.  To  obtain  it 
some  have  gone  to  war  with  others,  whom  they 
claim  already  have  more  than  their  share,  and  the 
latter  are  trying  to  retain  it.  So  far  as  the  United 
States  is  concerned,  it  will  not  make  a  great  deal 
of  difference  which  of  the  European  nations  obtains 
or  retains  an  abnormal  share  of  the  world's  trade. 
Obviously  the  strongest  will  get  it,  and  the  others 
will  share  what  is  left  in  some  rough  proportion 
to  their  strength,  while  the  nation  least  fitted  to 
compel  others  to  consider  its  needs,  will  get  only 
as  much  as  the  victors  do  not  feel  it  worth  their 
trouble  to  take.  This  interference  by  military 
and  political  forces  with  the  working  of  economic 
factors  must  not  be  exaggerated :  the  economic  fac- 
tors themselves  prevent  its  going  beyond  a  certain 
point.  It  cannot  entirely  ruin  our  prosperity, 
if  we  actually  have  goods  to  sell  which  other  nations 
wish  to  buy.  But  it  can  interfere  in  the  future 
as  it  has  in  the  past  with  the  rate  of  our  develop- 

435 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

ment  and  with  our  degree  of  profit.  It  will  first 
reduce  our  trade  with  the  lesser  developed  nations 
where  the  proportionate  profits  are  large,  and  will 
compel  us  to  deal  with  the  highly  developed  nations 
where  the  normal  profits  are  small  and  the  com- 
petition great.  Access  to  markets  where  competi- 
tion has  been  minimized  by  political  forces  and 
the  profits  consequently  enhanced  will  not  be  for  us. 
To  meet  the  situation  we  will  be  driven  to 
develop  intensively  our  own  resources  and  work 
hard  to  produce  things  which  the  world  must 
have  and  for  which  it  is  ready  to  pay.  It  will 
mean  of  course  economic  pressure,  an  increase  in 
the  number  of  hands  beyond  the  demand  for  work, 
and  the  creation  of  a  more  or  less  permanent 
body  of  individuals  not  able  to  find  employment. 
We  have  hitherto  had  in  the  United  States  practi- 
cally no  poverty  in  the  European  sense  and  no 
margin  of  existence.  These  phenomena  are  just 
appearing  and  their  development  will  be  accel- 
erated by  any  slackening  in  our  rate  of  progress. 
At  the  same  time  the  surplus  population  can  emi- 
grate without  danger  to  our  political  independence 
because  the  size  of  our  population  will  be  of  no 
military  consequence  once  we  have  disarmed. 
Our  geographical  location  will  in  all  probability 
continue  to  make  political  conquest  inexpedient 

436 


THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT 

for  nations  strong  enough  to  undertake  it.  As 
the  intensified  development  of  our  own  resources 
proceeds,  the  supplies  of  minerals  will  decrease 
at  a  faster  rate  than  at  present,  the  land  will  yield 
constantly  diminishing  returns  to  a  greater  degree, 
and  we  shall  be  steadily  looting  the  capital  which 
Nature  has  furnished  us.  In  each  decade  more 
labor  will  be  required  to  secure  the  same  degree 
of  profit  and  as  men  continue  to  increase  and 
the  resources  to  decrease  it  will  not  be  many 
decades  before  the  pressure  of  existence  will 
become  apparent.  We  are  already  deeply  in 
debt  to  Europe  for  the  capital  which  we  have 
borrowed  in  the  past  and  some  day  we  must  pay 
the  principal.  It  can  be  discharged  only  from 
profits,  and  the  moment  we  reduce  the  present 
rate  of  development  and  therefore  the  present 
profit,  the  annual  payment  on  our  debt  will  be- 
come a  larger  and  larger  share  of  our  net  income, 
not  because  the  sum  is  greater  but  because  the 
income  is  diminishing.  Above  all  we  must  re- 
member that  the  pressure  of  these  problems  will 
steadily  increase,  bringing  lower  wages,  higher 
prices,  less  to  eat,  less  to  wear,  while  a  larger  and 
more  permanent  part  of  the  population  is  unem- 
ployed and  lives  on  the  margin  of  existence.  The 
present  standard  of  comfort  in  the  United  States 

437 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

can    be    maintained    only    by    maintaining    our 
present  rate  of  progress. 

Disarmament  therefore  will  ask  the  present 
generation  to  sacrifice  something  of  its  present 
comfort,  a  good  deal  of  its  future  well-being,  and 
the  possibilities  of  enhancing  its  economic  pros- 
perity and  that  of  subsequent  generations.  It 
will  prevent  us  from  attempting  to  remove  by 
force,  arbitrary  and  artificial  interference  by  other 
nations  with  the  workings  of  the  economic  pro- 
cesses upon  which  our  present  prosperity  depends. 
No  European  statesman  supposes  to-day  that 
economic  forces  can  be  created  by  war  or  by 
legislative  fiat,  but  they  do  believe  that  their 
operation  can  at  times  be  consciously  assisted  and 
that  political  factors  can  always  prevent  inter- 
ference by  the  political  or  military  strength  of 
other  nations  in  their  own  interests.  This  pro- 
tection disarmament  will  compel  us  entirely  to 
forgo.  We  shall  trust  ourselves  to  the  sufferance 
and  good  will  of  the  other  nations  of  the  world, 
not  expecting  them  to  aggrandize  themselves  at 
our  expense,  but  ready  to  accept  the  worst  if  they 
decide  to  act  selfishly  rather  than  with  generosity. 
Is  it  not  perhaps  wise  for  us  to  ask  whether  they 
are  at  present  ready  to  treat  us  in  the  spirit  in 
which  we  purpose  to  deal  with  them?  Do  they 

438 


THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT 

show  at  present  a  conspicuous  willingness  to 
advance  each  other's  interests?  Have  they  for- 
borne to  promote  their  own  where  they  knew  them 
to  be  inimical  to  others?  Have  they  hesitated 
to  employ  the  force  at  their  command  to  further 
their  interests  against  peoples  unprotected  and 
utterly  innocent  of  offense?  Can  we  wisely 
accept  their  interpretation  of  their  interests  as 
the  measure  of  our  privileges? 

We  may  also  ask  whether  the  sacrifice  of  the 
United  States  in  the  interests  of  universal  peace 
will  accomplish  its  object.  The  utility  of  dis- 
armament as  an  argument  for  peace  will  depend 
entirely  upon  the  extent  to  which  other  nations 
accept  our  decision  as  actuated  by  noble  motives 
rather  than  by  a  mixture  of  vanity  and  selfishness. 
Europeans  claim  to-day  that  the  condition  of  our 
army  and  navy  is  due  to  the  fact  that  we  do  not 
believe  ourselves  threatened  rather  than  to  our 
belief  in  the  wickedness  of  war;  that  we  would 
act  as  they  have  if  the  situation  were  similar. 
Disarmament  is  cheaper  for  us  and  not  dangerous, 
they  insist.  There  are  indeed  so  many  economic 
and  quasi-economic  motives  cited  in  support  of 
disarmament  which  do  appeal  to  certain  selfish 
instincts  in  every  population  that  the  purity  of 
our  motive  in  reaching  that  decision  will  be  only 

439 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

too  open  to  question  by  those  who  seek  to  impugn 
our  sincerity.  Unfortunately,  too,  the  true  dis- 
tinction between  war  and  peace  seems  hardly 
to  be  that  of  armament  or  disarmament.  The 
line  is  difficult  to  draw  to-day  on  account  of 
the  interrelated  aspect  of  the  economic  world 
which  spreads  the  interests  of  any  nation  to  the 
confines  of  the  globe.  Where  mine  begins  and 
thine  leaves  off  is  very  difficult  to  state  when  we 
deal  with  the  complex  affairs  of  nations.  Until 
we  shall  include  in  war  every  and  any  method  of 
interfering  unduly  with  the  ordinary  operations 
of  life,  we  shall  not  make  a  distinction  of  any 
importance  between  war  and  peace.  It  is  only 
too  evident  that  the  crux  of  the  difficulty  in  inter- 
national politics  is  the  desire  to  secure  an  abnormal 
share  of  the  world's  trade,  a  valuable  dependency, 
the  right  to  exploit  a  certain  people  or  a  tract  of 
land.  Until  the  attempt  to  take  another's  prop- 
erty shall  be  deemed  equally  bad  whether  or  not 
it  results  in  actual  warfare,  no  lasting  result  can 
be  obtained.  Indeed,  a  true  comprehension  of 
the  present  situation  seems  to  show  that  warfare 
is  really  directed  against  the  furtherance  of  eco- 
nomic ends  by  economic  aggression  and  unfair 
dealing  in  other  ways  than  war.  Shall  we  there- 
fore say  to  those  who  see  their  property  being 

440 


THE  PRICE  OF  DISARMAMENT 

filched  from  them  by  "peaceful"  methods,  that 
they  must  not  resist,  because  war  is  wrong?  They 
see  and  feel  a  very  real  wrong  and  they  perceive 
very  clearly  that  nothing  except  force  can  save 
them;  to  it  therefore  they  appeal  with  promptitude 
and  dispatch.  The  true  aggressor  is  the  man 
they  assail,  for  they  regard  themselves  as  pushed 
already  into  the  last  ditch  and  driven  to  defend 
their  firesides  by  means  which  they  would  other- 
wise have  preferred  not  to  employ.  The  horrors 
of  war,  its  dangers  and  risks  they  fully  appreciate, 
but  they  feel  that  they  cannot  yield  all  they  hold 
dear  without  a  struggle. 

Peace  in  fact  is  not  a  temporal  condition,  nor 
merely  abstinence  from  war:  it  is  a  state  of  mind 
which  will  become  universal  when  men  no  longer 
desire  to  take  another's  property  by  methods 
whose  fairness  the  other  will  deny.  Such  a  state 
of  morality  is  not  something  which  can  be  created 
in  a  brief  time  by  agitation,  example,  precedent, 
or  oratory.  It  is  a  condition  and  is  no  more  some- 
thing into  which  the  community  can  be  dragged 
or  argued,  than  men  can  be  coerced  into  it  by 
shooting  off  cannon.  The  fact  that  it  does  not 
exist  is  the  clearest  possible  evidence  that  the 
prerequisites  are  not  yet  true  and  are  beyond 
the  reach  of  argument  or  logic.  Force  is  not  the 

441 


PAN-AMERICANISM 

difficulty;  the  trouble  lies  in  selfishness,  wicked- 
ness, ignorance,  and  a  lack  of  morality  and  Chris- 
tianity in  mankind.  Nothing  short  of  the  slow 
process  of  education  and  growth,  by  which  the  bad 
will  be  made  good  and  the  covetous  and  greedy  will 
be  reformed  seems  capable  of  creating  universal 
peace.  Some  difficulties,  argument  may  avoid, 
some  troubles  may  be  explained,  needless  misun- 
derstandings adjusted  and  the  toll  of  suffering 
and  destruction  somewhat  reduced. 

If  this  is  in  a  measure  true,  are  we  wise  to 
entrust  our  national  integrity  and  our  future 
prosperity  to  the  present  moral  and  ethical  im- 
pulses of  European  nations  in  the  expectation  of 
thus  promoting  the  cause  of  peace?  Will  it  be 
expedient  to  advertise  beforehand  our  intention 
not  to  defend  ourselves  from  robbery  of  any  sort 
and  our  reliance  upon  the  goodness  of  other  na- 
tions? Will  the  victor  look  upon  our  interests 
as  his  own,  and  forbear  to  take  from  us  more  than 
we  will  gladly  give  him?  Will  he  listen  in  the 
future  to  our  representations  of  economic  distress 
and  trade  difficulties  and  sacrifice  something  of 
his  own  welfare  to  advance  ours? 


442 


Bibliography 


WHILE  the  diplomatic  history  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  in  Europe  remains  a 
sealed  book,  the  evidence  available  in 
contemporary  history  must  differ  widely  from  the 
line  and  precept  which  investigators  in  other 
fields  than  diplomatic  history  are  accustomed  to 
demand.  For  this  reason  the  evidential  precepts 
for  sifting,  evaluating,  and  comparing  evidence 
at  other  periods,  "result  when  applied  strictly  to 
the  history  of  the  last  quarter  of  a  century,  in  a 
series  of  negations  and  colorless  affirmations  which 
neither  describe  nor  explain  events."  We  must 
either  deny  the  movements  of  our  own  time  his- 
toricity, until  we  ourselves  have  passed  from  the 
scene,  or  recognize  frankly  and  fully  that  we  shall 
have  to  be  satisfied  with  a  good  deal  less  than 
certainty  and  be  content  when  we  have  pro- 
duced an  approximation  of  the  truth  which  an 
investigator  of  the  Stuart  period  would  stigmatize 
as  mere  guesswork.  Never  should  the  student 

443 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

of  contemporary  affairs  forget  this  probability 
of  error  in  conclusions  which  seem  undoubtedly 
sound;  nor  allow  his  reader  to  forget  that  some  of 
his  boldest  statements  would  be  regarded  in  treat- 
ing almost  any  period  of  the  past  as  conjectures 
scarcely  worth  hazarding.  He  must  do  the  best 
he  can  with  the  bricks  he  has,  and  leave  the  pro- 
duction of  a  final  and  accurate  account  for  his 
children  and  grand-children. 

The  question  of  evidence  reduces  itself  to  two  pro- 
positions :  the  relative  importance  of  data  whose  cor- 
rectness is  certain  and  the  relative  credibility  of 
testimony  which  would  be  important  if  it  were  true. 
Indeed,  in  most  cases,  we  have  to  deal  as  students 
less  with  evidence  than  with  testimony,  itself  explicit, 
clear,  and  from  authoritative  sources.  The  real 
difficulty  lies  in  the  amount  of  this  testimony,  its 
conflicting  statements,  and  the  apparently  unim- 
peachable character  of  all  the  witnesses.  It  may  often 
be  clear  that  a  witness  might  know  the  whole  truth 
about  the  facts  we  are  investigating;  but  this  will  not 
prove  that  he  has  chosen  to  tell  us  any  of  it.1 

Minute  details,  forests  of  dates,  economic 
statistics  by  the  thousand,  innumerable  bio- 
graphical data,  we  have;  to  provide  them  for  the 
period  of  Julius  Caesar  is  difficult  and  exhausting 
and  takes  much  of  our  time;  we  need  not  look  for 

1  Usher,  Pan-Germanism,  revised  edition,  1915,  p.  346. 
444 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

them  in  contemporary  history;  they  fairly  throng 
upon  us;  but  are  the  least  valuable  and  essential 
part  of  the  story.  In  the  second  category,  testi- 
mony, belongs  nearly  everything  of  an  interpre- 
tative nature  or  which  tends  in  any  degree  to 
elucidate  these  teeming  facts  and  piece  them  into 
something  resembling  a  picture.  Beyond  doubt 
these  are  the  vital  things.  These,  the  secrets  of 
senates  and  presidents,  we  know  in  the  past  cen- 
turies; these  we  lack  almost  entirely  to-day.  Let- 
ters by  the  hundred,  memoirs,  interviews  we  have, 
but  they  are  all  testimony,  important  only  if 
true.  And  those  who  hold  the  key  are  distressingly 
discreet.  Apparently,  these  difficulties  are  less 
serious  in  American  than  in  European  history, 
but  the  difference  is  more  seeming  than  real; 
for  where  we  can  be  quite  sure  we  see  the  Ameri- 
can side  of  the  picture  clearly  and  accurately,  the 
clouds  and  mist  which  shroud  the  European 
background  prevent  us  from  apprehending  beyond 
mistake  the  meaning  of  the  whole. 

In  deciding  what  was  credible  and  whom  to 
believe  I  have  tried  to  apply  a  few  relatively  simple 
tests.  Of  most  importance  seems  to  me  the  logic 
of  events,  the  reading  which  best  explains  the 
really  potent  happenings,  like  the  building  of  the 
Panama  Canal,  the  annexation  of  the  Philippines 

445 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

— les  fails  accomplis.  It  must  too  always  be  a 
reading  in  accord  with  the  logic  of  events  in  mod- 
ern Europe,  for  if  one  thing  is  more  conspicuously 
true  than  another  it  is  the  world  aspect  of  in- 
ternational politics.  No  country  is  isolated;  no 
country  unaffected  by  the  sea-power  of  England 
or  the  ambitions  of  the  Pan-Germanists. 

To  rely  upon  this  logic  of  events,  as  I  have 
called  it  is  merely  to  accept,  faute  de  mieux,  the 
guidance  of  indirect  testimony  which  could  not 
have  been  manufactured  for  a  purpose,  in  prefer- 
ence to  a  choice  between  several  equally  plausible 
explanations  provided  for  us  by  those  whose  in- 
terests are  obvious  in  guiding  our  opinions.  We 
simply  insist  "upon  a  reasonably  complete  chain 
of  indirect  or  circumstantial  evidence,  composed 
of  actual  events,  however  minute,  as  superior 
evidentially  to  any  amount  of  direct  testimony 
which  is  open  to  the  suspicion  of  manufacture  for 
the  purpose  of  forming  opinion,  if  not  with  the 
intention  actually  to  mislead  it."  A  comparison 
of  this  logic  of  events  with  direct  testimony, 
American  and  foreign,  with  the  ideas  of  competent 
foreign  observers,  with  what  we  believe  to  be 
true  of  the  European  situation  itself,  and  with  the 
actions  of  our  own  and  foreign  governments  seems 
to  me  to  provide  eventually  the  only  approach  to 

446 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

i 
certainty  we  are  likely  to  achieve  during  our  own 

lifetime.  To  detail  this  process  of  reasoning  to 
the  reader  would  be  tedious  and  not  informative, 
for  usually  a  brief  inspection  of  the  situation  in 
the  light  of  the  general  premises  will  show  him  the 
trend  of  reasoning.  I  have  contented  myself 
with  stating  results  and  not  processes.  Until 
testimony  will  stand  the  test  of  indirect  evidence, 
I  regard  it  as  too  uncertain  for  me. 

These  postulates  at  once  exclude  from  the  stu- 
dent's consideration  all  propaganda  of  any  sort, 
except  as  evidence  of  what  such  partizans  ad- 
vocate; all  newspaper  and  magazine  material, 
except  as  providing  testimony  or  as  the  factual 
background.  In  the  former  category  belong  the 
literature  of  peace  societies  and  political  associa- 
tions— rhetoric  in  Congress,  in  the  press,  and 
between  covers.  Testimony  is  testimony  and 
not  evidence,  whenever  and  wherever  found.  So, 
too,  natives  or  returned  travelers  from  South 
America,  Mexico,  or  Japan  are  not  necessarily 
equipped  with  more  accurate  information  about 
the  sentiments  of  the  population  or  governmental 
policies,  even  after  a  residence  of  years,  than  we 
are  about  the  secrets  of  the  United  States  after  a 
residence  of  a  lifetime.  We  must  demonstrate 
first  that  our  witness  really  ought  to  know  what 

447 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

we  are  seeking  and  then  prove  that  he  has  some 
adequate  motive  to  tell  us. 

The  excellent  bibliographies  of  American  history 
— J.  N.  Larned's  Literature  of  American  History, 
Channing,  Hart,  and  Turner's  Guide  to  American 
History,  and  the  bibliographies  of  Hart's  American 
Nation — render  a  work  of  supererogation  the 
listing  of  even  that  part  of  the  voluminous  lit- 
erature which  any  student  must  perforce  utilize. 
The  Library  of  Congress  publishes  careful  lists 
of  all  government  publications,  and  has  also  com- 
piled elaborate  bibliographies  on  Cuba,  Hawaii, 
the  far  East,  and  the  like,  thoroughly  covering 
American  interests.  On  a  less  elaborate  scale  and 
less  accurately  the  Pan-American  Union  has  done 
something  of  the  sort  for  the  literature  in  English 
about  Latin  America.  For  the  less  expert  student 
the  following  titles  and  brief  comments  may  prove 
useful  as  indications  of  books  likely  to  be  helpful. 

I 
THE  UNITED  STATES 

a.    Strategic  Position. 

MAHAN,  A.  T.      The  Influence  of  the  Sea  Power 
upon  History,  1660-1783.     Boston,  1890. 

An  epoch-making  book  of  the  first  caliber, 
which  even  the  casual  reader  will  do  well  to 
448 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

ponder  carefully.     It  has  revolutionized  the 
conceptions  of  men  who  guide  empires. 

Sea  Power  in  its  Relations  to  the  War  of  1812. 

Boston,  1905. 

The  Interest  of  America  in  Sea  Power,  Present 

and  Future.    Boston,  1898. 

Naval  Administration  and  Warfare.    Boston, 

1908. 

Undoubtedly,  Admiral  Mahan's  books  form 
the  most  important  single  contribution  to  an 
understanding  of  the  polity  of  the  United 
States. 

SEELEY,  J.  R.    Expansion  of  England.    London, 
1883. 

An  extraordinary  book,  also  epoch-making, 
in  its  analysis  of  England  as  colonizer  and 
empire  builder. 

SEMPLE,  E.  C.      American  History  and  its  Geo- 
graphic Conditions.     1903. 

BRIGHAM,  A.  P.    Geographic  Influences  in  Ameri- 
can History.     1 903 . 

Slighter  and  less  valuable  than  Miss 
Semple's  fine  contribution. 

b.     American  Development. 

USHER,  R.  G.     The  Rise  of  the  American  People. 
New  York,  1914. 
39  449 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  present  author  has  here  set  forth  at 
greater  length  the  fundamental  notions  of 
American  history  which  underlie  the  present 
volume.  There  his  defense  can  be  found. 
ADAMS,  BROOKS.  America's  Economic  Develop- 
ment. 1900. 

On  the  West  India  trade,  the  best  work  is 
Edward  Channing's  History  of  the  United 
States,  ii.,  iii. 

c.     Foreign  Relations. 

MOORE,  J.  B.    American  Diplomacy.    New  York, 
1905. 

A  relatively  brief  but  thoroughly  excellent 
sketch  by  probably  the  best  equipped  Ameri- 
can authority. 

LATANE,  J.  H.    Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  United 
States    and    Spanish    America.     Baltimore, 
1900. 
COOLIDGE,  A.  C.      The  United  States  as  a  World 

Power.    New  York,  1908. 

DUNNING,   H.   A.     The  British  Empire  and  the 
United  States.     New  York,  1914. 

A  semi-official  history,  written  for  the 
Centennial  of  the  Peace  of  Ghent.  Careful, 
astute,  as  valuable  for  what  it  avoids  as  for 
what  it  says. 

450 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

TRAVIS,  IRA  DUDLEY.  The  History  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty.  Ann  Arbor,  1900. 

JOHNSON,  W.  F.  Four  Centuries  of  the  Panama 
Canal.  1906. 

MOORE,  J.  B.  Digest  of  International  Law.  8 
vols.  1906. 

For  reference  only. 

> 

d.     The  Monroe  Doctrine. 

HAMILTON,  S.  M.  The  Writings  of  James  Monroe, 
vi.  New  York  and  London,  1898-1903. 

Contains  the  correspondence  and  the  mes- 
sages up  to  1823.  A  useful  selection  of  subse- 
quent statements  has  been  printed  in  American 
History  Leaflet,  No.  4.  A  bibliography  of  the 
literature  is  in  D.  C.  Oilman's  Monroe. 
HENDERSON,  J.  B.,  JR.  American  Diplomatic 
Questions.  1901. 

The  discussion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
particularly  full  and  satisfactory. 
LAWRENCE,    T.    J.    Essays    on    Some    Disputed 
Questions  in  Modern  International  Law.     2d 
ed.,  Cambridge,  England,  1885. 

The  views  of  a  distinguished  English  inter- 
national lawyer. 

REDDAWAY,  W.  F.     The  Monroe  Doctrine.     Cam- 
bridge, England,  1898. 
45i 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

An    English    discussion,    temperate    and 
excellent.     See  also  J.  A.  Cook  in  the  Fort- 
nightly Review,  Sept.,  1898,  pp.  357-368. 
PETIN,  HECTOR.    Les  Etats  Unis  et  la  Doctrine 
de  Monroe.     Paris,  1901. 

A  French  point  of  view. 

ONCKEN,  HERMANN.  Historisch-politische  Auf- 
satze  und  Reden,  i.,  37-95.  Munchen, 
1914. 

The  interesting  views  of  a  leading  German 
historian  and  publicist. 

BINGHAM,  HIRAM.  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  an 
Obsolete  Shibboleth.  New  Haven,  1913. 

e.     The  Influence  of  International  Politics 

on  the  United  States. 

USHER,  R.  G.  Pan-Germanism.  Boston,  1913. 
Revised  edition,  enlarged,  1915. 

In   this   volume   the   present   author   has 
stated  his  general  conception  of  the  European 
situation.     The  bibliography  in  the  revised 
edition  contains  numerous  authorities. 
MAHAN,  A.  T.     The  Interest  of  America  in  Inter- 
national Conditions.     Boston,  1910. 
The  least  valuable  of  his  writings. 
The  Problem  of  Asia  and  its  Effect  on  Inter- 
national Politics.     Boston,  1900. 
452 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

ARNOLD,  W.  T.  German  Ambitions  as  they  Affect 
the  United  States. 

REINSCH,  P.  S.  World  Politics  at  the  End  of  the 
Nineteenth  Century  as  Influenced  by  the  Ori- 
ental Situation.  New  York,  1900. 

GRIFFIS,  H.  E.  America  in  the  East:  A  Glance 
at  our  History,  Prospects,  Problems,  and  Duties 
in  the  Pacific  Ocean.  New  York,  1914. 

MASAOKA,  N.  Japan  to  America.  New  York, 
1914. 

A  series  of  papers  by  Japanese  leaders  on 
relations  with  the  United  States.  It  is  testi- 
mony, not  evidence,  except  of  what  they 
wish  us  to  believe. 

LEA,  HOMER.     The  Valor  of  Ignorance. 

Written  by  an  American  soldier  of  fortune, 
who  knew  the  far  East  well. 

/.    Imperialism:  Expansion. 
WILLOUGHBY,  W.  F.     Territories  and  Dependencies 

of  the  United  States.     New  York,  1905. 
RANDOLPH,  C.  F.    Law  and  Policy  of  Annexation. 
New  York,  1901. 

The  constitutional  aspects  of  imperialism. 
The  bibliographies  give  titles  of  many  less 
pretentious  but  more  important  articles  and 
reviews.  r 

453 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

g.    Peace  and  Disarmament. 
The   publications   of   the   Association   for 

International   Conciliation,   of    the    World's 

Peace  Foundation,  and  of  the  American  Peace 

Society. 
ANGELL-,    NORMAN.     The    Great,    Illusion.    New 

York  and  London,  1910. 
Arms  and  Industry.     New  York  and  London, 

1914. 
MAHAN,  A.  T.    Armaments  and  Arbitration,   the 

Place  of  Force  in  the  International  Relations 

of  States.     New  York,  1912. 
Some    Neglected   Aspects   of   War.     Boston, 

1907. 

II 
LATIN  AMERICA 

CALDERON,  F.  GARCIA.  Latin  America;  Its  Rise 
and  Progress.  New  York,  1913. 

The  best  book  in  English  by  a  Latin  Ameri- 
can. 

MEROU,  M.  G.  Historia  de  la  Diplomacia  Ameri- 
cana. Buenos  Ayres,  1904. 

BRYCE,  JAMES.  South  America,  Observations  and 
Impressions.  New  York,  1913.  Revised  edi- 
tion, 1914. 

454 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  work  of  a  scholar  of  international 
repute,  of  a  statesman,  and  diplomatist, 
written  almost  from  a  cosmopolitan  point  of 
view,  and  by  a  man  with  deep  insight  into  the 
American  people  and  the  way  in  which  things 
must  be  put  to  reach  them. 

CLEMENCEAU,  GEORGES.  South  America  To-day: 
A  Study  of  Conditions,  Social,  Political,  and 
Commercial.  New  York,  1911. 

A  study  by  an  eminent  French  statesman 
and  publicist,  whose  natural  sympathies  are 
with  the  Latin  Americans. 

DoMViLLE-FiFE,  C.  W.  The  Great  States  of  South 
America.  London,  1910. 

An  honest,  readable  English  account  from 
the  English  point  of  view. 

"Latin  Americans  and  the  United  States,"  by 
various  authors.  Annals  of  the  American 
Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 
July,  1903. 

CRICHFIELD,  G.  W.  American  Supremacy:  The 
Rise  and  Progress  of  the  Latin  American  Repub- 
lics and  their  Relations  to  the  United  States 
under  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  New  York, 
1908. 

Perhaps  the  best  of  the  veritable  deluge  of 
literature  issued  by  enterprising  publishers. 
455 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

CRICHFIELD,  G.  W.     The  South  American   Year 
Book.     London.     Louis  Gassier  Co.,  Ltd. 

Invaluable  for  statistical  information. 
PALMER,  F.     Central  America  and  Its  Problems. 
New  York,  1910. 

A  frank  story  of   what  the  noted  corre- 
spondent saw. 

The     South     American     Series.     Scribners, 

New  York. 

This  series  of  descriptive  books  seems  to 
be  the  best  at  present  available. 
The  reader's  attention  is  called  to  the  admirable 
articles  in  the  last  edition  of  the  Encyclopedia 
Britannica;  they  contain  perhaps  the  latest  infor- 
mation from  authoritative  sources.  The  peri- 
odical literature  on  Latin  America  is  more  than 
usually  important  because  of  the  paucity  of  good 
books  and  because  of  the  contemporary  character 
of  the  subject.  While  the  North  American  Review, 
the  Political  Science  Quarterly,  the  American  Jour- 
nal of  International  Law  contain  valuable  articles 
from  time  to  time,  the  English,  French,  and  Ger- 
man reviews  are  ordinarily  better  informed  and 
more  apt  to  print  extended  surveys  because  their 
audiences  have  long  been  interested  in  Latin 
America  from  something  more  than  academic 
reasons.  Archives  Diplomatiques,  Questions  Diplo- 

456 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

matiques  et  Coloniales,  Revue  Generate  de  Droit 
International  Public,  the  Fortnightly,  Contempo- 
rary, Nineteenth  Century  and  After,  and  the  South 
American  Supplement  of  the  London  Times  are 
to  be  strongly  recommended.  The  interest  in 
Germany  is  more  recent  and  the  articles  less  numer- 
ous. France- Amerique,  published  at  Paris,  and 
Union  Ibero- Americano,  published  at  Madrid, 
make  a  specialty  of  Latin  American  news.  There 
is  also  a  Pan-American  Magazine,  published  at 
New  Orleans. 

Ill 

PAN-AMERICANISM 

BARRETT,  JOHN.  The  Pan-American  Union: 
Peace,  Friendship,  Commerce.  Washington, 
1911,  pp.  251. 

An  official  account  by  the  Director-General 
of  the  Union. 

CHANDLER,  C.  L.  "The  Beginnings  of  Pan- 
Americanism.  ' '  Bulletin  of  the  Pan- A merican 
Union,  Sept.,  1911. 

FORTESCUE,  G.  "The  Pan-American  Ideal." 
Bulletin  of  the  Pan-AmericanUnion,  Jan.,  1912. 

GARRIGO,  ROQUE  F.      America  para  los  Ameri- 
canos.    New  York,  1910. 
457 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

LIMA,  OLIVEIRA  MANGEL.  Pan-Americanismo 
(Monroe,  Bolivar,  Roosevelt).  Rio  de  Jan- 
eiro, 1907.  pp.  342. 

LOBO,  H.  De  Monroe  d  Rio  Branca.  Rio  de 
Janeiro,  1912.  pp.  155. 

ORLANDO,  ARTHUR.  Pan-Americanismo.  Rio  de 
Janeiro,  1906.  pp.  220. 

ROOT,  ELIHU.  "The  Pan- American  Spirit." 
Outlook,  Oct.  20,  1906. 

SHERRILL,  C.  H.  The  Pan-Americanism  of  Henry 
Clay,  Sarmiento,  and  Root.  Buenos  Ayres, 
1909.  pp.  ii. 

"The    South    American    Point    of    View." 

American  Association  of  International  Con- 
ciliation, Bulletin  No.  52,  1913. 

TORRES-CAICEDO,  J.  M.  Union  Latino- Americano; 
pensamiento  de  Bolivar  para  formar  una  Liga 
Americana,  su  Origen  y  sus  Desarroelos  y 
Estudio  sobre  la  Cuestion  6  un  Gobi&rno  le~ 
gitimo  es  responsable  par  los  Clanos  y  Perguicios 
occasionados  a  los  Extrangeros  par  las  Fac- 
ciones.  Paris,  1865. 

URRUTIA,  F.  G.    El  ideal  international  de  Bolivar. 

Quito,  1911.     pp.  105. 
To  this  meager  literature  may  be  added  a  few 

scattered    magazine    articles   of   lesser    moment: 

South  American  Supplement  to  the  London  Times 

458 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

for  July  30, 1912 ;  W.  C.  Fox  in  the  Forum,  vol.  xxx., 
294;  the  New  York  Nation,  vol.  xxii.,  505;  xxiii., 
332.  The  correspondence  and  state  papers  of  Clay 
and  Elaine  contain  some  illustrative  material.  The 
publications  of  the  Pan-American  Union  are  de- 
voted almost  entirely  to  trade  statistics  and  descrip- 
tive material  of  an  elementary  character  intended 
for  those  entirely  ignorant  of  Latin  America. 
The  material  in  Spanish  intended  for  circulation 
in  Latin  America  is  also  largely  descriptive.  Ex- 
cerpts and  translations  from  the  novelists  and 
agitators  anent  the  United  States  appear  from 
time  to  time  in  the  Review  of  Reviews,  the  Literary 
Digest,  and  similar  periodicals. 


459 


INDEX 


Acquaintanceship,  lack  of,  be- 
tween United  States  and 
Latin  America,  228-31 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  Secre- 
tary of  State,  76,  77,  78,  80, 
88 

Administrative  problems  of 
Pan- Americanism,  267-78 

Aggression,  United  States  not 
created  by,  7-8,  257;  inde- 
pendence of  the  sea-power 
the  prerequisite  of,  336-7; 
nature  of,  to-day,  371-9, 
401-2 

Alaska,  155 

America,  use  of  the  word,  21, 
note,  28,  note.  See  United 
States 

Central.    See  Central 

America 

Latin. 

America 

South. 

America 

American  people,  resolved  to 
play  disinterested  part  in 
crisis,  8-9;  non-military 
character  of,  17;  must  decide 
future  policy,  18;  effect  of 
English  sea-power  on,  39- 
40 ;  attitude  toward  England 
after  Revolution,  50-1;  at- 
titude toward  Latin  America, 
203,  226-33,  250-3,  261, 
286-8,  291,  299-301 ;  present 
issues  before,  3-18,  327-32 

Argentine  Republic,  273 

Armament,  the  prerequisite  of 
aggression,  expansion,  or  in- 
dependence of  sea-power, 
332,  401-2;  what  its  lack 
would  compel  us  to  sacrifice, 
422-42 ;  distinction  from 
disarmament,  422-3,  438-9 

Army,  place  of,  in  strategic 
fabric  of  United  States,  13, 


See      Latin 
See      South 


H.  23-5,  27,  45-50,  52, 101-8 

United    States,    29,    57, 

I9&i  341-2;  present  condi- 
tion of,  3 1 4-5, 422-3 ;  present 
cost  of,  345-6,  427 
Atlantic  Ocean,  influence  of, 
upon  United  States,  21-5, 
30,  33-5,  98-100 

Balance  of  power  in  Europe, 
effect  on  United  States  of, 
25-7,  107-8 

Belgium,  4 

Brazil,  273 

California,  Japanese  in,  197-8 

Canada,  32,  52-3,  122,  156-7 

Canning,  English  Foreign  Sec- 
retary, 74,  77,  81,  83,  88 

Capital,  in  Latin  America, 
8 i,  95,  I3I-4,  146-7,  163-5, 
244-9;  m  United  States, 
358;  future  condition  of, 
362-6 

Central  America,  96;  influence 
of  United  States  in,  154-5, 
234, 254-6 

Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  88 

Coast  defenses  of  United 
States,  423-4 

Communication,  condition  of, 
in  past,  21-5;  improvements 
of  nineteenth  century  in, 
98-101,  356-7;  influence  of, 
on  South  America,  127-34, 
218-25 

Confederation,  Pan-American, 
prerequisites  of,  207-1 1 ;  ad- 
ministrative and  legal  prob- 
lems of,  267-84;  weakness 
of,  309-10,  320-1 

Conquest  of  United  States, 
prerequisites  of,  27-30,  35-6, 
136 

Contraband,  168-174 

Cotton  culture,  provides  me- 


461 


INDEX 


Cotton  culture — Continued 
dium     of     exchange     with 
Europe,  84-7 

Customs  union,  Pan-Ameri- 
can, 232,  267,  319 

Democracy,  in  United  States, 
24;  in  Pan- Americanism, 
267-84;  in  Latin  America, 
285-303 

Democratic  party,  influence  of, 
on  issue  of  neutral  trade, 

178-9.  183 

Disarmament,  argument  for, 
407-21;  price  of,  422-42; 
distinction  from  armament, 
422-3,  438-9 

Economic  aspects  of  Pan- 
Americanism,  232-49 

Economic  factors  in  American 
development,  21,  31-3,  59- 
65,  80-8,  93-5,  98-108,  351- 
66 

Economic  factors  in  modern 
Europe,  31-3, 111-23,  137-8, 
I57-65,  362-6;  in  Japan, 
189-91;  in  United  States, 
351-66,  434-7 

Economic  inexpediency  of  ar- 
mament or  war,  416-19 

Economics  of  expansion,  351- 
66 

Emigration,  modern  problem 
of,  116-23,  I6*,  360-2 

England,  American  independ- 
ence of,  21-5,  32-7;  in- 
fluence of,  on  United  States, 
39-40;  nature  of  sea -power 
of,  41-4;  limitations  of  sea- 
power  of,  44-52;  modera- 
tion in  use  of  sea -power  of, 
55-6;  influence  of  sea-power 
on  United  States,  56-8; 
economic  interests  of,  42-3, 
l6°-3,  334-5;  in  War  of 
1812,  51-2;  merchant  marine 
°f»  55-6,  34°-i;  double  r&le 
played  by,  in  our  colonial 


history,  68;  control  of  West 
Indies  and  South  America 
by,  71-4,  80-3;  Monroe 
Doctrine  aimed  at,  79;  ob- 
jects to  territorial  expansion 
of  United  States,  87;  supre- 
macy of,  in  Western  Hemi- 
sphere lost  by  building  of 
German  navy,  91;  arranges 
to  hand  supremacy  to  the 
United  States,  92-4;  econo- 
mic motives  of,  to-day,  1 1 1- 
23;  past  solution  of  present 
economic  problems  of,  120-1 ; 
Latin  America  easiest  con- 
cession for,  to  a  victorious 
Germany,  146-7;  possibili- 
ties of  clash  of,  with  United 
States,  151-83;  attitude  to- 
ward neutral  trade,  51,  68-9, 
166-83;  holds  strategic 
points  of,  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, 152-3;  loss  of  su- 
premacy of  Pacific  to  Japan, 
188-9,  192-5-  See  also  Sea 
Power  and  Supremacy  of 
Western  Hemisphere 

Equality,  legal,  between  citi- 
zens of  United  States  and 
Latin  America,  268-9,  278- 
81 

social,  between  citizens 

of  United  States  and  Latin 
America,  289-303 

Ethics  of  expansion,  367-89 

Ethics  of  white  conquerors, 
257-66,  384-7 

Exchange  facilities  for  United 
States  with  Latin  America, 
234-7;  with  rest  of  the 
world,  1 80,  276 

Exchange,  medium  of,  diffi- 
culty of  securing,  in  colonial 
days,  60-4;  after  the  Revolu- 
tion, 50-3,  60-7,  70,  78; 
provided  by  cotton,  84-7 

Expansion,  territorial,  of  the 
United  States,  caused  by 
demand  for  cotton,  85-7, 
254;  resulting  from  our 


462 


INDEX 


Expansion — Continued 
supremacy  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere,  92-7,  254-5; 
problem  of  to-day,  330, 
336-7,  371-2,  375-81;  the 
economics  of,  351-66;  ethics 
of,  367-89;  present  expedi- 
ency of,  396-406;  made 
impossible  by  disarmament, 
429-33 

Europe,  strategic  relations  of 
North  America  with,  24-8 
30-1,  98-108;  economic  in- 
terests of,  in  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, 31-3;  economic 
motives  of,  111-23;  geo- 
graphic relationship  with 
North  and  South  America 
compared,  218-24;  depend- 
ence of  Western  Hemi- 
sphere intellectually  upon, 
225-6 ;  interdependence  of 
United  States  with,  364-6 

Far  East,  94-7,  184-200,  330-1 
Foreign  policy  of  United  States, 
10-11,  252-3.     See  Monroe 
Doctrine 

France,  5,  51,  73,  97,  345-6; 
influence  of,  on  Latin  Amer- 
ica, 225-6,  239,  265 

Germany,  influence  upon 
United  States  of  develop- 
ment of,  90-2;  economic 
motives  of,  111-23,  137-8; 
probabilities  of  clash  with 
United  States,  135-50;  use 
of  English  sea-power  against, 
166-71 

Hawaii,  195-6 
Holy  Alliance,  73-4 

Immigration,      influence      of, 

upon  United  States,  351-3; 

upon  South  America,  297 
Imperialism,    252,    330,    399- 

406;  premise  of,  371-2 
Independence  of  United  States 

of  sea-power,  327-9;  ethics 


of,    3331    prerequisites    of, 
337-431  cost  of,  343-50 
Independence  of  United  States, 
foundation  of  political,  21- 

3? 

India,  143,  194 

Indians,  treatment  of,  inUnited 
States,  86,  258-9,  264,  281, 
296-7;  problem  of,  in  Latin 
America,  257-66,  281,  290- 
303 

International  economics,  237- 
49, 351-66 

International  ethics,  375-89 

Invasion  of  United  States, 
prerequisites  of,  27-31,  35-6 

Inventions  of  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, influence  on  United 
States  and  its  position,  98- 
108;  on  Europe,  114-6;  on 
South  America,  221-2 

Isolation,  of  United  States 
from  Europe,  21-5;  dis- 
appearance of,  100-1 ;  of 
South  America  from  Europe, 
218-24 

Japan,  character  of  people, 
184-5;  strategic  position  of, 
186-7;  building  of  fleet  se- 
cures supremacy  of  Pacific, 
187-8;  object  of  Japanese 
ambition,  189;  relations  with 
England,  190-95;  with 
United  States,  195-200 

Latin  America,  basis  of  notion 
of  mutual  interest  with 
United  States,  59-60,  65-7, 
70,  78-9;  early  relations  of 
England  with,  71-3,  80-3; 
winning  independence  for, 
72;  economic  basis  of  Eng- 
lish monopoly  of  trade  with, 
80-1,  89;  economic  interest 
of  United  States  with,  80-1, 
94-5;  conditions  in,  138-43, 
272-6,  278;  strategic  posi- 
tion of,  146,  305-7,  310-13; 
future  relations  of  England 


463 


INDEX 


Latin  America — Continued 
to,  157-65;  extension  of 
American  trade  with,  158-9; 
isolation  in  time  from  North 
America,  221-3;  dependence 
of.  on  Europe,  223-4;  lack  of 
economic  mutuality  of,  with 
United  States,  232-49;  race 
problem  in,  229,  257-66, 
281,  289-303;  independence 
of  United  States  about  to 
be  declared,  320-3;  bibliog- 
raphy of,  454-7 

Latin  Americans,  character 
and  attainments  of,  140-1, 
220-2,  226-8,  239,  290-303; 
attitude  toward  England, 
71-4,  81-3,  306-7;  attitude 
toward  Germany,  148-50, 
307;  attitude  toward  United 
States,  226-33, 250-1, 253-7, 
261,  285-8,  291,  296-9,  301- 
3,  307-10,  312,  320-3,  399- 
400 

Legal  equality  between  citi- 
zens of  United  States  and 
Latin  America,  268-9,  278- 
81 

Legal  problems  of  Pan-Ameri- 
canism, 278-84 

Markets,  expanding,  necessity 
for,  in  American  colonies, 
61-79;  necessity  for,  in  mod- 
ern Europe,  111-23,  371-6; 
for  Germany,  137-8;  for 
England,  157-65;  for  Japan, 
189-91;  for  United  States, 
351-66,  401-6;  disarmament 
will  exclude  United  States 
from,  434-6 

Merchant  marine,  American, 
69,  166,  337-8,  340-1;  Eng- 
lish, 55-6,  340-1;  German, 

335 

Mexico,  32,  86-7,  214,  256,  403 
Monroe,  James,  President,  75, 

79,  83,  88 
Monroe    Doctrine,    clash    of 

victor    with,    5;  origin    of, 


70-9;  change  in,  as  result  of 
cotton,  83-7;  supposed  abro- 
gation by  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,  88;  attitude  of  Ger- 
many toward,  149-50;  of 
England,  75-9, 1 54 ;  of  Japan, 
196-9 ;  of  Latin  America,  203, 
215-7,  225,  232-3,  261,  308, 
320,  399-400;  importance 
of,  at  this  time,  330;  true 
principle  of,  390-2;  past 
expedients  to  advance,  392- 
95;  present  expediency  of, 
395-406;  bibliography  of, 
451-2 

Navy,  English,  protects  Amer- 
ican colonies,  34-44;  used 
against  United  States,  50-3, 
66-9;  protects  Latin  Amer- 
ican independence,  72-4,  77, 
81-2,  255.  See  also  Sea- 
power 

German,  robs  England  of 

supremacy  of  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, 90-1 ;  and  hands  it  to 
United  States,  91-7;  robs 
England  of  supremacy  of 
Pacific,  192 

Japanese,  187-9,  192-6 

United  States,  52,  67, 177; 

basis  of,  57-8,  94-5,  196; 
present  cost  of,  347-8,  427; 
condition  of,  339-41,  423-5 

Negro,  treatment  of,  by  white 
men,  259-60,  264,  281 

Negro  problem  in  Latin  Amer- 
ica, 260-4,  281,  290-303 

Neutral  trade,  rights  of,  51, 
67-8,  166-83 

Pacific  Ocean,  184-6 

Pacifist  ethics  and  ideals,  368, 

407-21 
Panama  Canal,  94,  96,  148-9, 

153,195,219,254,432-3 
Pan-American      courts,     268, 

278-83,  319 
Pan-American  Union,  213-4 


464 


INDEX 


Pan-Americanism,  relation  to 
present  crisis,  17-18;  econo- 
mic motives  behind,  1 1 1-23, 
232-49;  meaning  of  term,2O3, 
215;  not  now  a  reality,  203, 
212,  216-7,  31°;  importance 
of,  204,  216-7;  Past  history 
of,  212-4;  present  status  of, 
214-6;  premises  of,  205-7; 
as  an  hypothesis  for  the 
future,  204-5;  prerequisites 
of,  207-11,267-8,290,  300, 
317-8;  probable  results  of 
its  establishment,  212;  fun- 
damental fallacies  of,  218- 
31,  250^-66;  lack  of  economic 
mutuality  in,  232-49;  South 
American  view  of,  203,  232- 
3,  251-6,  285-8,  291,  296-9, 
301-3,  320-3;  racial  obsta- 
cles, 257-66;  administrative 
and  legal  problems,  267-88 ; 
social  obstacles,  289-303; 
defensive  weakness,  304-16; 
strategic  weakness  of,  310- 
14;  improbability  of,  317- 
23;  bibliography  of,  457-9 

Pan-Germanism,  importance  of 
sea-power  for,  90;  economic 
motives  behind,  111-23,  I37~ 
8;  finds  best  solution  of 
problems  in  South  America, 
1 38-50;  application  of  eco- 
nomics of,  to  United  States, 

„  35.1-66 

Patriotism,  varieties  of,  12-3, 
14-6 

Peace,  nature  of,  439-42 

Philippines,  96;  importance  of  > 
to  Japan,  189-91,  195-6; 
importance  of,  to  United 
States,  330-1 

Population,  modern  problems 
of,  117-23 

Prosperity,  economic,  present 
conception  of,  111-23 


Race  problem  in  Latin  Amer- 
ica, 229,  257-66,  281,  289- 
303 


Revolution,  American,  showed 
strength  of  American  posi- 
tion, 28-9,  35-7 ; influence  of 
sea-power  on,  46-8;  effect 
upon  our  commercial  posi- 
tion, 50-1,  65-7;  caused  by 
determination  to  reach  West 
India  markets,  64-6 

Sea-power,  nature  of,  41-4; 
limitations  of,  44-53 ;  moder- 
ation of  England  in  use  of, 
55-6.  89;  influence  on  United 
States,  39,  56-8,  80^97; 
necessity  of  cordial  relations 
of  United  States  with,  67-9; 
part  of,  in  Monroe  Doctrine, 
70;  English  possession  of, 
challenged  by  Germany, 
90-1 ;  use  of,  in  time  of  war, 
166-83;  prerequisites  of  in- 
dependence from,  by  United 
States,  333-50;  changed  con- 
ditions of,  334-6 

Social  equality  between  citi- 
zens of  United  States  and 
Latin  America,  289-303 

South  America,  lure  to  entice 
the  victor  to  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, 4;  not  able  to  replace 
West  India  market,  84; 
rediscovery  of,  124-34;  con- 
ditions in,  126-34,  138-42, 
240-1;  most  favorable  solu- 
tion of  German  problems, 
JSS-S0;  strategic  position 
of,  146,  310-14;  most  favor- 
able solution  of  English 
problems,  157-65;  geograph- 
ical relation  to  North  Amer- 
ica and  Europe  compared, 
218-24 

Spanish  in  America,  32,  34,  71, 
125-6,  272 

Strategic  position  of  United 
States,  21-58,  90-108 

Sugar  trade,  32,  61-5,  83-4 

Supremacy  of  England  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  71-4, 
80-97;  true  basis  of,  80-1; 


465 


INDEX 


Supremacy  of  England — Con'd 
loss  of,  by  building  of  Ger- 
man navy,  90-7;  will  be 
regained  by  victory  in  the 


war,  152-3 
of  U 


nited  States  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere,  origin 
and  basis  of  the  idea,  59-60, 
65-7,  70,  78-9,  84;  attained 
by  the  building  of  German 
navy,  90-7;  will  be  lost  by 
English  victory,  152-3;  de- 
nied by  Latin  Americans, 
320-3 

Transportation,  conditions  of, 
in  past  and  its  influence  on 
United  States,  21-4;  im- 
provements in  igth  century 
and  influence  on  United 
States,  98-102,  120-3,  356; 
on  South  America,  127-34, 
218-25;  influence  of,  on  in- 
ternational interests  of  the 
United  States,  364-6 

United  States,  effect  of  war 
upon  position  of,  3-4;  alter- 
natives before,  3-18;  use  of 
term,  28,  note;  noble  part  in 
past  history,  7-8;  strategic 
position  of,  21-38,  98-108; 
effect  of  supremacy  of  sea 
upon,  39-58;  merchant  ma- 
rine of,  56-7;  influence  of 
West  Indies  upon,  59-79; 
early  relations  of,  with  Latin 
America,  75-9,  81-2;  made 
supreme  in  Western  Hemi- 
sphere by  German  navy, 
90-7;  economic  structure 
complementary  to  England's, 
94;  probabilities  of  clash 
with  Germany,  135-50;  pos- 
sibilities of  clash  with  Eng- 
land, 151-83;  possibilities 
of  clash  with  Japan,  184- 


200;  position  on  neutral 
trade,  166-83;  attitude  of 
Latin  America  toward,  226- 
33 ;  economic  relationship  of, 
to  Latin  America,  232-49; 
likely  to  be  assailed  by 
Europe  in  name  of  Latin 
America,  316;  bibliography 
of,  448-54 

Victor,  of  European  war,  only 
two  possible  for  United 
States,  5;  power  of,  5,  415-6; 
economic  motives  and  prob- 
lems of,  111-23;  probable 
personnel  of,  135,  151;  im- 
probability of  defense  of 
Western  Hemisphere  against, 
by  Pan- Americanism,  310 

War,  nature  of,  369,  439-42 
—  of  1812,  50-4,  69-70 

Warfare,  modern,  character  of, 
and  influence  on  interna- 
tional politics,  102-7,  344 

Western  Hemisphere,  relation 
of  Monroe  Doctrine  to,  5; 
relation  of  Europe  to,  31-2; 
place  of  West  Indies  in 
history  of,  59-79;  origin  of 
idea  of  supremacy  of  United 
States  in,  59-60, 65-7, 70, 78- 
9,  84;  English  supremacy 
of,  71-4,  80-93;  supremacy 
of  United  States  of,  94-7; 
strategic  points  in  English 
hands  still,  153;  close  con- 
nection of,  with  Europe,  218- 
31;  Pan- Americanism  not 
able  to  protect,  from  Europe, 
308-10 

West  India  Islands,  influence 
of,  upon  American  develop- 
ment, 32-3,  59-79;  neces- 
sity of  freedom  of  trade 
with,  54,  60-7,  70,  78;  pros- 
perity of,  destroyed,  83-4 


466 


THE  RISE  OF 
THE  AMERICAN  PEOPLE 

By  ROLAND  G.  USHER, 

Author  of  "Pan-Germanism,"   "  Pan- Americanism,"  etc.; 
Professor  of  History  in  Washington  University. 

"  A  solid  contribution  to  the  knowledge  of  our  real  past." 

New  York  Times. 

"Not  since  Fiske  has  a  more  brilliant  and  sympathetic 
treatise  of  American  affairs  been  written." — Boston  Herald. 

"The  life-story  of  the  American  nation,  the  epic  of 
American  nationality." — Magazine  of  History. 

"  A  one-volume  history  that  tells  the  story  of  the  growth 
and  development  of  the  American  nation.  .  .  .  Filled 
with  the  spiritual  ideals  of  democracy  and  patriotism." 

Metropolitan  Magazine. 

"An  interpretation  full  of  thought  and  insight." — San 
Francisco  Bulletin. 

"  Now  and  then  one  finds  a  treatise  upon  a  subject  of 
common  and  vital  interest  which  seems  fitted  to  fulfill  for 
popular  culture  as  large  a  part  as  has  been  performed  in  the 
special  science  by  certain  notable  text-books.  To  this  class 
'The  Rise  of  the  American  People'  may  be  assigned." 

North  American  Review. 

Price,  $2.00  net,  postage  12  cents 
THE  CENTURY  CO. 


DATE  DUE 


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